Is there a prima facie case against Deere US?
19 As already mentioned, Caterpillar obtained by subpoena for the purposes of the present motion a large body of documents. Many of these were confidential exhibits to the affidavit of Mr Campbell Thompson sworn on behalf of Caterpillar. Counsel for Caterpillar argued that these documents and other material supported a number of propositions. Counsel for the respondents disputed some of these propositions. Others were accepted, but counsel said they did not advance Caterpillar's case. I turn now to these propositions and the conclusions I have reached as to them.
(i) "The alleged infringing tractors ('the tractors') were designed and are manufactured by Deere US in the United States."
This is not disputed.
(ii) "Deere US sells or has sold the tractors throughout the world through its subsidiaries (which it calls 'branches' or 'export branches') including in Australia through Deere Australia. The tractors are and have been exported to Deere Australia by Deere US. It is common ground that sales of the tractors to Deere Australia were on c.i.f. terms."
This is not disputed.
(iii) "Deere Australia is a 100 per cent owned subsidiary of Chamberlain Holdings Ltd which is a 100 per cent owned subsidiary of Deere US. Deere US thus controls Deere Australia and has the power to cause it to sell or to prevent it from selling the tractors in Australia."
Relevant here is the observation of Aldous J in Intel Corporation v General Instrument Corporation (No.2) [1991] RPC 235 at 241. Speaking of an argument by counsel on behalf of defendants opposing leave to serve out of the jurisdiction, his Lordship said:
"He is right that, if all that the plaintiff has established is a parent/subsidiary relationship and that the parent does no more than allow the subsidiary to get on with its business, a good arguable case [the criterion under the English rule] cannot have been established …. Thus the fact that one of the legal entities is a subsidiary of the other is relevant to whether there has been a common design because the parent has the capacity to control the actions of the subsidiary. However, that capacity to control will not establish a common design. It is the extent of the control actually exercised or the involvement which is relevant and, in particular, whether it amounts to a common design to do the acts complained of."
(Cf the discussion of the relationship of parent and subsidiary in the context of discovery obligations in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 627 at 634-636.)
On the evidence of Mr Wilson I am satisfied that Deere US does not control the day-to-day business of Deere Australia, and did not at times relevant to this case. Decisions whether to purchase Deere US products, including the allegedly infringing tractors, were made by Deere Australia free of any direction by Deere US.
(iv) "Deere Australia required the permission of Deere US before it could market the tractors in Australia. Deere US decided when and on what terms the tractors could be marketed in Australia and at all times controlled the quantities and types of the tractors to be exported to and marketed in Australia."
I do not think this is a fair summary of the position. The sale and purchase of the tractors as between Deere US and Deere Australia is no different from what might be expected where any Australian company imports manufactured goods from an unrelated overseas supplier. Deere Australia orders goods. Ordinarily Deere US will supply if it can, given the economic imperative to sell as many tractors as it can make. Initially in the case of the 8000T tractors there was some reluctance to sell outside North America because of perceived potential servicing problems, as has been explained by Mr Wilson. If Deere US sometimes has more orders that it can fill it will share or allocate supplies among its overseas "branches", including Deere Australia.
(v) Deere US has controlled and co-ordinated the marketing, export, sale and distribution of the tractors throughout the world, including Australia."
As above, I think all the evidence shows is that, like any manufacturer, Deere US can decide whether or not to sell any of its products to any purchaser, including Deere Australia.
(vi) "Deere US has provided and continues to provide technical and marketing advice, assistance, know-how, instructions and services to Deere Australia to assist in the promotion, marketing, sale, use, preparation and servicing of the tractors in Australia."
Given that the tractors are complicated and sophisticated machines, it is hardly surprising that the manufacturer would provide technical and operational assistance. Likewise it would be expected to provide promotional material. It is obviously in the interest of a manufacturer to provide as much assistance as it can to a wholesaler because the more sales the wholesaler makes, the more products it will order from the manufacturer. Caterpillar's submissions included a number of detailed propositions which are sub-sets of proposition (vi). I shall not repeat them as in my view they are all met by the same answer.
(vii) "The tractors themselves constitute infringements of the patent in suit and cannot be used or dealt with in a non infringing way."
While there is some prima facie evidence of infringement, in the form of an affidavit sworn by a patent attorney, this fact of itself does not advance matters so far as the case against Deere US is concerned: see Walker v Alemite Corporation (1933) 49 CLR 643 at 658 referred to below.
(viii) "Before the first tractors were supplied by Deere US to Deere Australia, Deere US was aware of the patent in suit and was aware that Caterpillar would allege that the importation into and sale of the tractors in Australia constituted an infringement of the patent in suit."
It is not disputed that litigation between Caterpillar and Deere US concerning Caterpillar's corresponding US patent began in the United States in August 1996. There is also litigation in Germany involving Caterpillar's corresponding European patent. But if there is not otherwise common design, authorisation etc, I do not see how knowledge of other litigation can alter the position of a vendor of goods like Deere US.
(ix) "Deere US profits from the sale and other commercial dealings with the tractor in Australia by Deere Australia."
This would seem to follow from the role of Deere US as vendor of the goods in question and as shareholder in Deere Australia. But it does not advance matters.
(x) "Deere US and its subsidiaries including Deere Australia are and have been conducted at least so far as the tractors are concerned as one world-wide organisation (controlled by Deere US)."
For reasons already mentioned, I think that Deere US is no more than a manufacturer supplying products to Deere Australia and, if it matters, other "branches" in other parts of the world. I do not think this amounts to "control", in any relevant sense, of Deere Australia's activities.
(xi) "It was the common object of Deere US and its subsidiaries (including Deere Australia) to introduce the tractors to the market to combat or halt loss of market share to Caterpillar in the agricultural tractor market which had occurred when Caterpillar introduced its tractor belted tractors."
It might reasonably be inferred that Deere Australia and Deere US would be aware of competitors in the Australian market and would wish Deere products to outsell those of its competitors.
(xii) "This case and this litigation is controlled by Deere US. Solicitors for the respondents take their instructions from Deere US."
I was informed by way of submissions that the respondents' present solicitors "received assistance in the conduct of the litigation from Deere US's internal attorneys". The material does not take matters beyond this, and in any case one would encounter difficulties with legal professional privilege. Moreover, the conduct of litigation and who runs it are matters which occurred after the relevant events. Control by A of B's case in its litigation with C does not of itself mean that A participated in a common design with B in the events complained of by C in the litigation.
(xiii) "Deere US has caused the formation of an Australian incorporated and resident subsidiary John Deere Credit Limited to finance the sale or lease of Deere US products including the tractors in Australia."
This is not disputed, but I fail to see its relevance.
20 In summary, Caterpillar have not to my mind made out a prima facie case that there has been conduct of Deere US which went beyond the supply of goods and activities ordinarily incidental to supply of goods of this nature, such as the provision of promotional material and technical support. In the words of Dixon J in Walker v Alemite Corporation (1933) 49 CLR 643 at 658 (citations omitted):
"… it is settled law that the exclusive property in a combination invention is not infringed upon by the sale of the components; that selling articles to persons to be used for the purpose of infringing a patent is not an infringement of the patent; and that sale with a knowledge that the purchaser will use the articles for infringement is not itself an infringement although the vendor gives the purchaser an indemnity, the vendor must have made himself a party to the act of infringement. Further, it is not enough that the article sold has no other use than a use in the course of what amounts to an infringement. The basis upon which these rules rest is that whatever is not included in the monopoly granted is publici iuris and may be freely used as of common right."
21 See also Belegging-en Exploitatiemaatschappij Lavender BV v Witten Industrial Diamonds Ltd [1979] FSR 59 at 65 and Best Australia v Acquagas Marketing Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 217 at 220-1.
22 As to authorisation under s 13(1) of the Patents Act, it is not yet authoritatively established whether "authorise" bears the copyright law meaning of "sanction, approve or countenance": Sartas No. 1 Pty Ltd v Koukurou & Partners Pty Ltd (1994) 30 IPR 479 at 492, Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205 at 243 or the more limited meaning of "give authority or legal power to": Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners Aust Pty Ltd (1995) ARPC 91-129 at 39,200, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Pty Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 467 at 488. But on either view I think, for essentially the same reasons, Caterpillar has not made out a case of any more than sale of goods with necessarily incidental services.