A further objection, not referred to by the Judges of the
Supreme Court, was that the provision for a penalty in the
by-law does not follow the words of the by-law. The by-law
in terms provides that "no privy, urinal, cesspool or earth-
closet shall be constructed, built, formed, remain or be allowed
to remain within ten feet of any kitchen, dining room, bedroom,
dwelling house or room used for domestic purposes . . . except
in any case where it is impossible to erect a privy, urinal, cess-
pool or earth-closet in accordance with the above distance, then
such privy, urinal, cesspool, or earth-closet shall be erected at the
extreme distance possible under the circumstances from any
kitchen, dining room, bedroom, dwelling house or room used for
domestic purposes." The penalty is "if the owner or occupant
of any land uses or permits to be used any privy, urinal,
cesspool or earth-closet on land owned or occupied by him in
breach of the foregoing provisions, he shall be subject to a
penalty of Five pounds for each day during which such breach
shall be committed or continued." The penalty, therefore, does
not in terms follow the prohibition. The power to impose a
penalty is conferred by sec. 32, which provides that a Council
may by by-laws " impose such reasonable penalties as they think
fit not exceeding Ten pounds for every breach of any such by-law
ora penalty not exceeding Five pounds for each day during which
such breach shall be committed or continued." The answer to
that argument is that the greater includes the less. The Council
might, if they pleased, have imposed a penalty upon the mere
existence of the place without any reference to its user. Hood J.,
indeed, thought that, having regard to the subject matter, a con-
venience of this sort could not be called a privy unless it was in
use. But I think it is a safer view that the Council did not desire
to punish, as they might, the mere existence of the thing, that is,
they did not desire to exercise the power to its full extent, and
that the penalty clause should be regarded as a qualified prohibi-
tion against the user only. By way of analogy I may put the
case of a power to prohibit the use of tires less than six inches in
width and a by-law prohibiting the use of tires less than five
jnches in width, That would clearly be within the power,
Another illustration is a power to make a by-law prohibiting