the applicant's claims
37 The applicant by its statement of claim alleges that the respondent has engaged in conduct in contravention of ss 52 and 53(c), (d) and (eb) of the TPA and has sought to pass off Fat Terminator as being a product of the applicant or as being associated with the applicant or Fat Blaster or as having the licence, sponsorship or approval of the applicant. The applicant further alleges by its statement of claim that the respondent has passed itself off as being associated with the applicant or having the licence, sponsorship or approval of the applicant.
38 No submissions were advanced by the applicant in support of the allegation that the respondent has engaged in conduct in contravention of s 53(eb) of the TPA. This paragraph has previously been thought to be concerned with the geographic origin of goods (see, for example, QDSV Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1995) 59 FCR 301; Trade Practices Commission v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-307; Siddons Pty Ltd v Stanley Works Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 14). The applicant has not made out its claims so far as they are based on s 53(eb) of the TPA.
39 Similarly no submissions were advanced by the applicant in support of the allegation that the respondent has engaged in conduct in contravention of s 53(d) of the TPA. The case of the applicant was that the respondent had sought to link its product with the applicant or the applicant's product, Fat Blaster, rather than that the respondent had sought to link itself with the applicant. The applicant has not made out its claims so far as they are based on s 53(d) of the TPA.
40 I do not understand the applicant to have advanced submissions in support of the allegation that the respondent has engaged in conduct in contravention of s 53(c) of the TPA. The applicant contended that significant numbers of consumers 'are likely to be misled into believing that the respondent's Fat Terminator product, in its current get-up, is the Fat Blaster brand or comes from the same source as Fat Blaster'. However, deception as to the identity of a product or its source is not the same as deception as to the existence of a sponsorship or approval. The evidence is insufficient, in my view, to make out a case based on s 53(c) of the TPA. The applicant's claims so far as they are based on s 53(c) of the TPA fail.
41 It remains for consideration to be given to s 52 of the TPA and the tort of passing off. These two causes of action may conveniently be considered together. Section 52 of the TPA is aimed at conduct likely to be harmful to consumers. However, its 'clear and quite general words' are not to be given an unnaturally confined meaning because of the heading of Part V of the TPA (Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 216 at 225 ('Hornsby') per Stephen J, with whom Jacobs J, and in this regard Murphy J, agreed). The tort of passing off, on the other hand, is concerned to protect a trader's goodwill in its business. Nonetheless, as Stephen J pointed out in Hornsby at 226:
'… a consequence of the very direct relationship which necessarily exists between the deception of consumers in the course of trade and the injury caused by the unfair practices of a trade rival [is that] [l]egislation which aims at the prevention of the former will, at the same time, tend to put an end to the latter.'
42 In Conagra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 302 at 355 Gummow J observed that '[a]ttempts to produce a definition of the tort [of passing off] which is both succinct and comprehensive have had mixed success'. However, in this case, which is not suggested to raise any novel or complex question of law, the elements of the tort may be regarded as those identified by Lord Oliver in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (1990) 17 IPR 1 at 7. These elements were described by the Full Federal Court in Vieright Pty Ltd v Myer Stores Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 361 in the following way at 369:
'(1) that the trader's get-up, including any brand name, is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff's goods;
(2) that there has been a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that the goods offered by the defendant are the plaintiff's goods (whether the public is aware of the plaintiff's identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods is immaterial, provided they are identified with a particular source, e.g. by means of a brand name which is in fact the plaintiff's);
(3) that the plaintiff suffers or, in a quia timet action is likely to suffer, damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation that the source of the defendant's goods is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.'
43 I understand the respondent to have conceded the first of the above elements. Lest my understanding be wrong, I record that, in my view, the evidence that the Fat Blaster get‑up is recognised by a significant segment of the public as distinctive of the applicant's Fat Blaster product is strong. Having regard to the nature and extent of the advertising of Fat Blaster, I am satisfied that the name Fat Blaster and the Fat Blaster packaging is recognised not only by those who have already purchased the product, whether as consumers or stockists, but also by others who have an interest in weight loss products. As is mentioned in [17] above, I am satisfied that the applicant has acquired a substantial goodwill and reputation in the name Fat Blaster and in the Fat Blaster get‑up in connection with the distribution, sale and offering for sale of weight loss supplement products in Australia.
44 I turn to consider the second element of the tort, namely, in the context of this case, whether there has been a misrepresentation by the respondent to the public leading or likely to lead the public to believe that Fat Terminator is the product Fat Blaster or alternatively that Fat Terminator comes from the same source as Fat Blaster.
45 I have referred above to the major features shared by the Fat Blaster packaging and the Fat Terminator packaging. There are other less prominent features which they share. Examples are the notation that the box holds 60 tablets and the description of the product on the back of the box. The opening words of the Fat Blaster description on the back of the box are 'A breakthrough in weightloss, this potent formula contains a synergistic blend of herbs and nutrients that give excellent support to your diet and exercise plan'. The opening words of the Fat Terminator description on the back of the box are 'A major breakthrough in weightloss, this formula contains 37 of the most potent ingredients ever formulated for weight control'.
46 Fat Terminator was placed on the market at the same price as Fat Blaster with the consequence that price could not operate as a factor which would alert a purchaser to confusion between the two products. Nor, as is mentioned above, was the Optislim brand name given prominence on the face of the Fat Terminator box in a way likely to obviate confusion between the two products or their respective sources.
47 The names 'Fat Blaster' and 'Fat Terminator' are given prominence on the respective boxes of the two products. However, while the names are, in a sense, descriptive, their force or 'punch' as names comes from the connation of explosive force which I am satisfied that they are each apt to convey to an ordinary member of the public. I accept the submission of the applicant, with which Mr Rathgeber in part agreed, that the word 'terminator' in the context of the Fat Terminator packaging was calculated to evoke a connection with Mr Schwarzenegger and the movie roles in which he 'blasts' away opponents. I am satisfied that the Fat Terminator name is not calculated, despite its prominence on the face of the Fat Terminator box, clearly to distinguish Fat Terminator from Fat Blaster.
48 In the end it is a question of fact for the Court to decide whether there is such a reasonable probability of deception arising from the packaging that the respondent has adopted for its product Fat Terminator that the continued use of that packaging should be restrained: Australian Woollen Mills Limited v FS Walton and Company Limited (1937) 58 CLR 641 ('Australian Woollen Mills') per Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 658. In deciding whether there is such a reasonable probability of deception it is legitimate to consider the possibility of the two products being displayed on the retailer's shelf side by side or in close proximity. It is also legitimate to consider the possibility of a potential purchaser seeking to identify a product from a recollection or impression earlier produced in his or her mind of a Fat Blaster box or an image of a Fat Blaster box reproduced in an advertisement seen either on television or in the print media. Further, I consider it legitimate to consider the possibility of a potential purchaser seeking to identify a product recommended by word‑of‑mouth where the potential purchaser has been given an oral description of the Fat Blaster packaging.
49 In Australian Woollen Mills Dixon and McTiernan JJ at 658 observed:
'The usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected. Potential buyers of goods are not to be credited with any high perception or habitual caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded. The course of business and the way in which the particular class of goods are sold gives, it may be said, the setting, and the habits and observation of men considered in the mass affords the standard. Evidence of actual cases of deception, if forthcoming, is of great weight.'
50 In this case unchallenged evidence was placed before the Court of consumers and pharmacy representatives acting on the apparent assumption that Fat Terminator is a product distributed by the applicant. I reject the submission of the respondent that this evidence is of little probative value because it says little, if anything, about the effect of the Fat Terminator get‑up on the mind of the person who made the apparent assumption. I am satisfied that the evidence, taken as a whole, establishes instances of actual deception and is of importance to the judgment or estimation which I am required to make of the effect likely to be produced in the wholesale and retail marketplace for weight loss products of the Fat Terminator packaging. I stress, however, that I would have reached the conclusion which I have identified above in the absence of the 'confusion evidence'.
51 As is mentioned above, I am satisfied that the significant similarities between the Fat Blaster box and the Fat Terminator box, the dissimilarity between the Fat Terminator box and the packaging of other rival products, and the absence from the Fat Terminator box of a significant feature capable of unambiguously distinguishing it from the Fat Blaster product, means that there is a reasonable probability of ordinary or reasonable members of the class of prospective purchasers of over‑the‑counter weight loss products being deceived by the Fat Terminator packaging. The respondent submitted that a prospective purchaser of Fat Blaster would, by reason of the way in which Fat Blaster has been advertised, and because of the likely subjective importance to him or her of the proposed purchase, have a heightened awareness of the brand name Fat Blaster such that they would not be deceived by the Fat Terminator packaging. I reject this submission. First, in my view, it attributes unrealistic significance to the precise brand name and insufficient significance to the general impression of the product and its packaging created by the Fat Blaster advertisements. Secondly, in my view, the submission pays insufficient regard to the likelihood of prospective purchasers acting on word‑of‑mouth endorsements of Fat Blaster which might not be given in a way, or might not be recalled in a way, which is dependent on the precise name Fat Blaster.
52 In my view, by its adoption of the Fat Terminator packaging the respondent has made a representation to the public which is likely to lead a significant proportion of prospective purchasers of over‑the‑counter weight loss products to believe that Fat Terminator is Fat Blaster or alternatively that Fat Terminator is a product which comes from the same source as Fat Blaster.
53 As to the third element of the tort, I am satisfied that the applicant is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the respondent's misrepresentations. That damage will flow from lost sales of Fat Blaster or Fat Blaster Max.
54 The applicant has established its claim of passing off. Further, the applicant's claim that the respondent has contravened s 52 of the TPA is made out.
55 I conclude these reasons for judgment with the following observations. Each of the parties placed before the Court expert evidence in the form of a report of a marketing consultant touching on the issues, including the ultimate issue, which the Court is required to determine in this proceeding. The evidence was received in each case without objection. I make no criticism of the parties' conduct in this regard. However, I consider it appropriate to record that in the particular circumstances of this case, which is concerned with the packaging of a product intended to appeal to a wide segment of the general public, I have found the expert evidence of no real assistance. This is not only because there is, as is common in cases of this kind, conflict between the evidence of the two experts. It seems to me that evidence of opinions based on market research and expert appreciation of consumer behaviour will rarely be of assistance in litigation where the Court's primary concern is with the behaviour to be expected of, and the judgments likely to be made by, ordinary (even if it might be thought, somewhat credulous) members of the community intent on making a relatively modest purchase in a conventional way. I endorse the comment of Beaumont J in Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v IPC Media Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 104 at [92] that where a claim is essentially a matter for the Court's impression, expert views which are merely 'impressionistic' can be given no more than nominal weight. These observations are not intended in any way to belittle the importance of market research and expert appreciation of consumer behaviour in other types of cases and for other purposes.