The argument
12 Prima facie the first respondent has been successful in having two applications for interlocutory relief dismissed and obtaining an order that the present applicant provide security for costs. It might be expected, therefore, that in the absence of unusual or exceptional circumstances, the Court would exercise its discretion in favour of the first respondent and make an order for payments of its costs as the successful party.
13 Mr Brockwell, who appears for the first respondent, relies upon the nature of the findings made by the Court which, he says, do not provide the basis for categorising the litigation as public interest litigation. The first proceedings brought by Wadi Wadi did not raise any issue of breach but rather was an attempt to revisit the merits of granting the consents on the basis of more recent information. In the second application, according to Mr Brockwell, any breach of the NP&W Act that might be proved did not justify an injunction to restrain work in the area covered by the consents. Even so, there was no threat of further breach. Finally, Mr Brockwell relies on the fact that there was no argument in respect of significant issues in respect of interpretation of legislation or its future administration.
14 In Kennedy on behalf of the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy v The Director-General of the National Parks and Wildlife Service and Another (No. 2) [2002] NSWLEC 127, unreported, the Court had to decide whether the subject litigation in that case, which related to the same site as the present proceedings, should be regarded as public interest litigation for the purpose of exercising the Court's discretion in relation to a costs order against the unsuccessful applicant. In Kennedy I examined the various judgments delivered by judges of the High Court in Oshlack v Richmond River Shire Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 and deduced from the majority that starting from a position which favours costs orders against an unsuccessful party, if the Court finds the nature of the litigation concerns the public rather than private rights, and there are sufficient special circumstances which are not extraneous to the object of the enactment of s 69 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 in the context of proceedings commenced under an open standing provision, the discretion to make a costs order may be exercised having regard to those special circumstances.
15 I was not satisfied that the applicant in Kennedy had a sufficient interest to characterise the litigation as public interest litigation or to give rise to sufficient special circumstances to justify departure from the ordinary practice. By placing Mr Carriage in the same representative type of category as Mr Kennedy was in the earlier litigation, the same line of reasoning can be applied in the present case.
16 The Court accepts that Wadi Wadi and Mr Carriage were motivated by a sincere concern that Aboriginal artefacts and relics should be protected and preserved. There were no "significant issues" of the type identified by Stein J at first instance in Oshlack, as to the interpretation and future administration of the statutory provisions relating to the issue of consents under the NP&W Act. The challenge in both applications for interlocutory relief was fundamentally an attempt to revisit the merits of the grant of the consents under the NP&W Act in the guise of a legal challenge. The fact that a peripheral prospect of breach of the legislation in respect of areas not covered by the consents emerged in the litigation does not, in my opinion, give rise to "sufficient special circumstances" to justify a departure from the ordinary costs rule.
17 If the applicants had persuaded the Court that the applications for interlocutory relief could be treated as public interest litigation then it might follow that the application for security for costs might be regarded in the same light. I was not persuaded that an order for security for costs should not be made on the basis claimed, namely that the applicant should be given a full opportunity to restrain the breach alleged. Although the application for security for costs was only partially successful in that the order was made in respect of an amount significantly less than that claimed by the first respondent, nevertheless the application proved to be justified and the first respondent was successful.