. certain of the claims would not be clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification - s 102(2)(b) when read with s 40(3) of the Act.
Only the first of the above issues remained live in the appeal. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the appellant's challenge is confined to so much of the amendments allowed as would permit two additional claims ("additional claims 4 and 5"). RGC had, at first instance, also advanced various matters by reason of which it contended that the learned primary judge should exercise his discretion against ordering the amendments. His Honour rejected those contentions. The appellant does not appeal against the discretionary aspects of his Honour's judgment.
THE STATUTORY REGIME
Section 105(1) of the Act empowers the Court in any "relevant proceedings" in relation to a patent, on the application of the patentee, to direct the amendment of a patent. "Relevant proceedings" in relation to a patent means court proceedings for infringement or for revocation of a patent or in which the validity of the patent, or of a claim, is in dispute - see the definition in Schedule 1 to the Act. Section 105(4) provides that an amendment is not to be directed which is not allowable under s 102. Section 102 relevantly provides as follows:
"(1) An amendment of a complete specification is not allowable if, as a result of the amendment, the specification would claim matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed.
(2) An amendment of a complete specification is not allowable after the specification has been accepted if, as a result of the amendment:
(a) a claim of the specification would not in substance fall within the scope of the claims of the specification before amendment; or
(b) the specification would not comply with subsection 40(2) or (3).
(3) This section does not apply to an amendment for the purpose of correcting a clerical error or an obvious mistake made in, or in relation to, a complete specification."
Section 40(2) of the Act requires that a complete specification describe the invention fully, including the best method known to the applicant of performing the invention, and end with a claim or claims defining the invention. Section 40(3) requires the claim or claims to be clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter described in the specification.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
There does not appear to be any authority squarely in point on the question whether an order made under s 105(1) of the Act is interlocutory or final. Mr D K Catterns QC, who with Mr A J Ryan appeared as senior counsel for Wimmera, told us that they had not found any authority on that particular point. None was otherwise cited to us. In deference to counsel, we have not searched for any such authority. We treat the matter as being a case of first impression but, of course, one which is to be decided by applying the principles explained in the leading cases such as Licul v Corney (1976) 8 ALR 437 at 446; Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd [No 1] (1981) 147 CLR 246 at 248 and Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc. (1984) 54 ALR 767 at 768. We think that we are constrained by those authorities to hold that the orders made at first instance in this matter were interlocutory. They cannot be said finally to have determined, in a legal sense, all the rights of the parties that were in issue in these proceedings. If we were not so constrained, we would have been inclined to hold that the orders were relevantly final. The orders which RGC seeks to challenge were granted as a result of a motion, notice of which was filed within the proceedings that comprise the original application. But to characterise the challenged orders as interlocutory rather than final, so it seems to us, is to attach too much importance to form over substance. The true characterisation of what happened is that Wimmera has successfully invoked the Court's jurisdiction and power to direct amendment of the Patent, over the objections of RGC. The consequence of that is that the Patent will be amended once a copy of the order is filed at the Patent Office - see s 105(6). Wimmera's right to amend its patent has been finally determined by the orders made. That is a valuable right, conferred by the Act in relation to a public document. An example of the importance and value of that statutory right can be seen, in the context of the United Kingdom statutory equivalent, in May & Baker Ltd v Boots Pure Drug Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 255; (1948) 66 RPC 8; (1950) RPC 23. The appeals in that case, to the Court of Appeal and eventually to the House of Lords were not against the judgment that the patent was bad and had to be revoked, but were against the refusal of leave to amend. In any event, we consider that leave to appeal should be granted because important matters of public law are involved, in an area where it cannot be said that the law has been clearly settled. We think that this case thus raises "special considerations" - see Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 399.
THE APPEAL
As mentioned above, the appeal was confined to so much of his Honour's decision as granted Wimmera leave to amend its patent by adding additional claims 4 and 5. Those claims read as follows:
"4. A process according to any one of the preceding claims further comprising mixing an additive into the titaniferous ore or concentrate to encourage the formation of the separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase in the reduced product of step (i).
5. A process according to claim 4 wherein the additive is an oxide or oxides."
It was common ground that additional claim 5 stood or fell with additional claim 4, so attention may be confined to additional claim 4.
The complete specification, incorporating the amendments made before acceptance, contains the following:
"Accordingly, the present invention provides a process for upgrading the titania content of a titaniferous ore or concentrate which process comprises the steps of:
(i) reducing the titaniferous ore or concentrate using a solid carbonaceous reductant under temperature conditions which promote the formation of metallic iron, a major rutile phase, and a separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase to produce a reduced product;
(ii) . . ."
In the body of the specification as filed there were contained a number of optional additional steps which could be incorporated in the process. The second of those additional steps ("the additive option") was described in the following terms:
"2 Additives, such as chlorides or oxides (eg. Mn O2)may be mixed into the titaniferous mineral prior to reduction in order to redistribute the metallic iron produced via segregation reactions, thereby influencing metallic iron removal, or to encourage the formation of an acid leachable minor impurity bearing phase."
The learned primary judge found that the verbal difference between the proposed claim 4 and the specification as filed did not result from the proposed amendment. This was, so his Honour reasoned, because as a matter of construction of the specification as it then stood, the phrase in the additive option "minor impurity bearing phase" meant the minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase. Step (i) in the consistory clause spoke of reducing the titaniferous ore under temperature conditions which promote the formation of, inter alia, a separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase. The description of step (i) in the body of the specification, so his Honour found, disclosed that the various impurities are predominantly concentrated into a small amount of a separate titaniferous phase. Step (i) of claim 1 repeated the phrase in the consistory clause - "separate minor impurity-bearing titaniferous phase". His Honour noted that any additive was to be mixed into the titaniferous mineral prior to reduction. In those circumstances, his Honour held that the reference in the additive option to a "minor impurity-bearing phase" must be to a minor impurity-bearing titaniferous phase, because that was the result, elsewhere described in the document, of the reduction process. The amendment converted an optional feature of the invention into an essential one. However, as that optional feature was in substance disclosed by the specification, the amendment was unobjectionable, as had been held in AMP Incorporated v Hellerman [1962] RPC 55.
WHETHER THE PRIMARY JUDGE MISCONSTRUED S 102(1) OF THE ACT?
RGC accepted, subject to a proviso, the approach which his Honour held that s 102(1) required, i.e. a comparison between:
. "the matter" which "the specification would claim", "as a result of the amendment" (on RGC's case, the whole of additional claims 4 and 5, respectively); and
. "the matter", disclosed "in the specification as filed".
In particular, again subject to the same proviso, RGC agreed that the first stage is to identify "the matter resulting from the amendment", the phrase used by his Honour. In that stage, as his Honour observed, the "specification as it stands" is compared with "how it would stand after amendment".
The proviso for which RGC contended is that his Honour's phrase "the matter resulting from the amendment", in s 102(1) should be understood as meaning "the matter claimed as a result of the amendment" (emphasis added).
RGC contended that the result of the first stage must be relevantly to identify additional claims 4 and 5 as matter claimed as a result of the amendment. It submitted that those claims had no equivalent in the specification as filed. RGC acknowledged that those claims were dependent on existing claims. RGC contended that his Honour had undertaken an incorrect comparison between additional claim 4 and the specification as it stood (i.e. as amended between filing and acceptance) including the consistory clause as it had been amended and step (i) of claim 1 as so amended.
On behalf of RGC it was submitted that nowhere in the specification as filed was the phrase or concept of a "minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase" mentioned or discussed or, critically, described as a feature of the invention. The introduction, in additional claim 4, of the concept of the use of an additive to "encourage the formation of" a "minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase" therefore, so it was contended, offended s 102(1). This was because it claimed matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed. The presence of the word titaniferous in claim 1 and the consistory clause as amended was, so RGC submitted, irrelevant.
We do not accept the submissions thus advanced on behalf of RGC. The suggested proviso, subtle as it is, in our opinion, puts an unnecessary gloss on s 102(1). That subsection requires one first to identify precisely what is the amendment. In this case that is done by identifying the difference between the specification as accepted (and as it stood at the hearing of the motion at first instance) on the one hand and, on the other hand, as the specification would read if amended in the manner sought. Then one reads the specification as a whole (as so amended in the manner sought) to see whether as a result of the amendments sought (which must mean by reason of the amendment sought) the specification would claim matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed. The subsection focuses on the amendment proposed and it must be that amendment which has the result of pushing the claimed matter over the line defined by the expression "matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed." The key point to keep in mind is, as counsel for the respondent contended (in our view correctly), that the words "as a result of the amendment" are not to be confused with the expression "after the amendment".
RGC complained that the primary judge compared what was then the proposed new claim 4, not with the specification as filed, but as it then stood.
Counsel for RGC took us to page 19 of the primary judge's reasons, where his Honour referred to:
(a) the description of step (i) in the body of the specification as it then stood; and
(b) step (i) of claim 1;
as each containing the words "separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase", whereas in fact the specification as filed did not contain that phrase.
But his Honour can be seen to have done this only as part of the process of identifying the precise nature of the proposed amendment - what was it that was to be changed? This may be described as the "first stage". The first stage, which requires a comparison between the specification as it stands and how it would stand after amendment, enables the identification of what matter results from the amendment. It is only after one determines what matter results from the amendment that one turns to a consideration of, or comparison with, the specification as filed. Optional step 2 - the additive option - did not, in the specification as filed describe the "minor impurity bearing phase" as a "minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase". However, when identifying the matter resulting from the amendment, the description of the additive option in the specification as filed had to be construed by reference to:
. the expression "a separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase" in step (i) of the consistory clause of the specification as it stood;
. the description of step (i) in the body of the specification as it stood as disclosing that the various impurities are predominantly concentrated into "a small amount of a separate titaniferous phase";
. step (i) of claim 1 in the specification as it stood which repeated the phrase "a separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase"; and
. the fact that any additive is to be mixed into the titaniferous material prior to reduction.
So construed, the additive option in the specification as filed, while not expressed in terms of an acid leachable minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase must be taken as having that meaning.
RGC submitted that the claim in claim 4 in relation to the separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase is a claim in relation to matter not in substance disclosed in the specification as filed because claim 1 in the specification as filed only refers to a minor impurity bearing phase. But the claim in claim 4 in relation to the separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase is not a matter resulting from the amendment. Prior to the amendment such a matter was disclosed in the specification as it stands. The matter resulting from the amendment is the claim in relation to the mixing of an additive and it is therefore that matter which must be compared with the specification as filed. One does not compare claim 1 in the specification as filed with the claims after amendment to determine what matter results from the amendment; one compares claim 1 in the specification as it stands before the proposed amendment with the claims and specification after amendment to determine what matter results from the amendment.
Having thus determined the matter resulting from the amendment, i.e. the mixing of the additive to encourage the separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase, his Honour determined that such a matter was disclosed in the specification as filed because the reference to the mixing of additives "to encourage the formation of an acid leachable minor impurity bearing phase" was, in context and on its proper construction, a reference to a separate minor impurity bearing titaniferous phase.
It can be seen that additional claim 4 has two relevant aspects. One is the reference to "the separate impurity bearing titaniferous phase". But that reference to the phase being titaniferous is not an amendment to the specification. That is already part of step (i) of claim 1 and optional step 2 and hence part of the specification when construed in the manner referred to immediately above. The second relevant aspect is the reference to "further comprising mixing an additive into the titaniferous ore or concentrate to encourage ...". That is, in our view, a relevant amendment by way of adding a limitation to the three preceding claims. The amendment has the result of claiming that matter ("the additive") as part of the invention. The question is - was that matter in substance disclosed in the specification as filed?
WHETHER THE CLAIMED MATTER WAS IN SUBSTANCE DISCLOSED IN THE SPECIFICATION AS FILED?
The essence of RGC's submission on this point was that this optional feature must have been disclosed as part of the invention. Alternatively, RGC contended that his Honour had erred in failing to consider whether, in truth, the statement of the optional feature in the second of the additional steps which may be incorporated in the process, in the specification as filed, constituted sufficient disclosure within s 102(1). RGC did not contend that the "additive of claims 4 and 5" had to be "an essential integer" or "essential feature" of the specification as filed. It suggested that such an approach might be "too restrictive against the patentee". Relying fairly heavily on the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Coopers Animal Health Australia Ltd v Western Stock Distributors Pty Ltd (1986) 15 FCR 382, counsel for RGC submitted that the amendment was impermissible because the use of an additive was not disclosed as part of the invention in the specification as filed.
We shall deal with the alternative submission first. In our opinion his Honour was quite right in holding that the optional feature was in substance disclosed by the specification as filed. We have set out above the description of what we have termed "the additive option". In our view that description in substance discloses, by way of an option, the matter which is now claimed in additional claim 4 by way of limitation. We think that Coopers can and should be distinguished from the present matter. To start with, Coopers was not concerned with the application of s 102(1) of the Act. The question in Coopers was whether so much of the invention claimed as involved the use of the solvent diethylene glycol mono-butyl ether ("DGBE") was fairly based on a provisional specification. It had transpired that the use of DGBE was the only matter which could possibly have been inventive. As can be seen from the reasons of Fox J at p 390-391, the use of DGBE as part of the matter claimed resulted from further experimentation after the provisional specification had been filed. At 390 his Honour referred to the indirect mention of DGBE in the provisional specification and what we would describe as the relatively unimportant role assigned to DGBE in that document. Accepting for present purposes (but without deciding) that there are analogies between the fair basing test [then contained in s 45A(2) of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) and applied by the Full Court in Coopers] and the test for whether matter was in substance disclosed in the specification as filed for the purposes of s 102(1) of the Act, we do not think that too much should be made of the references by Fox J (at the top of 391) and Spender J (at 401) to disclosure "as part of the invention" in the sense of being strictly claimed matter. When their Honours refer to "part of the invention claimed in the provisional specification", we think it is acceptable and appropriate to treat the word "claimed" as being a reference to "described" - see for example the discussion at 388. So read, Coopers is easily reconciled with the House of Lords decision in the AMP case. In AMP the relevant feature was clearly disclosed in the specification as an optional part of the device. The House of Lords, by a majority, held that it did not matter that it was an optional part. It was sufficient that the optional part was in substance disclosed in the original specification. That is all that is required by s 102(1). In our opinion, to require such disclosure to be part of the invention would be to place an unnecessary and restrictive gloss on a section which cases such as Ethyl Corporation's Patent [1972] RPC 169 and AMP itself show should be given a liberal interpretation - see Lord Denning MR at 195 in the former case.