Consideration
26 The contract comprised in the Policy Document and the Investor Contract is to be construed objectively. The meaning of the words is to be determined by what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the words to mean: Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [40].
27 The nomination form is not part of the contract but is a document that was issued pursuant to the Policy Document. It is therefore to be construed in the light of the Policy Document as a document which was intended to give effect to the terms of the contract.
28 The words used in section 11 of the Policy Document under the heading "Nominated Beneficiary" are not free of ambiguity. The policy owner is told, relevantly, that Challenger will pay the remaining benefit under the Policy to "any one" of his or her estate or his or her "Nominated Beneficiary".
29 A strict semantic and syntactical analysis, focussing in particular on the words "any one", and the word "or" together with the singular in the phrase "Nominated Beneficiary" might suggest that the alternatives offered to the policy owner are exclusive. That is to say, on this approach, the policy owner may select only his or her estate or a single nominated beneficiary to receive the whole of the benefits payable under the policy.
30 However, it seems to me that a commonsense reading of the language, particularly when read with other parts of section 11 and the information provided on page 15, indicates that there is another possible meaning.
31 The information provided on page 15 indicates, at very least, that more than one nominated beneficiary can be selected and that if no selection is made, the default selection is the estate.
32 Moreover, the wording of section 11 following after the description of the alternatives available to a policy owner suggests that the estate may be nominated to receive only part of the benefit. This appears from the statement that if the estate is entitled to receive "some or all of the Income Payments", it may commute them on the death of the policy owner.
33 In any event, the fact that two alternatives are offered does not of itself mean that the alternatives are exclusive. It seems to me that very clear words would be needed to demonstrate that a policy owner can choose only one of the alternatives rather than a combination of them.
34 This is particularly so when the business setting in which the contract was made is taken into account. The policy is a standard form of contract entered into with ordinary members of the public who wish to invest monies in an annuity payable during the currency of the policy and to selected beneficiaries on the death of the policy owner.
35 A contract of this kind is not to be given an overly legalistic, narrow or pedantic construction. It is not to be read as a statute. It may be that in some cases the ejusdem generis principle is of assistance in the process of construction of contracts: see Herzfeld P, Prince T and Tully S, Interpretation and the Use of Legal Sources (Thomson Reuters, 2013) at [25.3.340]. However, in the present case, there is no room for the application of that maxim or the principles applicable to the interpretation of legal texts. Yet this was the approach that was taken by counsel for the great grandchildren.
36 The effect of the construction proposed on behalf of the great grandchildren would be to deprive the nomination of Ms Costigan for a 50% share of any legal efficacy. It is true that the nomination form states that if the policy owner nominates the estate as the sole nominated beneficiary, he or she cannot also select another beneficiary. But it does not go on to say that where the policy owner nominates a beneficiary, that person must be nominated for 100% of the benefits payable.
37 This suggests that what was intended by the policy was that it was open to the policy owner to nominate one or more beneficiaries for less than 100% of the benefits, with the balance then payable to the estate if the estate was not specifically nominated to receive the balance payable.
38 In my opinion that reflects the proper construction of the Policy Document. To construe it in the manner proposed on behalf of the great grandchildren would be capricious: see Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99 at 109.