"(B) IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT PERSONS JOIN TRIAD SOCIETIES FOR LIFE. CORE OF ORIGINAL TRIAD MOVEMENT WAS QUOTE IF I SHOULD CHANGE MY MIND AND DENY MY MEMBERSHIP OF THE HUNG (TRIAD) FAMILY I WILL BE KILLED BY A MYRIAD OF SWORDS UNQUOTE. TRIAD RENUNCIATION SCHEME FROM 1989-91, GAVE PERSONS CHANCE TO REHABILITATE (OF WHICH VERY FEW DID). THOSE WHO DID SHOULD PROBABLY BE CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE WHILE THOSE WHO DID NOT HOWEVER, ARE OBVIOUSLY MAINTAINING THEIR VOWS OF MEMBERSHIP FOR LIFE, REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER STORY LAWYER WILL SPIN.
(C) WHAT MUST BE KEPT IN MIND IS THAT REVEALING THEIR ACTIVITIES COULD MEAN DEATH OR HARM TO THEM BY OTHER TRIAD MEMBERS. DISCLOSURES COULD RESULT IN PHENOMENAL SUMS OF MONEY RELATING TO THEIR QUOTE BUSINESS UNQUOTE DEALINGS. OR, PENALTIES IN HKONG FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAD MEMBERSHIP COULD RESULT IN 7 YEARS IMPRISONMENT (IN PRC IT IS DEATH). THUS IT IS HARDLY LIKELY YOU COULD EVER GET TRUTHFUL CONFESSIONS ABOUT THEIR ACTIVITIES.
(D) DESPITE CLAIMS WE HAVE SEEN, THESE PERSONS JOIN TRIADS OF THEIR OWN VOLITION. WHILE THEY MAY GO THROUGH QUIESCIENT PERIOD, THEY CAN BE RE-ACTIVATED ANY TIME IN THEIR LIFE AND HELP OUT THEIR FELLOW TRIAD MEMBERS WHO THEY BONDED WITH FOR LIFE.
(E) FYI IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ONLY 15 PER CENT OF TRIAD MEMBERS HAVE ANY CONVICTIONS."
The decision-maker made the following findings:
"Triads are illegal organisations in Hong Kong which are widely believed by expert sources and widely reputed by open sources to be heavily involved in various illegal activities;
Absence of criminal convictions does not exclude the possibility of a person being a Triad member or office bearer;
Triad membership is a long-term commitment, involving a virtual pledge to assist the Triad at any time in return for the 'value-added' power of being able to use the threat of recourse to a Triad organisation to settle disputes in one's favour;
Triad members can be found in many different walks of life in Hong Kong and overseas, including legitimate business circles - indeed the strength and tenacity of the Triads as organisations stems from the success of their members in penetrating legitimate organisations. Law enforcement authorities see the stripping of Triad members' anonymity as an important step in combating their activities."
The decision-maker was satisfied that Mr Choi was not a person of good character by virtue of his association with the Wo Shing Wo Triad group.
The decision-maker also considered information about Mr Choi's business ties with Australia, and the harm which was likely to result if a visa were granted and Mr Choi was not a person of good character. He recorded:
"I felt that the grant of a visa despite a negative character finding would carry with it the long-term indicator to the Australian community that an identified Triad member is able to travel to and enter Australia to pursue business interests and in the absence of compassionate or humanitarian ties to Australia. I considered that this indicator would have a negative impact on the Australian community and that, on balance, the harm caused would be undue in relation to the claimed benefit to the Australian community from Mr Choi's entry."
Counsel for Mr Choi has not been concerned with the decision-maker's findings that Triad groups are criminally active or with the proposition "that persons join Triad societies for life", and, in my view, for good reason. Having regard to the general nature of these findings, the material before the decision-maker was of a kind on which he was entitled to rely. The period since 1983 is a long one but the proposition "that persons join Triad societies for life" accepted by the Minister, overcame the fact that some fourteen years had passed without the recording of any relevant criminal conviction against, or criminal activity by, Mr Choi.
I do not think that either ground (e) or (g) is made out in relation to the issue of the association between Mr Choi and the Wo Shing Wo Triad group either. It is true that the material before the Minister was hearsay-on-hearsay information which I would describe as non-specific. Notwithstanding the information contained in the documents covered by the public interest immunity, the substantive allegation remains one of participation of an unspecified kind in a Wo Shing Wo Triad ceremony at an unidentified place in Macau on an unspecified date in 1983, of which the AFP was informed by an unidentified source. But in my opinion, it was a matter for the decision-maker whether to treat the AFP information as credible, and his doing so did not involve an error involving an incorrect interpretation of s 501 or an incorrect application of that section to the facts as found by him (ground (e)), and it does not appear that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision (ground (g)).
In relation to ground (e), it was simply not an error for the decision-maker to apply s 501 to the facts as found by him noted earlier and as a result to be satisfied that Mr Choi was not a person of good character because of his association with a group or organisation who or that the Minister had reasonable grounds to believe had been or was involved in criminal conduct.
Unlike the position in Chan v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 FCR 565, in this case there was material before the decision maker, noted earlier, to the effect that "persons join Triad societies for life". In Chan, the only fact on which the decision was based was the conviction of Mr Chan in 1960 (some thirty years before the decision to refuse him a visa) for being a member of a Triad society. In my view, the additional material in this case makes reasonable what may have been an unreasonable decision had the evidence established nothing more than that Mr Choi attended a Triad ceremony in 1983. It is therefore unnecessary for me to explore the question to what extent the "reasonableness" of a decision is open to challenge in light of par 476 (2) (b) of the Act, inserted after the decision in Chan.
Ground (g) is, perhaps, the more relevant of the two grounds to Mr Choi's grievance. Again, it is perhaps sufficient to say that the AFP information supported the first finding of fact referred to earlier and that that and other material supported the second group of findings of fact referred to earlier.
I turn next to par 476 (4) (a). Section 501 empowered the Minister to refuse to grant the visa only if, relevantly, he was satisfied that the applicant was not of good character because of his or her association with a group or organisation satisfying the description set out. It is not the case that s 501 relevantly required the Minister to reach the decision to refuse to grant the visa only if it was the objective fact that Mr Choi was not of good character by reason of an association of the kind described. Rather, the condition of the existence of the power of refusal is only the Minister's being satisfied of that matter. It is arguable that the Minister's state of being satisfied to which the opening words of par 501 (2) (b) refer is not a "particular matter" "required by law" to be "established" within the meaning, and for the purposes of, par 476 (4) (a) (but cf Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 44 FCR 540 (Drummond J) at 560 and Adams v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 48 ALD 280 (FCA/Drummond J) at 283-285). Be this as it may, it suffices to say that in my opinion there was logically probative "material" for the purposes of par 476 (4) (a), albeit not evidence admissible according to the rules of evidence, from which the decision-maker could reasonably be satisfied that Mr Choi was not of good character because of his association with the Wo Shing Wo Triad group.
I turn next to par 476 (4) (b). For the purpose of that provision, the decision-maker based his decision on the existence of a particular fact, that is, Mr Choi's participation in a Wo Shing Wo Triad ceremony in Macau in 1983. But it is not enough to establish ground (g) for Mr Choi merely to prove as an objective fact on the balance of probabilities in this Court that he did not participate in such a ceremony. Such proof notwithstanding, it would remain for Mr Choi to establish, in terms of par 476 (1) (g), that there was "no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision" by the decision-maker. Paragraph (b) of subs 476 (4) isa "gateway" through which an applicant must pass before it is permissible for the Court to proceed to hold that ground (g) of subs 476 (1) is established (see Television Capricornia Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1986) 13 FCR 511 (Wilcox J) at 519-521, and Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 (FC) at 221, 223 (per Black CJ)). It suffices to say in terms of s 476 (1) (g) that in my opinion the hearsay-on-hearsay material from the AFP was able to justify the making of the decision to refuse to grant the visa.
Counsel for Mr Choi submitted that grounds (e) and (g) were also established by the decision maker's having failed to take into account relevant considerations and having taken into account irrelevant considerations. He did not explain how this result came about or refer to pars 476 (3) (d) or (e). The "relevant considerations" relied on were that Mr Choi had visited Australia previously on "visitor's visas" without any untoward result and that the purpose of his proposed visit was to pursue lawful business interests. The "irrelevant consideration" relied on was:
"that the grant of a visa despite the negative character finding would carry with it the long-term indicator to the Australian community that an identified Triad member is able to travel to and enter Australia to pursue business interests in the absence of compassionate or humanitarian ties to Australia."
I reject the submission. It is sufficient for me, without exploring the matters to which I have referred, to say that in my opinion, having regard to the legislative context and purpose, it is clear that the decision maker was not bound at peril of invalidity to take into account the suggested relevant considerations or prohibited at peril of invalidity from taking into account the suggested irrelevant one: cf Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 (Mason J).
In the result, neither ground of review is established.
Before passing from the application, I record, as I did in my Reasons for Judgment published on 25 August last, my concern that someone (I presume the AFP), should check the correctness of the information on which the Minister has acted. It is a serious thing either way: that a member of a criminal organisation should be granted a visa or that a wrongly accused man should be denied one on an allegation that is not particularised, that is made by an unidentified accuser, and that is, for these reasons, effectively beyond challenge.