The definition of "development standards" is referable only to provisions of an environmental planning instrument "in relation to the carrying out of development". Thus the development standard must be one which may be carried out; that is one which is permitted or permissible. One can only determine that question by reference to the terms of the planning instrument
It does not follow that only those elements that are included in the zoning table of the planning instrument are to be included as the essential elements of the development. There may be other elements in a particular instrument that should properly be treated in the same way as the zoning table.
The criteria which are the essential considerations for determining the permissibility of the proposed development is of the appellants are twofold. First the proposed development must be a fruit and vegetable stall. Second, it must have a maximum floor area of 1 50 m². That which is proposed satisfies the first criterion, but not the second. It is therefore prohibited.
11 In the above Court of Appeal judgement a number of relevant principles for determining a development standard are set out at paragraph 25 and following
25 The issue of whether a particular provision of an environmental planning instrument constitutes a development standard or a prohibition has engaged the time of this Court on a number of occasions…
27 As I have indicated, there are a number of decisions of this Court which discuss and state the principles or approaches to the resolution of a dispute such as the present…
28 I do not propose to reiterate in detail the principles that have emerged from the above cases as I discuss them at some length in Lawrence Browning at [35] to [47..
29 In Poynting Giles JA adopted what he referred to as a two-step approach, namely, whether the relevant provision prohibited a proposed development under any circumstances, in which event that provision was not a development standard, and a second step (which was only relevant if the first step was determined in the negative) as to whether the provision specified a requirement or fixed a standard in relation to an aspect of the (non-prohibited) development. Ipp JA in Lawrence Browning at [15] noted that the first step involved determining whether the provision being considered prohibited the proposed development whereas the second step involved determining whether the provision specified a requirement or a standard in respect of an aspect of the development. At [16] he tended to agree with the observations of Basten JA in the same case which drew attention to the inherent difficulties of that two-step approach: see at [85]. However, it is unnecessary in the present case to elaborate further on that aspect of the debate.
30 Nevertheless, it would seem that Basten JA's preferred approach, as articulated by him in Lawrence Browning at [80] and [81] simply depended upon the terms and structure of the particular planning instrument under consideration. This is not inconsistent with the approach of Giles JA in Lowy : see at [116]. In particular, it could be said in summary that Basten JA's approach required one to first determine what were the essential elements of the permissible development. Thus, at [77], after referring to what McHugh JA (as he then was) had said in Carr (at 269-270), his Honour observed:
"Thus a prohibition on a particular kind of development will not be a development standard if the characteristic or criterion engaging its operation is an essential element of the particular development, rather than a standard or requirement in respect of an aspect of the proposed development."
31 Carr was a classic case in this regard and one heavily relied upon by the appellants in the present case. Under the relevant zoning what was permissible with consent was " professional consulting rooms ", an expression relevantly defined in the applicable planning instrument ..
33 It was submitted that the requirement in the definition that there be only three employees was a development standard. This Court rejected that submission. McHugh JA observed (at 269) that the Land and Environment Court Assessor had overlooked
"the essential condition that the requirements specified or standards fixed in respect of any aspect of the development must be requirements or standards which, ex hypothesi, are external to the aspects of that development. A provision is not a specified requirement or fixed standard 'in respect of' an aspect of a development until the development and its aspects are defined."
35 In other words, as McHugh JA observed, the development could not be carried out even if the requirement of three employees was eliminated, as there was no other relevant category in the relevant planning instrument that permitted a dental surgery with more than three employees in the relevant zone. The use of premises as a dental surgery with more than three employees was not the use of a building for " professional consulting rooms " as defined.
36 Carr was referred to by Clarke JA in Mayoh where his Honour (at 237) noted that the point being made by McHugh JA was simply that the relevant provision in the definition of " professional consulting rooms " relating to the number of employees, did not lay down a standard against which the proposed development could be measured as the number of employees formed part of the definition of the permissible development. His Honour continued:
"If, for instance, in the present case, residential flat buildings were defined in the table in clause 9 as meaning residential flat buildings with no more than two storeys, no part of that definition could be regarded as a development standard."
43 As has been stated on a number of occasions in the authorities to which I have referred, at the end of the day what is involved in the resolution of the present issue is a question of construction of the particular provisions of the particular planning instrument under consideration. The starting point in the present case, in my view, is the proposition that prior to the insertion of clause 41 into the LEP, a fruit and vegetable store, being a shop (as defined) was a prohibited use. Clause 41 was inserted as an exception to that general prohibition to provide for a particular permissible use on a particular parcel of land.
46 in the present case, what one is required to do is to identify the proposed development, and then to determine whether it falls within the description of that which clause 41(3) makes permissible with consent. In performing this exercise, it is necessary to identify which criteria are essential conditions in determining whether the particular development proposed is permissible…. It is necessary to 1st address the LEP by reference. Not only to principle, but also to its own structure and provisions. In so doing, care is also to be taken to ensure that form does not govern substance…
47 What are those criteria in the present case? As a matter of name, which in my view, the criteria, which are the essential considerations for determining the permissibility of the proposed development will are twofold 1st the proposed development must be a fruit and vegetable stall, as defined. 2nd, it must have a maximum floor area as defined of 150 m². That which is proposed satisfies the 1st criterion, but not the 2nd. It is therefore prohibited. …
50 In my respectful view therefore, the approach referred to in [48] above is to put the cart before the horse. Before one comes to the definition of " development standards " one is required to determine precisely what is the permissible or, as Giles JA described it in Poynting at [97], the " non-prohibited " development. For it is only when one determines what precisely is permissible that one can measure that which is proposed against it in order to determine whether it is permissible or prohibited: if you like, the first step described by Giles JA in Poynting .
51 Furthermore, controlling development by the imposition of development standards as contemplated by s 26(1)(b) in the EP&A Act is only relevant to a development that is otherwise permissible. It is an oxymoron to suggest that a development that is controlled by way of a prohibition (see the definition of " control " at [23] above) can also be controlled (regulated) by a development standard. Accordingly, it is only once one has determined what is permissible that one can then consider whether that which is proposed is permissible and, if it is, whether any other regulatory controls are development standards (as defined) for the purpose of applying SEPP No 1.
55 Finally, as Basten JA observed in Lawrence Browning at [81], it does not follow that only those elements that are included in the zoning table of a planning instrument are to be included as the essential elements of a development. There may be other elements in a particular instrument that should properly be treated in the same way as the zoning table.