Chaina v Presbyterian Church
[2013] NSWSC 1057
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2013-08-08
Before
Davies J, Heydon J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (56 paragraphs)
Judgment 1The Defendants make application under s 192A Evidence Act 1995 to have some of the Plaintiffs' expert evidence disallowed. The basis for this application is that the expert evidence proceeds on particular assumptions and those assumptions are not made out by other evidence put forward by the Plaintiffs. 2I discussed in Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 6) [2012] NSWSC 1476 at [7] to [11] my reasons for having made preliminary rulings in relation to witness statements prepared by lay witnesses. The reasons I gave there are apt here. The second tranche of the hearing is almost complete. 3The third tranche of the hearing is fixed for 4-5 weeks commencing 8 October 2013. At that time the various experts retained by the parties will give evidence on issues concerning (a) the formulae said to have been written by Mr Chaina; (b) how the Plaintiffs' products compared with those of competitors; (c) costings associated with the planned launch of the new lines of products; (d) the ability of the Plaintiffs to obtain finance for their venture; (e) the profits that might have been achievable if the new products had been launched; and (f) the losses sustained by the Plaintiffs as a result of the launch not proceeding. 4The Defendants submit that if they are successful in the present application the third tranche of the hearing will be considerably shortened. Further, as many of the Plaintiffs' experts need to travel to Sydney from overseas locations, or appear by videolink, it is in the parties' interest to know now whether and which experts will need to give evidence. 5The Plaintiffs did not oppose my dealing with the application although it should be noted that the Plaintiffs have been self-represented since the commencement of the second tranche of the hearing. 6I accept the Defendants' submissions concerning the utility of determining the admissibility of the expert evidence concerned at this point in the proceedings. 7The Defendants rely particularly on the judgment of Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588 to justify the exclusion of the evidence. Heydon J first discussed the common law requirements for expert evidence which he said were not abolished by s 79 Evidence Act 1995. He said that there three common law rules. The first was called "assumption identification" rule. The second is called the "proof of assumption" rule and the third is called the "statement of reasoning" rule. 8In relation to the first of these rules Heydon J said: [65] Function of the assumption identification rule. The rule facilitates the operation of the proof of assumption rule and other rules of admissibility. It helps to distinguish between what the expert has observed and what the expert has been told; to ensure that the expert is basing the opinion only on relevant facts; to ensure that experts do not pick and choose for themselves what aspects of the primary evidence they reject, what they accept, how they interpret it and what the court should find; and to ascertain whether there is substantial correspondence between the facts assumed and the evidence admitted to establish them. 9In relation to the second rule, the "proof of assumption" rule Heydon J said: [66] The authorities. There is also no doubt that the proof of assumption rule exists at common law. An expert opinion is not admissible unless evidence has been, or will be, admitted, whether from the expert or from some other source, which is capable of supporting findings of fact which are sufficiently similar to the factual assumptions on which the opinion was stated to be based to render the opinion of value. There is authority for the rule in this Court; in the Federal Court of Australia; in New South Wales; in Victoria; in Queensland; in South Australia; in Western Australia; in the Australian Capital Territory; in England; in Scotland; in New Zealand; and in Canada. The Victorian Court of Appeal (Ormiston, Vincent and Eames JJA), speaking of a proposition that an expert opinion without any evidentiary basis is inadmissible, said: "The situation requires no elaborate exposition of the legal principles nor is the extensive citation of authority required with respect to such a basic proposition." ... [68] There is no common law rule that expert opinion evidence cannot be received unless there exists already "admitted" evidence. It suffices if it can be seen that the appropriate evidence will be admitted later. Statements suggesting the contrary stem from a time when it was commoner than it is now for a party not to call expert evidence until all the other evidence in that party's case had been called. ... [84] Sometimes the tendering party will fail to ensure sufficient conformity between the assumed and the primary facts because the tendering party never intends to call evidence of the primary facts. Sometimes it will fail because while its tenders, if accepted, would go some distance towards establishing the primary facts, they do not go far enough, even if accepted, to establish their existence. [85] When a party tendering the opinion of an expert contends that all the evidence of the primary facts that could be tendered has already been admitted, the court's task in deciding the admissibility of the opinion is relatively simple. It is to assess whether, assuming the evidence of the primary facts is accepted, it will lead to findings sufficiently similar to the factual assumptions on which the expert opinion was stated to be based to render it of value. That task is easier when carried out in the light of actual evidence as distinct from a perhaps imperfect prediction of what the evidence may turn out to be. If, on the other hand, the evidence of the primary facts already admitted, even if accepted, would not lead to the necessary findings, the admissibility of the expert evidence may depend on the giving of an undertaking by the tendering party to call another witness. It is good practice for counsel opposing tender of the opinion evidence to draw attention, at the time of tender, to any significant gap between the primary facts assumed by the expert and the evidence so far received in an attempt to establish those facts, and to seek rejection of the expert evidence unless an appropriate undertaking to fill the gap is offered. ... [87] Where a tendering party refuses in advance to give an undertaking to attempt to comply with a condition of admissibility, the court should reject the tender. When their Honours in Ramsay v Watson said that the trial judge "could properly refuse to admit evidence of [what the 21 employees told the doctor], it having been made apparent that the men would not be called", they were not referring to a discretion: the trial judge "could properly" refuse to admit the evidence because it is proper to reject inadmissible evidence. ... [90] Function of the proof of assumption rule. The function of the proof of assumption rule is to highlight the irrelevance of expert opinion evidence resting on assumptions not backed by primary evidence. It is irrelevant because it stands in a void, unconnected with the issues thrown up by the evidence and the reasoning processes which the trier of fact may employ to resolve them. If the expert's conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks probative capacity. Opinion evidence is a bridge between data in the form of primary evidence and a conclusion which cannot be reached without the application of expertise. The bridge cannot stand if the primary evidence end of it does not exist. The expert opinion is then only a misleading jumble, uselessly cluttering up the evidentiary scene. 10His Honour then considered whether s 79 affected the common law rule. He said: [108] The ordinary meaning of s 79, taking into account its language, its context in the Act (including ss 55-57), the function of the Act (which is the efficient and rational regulation of trials from an evidentiary point of view), and the unreasonable results which a contrary construction would produce, is that it does not abolish the common law proof of assumption rule. Failure by the tendering party to comply with the proof of assumption rule makes the opinion evidence irrelevant. The court may find the opinion relevant, however, if the evidence already tendered of the primary facts, taken with further evidence to be admitted at a later stage, makes it reasonably open to make a finding that they exist: s 57(1). ... [110] The respondent asked: "Does s 79 provide for the common law proof of assumption rule?" That was not the correct question. The correct question was: "Does s 79 abolish that rule?" The Act is far from being a complete code. It often deals with complex and important subjects, like expert evidence, in very general words. Sometimes the Act changes the previous law. Sometimes it repeats it. At many points it assumes the continuance of the common law. An example is the common law exception to the hearsay rule permitting experts to rely on the writings of others in the relevant area of expertise as a basis for their opinion. Although s 79 says nothing about that rule, the Full Federal Court, correctly, did not approach the issue by asking whether s 79 provided for the permissible reliance of experts on other expert works, but simply held that nothing in s 79 has abolished it. Similarly, s 79 does not in express terms state that experts must articulate the factual assumptions on which their opinions are based. But the vast bulk of authority holds that that principle applies in relation to tenders under s 79. 11His Honour then considered the procedural advantages of this rule and said: [121] Procedural advantages of a proof of assumption rule. A construction of s 79 which does not require establishment at the time of tender that there either has been, or will be, evidence admitted capable of proving the assumed facts permits more expert opinion evidence to be received. It permits postponement of the difficulties by seeking to solve them as questions of weight at a later time - even as late as the end of the trial. But increasing the amount of this type of evidence is not necessarily valuable. It may be unfair to the opposing party. It is indecisive. Its indecisiveness inflicts uncertainties on the parties. The additional evidence received may have a cloud over it for the rest of the trial. [122] In contrast, a proof of assumption rule diminishes the risk of clouds. It encourages early and decisive rulings. Early and decisive rulings are important, both for the party opposing tender and for the tendering party. [123] From the point of view of the party opposing tender, it is vitally important to know what evidence is or is not in, and how much utility expert opinion evidence is likely to have. That knowledge affects decisions about cross-examining the witnesses called by the tendering party; decisions by defendants whether or not to submit that there is no case to answer; decisions whether or not to call particular categories of evidence; and, if rulings are delayed until after the close of the trial, decisions about what is to be said in address. A practice of deciding whether a proof of assumption rule has been complied with at the time when expert opinion evidence is tendered avoids a dilemma for cross-examiners. One horn of the dilemma is that to cross-examine a witness about expert evidence which may later be rejected or treated as useless carries the risk of giving it a foothold in the record which it lacked at the time of the tender. The other horn of the dilemma is that, if the opposing party avoids that danger by not cross-examining on the expert evidence, there is a risk that it will be accepted despite its feebleness. It is a dilemma which cross-examiners should not have to face. [124] From the point of view of the tendering party, it is desirable that the admissibility of expert opinion evidence tendered by that party be clear by the moment when the case for that party closes. It is undesirable that expert opinion evidence admitted in that party's case should later be held - perhaps as late as the time of judgment - to be subject to such doubts about its weight that it lacks utility. It is undesirable that its admissibility be in suspense until a time after the tendering party's case has closed. If the admissibility of expert opinion evidence which is tendered and conditionally admitted is not finally ruled on until after the case for the tendering party is closed, and the evidence is then rejected, or its weight has become so questionable that it is useless, the tendering party may have lost an opportunity to repair the position before its case closed, either by calling further witnesses or tendering further documents, or by recalling witnesses who had already been in the box. The capacity of tendering parties who are the prosecution or the plaintiff to reopen their cases rests on a discretion in the court which may not be favourably exercised; their capacity to tender evidence in reply is constricted by fairly strict rules, particularly in criminal cases. [125] ... [126] And what is to be done with any evidence that was called in relation to that conditionally admitted but inadmissible evidence, whether it was elicited by the cross-examination of the party opposing tender or tendered by that party in its own case? That problem is reduced if decisive rulings about compliance with a proof of assumption rule are made. [127] Conclusion. A construction of s 79 which holds that there is no proof of assumption rule in relation to s 79 tenders is difficult to reconcile with the practical exigencies pursuant to which parties conduct their cases. It is necessary for trials to be conducted in a businesslike and efficient way. That is a matter of context pointing to the view that there is a proof of assumption rule with which those tendering expert opinion evidence must comply by reason of ss 55, 56 and 79 read against the background of the common law. 12What appears in [123] to [124] above provides ample justification for the early determination of this issue. 13Following Heydon J's approach the Defendants pointed to assumptions made in a number of the Plaintiffs' expert reports and then drew attention to evidence in other expert reports served by the Plaintiffs which the Defendants submitted did not provide the necessary evidence to support the assumptions made. I shall now deal with the reports in turn.