Chang Jeeng v Nuffield

For the reasons I have already stated, I consider that the amended section operates to allow the present applicant four years in which to apply for an extension. Accordingly, this appeal should be allowed, and, as the Full Court has not considered the application upon its merits, the matter should be remitted to it to deal with the appeal from McClemens J. upon the merits of the case.

I agree with the Chief Justice and with my brother Menzies that the period within which the applicant might seek an extension of time had not expired. In view of what they have written, it is not necessary that I say more than that we must, I think, see what was the position at the time when the 1953 amendment came into operation. At that time the prescribed period for bringing an action had not expired. The effect of the amendment was to remove an existing period of limitation for the enforcement of a common law right and to substitute a new and longer period. This new period became the "prescribed period" for the purposes of the Act; and any application for an extension of time had to be brought within twelve months of its expiry - which from the time of the amendment meant within twelve months from the expiry of three years from the first payment of compensation. Therefore, the time when the applicant might avail himself of the rights given by the Act not having expired at the date when the Act was amended, he became entitled to the benefit of the enlarged time. His right had not been barred. The removal of the limitation of twelve months meant that the Act provided no temporal limitation. The substitution of the period of three years made that (and the consequential further twelve months for an application for an extension) the only temporal limitation. This is in accordance with the decision in Maxwell v. Murphy [1] and there is nothing elsewhere in the Act which, to my mind, displaces this as the intended consequence of the amendment. I agree with the order proposed remitting the matter to the Supreme Court.