Finding
18 I have a broad discretion under s 69 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 in relation to the award of costs. As set out in the Applicant's submissions, the relevant principles were set out by Pearlman J as follows in Save the Showground Inc v Min for Urban Affairs and Planning (1998) 105 LGERA 254 at p 255:
(1) The discretion conferred upon the Court by s 69(2) is wide and unconfined (Oshlack at pp 180, 205);
(2) It is, however, a discretion which must be exercised judicially, that is to say, not arbitrarily and not by reference to irrelevant or extraneous considerations, but upon facts connected with or leading up to the litigation (Oshlack at p 180; Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 557; Australian Conservation Foundation and Ors v Forestry Commission of Tasmania and Ors (1988) 76 LGRA 381 at 384);
(3) Nonetheless, principles have been laid down to guide the exercise of such discretion in the interests of consistency of approach (Latoudis v Casey at p 541);
(4) One such principle is that, ordinarily, costs follow the event; that is, costs are awarded to the successful party as compensation for the costs incurred (Latoudis v Casey at p 567; Oshlack at p 213;)
(5) However, the principle that costs follow the event is not a fixed or absolute rule (Oshlack at pp 186, 213);
(6) This Court, in exercise of its discretion under s 69(2), must take into account all relevant factors, which, in proceedings which have been brought pursuant to the open standing provision contained in s 123 of the EP&A Act, may include factors which have a public interest nature (Oshlack at p 187);
(7) The consideration of all relevant factors may lead to a finding that special circumstances exist for departing from the general rule that costs follow the event and may lead to a consequent determination that there be no order as to costs (as occurred in Oshlack at first instance - see Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1994) 82 LGERA 236);
(8) Public interest factors are not, however, determinative factors; they are merely relevant factors to consider. In other words, factors based on the public interest nature of the litigation do not give the applicant automatic immunity from a costs order (Oshlack at 214);
(9) Nor is it necessary that the Court go through a process of characterisation of the litigation as "public interest litigation". What is required is for the Court to consider all relevant factors, including factors of a public interest nature (Oshlack at p 182);
(10) A "shopping list" approach should also be avoided. The factors which Stein J (as he then was) took into account in Oshlack at first instance should not be elevated to a fixed list, each item of which the Court, in a particular application for costs, merely ticks with approval or rejects with a cross. Such a mechanically rigid approach is not appropriate (Oshlack at p 213).
19 The Applicant argued that presumably in relation to Ground 4 the usual rule that costs follow the event should be departed from in this case as special circumstances apply as these proceedings are in the public interest. The circumstances relied on by the Applicant to support his submission that there are special circumstances are set out in par 10 of the written submissions as follows:
(1) the high level of public interest in the proposed development at Sandon Point;
(2) the general level of public interest in the proteciton of Aboriginal Objects and SCESFC;
(3) Mr Carriage's lack if personal interest and his exercise of rights under s 123 of the EP&A Act to uphold the orderly development of land;
(4) Mr Carriage's success on the critical issue as to whether there was development carried out on Lot 235 in breach of the EP&A Act (grounds 1 and 2);
(5) the exposition of whether a construction certificate can be declared partially invalid; and
(6) the challenge was arguable and not merely specious.