" 24 Arrangements that reduce the dutiable value
If any arrangement affecting the dutiable value of dutiable property that was entered into within 12 months before a dutiable transaction was brought about by any person with the intention of reducing the dutiable value of the dutiable property, the Chief Commissioner may:
(a) cause a valuation of the dutiable property to be made, and
(b) direct the valuer to disregard the arrangement for the purposes of the valuation, and
(c) assess duty on the basis of the valuation carried out in accordance with the direction."
12 By delaying the acquisition of the reversion for over 12 months, s 24 of the Duties Act was avoided.
13 During this period differing arrangements were considered. One was for CPT Manager to acquire a 125-year concurrent lease with Centro retaining 50% and forming a syndicate to hold the other 50%. Another proposal was to acquire a 300-year concurrent lease and then enlarge the leasehold estate into the fee simple.
14 This plan had in mind the Conveyancing Act 1919, s 134(1) which provides for the enlargement into a fee simple of a lease of at least 300 years. It provided:
"Where a residue unexpired of not less than two hundred years of a term which, as originally created, was for not less than three hundred years, is subsisting in land, whether being the whole land originally comprised in the term, or part only thereof, without any trust or right of redemption affecting the term in favour of the freeholder, or other person entitled in reversion expectant on the term, and without any rent, or with merely a peppercorn rent or other rent having no money value, incident to the reversion, or having had a rent, not being merely a peppercorn rent or other rent having no money value, or a money value not exceeding four dollars per annum originally so incident, which subsequently has been released, or has become barred by lapse of time, or has in any other way ceased to be payable, then the term may be enlarged into a fee simple in the manner, and subject to the restrictions, in this section provided."
15 In any event, following board approval, Mr Scott wrote on behalf of CPT Manager on 20 September 2002 offering to acquire the Shopping Centre by CPT Manager or its nominee being granted a 300-year concurrent lease upon payment of a premium of $351.75 million at a rental of $1 per annum with CPL granted an option to acquire the reversionary freehold interest for a fee of $0.2 million exercisable within four years with the vendors restrained from selling the underlying freehold interest during that term.
16 The offer lapsed without acceptance and negotiation continued. Mr Scott said that Centro investigated the possibility of having a third party such as a charitable organisation acquire the reversionary freehold interest.
17 On 2 October 2002, GPT Management and the Superannuation Office wrote to Mr Scott requiring, amongst other things, a covenant that conversion of the leasehold interest to freehold would not be triggered for a minimum of 50 years.
18 This requirement was, no doubt, motivated by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 104-115.
19 Section 104-110 of the Income Tax Assessment Act provides that a CGT event F1 happens if a lessor grants, renews, or extends a lease. The lessor makes a capital gain if the capital proceeds from the grant, renewal or extension are more than the expenditure it incurred on the grant, renewal or extension.
20 But s 104-115 of the Income Tax Assessment Act provides that a CGT event F2 happens if the lease is for at least 50 years and at the time of the grant, renewal or extension it was reasonable to expect that it would continue for at least 50 years and the lessor chooses to apply that section instead of s 104-110. In that case the lessor has the advantage that the capital gain is extent to which the capital proceeds from the event are more than the cost base of the lessor's interest in the land.
21 In the letter, GPT Management also required a mechanism by which it had control over the collapsing of the concurrent lease. It was agreed that it should have a put option.
22 Work on the arrangement continued with consideration of the structure for the syndication of a 50% interest.
23 On 11 October 2002, GPT Management and the Superannuation Office informed Mr Scott that GPT Management was prepared to accept a net price of $175 million and a lease structure, but the Superannuation Office was unlikely to support the structure but might be prepared to consider a lower price for its 50% interest of $175 million less the notional cost of the applicable stamp duty to the Superannuation Office interest on the basis that its interest was sold utilising a conventional sales structure and a separate sale contract.
24 On 15 October 2002, Mr Scott made an offer on behalf of CPT Manager to purchase the Superannuation Office's interest outright for $167 million, which was accepted on 21 October 2002.
25 On advice that the Superannuation Office interest should be acquired by a new Centro sub-trust with a holding trust above it, all the units in which should be held by CPT Manager as trustee of the Centro (CPT) Trust and that this double unit trust structure should be replicated for the other 50% interest, a flurry of activity occurred on 25 October 2002.
26 With respect to the leasehold interest, Centro Bankstown Holding Trust No 1 was created with CPT Manager as trustee, the units in which were held by CPT Manager as trustee of Syndicate No 8. The Centro Bankstown Sub Trust No 1 was established with CPT Custodian as trustee, all the units in which were held by CPT Manager as trustee of Holding Trust No 1.
27 To acquire the freehold interest of the Superannuation Office, Centro Bankstown Holding Trust No 2 was established with CPT Manager as trustee, all the units in which were held by CPT Manager as trustee of the Centro (CPT) Trust. Centro Bankstown Sub Trust No 2 was also established with CPT Custodian as trustee, its units being held by CPT Manager as trustee of Holding Trust No 2.
28 On 30 October 2002, the Superannuation Office and CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 2 executed an agreement for sale of the Superannuation Office's interest in the Shopping Centre for $167.1 million.
29 On the same day, GPT Management and CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 entered into an agreement for a 300-year lease at a premium of $175.95 million with a rent of $1 per annum.
30 Also on 30 October 2002, GPT Management granted CPL a call option to purchase GPT Management's reversionary freehold interest for $50,000 and CPL granted GPT Management a put option to require CPL to purchase the reversionary interest for $50,000. The call option was exercisable in the period beginning one day and one year after the commencement date of the concurrent lease and terminated one month later. The put option was exercisable in a period commencing one year seven months and one day after the commencement date of the lease.
31 Also on 30 October 2002 CPL, CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 and GPT Management executed a deed of warranty and indemnity in which CPL and CPT Custodian as such trustee warranted that they had no present intention to allow the lease and the freehold to come into the same ownership legally or beneficially, or to terminate the lease within 50 years. A deed of guarantee and indemnity was executed by CPT Manager as responsible entity for CPT Trust guaranteeing performance by CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1.
32 An umbrella agreement was also executed on 30 October 2002 by Superannuation Office, GPT Management, CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 and CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 2 warranting that they would carry on the Shopping Centre.
33 Thus the documentation provided for CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 to obtain a 300-year concurrent lease of GPT Management's 50% interest in the Shopping Centre, for CPL to obtain an option to acquire from GPT Management its reversionary interest in the land through a call option and GPT Management granted a put option in the event that the call option was not exercised and it wished to rid itself of all interest in the Shopping Centre.
34 The advantage to CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 was that it acquired an interest in the Shopping Centre, tantamount to ownership, at a greatly reduced stamp duty impost. Lease duty is 0.35% under the Duties Act s 170(1) whereas conveyance duty on a dutiable value in excess of $1 million is $40,490 plus 5.5% on the excess under s 32(1).
35 The agreement of the long-term lease was lodged with the Chief Commissioner and stamped at $615,825 on the lease premium of $175.95 million on 19 November 2002. On 21 November 2002 the lease was granted and stamped on 25 November 2002 with $2 in accordance with the Duties Act, s 171(1) as the agreement for lease had been stamped. Presumably it was then registered.
36 The transfer of the Superannuation Office's 50% interest in the Shopping Centre to CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 2 was subsequently executed, stamped and registered.
37 On 20 January 2003 a prospectus issued offering the public units in Syndicate No 8. By July 2003 it was oversubscribed.
38 CPL did not exercise the call option. On 21 July 2004, GPT Management exercised the put option and on 22 July 2004, CPL and GPT Management executed a contract for sale and purchase of GPT Management's reversionary freehold interest in 50% of the Shopping Centre and a transfer was executed on 25 August 2004.
39 On 3 November 2004, CPL lodged the contract for sale with the Chief Commissioner for stamping and paid $765 on the basis that the dutiable value of the property was $50,000. On 25 May 2007, the Chief Commissioner issued a notice of assessment of $9,665,492 ad valorem duty plus $3,424,641.02 interest.
40 CPL's objection, lodged on 27 July 2007, was disallowed on 18 July 2008 and the matter proceeded to this Court under the Taxation Administration Act 1996, s 97(1).
Witness criticisms
41 Romano George Nenna was the chief financial officer of CPL with responsibilities across the group. He said Centro identified a property for consideration for investment and assessed it according to its investment criteria. If suitable, an offer was made for the property and if successful, the property was acquired. The whole or part of the property was then offered for investment to managed funds listed or unlisted, wholesale funds or unlisted syndicate funds. An entity within Centro would manage the funds deriving management fees for the service.
42 Mr Nenna said that in assessing investment opportunities Centro had regard to a number of criteria including whether the property could be acquired and financed at a price that provided a sufficiently attractive investment proposition to investors. The lower the property's acquisition price, the higher the yield and the more attractive the investment was for an investor.
43 He investigated whether the acquisition of a leasehold interest in the Shopping Centre would meet Centro's commercial objectives and would not be in breach of anti-avoidance provisions in the Duties Act.
44 Graham Ernest Terry was the chief operating officer of Centro. He was responsible for overseeing development work at all Centro's retail properties and he was responsible for all operations at those properties. He was involved in the acquisition of the Shopping Centre. He performed a first stage analysis of the property and recommended to Mr Scott that Centro proceed to the next stage. That analysis was carried out by Mr Scott and Mr Nenna.
45 Mr Nenna was assured by Mr Terry that a long-term lease would make no difference to Centro's day to day operations. Centro would be able to sublet the property and tenants would accept a sublease on that basis.
46 Mr Nenna concluded that the acquisition of a long-term lease would be the most cost effective way of acquiring the Shopping Centre and would not be inferior to an acquisition of the freehold. Centro would not be restricted, commercially, in its management and dealings with the property. And it would be attractive to syndicate investors.
47 Mr Nenna discussed his conclusions with Mr Scott and Mr Terry and he checked the acquisition of a long-term lease as against the freehold with one or more of Centro's syndicate fund managers.
48 It was submitted that because Mr Nenna had said that he was intent on minimising acquisition costs including stamp duty, it was disingenuous of him to say that there was never an intention of saving stamp duty through reducing the dutiable value of the freehold property.
49 The context in which Mr Nenna made this statement in cross-examination was that he was asked whether he recalled the terms of the specific anti-avoidance provision that he wanted to ensure was not breached. He said it was important not to contravene those provisions by entering into the lease merely for the purpose of thereafter acquiring the reversionary interest. They might as well not enter into the lease if they were to do that and the purpose of a lease would have been other than exploiting it in its own right. Counsel then put to him: "So you are suggesting that you had no intention, are you, of reducing any dutiable value", to which he responded: "That is absolutely correct."
50 That is consistent with what Mr Nenna had said in his affidavit. With respect to GPT Management's requirement that there be a deed of warranty and indemnity including the covenant not to merge the freehold reversionary interest for 50 years he, Mr Scott and Mr Terry had agreed that this was reasonable and since Centro did not want to acquire the reversionary interest it would be no trouble to comply.
51 And, again, with respect to GPT Management's requirement of a put option, both Centro and GPT Management agreed that the counter party should not be CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 because neither CPT Custodian nor GPT Management wanted to effect a merger with the freehold reversionary interest. From GPT Management's perspective a merger of the interests would result in it having to pay additional tax. GPT Management would not grant a leasehold if there was a possibility of a merger which would affect its tax position. From CPT Custodian's perspective it only wanted to acquire the leasehold under its commercial objectives. It was important to it to get the cost reduction benefits of a leasehold. If it acquired the freehold interest in the land it would need to pay additional stamp duty and its acquisition costs would increase. Mr Nenna said, accordingly, it was agreed that the counterparty to the put option would be CPL.
52 That evidence, that was not challenged in cross-examination, had nothing to do with an intention on Mr Nenna's part to reduce the dutiable value of the freehold property.
53 Mr Scott had said in his affidavit that at one stage Centro had investigated the possibility of having a third party acquire the reversionary freehold interest from GPT Management. He said he was aware that an entity known as Trust Company of Australia held investments on behalf of charitable organisations and he accordingly investigated the possibility of the reversionary freehold interest being gifted to a charitable organisation. He made some telephone enquiries but said that because of the complex nature of the transaction and the time pressure involved in attempting to complete the transaction as soon as possible, those investigations were not successful.
54 He was cross-examined on this issue but maintained that while of negligible value a charity might be interested because in a very long time it might get something of material value out of it.
55 It was submitted that this was fanciful evidence and a number of reasons were posited against a charity taking up the reversionary interest of GPT Management. Those issues were not, however, put to Mr Scott in cross-examination. Further, I do not see how they affect the choice of CPL as the party to the put and call options. I accept Mr Scott's evidence that there was an urgency about the matter and no time to continue investigation of charitable organisations.
56 Mr Nenna had recounted his being questioned by one board member as to whether there were any disadvantages or business risks in acquiring a lease rather than the freehold and whether there was a risk that Centro might have to pay more stamp duty. In cross-examination he said that he expressed his opinion to the board in answer to those questions. It was submitted that this cross-examination amounted to an admission by Mr Nenna of misgivings at board level. I do not interpret his evidence in that way. Board questioning of management is a regular feature of board meetings and, without more, does not indicate misgivings at board level.
57 In a board submission of 5 September 2002, reference was made to stamp duty advice from the solicitors that a lease structure with a reversionary interest that could be merged at a later date was acceptable to the solicitors. In cross-examination Mr Scott described this portion of the submission as effectively trying to "walk the board", who were going to make the decision at a later date, through whether or not a leasehold and freehold interest were the same. It was submitted that these matters revealed discomfort of the board with the structuring. Again, I do not read the evidence in that way. To take a board through an issue does not indicate discomfort at board level.
58 John Hutchinson was a partner at Freehills. During that period he did not negotiate leases of a term of 300 years. Michael James Neilson was general counsel and company secretary of GPT Management. He said that apart from the transaction with respect to the Shopping Centre he had never negotiated a 125-year lease arrangement or a 300-year lease arrangement. Freehills, in a memorandum dated 9 October 2002 said that the LPI did not have any information available on the Conveyancing Act, s 134.
59 I do not see the relevance of this evidence. Uniqueness does not justify the assessment against CPL. CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1 paid far less duty than it would, had it acquired GPT Management's 50% freehold interest. Mr Slater QC who with Dr Robertson appeared for CPL openly stated that the arrangement was a duty avoidance one but that did not mean that the assessment against CPL should stand.
60 Mr Nenna recommended that the call option not be exercised. He said the main reason was that it was unnecessary to pursue the reversion. But he did say that the issue of appearances did come into it. Again, I fail to see the relevance of Mr Nenna's intentions. There is no suggestion that the arrangement was a sham and Mr Nenna's intentions as to appearance do not justify the Chief Commissioner ignoring the acquisition of the 300-year concurrent lease by CPT Custodian as trustee of Sub Trust No 1.
Legislative history
61 The original version of the Duties Act, s 24 is set out at par 11 above.
62 The State Revenue Law Amendment Bill No 1 2002 was amended on 13 November 2002 to introduce an amended version of s 24 of the Duties Act spurred on by media discussion of duty avoidance arrangements including the arrangement by which Centro was to acquire the Shopping Centre. When passed, s 24 was given retrospective effect to 13 November 2002. It provided as follows:
" 24 Arrangements that reduce dutiable value