Were the disciplinary actions misconceived or lacking in substance? S. 60(3) (e)
- The Respondent referred to the equivalent provision to s.60 (3) (e) of the CATA as s.88 (lA) (a) (iv) of the ADT Act. However, s.88 (lA) (iv) was less extensive, referring only to "vexatious conduct" of proceedings, not to "whether the proceedings were frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance".
- There is clearly potential overlap between s.60 (3) (c) and s.60 (3) (e) in that both consider the underlying merits of a claim. However, s.60 (3) (e) is more clearly analogous to the Supreme Court's power to "strike out" proceedings or claims made in proceedings under UCPR 13.4(1). The Respondent submitted that strikeout power should only be exercised where the claim is "clearly deficient": see Cox v Journeaux (No. 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 720. The Tribunal understands the Respondent's argument in this respect to be that, by analogy, the Tribunal should only take the view that the Respondent's case falls into the section 60(3) (e) category, warranting an award of costs to the Applicants, in exceptional circumstances.
- The Respondent submitted that:
1. its application was not frivolous or lacking in substance;
2. the fact that the Applicant has not previously alleged that the Respondent's case is frivolous or lacking in substance should be considered as evidence that those allegations are spurious.
- The Respondent submitted that, for the reasons set out above, the Applicants had not made out the existence of any "special circumstances" because:
1. Neither of the considerations in s.60 (3) (c) or (e) is made out;
2. There was otherwise nothing out of the ordinary in the conduct of the proceedings by the Respondent; and
that the Applicants' application for costs should therefore be denied.