Campbell v Campbell

The parties' contentions

1. Julie puts alternative claims. First she alleges that, shortly after Sir Keith's death, Lady Campbell entered into a binding agreement with her four children, whereby she promised to leave the Property to them upon her death.
2. In the alternative, Julie alleges that Sir Keith and Lady Campbell entered into an enforceable mutual wills agreement prior to Sir Keith's death whereby each agreed that the survivor would leave his or her estate to the four children in equal shares.
3. In support of her primary case Julie claims that at the time of Sir Keith's death on 16 April 1983 Julie and her three siblings held an enforceable option to purchase the Property for the price paid by Hookers (plus rates and expenses incurred by Hookers). The option agreement is contended by her to have been one in writing and executed by all parties, including Hookers.
4. The defendants dispute that there was ever an enforceable option agreement. No document constituting such an enforceable agreement has been found and hence there is no direct evidence of such an agreement.
5. Julie, however, contends that between Sir Keith's death on 16 April 1983 and the transfer of the Property from Hookers to Lady Campbell on 23 May 1983, she and her siblings entered into an agreement with Lady Campbell whereby as consideration for Julie and her siblings directing Hookers to transfer the Property to Lady Campbell for the purchase price provided for in the option, Lady Campbell agreed to bequeath the whole of the Property on her death to her four children in equal shares. In her Amended Statement of Claim Julie pleads that this agreement was made in part orally and in part by conduct.
6. So far as the oral component is concerned it is alleged that it occurred at the conference between Lady Campbell, Susan, Julie and Robyn with Mr Burges around May 1983.
7. Julie contends that the relevant conduct involves, firstly, Lady Campbell executing a new will in 1983 in which she left her estate to the four children in equal shares and, secondly, the execution by Lady Campbell and each of her children of a direction to Hookers dated 17 May 1983 confirming their mutual desire that the Property be sold by Hookers to Lady Campbell.
8. All of the defendants dispute that any agreement was entered into between them in 1983. I note in passing that David was not present at the meeting at which the alleged agreement arose.
9. Julie contends that it was an implied term of the 1983 Agreement that Lady Campbell would not dispose of or encumber the Property in any manner inconsistent with her obligations under the agreement, and that the effect of that agreement was that Lady Campbell thereafter held a remainder interest in the Property on trust for the benefit of her four children.
10. Julie contends that permitting the development and subdivision of the Property in or about 2008 amounts to an anticipatory breach by Lady Campbell of the 1983 Agreement, or that by her conduct she has repudiated the 1983 Agreement. Julie further claims that Robyn has committed an anticipatory breach of the 1983 Agreement or repudiated that agreement and holds her 5% interest in Lot 1 as constructive trustee for the benefit of all four siblings.
11. Julie's alternative case is that Lady Campbell is bound in equity to devise her estate to her children as tenants in common in equal shares in accordance with the mutual wills agreement allegedly made by Lady Campbell and Sir Keith.
12. In respect of that claim Julie pleads that Sir Keith and Lady Campbell made "mutual wills" and entered into a contract whereby each was to be bound by the terms of his or her mutual will.
13. Again, the defendants deny that any agreement exists or was made.
14. This agreement is said by Julie to have been made by Lady Campbell and is said to have included a term that the entire estate (after payment of debts and expenses) was to be bequeathed upon trust for Sir Keith absolutely, provided he survived her for a period of six months, and a further term that in the event that Lady Campbell survived Sir Keith the entire estate (after payment of debts and expenses), was to be bequeathed upon trust to her four children as tenants in common in equal shares.
15. Julie claims that Sir Keith's will, to which the alleged mutual will is said to have corresponded, was in force at the time of Sir Keith's death so that Lady Campbell became the beneficiary of the whole of the estate of Sir Keith (after payments of debts and expenses). Julie alleges that by reason of these matters Lady Campbell is bound to leave the whole of her estate in accordance with that agreement.

Credit

1. In Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 and 319, McLelland CJ in Eq made the following remarks: …human memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience.
2. I made the following observations in Craig v Silverbrook [2013] NSWSC 1687 at [140]-[142]: 140 Whilst a trial judge is entitled to make observations relating to the demeanour of certain witnesses, it is a notoriously crude and inaccurate methodology. Its defects have been exposed on numerous occasions. 141 In that regard, I am of course mindful of the comments of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ in Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118 (at [30]-[31]) when they remarked (citations omitted): [30] It is true, as McHugh J has pointed out, that for a very long time judges in appellate courts have given as a reason for appellate deference to the decision of a trial judge, the assessment of the appearance of witnesses as they give their testimony that is possible at trial and normally impossible in an appellate court. However, it is equally true that, for almost as long, other judges have cautioned against the dangers of too readily drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly form the appearance of witnesses. Thus, in 1924 Atkin LJ observed in Societe d'Avances Commerciales (Societe Anonyme Egyptienne) v Merchants Marine Insurance Co (The "Palitana"): "... I think that an ounce of intrinsic merit or demerit in the evidence, that is to say, the value of the comparison of evidence with known facts, is worth pounds of demeanour." [31] Further, in recent years, judges have become more aware of scientific research that has cast doubt on the ability of judges (or anyone else) to tell truth from falsehood accurately on the basis of such appearances. Considerations such as these have encouraged judges, both at trial and on appeal, to limit their reliance on the appearances of witnesses and to reason to their conclusions, as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events. This does not eliminate the established principles about witness credibility… 142 In the recent decision of McGraddie v McGraddie and another [2013] UKSC 58; [2013] 1 WLR 2477, the UK Supreme Court emphasised that, especially in cases where a trial judge is faced with a stark choice between irreconcilable accounts, the credibility of the parties' testimony, and the trial judge's assessment of the character of witnesses and the manner in which the witnesses give evidence, is of primary importance. Those observations are particularly relevant to the present case. Similar observations have been made in Australian authorities (Fox v Percy at [23]; Rosenberg v Percival [2001] HCA 18; (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [41] per McHugh J and see generally comments in Ritchie's Uniform Civil Procedure NSW at SCA s 75A.20).
3. In Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39 at [34] Keane JA (as he then was) made the observation that "the rational resolution of an issue involving the credibility of witnesses will require reference to, and analysis of, any evidence independent of the parties which is apt to cast light on the probabilities of the situation." This remark was cited with approval by Leeming JA (with whom Barrett JA and Tobias AJA agreed) in New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226 at [56].
4. Hallen J recently set out the relevant principles in Evans and Braddock [2015] NSWSC 249 at [70]-[77]. After referring to Watson v Foxman, his Honour said: 71 In that case, his Honour was talking of a cause of action founded on s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW): see the discussion by McDougall J in Harbour Port Consulting v NSW Maritime [2011] NSWSC 813, at [10] - [18]. However, as McLelland CJ in Eq also pointed out, the views apply to all types of litigation. 72 I also remember what was said by Emmett J (as his Honour then was) in Warner v Hung, in the matter of Bellpac Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) (No 2) [2011] FCA 1123; (2011) 297 ALR 56, at [48]: "When proof of any fact is required, the Court must feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of that fact before it can be found. Mere mechanical comparison of probabilities, independent of any belief in reality, cannot justify the finding of a fact. Actual persuasion is achieved where the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court. However, reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, and the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations that must affect whether the fact has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court. Reasonable satisfaction should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences (see Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-2)." 73 The credibility of a witness and his, or her, veracity may also be tested by reference to the objective facts proved independently of the evidence given, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, by paying particular regard to his, or her, motives, and to the overall probabilities: Armagas Ltd v Mundogas S.A. (The "Ocean Frost") [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep 1, per Robert Goff LJ, at 57. Also see, In the matter of Kit Digital Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] NSWSC 1547, per Black J, at [7]. 74 A court, in cases involving events which occurred long before the litigation, usually prefers to rely upon contemporaneous, or near contemporaneous, documents, which will often provide valuable and, usually, more revealing, information than what may be flawed attempts at recollection of those facts by persons with an interest in the outcome of the litigation: Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200, per Jagot J, at [1247]. Greater weight is usually accorded to such documents, as often they provide a safer repository of reliable fact, particularly when it is clear that they have been prepared by a person with no reason to misstate those facts in the documents and where there is no suggestion that the documents are other than genuine: Hughes v St Barbara Mines Ltd [No 4] [2010] WASC 160, per Kenneth Martin J, at [157]. 75 In this regard, I have also found useful what Lord Pearce wrote, in his dissenting speech in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep 403, at 431: "Credibility involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour' which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or, though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and, if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by overmuch discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness, and motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process and in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." 76 The circumstances of this case, make what was written by Tamberlin J in Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (trading as Uncle Ben's of Australia) (Federal Court of Australia, Tamberlin J, 29 June 1995, unrep), at 122 - 123 (in a passage cited with approval by the High Court when it upheld his Honour's decision: Effem Foods Pty Ltd v Lake Cumbeline Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 15; (1999) 161 ALR 599, at [15]) appropriate to remember: "[Given the lapse of time] between the events and conversations raised in evidence and the hearing of the evidence before me, the only safe course is to place primary emphasis on the objective factual surrounding material and the inherent commercial probabilities, together with the documentation tendered in evidence. In circumstances where the events took place so long ago, it must be an exceptional witness whose undocumented testimony can be unreservedly relied on. The witnesses in this case unfortunately did not come within that exceptional class. The discussions referred to in evidence were capable of bearing quite opposed meanings depending on subtle differences of nuance and emphasis, and a proper appreciation of the significance of those matters must necessarily be considerably diminished over such a long period of time." 77 Finally, I should mention an article by the former the Chief Judge at Common Law, P McClellan entitled "Who Is Telling the Truth? Psychology, Common Sense and the Law" (2006) 80 ALJ 655, in which he wrote, at 665, quoting a passage from the "Guidelines Relating to Recovered Memories" (2000) of the Australian Psychological Society: "Memory is a constructive and reconstructive process. What is remembered about an event is shaped by how that event was experienced, by conditions prevailing during attempts to remember, and by events occurring between the experience and the attempted remembering. Memories can be altered, deleted and created by events that occur during and after the time of encoding, during the period of storage, and during any attempts at retrieval."
5. In Grundel v Registrar General (1990) 5 BPR 11,217 at 11,219, McClelland J observed: Accordingly on its first basis, the plaintiff's claim is essentially one against the estate of a deceased person based on alleged conversations between the plaintiff and the deceased of which the only evidence is that of the plaintiff. Generally speaking, in cases of that kind, by reason of the danger of estates of deceased persons being subjected to false or exaggerated claims in respect of matters of which the deceased has no opportunity to give his own account, the Court will treat such evidence with considerable caution, if not suspicion, will scrutinise it with great care, and act on it only if convinced of its truth…
6. These observations were reiterated by Robb J in Plaska v Coffey [2014] NSWSC 1930 at [35], and similar remarks were made by Wilcox J in Clune v Collins Angus & Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 246 at 253.
7. In Neale v Bank of Western Australia [2014] NSWSC 315, Hammerschlag J at [198] made the following observations: 198 Where a party seeks to rely upon spoken words as a foundation for a cause of action the conversation must be proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court. This means that the Court must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or its existence. In the absence of some reliable contemporaneous record or other satisfactory corroboration, a party may face serious difficulties of proof. Such reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is obtained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question of whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Court. Reasonable satisfaction should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences: see Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362; Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521; Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319.

Intention to create legal relations

1. The test for whether parties manifested an intention to create legal relations was articulated as follows in Ashton v Pratt [2015] NSWCA 12 (Ashton v Pratt) by Bathurst CJ (with whom McColl and Meagher JJA agreed). His Honour's remarks about agreements in the contest of family relationships are particularly relevant to this case: 69 In Ermogenous, the High Court held at [25] that whether the parties intended to create legal relations required an objective assessment of the state of affairs between them. 70 In that case, the High Court doubted at [26]-[27] the validity of the use of a presumption that "family arrangements" were not intended to give rise to legal obligations. Subsequently, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Evans v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] FCAFC 81; (2012) 289 ALR 237 concluded at [12]-[13] that the High Court had rejected the use of presumptions as a basis of determining whether parties had entered into contractual relations. 71 By contrast, in Sion v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2013] NSWCA 337 (Sion), Emmett JA, with whom Basten and Barrett JJA agreed, stated at [40]-[41] that as a matter of known experience, when family members make a promise to each other it is unlikely they intend it to be legally binding and the vaguer the language of the arrangement and the greater its informality, the more difficult it will be to rebut the presumption. 72 Ms Ashton contended that the primary judge erred in applying the presumption. It is correct that his Honour accepted the presumption applied, but he stated that in any event he was satisfied that the parties did not intend to make a contract: primary judgment at [36]. For the reasons which follow, he was correct in reaching that conclusion. 73 Notwithstanding what was said by this Court in Sion, in my opinion the effect of the decision of the High Court in Ermogenous was that in considering the issue recourse should not be had to any presumption concerning the contractual or non-contractual effects of family arrangements. That does not mean that the relationship of the parties and the circumstances in which the arrangement was entered into are irrelevant to the question. To the contrary, these factors form part of the surrounding circumstances from which it will be determined whether or not a contract came into existence.
2. The parties correctly accepted that in determining the issue of whether there was an intention to create legal relations, what was required was an objective assessment of the state of affairs between the parties as distinct from the identification of any subjective reservation or intention: Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95 (Ermogenous) at [25].
3. In Ashton v Pratt Meagher JA, whose remarks at [224] were cited with approval by Bathurst CJ at [220], put the test in the following terms: …whether Mr Pratt and Ms Ashton are to be taken to have intended by their conversation in November 2003 to create legal relations turns on whether in the circumstances, by what they said and did, they objectively conveyed such an intention in the sense that reasonable persons in their position would have understood that to have been intended: Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc [2002] HCA 8; 209 CLR 95 at [24] - [26]; Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas [2004] HCA 35; 218 CLR 451 at [22].
4. Formal language of offer and acceptance is not required in order for a contract to be formed: see, eg, Ashton v Pratt at [80] per Bathurst CJ, citing Vroon BV v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd [1994] VR 32 at 79. At [225] of Ashton v Pratt Meagher JA considered that: 225 At no stage in the conversation was anything said by either party that conveyed to the other that what was being promised was to be legally enforceable. However, as Windeyer J observed in Placer Development Limited v Commonwealth [1969] HCA 29; 121 CLR 353 at 367, that is not determinative of the matter in question.
5. It is clear that the question of whether a testamentary promise is enforceable requires an application of ordinary contractual principles: see Santow J in Sharp v Anderson (1994) 6 BPR 13,801 (Sharp v Anderson) at 13,807. His Honour observed in that case that, the alleged contract being a contract relating to land, it needed to be supported by valuable consideration, be certain in its terms and comply with the Statute of Frauds (as applicable per ss 23C and 54A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)). His Honour remarked that "[t]he courts have shown a natural scepticism about where statements of future testamentary beneficence made within a family are intended to have contractual significance."
6. This latter statement must be viewed in light of the observations in Ashton v Pratt and Ermogenous moving away from a presumption that family agreements were not intended to have legal force.
7. In Sharp v Anderson Santow J identified the following factors as being relevant to the issue of whether a statement of testamentary intention as intended to give rise to enforceable contractual obligations (at 13,809):

• The number of people to whom the statement was made;
• Whether the statement was in writing;
• Whether there was substantial consideration offered for the promise;
• The number of times the statement was made;
• The context, formal or informal, in which the promise was made;
• The nature of the relationship between the parties; and
• The certainty of the terms.

Testamentary promise not in writing

1. Sections 23C and 54C on the Conveyancing Act provide as follows: 23C Instruments required to be in writing (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the creation of interests in land by parol: (a) no interest in land can be created or disposed of except by writing signed by the person creating or conveying the same, or by the person's agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, or by will, or by operation of law, (b) a declaration of trust respecting any land or any interest therein must be manifested and proved by some writing signed by some person who is able to declare such trust or by the person's will, (c) a disposition of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the disposition, must be in writing signed by the person disposing of the same or by the person's will, or by the person's agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing. (2) This section does not affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied, or constructive trusts. 54A Contracts for sale etc of land to be in writing (1) No action or proceedings may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land, unless the agreement upon which such action or proceedings is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged or by some other person thereunto lawfully authorised by the party to be charged. (2) This section applies to contracts whether made before or after the commencement of the Conveyancing (Amendment) Act 1930 and does not affect the law relating to part performance, or sales by the court. (3) This section applies and shall be deemed to have applied from the commencement of the Conveyancing (Amendment) Act 1930 to land under the provisions of the Real Property Act 1900.
2. The defendant's position is that if the 1983 Agreement came into existence, and if it had the effect of making Lady Campbell trustee of the remaining interest in the land for the benefit of her children, it "created an interest in land" or constituted "a declaration of trust respecting land" within s 23C(1) and (2), or was a "disposition of land" within the meaning of s 54A(1). In Khoury v Khouri (2006) 66 NSWLR 241 (Khoury v Khouri) at [4] Handley JA remarked that: A declaration of trust of land creates an equitable interest in the land in favour of the beneficiary and does not convey an existing interest to him. A contract for the creation of a new interest, legal or equitable, in land is nevertheless a contract for the disposition of that interest.
3. At [15] Hodgson JA considered: If it could take effect at all, it was as an agreement to create a trust. The primary judge held that such an agreement was not affected by s 54A of the Conveyancing Act. In my opinion, he was in error. Although a declaration of trust in respect of land is a creation of an interest in that land rather than a transfer or assignment of such an interest, it is in my opinion plainly a disposition of an interest in land, within the meaning of s 54A. The grant of a lease is a creation of an interest in land rather than a transfer or assignment of such an interest; and I do not think it could be said that it is not a disposition of an interest in land. In my view, a declaration of trust is not relevantly different.
4. At [44]-[48] Bryson JA made the following observations: 44 The trial judge's consideration (after 22,958 [316]; 599 [316]) is directed to the words "disposition of land or any interest in land" and not the whole expression "contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land". The words "contract", "sale" and "disposition" in their ordinary and natural meanings have very extensive references. "Disposition" in its ordinary and natural meaning is broad and general in its reference to means of disposing of property, more so in s 54A(1) where it is presented as more than an exemplification of the reference to sale, itself a word of amplitude of meaning. The reference to "land or any interest in land" attracts the definition of inclusion in s 7(1) which enhances what would otherwise be an expression of very ample meaning. An ample approach to the meaning of s 54A(1) is assisted by the words "any" and the words "of land or any interest in land". 45 To categorise the agreement as found as not a sale of Peter's one half share of the Johnston Rd property, or as not a contract for the sale of that one half share, is to depart in a marked and striking way from the ordinary and natural meaning of references to a contract and to a sale. There is a price, there is property, and there is the passing of a proprietary right in the property. In my opinion there is no less a departure from the ordinary and natural meaning of those terms if a further stage is introduced in which there is an implied promise to declare a trust; if anything, the introduction of such a promise enhances the applicability of the ordinary and natural meaning of "contract for sale" and "sale" to the transaction because the contract itself confers equitable title to the property. I make similar observations about the use of "disposition"; to agree for consideration that one holds one's interest for the benefit of another person, so as to create a trust, falls centrally within the concept of a disposition. 46 In some submissions, reliance was placed on anomalies and circularities which were said to arise from the application of the definitions of "disposition" and "dispose" in s 7(1) to those words appearing in s 23C and s 54A. It was said that in the definition of "disposition" the words "other assurance of property by any instrument except a will" show that the reference in the definition is to a declaration of trust by an instrument: that the words "by any instrument" relate not only to "every other assurance of property" but to the previously appearing "declaration of trust" (and, it would I suppose follow, "disclaimer" and "release"). While there is room for doubt I am inclined to the view that this contention is correct, and that the reference in the definition of "disposition" to "declaration of trust" is a reference to a declaration of trust by an instrument. The definition is no more than a definition of inclusion and does not limit what "disposition" would otherwise mean. Context and subject matter require that this definition should not be applied to "declaration of trust" in s 23C(1)(b) because it would be an absurdity to make the provision in par (b) with relation only to declarations of trust which were by instruments, that is in writing. Similar considerations of absurdity and circularity show that the definition does not apply to the word "dispose" in s 23C(1)(a) or "disposition" appearing twice in s 23C(1)(c); and that the definition cannot produce the result, in s 54A(1) that the disposition referred to is only a disposition in writing 47 The trial judge stated to the effect that the creation of a trust does not dispose of land or an interest in land and that a declaration of trust creates an interest in land and is beyond the operation of s 54A for that reason. This must be understood with the assistance of the trial judge's references to his judgment in ISPT Nominees. His Honour's observations on the different terms of s 54A and s 23C, which led him to see, in the use of the words "declaration of trust" in s 23C and their absence from s 54A, reinforcement for the view that declarations of trust are not dealt with in s 54A, are lacking in cogency The history and also the terms of those sections show that it is not correct to see them as working closely together and dealing in a symmetrical and tightly drafted way, and exhaustively, with a single subject; the absence of the words "declaration of trust" from s 54A is far better explained by considering whether the words used in s 54A extend to declarations of trust among other things than by the supposition that whatever led the draughtsman to use those words in s 23C would have led him to use them again in s 54A if he intended s 54A to extend to the same concept. The consideration that no clear policy can be seen to be furthered by the exclusion of contracts to declare a trust from the operation of s 54A tells strongly against the view that s 54A does not extend to a declaration of trust. In my view it would be markedly anomalous if s 54A did not extend to a declaration of trust and no purpose for such an exception can be discerned; the desirability of requiring a memorandum or note in writing of an agreement for a sale or disposition by declaration of trust is just as strong as it is in any of the cases to which s 54A may be supposed to extend. 48 In ISPT Nominees, Barrett J (at 22,958 [317]-[322]; 599 [317]-[322]) shows the grounds for his Honour's opinion that a contract for the declaration of a trust is not a contract for the disposition of land to which s 54A would apply. Justice Barrett's treating this opinion as relevant and as a basis for decision in the present case is a product of his view that the contract as found is a contract by which Peter promised to declare a trust in Bechara's favour. As appears earlier, I am of the opinion that there is no such promise, and that, upon the contract as found, a trust arose upon the making of the agreement and passage of the consideration, without any declaration of trust being necessary or taking place. If it is necessary to consider whether and how the agreement as found falls within s 23C, I am of the opinion that it falls within s 23C(1)(a) which operates to prevent an interest in land being created without writing, as well as to prevent an interest in land being disposed of except by writing. Whether or not a declaration of trust, or a transaction which the law construes as creating a trust is a disposition is something which it is not necessary to decide in order to discern that par (a) applies where a trust interest in land is created. In my opinion, the passages in the judgments of Gibbs CJ and Aickin J in DKLR Holding Co (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 431, to which Barrett J referred do not show or tend to show that a declaration of trust or other transaction which brought a trust into existence is not a disposition of an interest in land. Justice Mason observed to the effect that, when imposing a stamp duty, the legislation treated a declaration of trust as if it were a transfer of an interest in land, on which stamp duty is otherwise imposed. The interest in land which the creation of the trust conferred on the cestui que trust was not transferred or conveyed because it had no previous existence, but the legislature can subject that transaction to rates of duty appropriate to a conveyance if it chooses to do so, notwithstanding the property lawyer's clear understanding that it is not a conveyance at all, as appears from the passage of the judgment of Brennan J, cited in ISPT Nominees (at 22,959 [320]; 600 [320]).
5. This requirement may be overcome through the doctrine of part performance, which requires "acts done under and by force of the contract that are unequivocally and in their own nature referable to some such agreement as that alleged": see Khoury v Khouri at [16] per Handley JA; see also Regent v Millett (1976) 133 CLR 679 and 682-3; Waltons Stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 at 432.

Indefeasibility

1. Section 42 of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) provides as follows: 42 Estate of registered proprietor paramount (1) Notwithstanding the existence in any other person of any estate or interest which but for this Act might be held to be paramount or to have priority, the registered proprietor for the time being of any estate or interest in land recorded in a folio of the Register shall, except in case of fraud, hold the same, subject to such other estates and interests and such entries, if any, as are recorded in that folio, but absolutely free from all other estates and interests that are not so recorded except: (a) the estate or interest recorded in a prior folio of the Register by reason of which another proprietor claims the same land, (a1) in the case of the omission or misdescription of an easement subsisting immediately before the land was brought under the provisions of this Act or validly created at or after that time under this or any other Act or a Commonwealth Act, (b) in the case of the omission or misdescription of any profit à prendre created in or existing upon any land, (c) as to any portion of land that may by wrong description of parcels or of boundaries be included in the folio of the Register or registered dealing evidencing the title of such registered proprietor, not being a purchaser or mortgagee thereof for value, or deriving from or through a purchaser or mortgagee thereof for value, and (d) a tenancy whereunder the tenant is in possession or entitled to immediate possession, and an agreement or option for the acquisition by such a tenant of a further term to commence at the expiration of such a tenancy, of which in either case the registered proprietor before he or she became registered as proprietor had notice against which he or she was not protected: Provided that: (i) The term for which the tenancy was created does not exceed three years, and (ii) in the case of such an agreement or option, the additional term for which it provides would not, when added to the original term, exceed three years. (iii) (Repealed) (2) In subsection (1), a reference to an estate or interest in land recorded in a folio of the Register includes a reference to an estate or interest recorded in a registered mortgage, charge or lease that may be directly or indirectly identified from a distinctive reference in that folio. (3) This section prevails over any inconsistent provision of any other Act or law unless the inconsistent provision expressly provides that it is to have effect despite anything contained in this section.
2. In Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [193] the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) at [193] considered (footnotes omitted): 193 In personam exception. An exception operating outside the language of s 42(1) can exist in relation to certain legal or equitable causes of action against the registered proprietor. So far as Say-Dee was relying on Barnes v Addy, it was certainly alleging a recognised equitable cause of action. In Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd (Tadgell JA (Winneke P concurring, Ashley A-JA dissenting) held that a claim under Barnes v Addy was not a personal equity which defeated the equivalent of s 42(1) in Victoria, namely the Transfer of Land Act 1958, s 42(1). Tadgell JA said (279): "[H]ere it is not possible to escape the circumstance that, if there was a 'knowing receipt' by the appellant, it was a receipt by virtue of registration under the Transfer of Land Act." He continued (280): "The argument for the respondent appears to assume that the acquisition by a mortgagee, in that capacity, of a proprietary interest following registration of a forged instrument of mortgage in respect of property that is subject to a trust amounts to a receipt by the mortgagee of trust property. If it were so, it might be possible to treat the holder of the registered proprietary interest as a constructive trustee arising from 'knowing receipt' of trust property. As it seems to me, however, there is neither room nor the need, in the Torrens system of title, to do so. If registration of the mortgagee's interest is achieved dishonestly then the registration, and with it the interest, are liable to be set aside not because, on registration, the registered holder became a constructive trustee but because s 42(1) recognises that fraud renders the interest defeasible. If, on the other hand, the registration is not achieved by fraud the Act provides, subject to its terms, for an indefeasible interest. Those terms allow, it is true, a claim in personam founded in equity against the holder of a registered interest to be invoked to defeat the interest; and a claim in personam founded in equity may no doubt include a claim to enforce what is called a constructive trust … [T]o recognise a claim in personam against the holder of a mortgage registered under the Transfer of Land Act, dubbing the holder a constructive trustee by application of a doctrine akin to 'knowing receipt' when registration of the mortgage was honestly achieved, would introduce by the back door a means of undermining the doctrine of indefeasibility which the Torrens system establishes. It is to be distinctly understood that, until a forged instrument of mortgage is registered, the mortgagee receives nothing: before registration the instrument is a nullity. As Street J pointed out in Mayer v Coe (281) … the proprietary rights of a registered mortgagee of Torrens title land derive 'from the fact of registration and not from an event antecedent thereto'. In truth, I think it is not possible, consistently with the received principle of indefeasibility as it has been understood since Frazer v Walker (282) and Breskvar v Wall (283), to treat the holder of a registered mortgage over property that is subject to a trust, registration having been honestly obtained, as having received trust property. The argument that the appellant is liable as a constructive trustee because it had 'knowingly received' trust property should in my opinion fail."
3. At [195] the Court, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy (2002) 26 WAR 517 at [289], drew a distinction between a case where the "primary wrongdoer" is the registered proprietor and where the registered proprietor merely has notice of third-party fraud. See also Sze Tu v Lowe [2014] NSWCA 462 at [224]-[227].

Laches, acquiescence and estoppel

1. The applicable principles regarding laches were identified by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Crawley v Short [2009] NSWCA 410 by Young JA (Allsop P and Macfarlan JA agreeing) at [163] as being: 1) knowledge of the wrong; 2) delay; and 3) unconscionable prejudice caused to the opponent by the delay. At [164]-[165] and [180] Young JA continued: 164 The key element is whether, in all the circumstances, "it would be practically unjust to give a remedy" (per Lord Selborne LC in The Lindsay Petroleum Company v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221 at 239-240). Normally, that means that the defendant must show both delay and detriment suffered by the delay, Fisher v Brooker [2009] 1 WLR 1764 at 1781 [64] per Lord Neuberger with whom Lord Hope, Lord Walker, Baroness Hale and Lord Mance agreed. 165 It is sometimes said that the essential nature of the defence is that the claim of the plaintiff is released in equity. This is often, but not always the case. Sometimes laches operates as an estoppel, see Fisher v Brooker and Ashburner's Principles of Equity 2nd ed (Butterworth & Co, London, 1933) at 520. The result of a successful plea of laches is that the plaintiff's equitable claim is dismissed. … 180 Thus the degree of knowledge, the type of transaction and the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay are all matters which need to be evaluated when assessing whether the defence of laches has been made out and it is an unrewarding task to search for some formula as to just what degree of knowledge must exist in any particular case.
2. The principles of acquiescence were explained by Deane J in Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316 at 337: There has, over the years, been considerable criticism of the loose us of the word "acquiescence" as a broad conjunctive or disjunctive companion to "laches": see, e.g., per Lord Cottenham L.C., Duke of Leeds v. Earl of Amherst; De Busscge v. Alt. Such criticism has obvious force in that, so used, the word has chameleon-like quality which adds little besides confusion to an already vague area of equity doctrine. Strictly used, acquiescence indicates the contemporaneous and informed ("knowing") acceptance or standing by which is treated by equity as "assent" (i.e. consent) to what would otherwise be an infringement of rights…
3. In order for a defence of acquiescence to be established the plaintiff must have had full knowledge of the facts: Permanent Trustee v Bernera Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 56 at [55] per Young CJ in Eq.
4. In Thompson v Palmer (1933) 49 CLR 507 at 547, Dixon J said of estoppel that: The object of estoppel in pais is to prevent an unjust departure by one person from an assumption adopted by another as the basis of some act or omission which, unless the assumption be adhered to, would operate to that other's detriment. Whether a departure by a party from the assumption should be considered unjust and inadmissible depends on the part taken by him in occasioning its adoption by the other party. He may be required to abide by the assumption because it formed the conventional basis upon which the parties entered into contractual or other mutual relations, such as bailment, or because he has exercised against the other party rights which would exist only if the assumption were correct…or because knowing the mistake the other laboured under, he refrained from correcting him when it was his duty to do so, or because he directly made representations upon which the other party founded the assumption. But, in each case, he is not bound to adhere to the assumption unless, as a result of adopting it as the basis of action or inaction, the other party will have placed himself in a position of material disadvantage if departure from the assumption be permitted.

Mutual wills

1. The term mutual wills is used to describe joint or separate wills made as a result of an agreement between the parties to create irrevocable interests in favour of ascertainable beneficiaries: see the discussion generally in GL Ceroma, The Law of Succession (2010, 4th edition, Lawbook Co), JG Ross Martyn, C Ford, A Learmonth, M Oldham (eds), Theobald on Wills (2010, 17th ed, Thomson Reuters).
2. The law has long since recognised the enforceability of such contracts.
3. In Aslan v Kopf [1995] NSWCA 26, it was observed by Gleeson CJ (Kirby P and Priestley JA agreeing) that "although a will is, by its nature, revocable, a testator may enter into a binding contract not to revoke a will, and breach of such a contract will give to the other contracting party a right of action for damages, and, depending upon the circumstances, a possible claim for equitable relief."
4. In Delaforce v Simpson-Cook (2010) 78 NSWLR 483 at 489, Handley AJA (Allsop P and Giles JA agreeing) remarked: [31] Although a will is revocable until death or loss of testamentary capacity, equity enforces a contract not to revoke a will, or to leave property by will, not by restraining or nullifying an inconsistent will, but by fastening a trust on the estate to give effect to the contract: Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666 at 683.
5. There are often difficulties as to proving the agreement and as to the nature, scope and effect of the trust imposed on the estate of the second person to die.
6. Equity does not protect the beneficiary under mutual wills merely because the wills have been made in identical or almost identical terms. There must be evidence of an agreement to create interests under mutual wills which are intended to be irrevocable after the death of the first person to die: Re Cleaver (deceased) [1981] 1 WLR 939 (Re Cleaver).
7. As Nourse J (as his Lordship then was) said in Re Cleaver at 945: It is therefore clear that there must be a definite agreement between the makers of the two wills; that that must be established by evidence; that the fact that there are mutual wills to the same effect is a relevant circumstance to be taken into account, although not enough of itself; and that the whole of the evidence must be looked at.
8. A mere desire held by both testators that both wills should remain unaltered is insufficient in the absence of an express agreement to prevent the surviving testator from changing his or her will. The agreement must be a contract at law: Re Goodchild (deceased) [1997] 1 WLR 1216 (Re Goodchild).
9. In Re Goodchild, Leggatt LJ (with whom Morritt and Phillips LJJ agreed) said: Two wills may be in the same form as each other. Each testator may leave his or her estate to the other with a view to the survivor leaving both estates to their heir. But there is no presumption that a present plan will be immutable in future. A key feature of the concept of mutual wills is the irrevocability of the mutual intentions. Not only must they be binding when made, but the testators must have undertaken, and so must be bound, not to change their intentions after the death of the first testator. The test must always be, suppose that during the lifetime of the surviving testator the intended beneficiary did something which the survivor regarded as unpardonable, would he or she be free not to leave the combined estate to him? The answer must be that the survivor is so entitled unless the testators agreed otherwise when they executed their wills. Hence the need for a clear agreement.
10. As Nourse J also said in Re Cleaver at 947: …the principal difficulty is always whether there was a legally binding obligation or merely what Lord Loughborough L.C. in Lord Walpole v. Lord Orford (1797) 3 Ves.Jun. 402, 419, described as an honourable engagement.
11. Nourse J was approved on that point specifically by the Court of Appeal in Re Goodchild at 1225.
12. The agreement may be contained in the will or it may be proved outside the will. The agreement may be oral or in writing (especially if it effects the disposition of land). But the evidence said to prove the agreement must be clear and cogent and the precise terms must be proved in order to ascertain the ambit of any restriction on disposition of the Property in question by the survivor: Re Oldham [1925] Ch 75 at 86.
13. The essence of such an arrangement is, of course, the agreement not to revoke (ever), on the part of the surviving testator.
14. This, in Hussey v Bauer [2011] QCA 91, Martin J (with whom Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreed) observed at [29] (footnotes omitted): Mutual wills arise when two persons agree to make wills in particular terms and agree that those wills are irrevocable and that they will remain unaltered.
15. I consider that the need for that requirement is also made apparent from the judgments of Latham CJ and Dixon J in the seminal authority of Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666.
16. Before turning to those judgments it is helpful if reference is made to the precise findings of the trial judge, which the High Court accepted, in Renfrew v Birmingham [1937] VLR 180 at 184-5 per Gavan Duffy J. The first question is whether there was any agreement binding on Mr. Russell. The financial and other circumstances are such that the very making of the two wills suggests an arrangement and, although there is little or no evidence other than that of interested parties, I am prepared to find there was such an arrangement. The only evidence to which I need refer specifically is as follows:-- Alexander Renfrew tells how, on the 31st March 1932, he and his wife were with Mr. and Mrs. Russell in a motor car on their way to the solicitor's office. Mrs. Russell said: "Before we go into Mr Corr's, I am going to tell you what we are going to do. Jack has agreed with me that, if I leave him all the residue of my estate, he is going to make his will and he will leave it to you, Kate, Elsie and little Billy, and he is not to alter it." Mr. Russell said: "That is right. I will do that and I will not alter it". Mrs. Renfrew, describing the same interview, says: "Mrs. Russell said: 'I want to tell you before we go into Mr. Corr's office that Jack and I have agreed that, if I do not tie up my estate in the ordinary way, and if I leave him the residue, he will make his will leaving all his estate to the same four', and she mentioned the four, Alex, Elsie, Kate and little Billy, 'to whom I am leaving the residue of my estate in the event of Jack dying before me'. Jack said 'Yes, that is right, and I will not alter it'." I accept this evidence as a substantially correct account of what occurred.
17. In the context of those findings, Latham CJ observed (at 674): The learned trial judge (Gavan Duffy J.) has found that an agreement was made between the husband and the wife according to which the wife, instead of leaving her property to the husband for life and then to certain relatives, should, after giving certain legacies, leave the residue to her husband, he in turn promising that he would leave his property to those relatives and he would not alter the will so leaving it.
18. Dixon J also observed at 682: Witnesses deposed to a circumstantial account of discussions between the wife and one or other of the intended beneficiaries. They narrated how the wife definitely stated in his presence the terms of the arrangement made with the husband and how he assented to her statement. The evidence, if believed, could leave no doubt that the wife made her will upon the faith of assurances on the part of her husband that he would leave his will unrevoked should she die first and that he made his will as part of the arrangement under which she made hers.
19. Dixon J then observed at 682-3: The contract bound him, I think, during her lifetime not to revoke his will without notice to her. If she died without altering her will, then he was bound after her death not to revoke his will at all. She on her part afforded the consideration for his promise by making her will. His obligation not to revoke his will during her life without notice to her is to be implied. For I think the express promise should be understood as meaning that if she died leaving her will unrevoked then he would not revoke his. But the agreement really assumes that neither party will alter his or her will without the knowledge of the other.
20. Dixon J, for obvious reasons, was satisfied that what the trial judge had found was that Mr Russell had made an express promise that he would not revoke his will during his lifetime, if his wife, on her death, had not revoked hers. Otherwise he was prepared to find an implication the husband would, whilst he and his wife were both alive, not revoke his will without first notifying her. It is obvious that the essence of such a contract, as I have already said, must be the express promise by the surviving testator not to revoke his or her will upon the death of the other testator.
21. It will be necessary to look at all of the circumstances. One very important factor in Birmingham v Renfrew was that the wife had come into a very substantial amount of property under the will of an uncle. The husband had no property. The trial judge, unsurprisingly, had found that the wife was quite prepared for her husband to have the entirety of the residue for his benefit and enjoyment in turn for his promising, as it were, to leave "his" property to her family, which had been, in effect, its source.
22. In Baird v Smee [2000] NSWCA 253, Giles JA (with whom Mason P agreed) outlined the relevant principles at [64]-[65]: [64] A will is by its nature revocable, and may be revoked inter alia by the making of a later will. A testator may, however, enter into a binding contract not to revoke his will. On ordinary principles, breach of the contract by the revocation of the will may entitle the other contracting party to damages (see Synge v Synge (1894) 1 QB 466 at 471; In re Richardson's Estate (1934) 29 Tas LR 149 at 155; Bigg v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1990) 2 Qd R 11 at 13). [65] The so-called doctrine of mutual wills goes beyond this. It is founded on finding a binding contract between two testators making corresponding wills to the effect that neither will revoke his will, or that neither will revoke his will without notice to the other testator. Where such a contract is found, and one testator dies leaving his will unrevoked so that the other testator take property under its dispositions, the surviving testator will be regarded in equity as under an obligation to give effect to the terms of the corresponding will, and the obligation will be enforced by the imposition of a constructive trust. The will of the surviving testator remains revocable, and may be revoked by making a new will. The new will is a valid testamentary disposition, but is overridden in that the testator's estate is nonetheless held subject to the constructive trust. The basis of the doctrine of mutual wills is authoritatively explained in Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666, especially in the judgment of Dixon J at 682-691.

The Witnesses

1. Not only by reason of the passage of time, but by reason of the lack of what might otherwise be crucial contemporaneous documentation, the reliability and hence the credit of the various witnesses who gave evidence before me in this case must necessarily play an important role in the determination of many of the key issues.
2. It is therefore necessary to consider each of the various witnesses in some little detail.

Julie Campbell

1. I found the plaintiff to be an entirely unsatisfactory witness. She gave evidence which I regard as frankly implausible and, worse, untruthful.
2. What makes matters worse in her case is that she is a solicitor of over 30 years standing. Her areas of practice have been property and company law.
3. She prepared three affidavits in the proceedings. She accepted, unsurprisingly, that in preparing her affidavits she, along with others, had to ensure that they were statements of her best recollection of events.
4. As a solicitor I would expect nothing less than honest and objective evidence. True it is that she is a party to proceedings but she was, in my view, far too emotionally involved with her sense of grievance, to the point that it had the effect, I consider, of clouding and distorting her judgement when she came to prepare and give her evidence.
5. As an example, a matter of some considerable significance in the trial was her evidence about the existence of the alleged option agreement.
6. In one of her affidavits (JC1) she refers to a conversation with her father in which he apparently indicated that there would be a seven year option to buy the Mosman residence: see [11].
7. She asserts that after her father's sudden death she found a file in a desk drawer in the study at the Property. She asserted that the file contained a typed document which she read. She described it in her affidavit in simple terms and asserted words to the effect that Hookers and her father had agreed that her siblings and she had an option to purchase the Property from Hookers for the price Hookers paid for it. At the time she swore that affidavit (11 April 2014), she said that she did not know the whereabouts of the file, or even if it still existed. However, she went on to assert that she showed the document "to her mother, sisters and brother": [27].
8. The plaintiff clearly appreciated the significance to her case of her assertion that she had, in fact, discovered the particular document. More to the point, she described it as a "typed document", which she then said she read "in order to describe its terms as simple". At no time in that or any subsequent affidavit did she hint that the document had been signed by all four of the children.
9. She agreed that when she made the assertion, namely that she saw a signed document, that that evidence was being given for the very first time in cross examination (T41/45-46). She had never so much as hinted in her affidavit evidence or anywhere else that she had executed the document.
10. At first, she said she was unable to say whether the executed version of the option agreement that she saw had been signed by her siblings (T42/49). However, a little later in her cross examination she asserted that she did recall that each of her siblings had signed the document (T43/25-33).
11. She could not recall when she had signed the option (T44/8-10), or in whose presence it was signed (T44/12). In addition, she could not recall where she signed the document (T44/18, T47/44-45).
12. She could give no other details in relation to the document, for example the purchase price in the executed option (T49/3-9). She could not give any detail as to the option period (T60/32-33).
13. Later in cross examination she asserted again, firmly, that the option had, in fact, been executed by all of the children (T137/47-138/38). Unsurprisingly, she had to agree that this, along with many other of her answers on the topic, had never appeared in any of her previous affidavits (T66/7-8).
14. Somewhat inconsistently, Julie had asserted that she had exercised the option in 1983 by speaking to a Mr Gavan, who it is accepted is now deceased and who was then a director of Hookers (T67/17-19). She asserted that her siblings had given her authority to exercise the option (T67/22-24).
15. The plaintiff was at a loss to say what had happened to the so-called executed version of the option. She had to accept that if she was telling the truth then it had been in her possession in 1983, and undoubtedly an important document (T46/5-36). She asserted that, having shown it to her family, she simply put it back in the desk and never saw it again (T46/58-47/3). She agreed that she did not take the document to the conference with Mr Burges in 1983 or even mention its existence to Mr Burges (T54/24-55; T56/0-8). It is obvious she never drew the existence of the document to the attention of Mr Mansell or his staff, which in and of itself is extraordinary for reasons to which I will return.
16. In her affidavit (JC1 at [33]) she asserts that she told Mr Burges in the presence of the others (excluding David) that there was a seven year option in existence. In cross examination, however, she accepted that the source of that information was a conversation she had had with her father and not the discovery by her of the so-called executed option agreement (T60/19-2; T61/6-9).
17. In the circumstances she and her family found themselves in, if she had, in fact, found such a document, I am certain she would have taken a copy with her to show or give to Mr Mansell and, for that matter, Mr Burges. At the time she was approximately 28 years old and well underway to becoming a qualified lawyer, and felt capable of drafting a will for her mother.
18. Her evidence in relation to the option is incredible and, in many respects, clearly inconsistent. I cannot accept that, having prepared three affidavits, one in which she specifically focusses upon the existence of the option, it could possibly have escaped her attention that the document she described was executed by herself and her siblings. She realised, of course, in the preparation of the case that her sister Susan had discovered the unsigned memorandum of Mr Mansell dated 17 May 1983. She was no doubt also well aware of the discovery of what has been described as the "fourth draft"; a draft and clearly unexecuted form of the option agreement. She was also aware that Mr Mansell had in his memorandum made explicit reference to the absence of an executed option as it were.
19. Given the manner in which she gave her evidence, the inconsistencies and, frankly, the incredible nature of it, I am of the view that her evidence as to her having seen a signed option agreement was deliberately false. She decided, in my view, to embellish the evidence she had otherwise given in a misguided attempt to enhance her case.
20. But the embellishment did not stop there. Not only had the document been signed by her siblings, but by Hookers as well. She described the relevant parties as "Hookers and me and my three siblings" (T43/21-24). As I have said, she had no recollection of where or when she had signed it, but she felt able to assert that it had been prepared by Mansell & Norton solicitors. Then, instead of it simply being a "typed document", it became two documents, an option agreement of some three to four pages to which was annexed a contract for the sale of land (T44/8; T45/5-10; T45/43-45). Again, I regret to say that I regard that evidence as deliberately false. It was put forward by her, in my view, again to give the appearance that she was able to provide plausible detail as to what she had seen. Given the way in which the cross examination unfolded, and in particular the manner in which she answered many of the questions, I simply could not accept her as a truthful witness on important issues unless there is independent corroboration of her testimony.
21. Such contemporaneous materials as do exist point overwhelmingly against the proposition that an option agreement was ever brought into final form and executed by anybody. When one carefully considers the history of the acquisition of the Property, and more importantly the board minutes and correspondence, the following picture, in my view, is very clear.
22. There is no doubt that on 21 April 1975 Mr Glover instructed Mr Mansell to not only prepare a lease of the Property but also an appropriate "option agreement". On 6 June 1975 Mr Mansell reminded Mr Glover about the lease and the option agreement and wanted instructions as to when discussions might take place in order to finalise them. There is no doubt that an option to purchase (at any time within 15 years) was being mooted in the middle of June 1975. Mr Glover expressly discussed the issue in correspondence with Mr Mansell on 17 June 1975. Following the transfer of the Property to Hookers on 30 June 1975 Mr Mansell later, of course, on 8 August 1975, wrote to Mr Glover pointing out certain technical difficulties with the proposed option arrangement and attaching what is described in handwriting as "fourth draft". It is likely this issue halted or stalled the process and, I consider it is reasonable to infer, took it off the table.
23. The Mansell memorandum prepared on or about 17 May 1983 (about one month after Sir Keith died) is, in my mind, a very important contemporaneous document. In my view there is no reason to doubt its accuracy in any respect.
24. The following, I consider, is tolerably clear from a careful reading of it. First, Mr Mansell obviously conducted a thorough investigation to determine the existence or not of the option agreement. He was well aware of the history of the matter from his file. Secondly, while he relied, no doubt, upon his memory, he also, one can reasonably infer, checked his file. He also spoke to Mr Millar (the Chairman) and Mr Glover (the new Chief Executive Officer). I consider it is reasonable to infer Mr Glover would have checked Hookers' files as well. Mr Mansell also discussed the matter with Lady Campbell, Susan and Julie. None of those investigations produced an executed option agreement as opposed to a fourth draft with handwriting on it. It is also reasonable to infer that neither Julie nor Mr Glover told Mr Mansell that there was in existence an executed option agreement. Mr Mansell recorded what the "original spirit of intent" was but then pronounced the existence only of a "gentleman's agreement".
25. Mr Mansell said quite expressly in his memorandum that he could find no formal option agreement. I also infer that he could not recall one being executed. Given Hookers' status as a public company and Mr Mansell's familiarity with his own files, I am certain that all reasonable efforts were undertaken in the search for such a document
26. A document of the kind Julie describes could simply, in my view, not have been in a file in her father's study, and this fortifies my view as to her deliberately false evidence on this topic. Had she found an executed document when she said she did she would have had every interest, on behalf of herself and her family, in providing a copy to Mr Mansell or Hookers, or at least in telling Mr Mansell so he could obtain it. It is clear she did not do that. I am satisfied her evidence on the topic was a fabrication.
27. The defendants refer to other examples of matters affecting Julie's credit. One example they give regards the letter of demand dated 28 November 2013, prepared by her and handed to her mother on or about the date it bore. They point to expressions used by her in the letter which amount to extraordinary exaggeration. For example, her assertion that she had "been agonising for years" when in fact what she meant was a 17 month period from June 2012 to November 2013.
28. In the letter of demand Julie asserted to her mother that it was her father's intention that all four of the children would inherit the Property, subject to Lady Campbell's right to live in it for the rest of her life.
29. The defendants point out that in cross examination Julie informed the Court that she was misstating things when she wrote that, and that she had no genuine belief at the time that her father had such an intention (T127/20-128/5). She also conceded, although she denied deliberately doing so, that she had misrepresented the advice given to her by her senior counsel (who appeared for her in the proceedings before me) (T130/35/45).
30. These additional examples only fortify the views I have already expressed. I regret to say that Julie was entirely unreliable as a witness and, I consider, solely motivated by considerations of self-interest.
31. The defendants generally contend that there are a number of possible explanations for Julie's behaviour. One they postulate is that she has incorrectly conflated her understanding or beliefs arising from her preparation of the 1983 will for her mother with the dealings with the Property in 1983. Having prepared the will for her mother it may well be so that Julie believed that she would receive one quarter share of Lady Campbell's estate, which included the Property. This, they say, has converted her personal understanding or belief as to her likely inheritance into a false recollection of an agreement. The alternative explanation they put is that she was simply prepared to assert a false case in order to achieve an end. Regrettably I consider the latter is the true position.
32. For completeness, I observe that Julie made no contemporaneous notes at the time she had any of the conversations, including the conference with Mr Burges. She does not appear to have kept a diary of relevant events. On any view she has been extremely slow to assert her rights, which is a matter to which I will return.
33. On that topic, I observe that notwithstanding advice from her counsel that she lodge caveats, she did not do so until 31 December 2013. She had received advice to do so, however, in 2011. Her instructions to her own counsel suggested that she would only lodge the caveats after her mother had died. It was put to her that she had decided for a number of reasons, largely tactical, that she did not really want to have litigation whilst her mother was alive, so that her mother was no longer able to dispute her evidence. I have to say she really did not satisfactorily respond to that proposition.

Barry Glover

1. Mr Glover is a former Chief Executive Officer of Hookers. He swore three affidavits. Most of his material I ruled inadmissible and almost none of it amounted to direct evidence of anything.
2. Mr Glover could not give any admissible evidence as to conversations he had with Sir Keith, Mr Mansell, Lady Campbell or, for that matter, any of the children about the option. He did not give evidence as to ever having seen an option, nor any relevant minutes of Hookers. His evidence was largely, if not entirely, admitted only as going to his state of mind or belief, or as a contention or a submission.
3. Nonetheless, his personal beliefs were urged upon the Court as a relevant and reliable source of information. I regard his evidence as carrying very little, if any, weight. That said, he was a person who was around at the relevant time and who clearly participated, with Mr Mansell, in the search for any relevant documentation. I cannot, however, come to any other conclusion but that Mr Mansell, having discussed the matter with Mr Glover and indeed having sought instructions and assistance from him, was able to form the conclusion that there was never a formal option agreement. The better view of the evidence is that this was a position with which Mr Glover agreed as at 1983.
4. Mr Mansell, it seems, did not provide a copy of his memorandum to Mr Glover. In his second affidavit (18 October 2014), Mr Glover said, however, that he believed that the option "was to be exercised by Keith's children": see [12]. At [13], and specifically referring to Mr Mansell's May 1983 memorandum and to Mr Mansell's comment regarding the non-existence of any "formal" agreement, Mr Glover was provoked to describe Mr Mansell's views as "fallacious and, in my opinion, intended as window dressing". He speculated that it would have benefited the Campbell family to avoid the possibility of double stamp duty and possible taxation consequences. Further, he asserted that Mr Mansell in effect lied about the existence of a formal option agreement in his memorandum.
5. That allegation about Mr Mansell is clearly one of unprofessional and/or dishonest conduct. It is true Mr Glover was not cross examined on his beliefs and theories, in particular that one, for good reason. However, I regard his attempt to characterise Mr Mansell's conduct in that way as contrary to the evidence as a whole, gratuitous, cowardly and frankly discreditable.
6. Far from being able to find any assistance from Mr Glover's beliefs, I find it extraordinary that anyone would regard evidence of this sort as appropriate or of any utility.

Kevin Burges

1. Mr Burges is a distinguished former practitioner who was an expert in the field of taxation. In his career he practised as both a solicitor and a barrister.
2. He undoubtedly had a conference with Lady Campbell and others in 1983. He also later settled some documents for the Campbell Family Trust.
3. Mr Burges had no contemporaneous notes of any meeting with Lady Campbell or any other member of her family. However, he believed he had a distinct recollection of the conference with Lady Campbell, not because he had an independent recollection of the detail of what had occurred at the meeting but rather, on my understanding, because he had harboured a long-lasting impression that Lady Campbell's children had acted in a most generous and loving way towards their mother. Notwithstanding this impression, his memory, unsurprisingly given the lapse of time, was shown to be faulty on matters of important detail.
4. Mr Burges swore two affidavits in the proceedings. Mr Burges was the only witness other than Julie to give evidence that the 1983 Agreement as alleged may have existed, although his version is entirely inconsistent with Julie's evidence in a number of important respects.
5. Mr Burges, of course, is put forward as a witness who has no interest in the outcome of the proceedings and, it was submitted, is therefore independent. That said, from my point of view Mr Burges' recollection was so flawed in important respects that I cannot accept that he provides any or sufficient corroboration for Julie's evidence, especially in relation to the alleged 1983 Agreement.
6. There is little doubt that in 1983, when Mr Burges was consulted by the family, he was a leading practitioner, especially in the field of taxation. I accept unequivocally that in giving his evidence he was doing his best to give his honest recollection of events. However, Mr Burges eventually had to accept that in important respects his memory was unreliable.
7. Mr Burges gave evidence that he had twice spoken to Julie about the events of 1983 prior to the commencement of proceedings (T150/29-43). Julie accepted that she had had conversations with Mr Burges prior to the proceedings. I am satisfied that during those conversations she clearly gave Mr Burges her account of events in 1983. This very likely influenced his recollection.
8. Notwithstanding his attempts to find documents, Mr Burges could not find any of his papers relating to the meeting he had in 1983, or indeed any advice he gave to the Campbell family. He nonetheless insisted that he had a clear recollection of events. His reason for having such a clear recollection, as I have said, is that he was much affected by what he perceived to be the decency and generosity of the family. However, the most significant inconsistency between his and Julie's evidence is what each say occurred at the meeting he conducted with Lady Campbell, Susan, Robyn and Julie in 1983.
9. Julie, of course, asserts that the meeting was in May 1983 and that she told Mr Burges that there was a seven year option agreement. Having received advice from Mr Burges, according to Julie she and her siblings present all made an agreement, as it were, to transfer the Property to their mother on the promise that Lady Campbell leave the Property to the four children equally in her will (JC1 [33]). Leaving aside for one moment the denials of the other siblings, Mr Burges' version of the meeting (KB1 [11]) is that during the course of the meeting an unidentified member of the family present announced that an agreement had already been reached. Mr Burges' evidence supports the proposition that, the agreement having been reached, the family was checking whether what had been done had created any tax problems "for us or any other issue that we might not have thought of".
10. Years later, however, when Mr Burges spoke with Mr Fleming (solicitor for the defendants) on 21 February 2014 in a telephone call, he confirmed that he could not find any notes in relation to that meeting but said instead (according to Mr Fleming): I recollect a general discussion with the Campbells and an entitlement that Keith Campbell had, entitling him to purchase the home at a favourable price. On his death, the estate was entitled to purchase the home. The discussion was an issue as to whether the home should be taken by the mother or taken by the children. They allowed her to take it. And the issue was simply that after much discussion, it was decided it would be more appropriate if mum owned the home rather than living in a home owned by the children, on her clear commitment to leave the home to the children in her will.
11. The description by Mr Burges that "they allowed her to take it" is certainly consistent with an agreement having already been reached, which is, of course, in accordance with his [11]. However, his further evidence that "… after much discussion, it was decided it would be more appropriate …" is somewhat equivocal. That was the account he gave of the conversation, of course, to Mr Fleming in February 2014, whereas his affidavit in the proceedings as to that conversation was sworn in July of that year. His version as it was given to Mr Fleming is, I consider, somewhat confused and ambiguous.
12. I am satisfied in any event that Mr Burges' recollection of the meeting should be regarded as unreliable. First, he has no contemporaneous notes. Second, he remained imbued by what he regarded as a conspicuous act of generosity on the part of the children. Having observed him in the witness box, he resorted frequently to that impression as the reason why he was able to give such detail as to the course of the conference (T150/25-27; 152/7-17; 153/44-47; 89/4-9; 190/20-46). I do not consider this to be a legitimate basis or foundation for his asserted recollection of the meeting.
13. Prior to or during the preparation of his affidavits he clearly had conversations with a number of people, including Julie and her solicitor, Mr Michos. He had no contemporaneous documents against which to check his recollection and, more importantly, his recollection was shown to be significantly faulty in connection with events which occurred in 1996, to which I will come, 13 years after the events, not 30 odd years after the events.
14. Mr Burges was shown a will prepared in 1996. It was said to have been attached to a letter from him to Lady Campbell dated 22 May 1996.
15. Mr Burges did not recognise the will (T170/42-43) and was confident that it was not a will that he had drafted. He was uneasy about accepting that it was a will he had drafted because Lady Campbell had not executed it until the November of that year. In addition, he was quite confident that the footer, as he described the reference on the bottom of the will, was not something that he had ever seen on documents prepared at that time by persons who did typing for him.
16. It may be recalled that after a career as a solicitor Mr Burges went to the Bar for a period. However, he certainly did not and could not deny that he had signed the letter of 22 May 1996 and that, on its face, he had indeed prepared a will for Lady Campbell. He simply could not rationalise in his own mind, however, why a will sent under cover of a letter of 26 May 1996 was not signed until 4 November 1996. For that reason, he simply could not accept it was the will that he had drafted (T171/10-15). Apart from those matters he could not recall any detail of having prepared a will but he accepted he must have done so given his signature on the letter.
17. This was another example where he (at the time) had a clear impression about an aspect of events and it demonstrated again his thought processes and thereby his manner of reasoning.
18. Critically, though, Mr Burges indicated that in 1996 he had a continuing belief that there had been a commitment in 1983 that Lady Campbell would not deal with her estate so as to mean that the children would not get an interest in the Property upon her death. He accepted that proposition unequivocally (T174/30-34). He also accepted that the will as drafted in 1996 is contrary to his understanding of those arrangements. That obviously placed him in a quandary.
19. During the course of the trial, and after the cross examination of Mr Burges had concluded, a further document was discovered by Robyn. It was a letter in similar terms to that addressed to Lady Campbell in May 1996 but was addressed to Robyn and attached a will that Mr Burges had obviously drafted for her, which was in a similar form with a similar footer (T370/40-44). Mr Burges did not return to the witness box, but I was informed that he accepted that he had drafted the 1996 wills for both Lady and Campbell and Robyn (T370/40-49).
20. Prior to that concession, Mr Burges accepted that unless the other siblings had given their consent the 1996 will was clearly inconsistent with his understanding of the 1983 Agreement because, for example, it granted a licence for Susan to remain at the Property for as long as she wished following Lady Campbell's death (T174/37-45).
21. The defendants submit with much force that in 1996 Mr Burges could not have believed there was any formal or binding agreement in the nature of the alleged 1983 Agreement, otherwise he would not have drawn the 1996 will. I agree. What is also important, of course, is that in the May 1996 covering letter Mr Burges comments that the "enclosed Will substantially covers all the points you raised with me, and certainly is much closer to your wishes than your old 1983 Will".
22. It is contended that Mr Burges could not have written that if he believed the 1996 will contravened any arrangements made in relation to the 1983 Agreement. Again, I agree.
23. It seems to me plain that in 1996 Mr Burges was proceeding upon the basis that the will which was being replaced was Lady Campbell's "old 1983 Will". That is indeed the fact. Upon that basis it is plain that he could not have held the view in 1996 that there was any binding arrangement of the sort asserted. Given Mr Burges' acuity and experience, I would have expected him in 1996 to have drawn any relevant matters to Lady Campbell's attention if he genuinely believed such matters existed. If it be that by 1996 he had forgotten the impression, then in my view his recall of the detail of the 1983 encounter is dramatically weakened in its potency, and indeed its accuracy is severely undermined.
24. I am therefore of the view that Mr Burges' evidence before me was based on a genuinely held and perhaps from time to time firm impression of the overall impact of what he thought had occurred back in 1983. It is clear to me, however, that he could not have held that view in 1996, and that his view in 2015 was likely the result of Julie or her solicitor having conversations with him and rekindling what he thought was a lasting (but, in reality, inaccurate) recollection of the detail of his 1983 encounter.
25. Notwithstanding his long experience and distinction in the legal profession I do not regard him as a reliable and/or persuasive source of evidence about the existence or non-existence of the alleged 1983 Agreement.

Jan Thomas

1. Jan Thomas is the plaintiff's aunt. She is Lady Campbell's sister. She swore one affidavit in the proceedings and deposed to conversations which she allegedly had with the plaintiff and Lady Campbell in 2004.
2. I did not find her evidence of any real significance or weight. It was put forward undoubtedly on the basis that somehow or other her conversation with Lady Campbell was meant to corroborate the 1983 Agreement. In my view, it does no such thing. She attributed to Lady Campbell simply an assertion that Lady Campbell was going to treat "everyone" fairly. As I have said, I do not regard that as corroborative of anything relevant in these proceedings. At best it was Ms Thomas' interpretation of Lady Campbell's subjective intention and could not amount to anything. In my view it should not be given much, if any, weight.
3. Her cross examination exposed, in my mind, a good deal of confusion about what she actually believed had been said.

Lady Campbell

1. The plaintiff submits that Lady Campbell's evidence should be accepted with the greatest caution. I do not accept that submission. Nor do I accept a suggestion that she was guilty of recent invention in her evidence in relation to her conversations with her late husband.
2. A number of specific complaints are made in relation to Lady Campbell's evidence on the basis that her story was internally inconsistent. Again, I do not accept these as valid criticisms.
3. The point is made against her that in her affidavit she said that she did not recall reading the memorandum of Mr Mansell in May 1983 but that, in fact, she may have done so. It is pointed out that a little later in her cross examination she was sure that she had read it. I must confess that I do not appreciate the force of that submission. I am satisfied that she did read it at the time, but I am equally satisfied that she may well, at the time of swearing her affidavit, have been a little diffident or uncertain that she had done so. Because the document is in any event, in my view, so contrary to the way in which the plaintiff puts her case, it is of no forensic moment whether Lady Campbell had a flawless recollection in relation to her likely reading of Mr Mansell's memorandum.
4. I was impressed by Lady Campbell both in the evidence she gave and, indeed, in the manner in which she gave it. Her evidence was clear, concise and responsive.
5. I do not consider there could be any serious or rational challenge to her veracity. She was firm in her recollection that no agreement of the sort suggested existed. I regard the will she made in 1983 which was, of course, prepared by the plaintiff, by reason of its failure to mention any such agreement, corroborative evidence of her version of events in a substantial manner.
6. Lady Campbell gave evidence which was entirely consistent with her affidavit material. She was firm but, if I may say so, credible. A comment was made by counsel for the plaintiff that she and Julie's siblings remained in Court and heard each other's evidence. I regard that as a somewhat misguided criticism. Each had sworn their affidavit evidence in advance of the trial. Indeed, I did not detect that Lady Campbell, but more importantly her other children, gave any evidence which could suggest they had been influenced by any oral testimony.

Robyn Campbell

1. The plaintiff criticises the evidence of her sister Robyn. It is submitted that Robyn's account of events in May 1983 is implausible. I simply do not accept that. Robyn's reference to the direction referred to in Mr Mansell's memorandum as a mere formality is, I think, entirely apposite. It was described as such. It is submitted that she gave an abbreviated account, for example, of the events of May 1983, which the plaintiff submits must have been of considerable significance and hence memorable. Again, I do not accept that. She was a young woman at the time who was no doubt grieving the loss of her father. Indeed, her frank concession about her lack of recollection had a refreshing candour about it.
2. Insofar as she denied understanding all of the contents of Mr Mansell's memorandum, I find nothing surprising about that. She has no contemporaneous notes (nor, for that matter, do her other siblings or Lady Campbell) of any discussions any of them had in 1983. The events took place 30 odd years ago. I find nothing surprising about her failure to recall precise details. The plaintiff says she is vague and uncertain in relation to certain recollections and yet it is said she can insist that she did not know of the existence of an option. Again, I do not accept that as an implausible response in all of the circumstances, given my other findings.
3. Again, I found Robyn to be frank and responsive in her evidence. She accepted that she may not have had a complete understanding of the legal advice the family received. But she was firm in her recollections of important meetings and I found, again, no reason whatever to doubt her veracity.

Susan Campbell

1. Similar criticisms are made of Susan. Again, it is asserted she was vague and has no recollection of important conversations in May 1983 as to the ownership of the Property. I do not agree. The passage of time affects different witnesses differently. Many, like Mr Burges, are entirely persuaded they have an accurate recollection which, upon objective analysis, as I have already explained, is materially flawed. The mere fact that Susan, and for that matter Robyn, admitted imperfections in their recollections against the proposition that it is inconceivable that they should and could not have a clear recollection is simply, again, misguided. It betrays, I consider, a failure to understand how people may or may not recollect. Courts have been often reluctant to rely on what are asserted to be crystal clear recollections, especially when there are no contemporaneous materials supporting them. In this case there are 30 odd years between the events and the necessity to recall them.
2. Again, I found Susan's evidence credible. As I said, she made concessions such as her imperfect recollection of events (T315/1-4). She conceded, for example, that Julie possibly had conversations with her regarding the Property in 1983 which she did not remember. She, like her sister Robyn, was nonetheless firm and consistent with her evidence that the option agreement and the 1983 Agreement simply did not exist.
3. A fairly tentative attempt was made with both Susan and Robyn to suggest that, in a sense perhaps unwittingly, they may have signed documents (including an option agreement) provided to them by their father, leaving open some possibility that Julie's evidence as to the executed option might find some modest corroboration. I regard both the attempt and the result as missing the mark by a significant margin.
4. There was also a mild conspiracy theory advanced through the cross examination of Robyn and Susan that the Deed of Family Arrangement was a device entered into when it was learned that Julie was maintaining that the Property had been, or indeed should be, left equally to the four children.
5. Leaving aside the lack of pleading, it seems to me there is no credible foundation for such a suggestion. There is little doubt that Susan and Robyn, and Robyn's husband John for that matter, would have wanted protection in relation to significant monies spent on property they did not own. I would have thought that was not only a matter of common sense but prudent on their part. I will return to these matters.

David Campbell

1. Similar criticisms are applied to David. It is said, for example, that he was present in Court and had the benefit of hearing all of the other evidence. That is true, but I did not detect either in his affidavit material or in the giving of his oral evidence that he was influenced in any material respect by having observed and heard the proceedings unfold. After all, he was not present at the meeting with Mr Burges and it is plain, as he candidly acknowledged, that the passage of time had an effect on his recollection. I find that both unstartling and, again, entirely plausible.
2. The defendants, unsurprisingly, place great weight on David's evidence. That is because, they submit, he is truly independent in the sense that he would benefit from Julie prevailing in the litigation. They submit he has given a version of events which entirely supports that of his mother and other siblings, which should be afforded considerable weight.
3. He was again frank and, in my view, matter of fact in the giving of his evidence. He was unequivocal in saying that the option had neither been executed nor existed in the form suggested by Julie, nor was there any 1983 Agreement. Again, I think he gave his answers credibly and thoughtfully.
4. There was an attempt to suggest that he was motivated, in effect, by greed. That was said to manifest itself, as I understood it, in him wishing to remain on side with his mother in order to ensure that he continued to receive monies under certain trusts. That, I think, was an example of a cross examiner being anxious to wound but afraid to strike.

John Dennett and Daniel Fleming

1. Evidence was also given by Robyn's husband John and the solicitor Mr Fleming. Nothing of moment arises in relation to their evidence and it was entirely credible and acceptable.

The existence of an enforceable option or other agreement in May 1983

1. The first issue is whether or not there was ever in existence an executed and enforceable option agreement.
2. In her affidavit (JC1) the plaintiff refers to a conversation with her father in which he indicated that there would indeed be a seven year option to buy the Mosman residence: see [11]. I have already, for example, referred in some detail to Julie's evidence in relation to, for example, the signed option agreement: see [129]-[140] above.
3. In any event, the plaintiff caused Notices to Produce to be forwarded to her mother and her siblings (JC2 [6]). Certain documents were thereafter produced. What was produced were documents dated 17 May 1983, signed by the plaintiff and the defendants, relating to the Property. What was also produced was a letter dated 15 June 1983 from Mansell & Norton also relating to the Property. The plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she believed she had not seen those documents since mid-1983: see [7].
4. The plaintiff then sets out the efforts she undertook to identify additional documents. She said that she made an extensive search for evidence of the 1975 option between Hookers and her father (JC2 [13]).
5. In about May 2012 she located a Ms Carolyn Baz, a former secretary to Mr Mansell. She is the "CB" referred to on the bottom of the last page of the Mansell memorandum. In any event, the plaintiff confirms that at no time did she find any option agreement or any other agreement of the sort she purports to describe in her first affidavit.
6. Susan discovered the unsigned memorandum from Mr Mansell dated 17 May 1983. In her searches the plaintiff had not uncovered such a document and indeed she states in her affidavit in reply (JC3 [25]) that she first saw the document when it was annexed to Susan's affidavit of 24 September 2014.
7. Lady Campbell in her first affidavit (MC1, 20 September 2014) denied that Julie ever showed her or members of her family an option agreement. She states that if such a document had ever existed she would not have destroyed it. She also asserts that her husband had never told her that Hookers had, in fact, granted her family or the children the option to purchase the Property: see [83]. I accept that evidence.
8. The second defendant in her affidavit (RD1, 24 September 2014) also denies being shown a document of the sort described by the plaintiff: see [73]. Again, I accept that evidence.
9. The third defendant in her first affidavit (SC1, 24 September 2014) states that her understanding was that her father kept all his personal and business papers at his office. She likewise denies the plaintiff ever showing her an option agreement of the sort described: see [82]. I accept that evidence.
10. The fourth defendant in his affidavit (DC1, 24 September 2014) also denies being shown such a document: see [30]. Again, I accept that evidence.
11. As I have already observed, when she gave her evidence the plaintiff's description of the document she had previously referred to in her affidavit was enhanced with much greater detail.
12. Julie was shown a document (CB537). This comprises the letter from Mansell & Norton dated 8 August 1975 together with what is described in handwriting at the top of the next page as the "fourth draft".
13. The plaintiff indicated that she had not seen the letter until it was produced in the proceedings. It was put to her that those documents were what she saw in her father's desk shortly after he died. She rejected that proposition and indicated that she had seen yet another and different document (T41/34-46).
14. I have already dealt in detail with this aspect of the plaintiff's evidence and made my comments and findings.
15. I am firmly of the view the plaintiff's evidence about having seen anything other than possibly the "fourth draft" is contrived.
16. The plaintiff's counsel submits for very good reason that the existence of the formally executed option is not essential to the plaintiff's case, but that it would assist her case significantly if it existed. The latter proposition is obvious. However, I am satisfied that there was never a formally executed option agreement.
17. The plaintiff points to a series of letters to which I have already made reference. In final written submissions, somewhat interestingly, when she comes to the letter of Mr Mansell of 8 August 1975 enclosing the fourth draft, she does not mention what Mr Mansell described as "problem factors". Mr Mansell was at pains to emphasise the need for further discussions so that "if the option is to go to the children personally then the attendant problems and risks are fully comprehended". The handwritten note, which the plaintiff in final submissions makes no mention of, and which Mr Glover accepts was in his handwriting, indicates that thought was obviously being given to whether Sir Keith would wait until all the children were over 18 years of age before documents were executed, or alternatively the documents be executed by only those children who were over 18 years of age. This fortifies my view that the option simply went off the table and was deferred.
18. Reference is made in Mr Mansell's letter to the possibility that some children might fail to ratify the agreement. In my view, it is reasonably clear those problems were simply not confronted, and people just got on with their respective lives, never anticipating that Sir Keith would die suddenly as he did in 1983. The mere fact that the fourth draft, for example, was predicated upon the option being in the names of the children is neither here nor there. Ultimately and in any event none of this matters if Julie's evidence can otherwise be accepted that she found the executed option agreement in her father's papers. For reasons I have already outlined, I do not accept that this is the case.
19. In the alternative, the defendants in my view correctly contend that in order to succeed in her primary claim (and in the absence of the signed agreement) the plaintiff must prove that during the course of the meeting with Mr Burges Lady Campbell made a testamentary promise to leave her property to her children equally. Julie's case after all, as pleaded and on her evidence, was that the Agreement was made orally at the meeting. Leaving aside that her brother David was absent, Julie asserts unequivocally that those present all agreed with Lady Campbell. She of course asserts that in a subsequent conversation later that evening David agreed as well.
20. Each of Lady Campbell, Susan, Robyn and David deny such an agreement and deny the things they allegedly said at the meeting. I accept their denials.
21. I am satisfied that no such agreement took place at that meeting. Given the various inconsistencies I have already referred to, and the lack of contemporaneous materials, I am not satisfied that the conversations alleged and hence the agreement has been proved by the plaintiff.
22. The evidence, in my view, and the weight of the evidence, favours the conclusion that no such agreement or testamentary promise was made. Indeed, Lady Campbell, Susan, Robyn and, for that matter, David, all assert that the meeting with Mr Burges did not take place in May but rather in June, after the Property had been transferred to their mother. Julie, of course, asserts that the meeting took place in May. Mr Burges, unsurprisingly given the event took place over 30 years ago, has no recollection of the specific date.
23. Mr Mansell's memorandum was dated 17 May 1983. The document signed by Lady Campbell and her children was dated the same day. Although the contract between Hookers and Lady Campbell is undated, the transfer to her from Hookers is dated 23 May 1983, as is the memorandum of costs and disbursements from Mr Mansell for acting on the conveyance. I was urged by counsel for the plaintiff to find that the evidence of Lady Campbell and that of Robyn and Susan could not be correct as to the meeting taking place in June. The principal reason for that was predicated upon an assertion that the likelihood was that they wished to consult with Mr Burges before undertaking the transaction, just to ensure prior to doing so that there were no avoidable or other adverse tax consequences. Of course Mr Burges's evidence, at least in his affidavit at [11], is entirely inconsistent with the version given by Julie. It is, however, on one view consistent with the version given by Lady Campbell and others, namely that the arrangement, if I can use that term, had already been made. In other words, even on that version Mr Burges was told that an agreement, in effect, had already been reached which, in my view, is entirely consistent, in broad terms, with the sale and transfer having already occurred.
24. There is, of course, no mention in Mr Mansell's memorandum of any desire to obtain advice on tax matters prior to the transfer taking place, although it is clear the family, in particular Julie and Susan, had discussions with Mr Mansell about stamp duty and land tax. However, equally important is the fact that the distinct impression I gain from all of the evidence, including that of the plaintiff and her siblings, was that there was no question but that the Property was going to be transferred into their mother's name come what may. In other words, it was not contingent on any outstanding issue such as financial consequences that might flow. I am satisfied that Lady Campbell and/or the family would have met any such obligations. Quite contrary to Mr Glover's rather snide suggestion, I did not gain the impression any meeting of the family was organised with the aim of exploring the possible avoidance of any legitimate legal obligations.
25. For example, such adjustments that had to be made for land tax (at [9] of Mr Mansell's memorandum) and the fact that ad valorem duty would have to be paid on the transfer ([4] of Mr Mansell's memorandum) simply indicate to me that whatever consequences flowed from the transfer to Lady Campbell would simply be faced by she and/or the family. After all, apart from a substantial parcel of shares in Hookers she had also received what Mr Mansell described as the proceeds of a "major insurance policy".
26. Lady Campbell, Susan and Robyn deny that Lady Campbell made the promise as alleged, which denials I have already accepted.
27. On the other hand, according to Julie's evidence it was Mr Burges who proposed the agreement (JC1 [33]; T61/17-42; T62/20-26; T61/38-42). Mr Burges, of course, gave evidence which is diametrically opposed to that, namely that he was told at the meeting that an agreement had already been made.
28. But Julie's evidence was in other important respects shown to be, at best, muddled and unreliable. For example, in her first affidavit she insisted that she brought a copy of Lady Campbell's 1983 will, which she had drafted, to the meeting with Mr Burges and that Lady Campbell signed it during that meeting. She said that she told Mr Burges in the meeting that Lady Campbell did not have a will and that she, Julie, "had taken instructions from her" and had prepared a draft. She said she then asked Mr Burges to look at the draft. She then, in some detail, described how she had handed the will to Mr Burges and he, having looked at it and appeared to read it, after a short time indicated that he thought it was "fine". Julie then asserts Mr Burges embarked upon an explanation of the will, directing it to Lady Campbell: see [33]. The will was then, Julie said, executed then and there. However, Lady Campbell's evidence, which I unequivocally accept, was that she took the will to her neighbours who witnessed it for her. She could not be challenged on this. The will is dated 31 May 1983.
29. I also note in passing that Julie's account of this meeting, particularly her remark that Lady Campbell did not have a will, is inconsistent with not only Lady Campbell's evidence regarding Lady Campbell's 1981/1982 will, but also with Julie's allegations regarding mutual wills.
30. Unsurprisingly, Mr Burges has no recollection of such an event (KB1 [12]). In cross examination Julie accepted that this aspect of her recollection was incorrect. Indeed, she said in her evidence in cross examination (T63/20-25) that she later accepted that the will was not signed at the meeting. However, she maintained that she did show Mr Burges the will at the meeting and asked him to explain it (T63/31-41). I reject that evidence.
31. Mr Burges, in cross examination, accepted that he was not shown a will at the first meeting but that he might have been shown a will at a subsequent meeting when members of the Campbell family came back to talk about a family trust (T155/3-8). I observe that the deed establishing the Campbell Family Trust was executed seemingly on 27 July 1983.
32. I cannot accept Julie's account of the meeting with Mr Burges about the will as truthful or plausible. Indeed, I am satisfied it is simply not what happened. Why, having drafted the will for her mother, she would then take it to the meeting with Mr Burges and, without notice, ask him to explain it is, I consider, inexplicable. In my view no person of Mr Burges's standing would give only cursory attention to the will of any person, let alone the will of someone like Lady Campbell, without notice, and then purport to give an explanation of a document that he had not drafted and had never seen before. He was being consulted about tax matters, not Lady Campbell's will.
33. A further reason why Julie's evidence is, I think, implausible is that for many, many years, perhaps twenty, she made no suggestion to anyone that there was any binding arrangement of the sort she now asserts. Her answer to that is rather glib; namely that no occasion arose for her to do so and that she trusted her mother. However, as she became in due time a property lawyer, it seems rather extraordinary to me, given the value of the assets concerned, that she would leave to chance or mere recollection an agreement of such significance so far as she and her siblings were concerned. There is no doubt that she was miffed when she discovered that she would receive only $2 million under her mother's will (T73/1-3; T73/50-74/2).
34. Julie's failure to assert the existence of the 1983 Agreement after learning of the proposed development of the Property is, I think, of particular significance. She knew from at least 2003 or 2004 that the Property was being developed. She must have known, as a property lawyer, that there was a risk that rights to the Property might be adjusted as a result of the redevelopment (T88/38-44). She appeared to concede in her evidence that she thought somehow, notwithstanding the redevelopment, there would be "some sort of equality" (T88/49). She appears to have thought that although she may not necessarily get a quarter share of the Property, she would get a quarter or an equivalent of that because he mother would in some way put other property or cash into the mix to achieve equality (T88/14). There are two comments which need to be made. First, if that was her honest belief at the time it was not consistent with the Agreement which she otherwise wishes to assert existed in these proceedings. But, second, it does not explain her failure to complain, or indeed her delay in doing something positive about what she alleges she saw as a breach of those arrangements.
35. I have observed before that Julie has no relevant contemporaneous notes taken at any time, either at the conference with Mr Burges or shortly thereafter, recording the arrangements that were made. That does not sit comfortably with someone who believed that an agreement of such importance and significance as she suggests existed.
36. But a more obvious difficulty arises for her case in relation to the very will she prepared for Lady Campbell in 1983. She relies on the will as conduct consistent on Lady Campbell's part with the 1983 Agreement. However, the 1983 will makes no mention of the 1983 Agreement (T83/22-25). Moreover the defendants contend, and I agree, that the will is inconsistent with the agreement in that it does not provide that the Property pass to the four children. Instead the Property, like the rest of Lady Campbell's estate, would be sold, called in or converted by her executrix with the proceeds held on trust for the four children as tenants in common in equal shares. If Lady Campbell had made the testamentary promise to Julie shortly before the 1983 will I consider it is inconceivable that she could have drafted that will with the apparent knowledge of the 1983 Agreement. It ran quite contrary to the very precise arrangement she asserts was made in front of Mr Burges.
37. I am simply not satisfied as a matter of probability there was any Agreement in 1983 of the sort or sorts asserted by the plaintiff.

Intention to create legal relations

1. As I have found against the plaintiff on the existence of a testamentary promise or agreement as alleged there is strictly no need for me to determine an alternative argument by the defendants, namely whether in the circumstances Lady Campbell and her children intended to create legally binding obligations by their statements at the Burges meeting and by their subsequent conduct. However, I propose to deal briefly with this issue.
2. I have referred to the principles above and to the scepticism courts frequently display towards such allegations.
3. In Sharpe v Anderson Justice Santow identified various factors. I will address each of them in turn.
4. In relation to the first factor, the only person who gives evidence of the testamentary promise is Julie. No other person present at the Burges meeting suggested that Julie's version of events occurred. Each of Lady Campbell, Susan and Robyn denied the assertion made by Julie. I accept their evidence.
5. I have already discussed why Mr Burges does not support Julie's version.
6. On balance the evidence is, in my view, unclear, and where critical assertions by Julie are not, so it seems, remembered by anybody else, I do not believe that it can be reasonably inferred that those present intended to enter legally binding relations.
7. Julie's participation in signing the direction, which makes no reference to any agreement, speaks loudly. Her failure to record any such agreement in the will she drafted for her mother, likewise. Mr Mansell clearly, by reason of his memorandum, was not told of any agreement, otherwise I would have expected him to mention it.
8. In Julie's case the alleged agreement was not in writing. For example, Julie did not circulate anything to all concerned by way of note or letter to record for posterity what had allegedly been agreed at the meeting.
9. In addition the defendants submit, and I agree, that there is no reliable evidence that there was any consideration given for the alleged testamentary promise. I will return to this issue.
10. There is certainly no evidence that the alleged testamentary promise was ever restated or confirmed following the Burges meeting, as I have already observed, whether orally or in writing.
11. The meeting with Mr Burges was a meeting designed, if not solely then predominantly, for the purposes of exploring with Mr Burges, by reason of his undoubted expertise, any tax consequences that might flow from the transfer of the Property to Lady Campbell. There is no evidence that Mr Burges had met Lady Campbell before, nor is there any suggestion he knew anything about her financial situation or personal circumstances at the time, yet even on Julie's version of events the whole affair was dealt with in an air of informality. Even on her version of events one could not exclude as a reasonable inference that what Mr Burges was saying was that at some point in the future a formal agreement might be entered into. Again, a reasonable inference from Julie's version is that Mr Burges' comments, even assuming what she said is a truthful account, were simply off-the-cuff and made without the benefit of independent legal advice and/or a consideration of precise terms and conditions, with the persons present simply indicating approval in principle.
12. That is putting the evidence, in my view, at its very highest, assuming I accept Julie's version of events, which I do not. As I have already found, I consider the Property had been transferred to Lady Campbell prior to the meeting with Mr Burges. I think it is most unlikely, in all of the circumstances, that Lady Campbell would have made or intended to make a solemnly binding agreement with such serious and lasting consequences on an ad hoc basis during an informal meeting whose principal purpose was to rule out any adverse tax consequences.
13. The other fact which I think militates against there being any intention to enter legally binding relations is the absence of David. Clearly, the 1983 Agreement as alleged required all relevant persons to be bound. In any event, at that time each of Lady Campbell's four children was living at the Property with her. I think it most unlikely in those circumstances a binding testamentary promise would have been made other than in the most formal way. The family was not short of the services of a competent lawyer.
14. On Julie's version of events, as is rightly pointed out by the defendants, the agreement contained one component only, namely that the Property was to be transferred to Lady Campbell on the basis that she leave the "property to the four of [the siblings] equally": JC1 [33].
15. As is again pointed out by the defendants, that simple if not simplistic agreement failed to deal with a whole series of contingencies which might affect the Property. For example, Lady Campbell's right to sell the Property or encumber it. I consider it highly unlikely that Mr Burges, who according to Julie was the genesis of the agreement, would have expected a mere handshake or embrace between members of the family to constitute a legally binding agreement. On his version, of course, no such matter arose because the agreement had been completed and was a fait accompli. He was not to know, nor did he on his version make any enquiries, about what level of formality the parties had engaged in. Nor did it deter him from giving the advice. Indeed, his version in part corroborates Lady Campbell and others that the Property had clearly been transferred.

Consideration

1. The defendants submit that even if Julie's version of events is accepted there is no reliable evidence that Julie (or any of her siblings) gave valuable consideration for the 1983 Agreement. Julie's pleaded case, of course, first pleads the existence of an option agreement in writing.
2. Next, it pleads that in May 1983 Lady Campbell and the plaintiff, second, third and fourth defendants entered into an agreement to the following effect: that in consideration for the plaintiff and second, third and fourth defendants directing Hookers to transfer the whole of the land to Lady Campbell for the price provided for in the auction, Lady Campbell would bequeath the whole of the land to the plaintiff, second, third and fourth defendants in equal shares as tenants in common. The valuable consideration, at least on the pleading, is the defendants foregoing the option.
3. However, in opening senior counsel for the plaintiff indicated that it was certainly not intended by the pleading (5) to suggest that the "direction" to Hookers needed to depend upon the existence of a legally enforceable option. Indeed, he submitted that was not the way the case was put in the outline of argument. Senior counsel indicated that, in the absence of an option in writing, the giving of the direction alone amounted to adequate consideration (T21/10-20).
4. On that alternative case, it is obviously necessary first to determine whether there was a binding and enforceable option in favour of the children in 1983. In the alternative, did the document signed by all concerned, as it is, otherwise provide adequate consideration?
5. On that issue I have decided against the plaintiff.
6. Of course, even if the option did exist, there is no proof that the children were in a position to exercise it. That, of course, also assumes any of them wanted to.
7. In any event, the only source of funds that Julie could identify as being available to her or her siblings were the amounts payable under the debentures and their shares in a family company, Wonga Enterprises Pty Limited (Wonga Enterprises) (T70/45-T71/2). However, the total amount payable under the debentures of $68,000 was clearly insufficient to meet the purchase price of $420,351.07. The shares concerned were in Wonga Enterprises, which was a private company. Whether they could be realised at their proper value (assuming it could be fixed) is problematic. In any event, the assets of Wonga Enterprises could not be used without the consent of Lady Campbell and Susan (who were the relevant directors at the time). It seems to me the defendant is correct in asserting that, even if the option existed, there was no consideration for the 1983 Agreement because the children were simply not in a position to exercise the option.
8. If the alleged option did not exist, then Julie and her siblings held no rights in the Property in 1983 and they had no power, therefore, to control the disposition of the Property by Hookers. Senior counsel for the plaintiff, however, attempted to suggest in the course of argument that Sir Keith would have had all sorts of rights, whether they be rights under the Australian Consumer Law or rights manifesting themselves in estoppel. Such a proposition is obviously speculative. A significant question of reliance, of course, might likely arise.
9. Hookers sought what was described by Mr Mansell as "Clearance" from the other family members before selling to Lady Campbell "in isolation from her children". He described it as a "formality". This is, of course, in the context of his carefully considered position that all that existed was a "gentleman's' agreement". In passing I observe that the plaintiff, as I understand it, relies upon that "Clearance" as corroborating the existence of a 1983 Agreement. I do not accept that. It is noteworthy that the word "Clearance" was chosen rather than, say, "release" or "indemnity".
10. In any event, the "Clearance" had two components to it. First, it confirmed all of the children wanted Hookers to sell the Property to Lady Campbell. Secondly, it acknowledged none of the children wanted to acquire any interest in the Property provided it was to be sold to their mother. The "Clearance" could not be a reflection of a binding option or any other agreement. It has to be seen for what, as a matter of reality, it was; a cautious public company honouring a gentleman's agreement. The "Clearance" makes no mention, of course, of any antecedent agreement, executed or otherwise. Indeed, it arose in the context that none existed.
11. In the context of there being no legal rights which any of the children had, the so called "Clearance" was indeed a mere formality. This does not suggest that it was a condition precedent to Hookers selling the Property. It was no more than a record of the unanimous wishes of all members of the deceased former Chief Executive Officer's family to a course of action. Julie does not assert (apart from her counsel's submissions) that the 1983 Agreement was discussed in the context of the "Clearance".
12. In any event the question, however, is whether the direction alone given by the children amounts to consideration. In that event, Julie would need to prove, it seems to me, on the balance of probabilities, that Hookers would have refused to transfer the Property to Lady Campbell had one or more of the children objected. The Mansell memorandum does not suggest that such consent was required as a condition precedent to Hookers selling the Property to Lady Campbell. That was urged upon me, but I consider that puts the evidence far too high. Mr Mansell and, for that matter Mr Glover, had formed the view that all that existed was a "gentleman's agreement". Hookers requested that the children "acknowledge" and "confirm" that they did not wish to acquire any interest in the Property if it was to be transferred to their mother.
13. On my findings, as I have said, any objection from any of the children could not have been based on any legal right of theirs. I am certain Hookers would not have been concerned if one of more of the children had objected. They could point to nothing that, objectively, could have persuaded Hookers not to go ahead. None of the children could have produced any support so as to substantiate the ability to purchase the Property. There is nothing to suggest Hookers would, or could, have favoured any child over the recently widowed wife of their former Chief Executive Officer.
14. The better view on the evidence, in my opinion, is that the consideration asserted by the plaintiff was either non-existent or illusory.

The absence of writing

1. The defendants raise certain affirmative defences in the event that I were to have found that Lady Campbell and her children entered into the 1983 Agreement as alleged. The defendants submit that the 1983 Agreement, even if it did exist, did not comply with the writing requirement imposed by sections 23C and 54C of the Conveyancing Act.
2. It is submitted that if the 1983 Agreement was made and if it had the asserted effect of constituting Lady Campbell as a trustee of the remainder interest in the land for the benefit of the children then that in turn created an interest in land or constituted a declaration of trust in respect of land within the meaning of section 23C(1) and (2) or was a disposition in land within the meaning of section 54A(1), such that writing was required.
3. The plaintiff submits, correctly in my view, that the requirement of writing may be overcome by part performance. However, the plaintiff bears the onus of establishing, it seems to me, the existence of such acts of part performance. Part performance, however, must exist unequivocally and whatever acts or conduct is relied upon it must be referable to the contract.
4. The plaintiff says the following acts were undertaken in performance of the agreement. First, the parties to the alleged 1983 Agreement signed the directions document dated 17 May 1983. Second, Lady Campbell executed the will drafted by Julie, on 31 May 1983, which left her estate in equal parts to her children.
5. The defendants submit that neither of those acts are unequivocally and in their nature referable to the contract. I agree.
6. Lady Campbell may have made the 1983 will for her own reasons, and there is no evidence to suggest, either from her or from Julie, the draftsperson, that the will was connected with any agreement made in 1983 or otherwise. Indeed, Julie's evidence (JC1[28]) is simply to the effect that after Sir Keith's death Julie had a conversation with Lady Campbell suggesting that Lady Campbell make a will, and she then followed her mother's instructions.
7. The execution of the "Clearance", as I have already observed, in my view is really the undertaking of the request from Hookers described by Mr Mansell as "a formality". I observed before that there is not the slightest reference in that document to any option. The direction, I am satisfied, was executed only by reason of the request made by Hookers, and not as a result or a reflection of any agreement independently made between Lady Campbell and her children. In my view, the allegation of part performance cannot be sustained, in which case sections 23C and 54A of the Conveyancing Act are insurmountable obstacles for the plaintiff.

Indefeasibility

1. Julie seeks relief in the form of a declaration that Robyn holds her 5% share of Lot 1 as a constructive trustee for herself and each of her siblings (FASOC - prayer 5).
2. The defendants submit that such a claim cannot be maintained in the face of s 42 of the Real Property Act. I agree.
3. There is no fraud alleged on the part of the plaintiff in relation to Robyn's 5% share in the lot.
4. In the absence, in my view, of Julie alleging fraud on Robyn's part in connection with her title to the 5% interest in Lot 1, I am of the view that there is nothing that gives rise to any in personam rights on Julie's part such as to overcome the effect of s 42 Real Property Act. In that event, her claim in that respect must fail and I would not grant any relief.
5. The plaintiff, in my view, makes no meaningful response to this submission (see plaintiff's final submissions at [58]).

Laches, acquiescence and estoppel

1. The defendants allege that Julie's claims are barred in equity by reason of her delay in bringing them, which manifested itself principally in her acquiescence in the face of the redevelopment of the Property and/or alternatively by reason of estoppel arising from her implied representation to the defendants that she had no interest in the Property.
2. Given my findings, the significance of this issue diminishes. I shall, again, deal with it briefly.
3. I have referred to the relevant principles earlier in this judgment. I am satisfied that the redevelopment of the Property began in or about 2003 and that Julie was aware that it was occurring from about that time.
4. In Julie's observations to counsel in 2011 she referred, in the sixth full paragraph on the first page, to her discovering "about eight years ago" the details of the proposed redevelopment. She records that she was "shocked and very upset to hear this" as it was contrary to her father's plans.
5. The plaintiff accepts that she was told in 2004 by Lady Campbell that Robyn and John were going to build on the site of the existing house and Lady Campbell was going to build a new house on Lot 8. The plaintiff, however, says she was never told that Robyn and John had agreed to lend Lady Campbell $3.4m and that Susan had agreed to lend Lady Campbell $4.5m to improve the Property. The plaintiff says, other than disclosure of the bare fact of the planned building works, no one informed her of the nature or size of the transactions. That submission is disingenuous. She must have realised that the building of a new house alone on Lot 8 would not have been an inexpensive exercise.
6. The defendants submit, in my view correctly, that notwithstanding that apparent knowledge Julie failed to raise any claim that the dealings in connection with the Property were in violation of her rights, even though she realised, as a property lawyer, the importance of doing so.
7. As an undisputed fact, Lady Campbell, Susan, Robyn and John, for that matter, have made significant personal and financial investments in the redevelopment of the Property. They did so to the clear knowledge of Julie. She knew, she says, about the 1983 Agreement, and the proposed redevelopment since 2003, yet she made no attempt in reality to assert her claim to an interest before 2013.
8. In the circumstances, it seems to me wholly inequitable, whichever preclusionary doctrine or notion is employed, that Julie have any rights, by reason of her failure to make a claim.
9. In my view, in the first instance that there was no 1983 Agreement. However, for the reasons I have considered as alternatives, in my view Julie is not entitled to any relief even if such an agreement could be demonstrated to have existed.

The mutual wills agreement

1. I have set out the relevant principles earlier in the judgment.
2. As the defendants point out in [27] of the FASOC, the plaintiff asserts that Lady Campbell and her late husband entered into a contract each to make a will equivalent in its terms to the other's will and not to revoke it. It is said that that contract was in part oral and in part written, the written portion being the execution of the mutual wills.
3. This part of the case was the subject of a number of amendments (one very late), which I allowed, and which were said to be largely founded upon statements made by Lady Campbell in her affidavit affirmed 24 September 2014 (MC3).
4. The statements relied upon involved Lady Campbell asserting that she had had a conversation with Sir Keith in around late 1981 or early 1982 to the effect that Sir Keith expressed the view that he thought he and Lady Campbell should make "mutual wills". He indicated that he would have Mr Mansell prepare them. Lady Campbell indicated that the document should simply be brought home and she would sign it. Lady Campbell indicated in her affidavit that she understood the discussions to mean that they would each make a will by which they would each leave each other everything.
5. She also said that, sometime after that conversation, her husband handed her a will which had been prepared. She read it through and understood the terms of it and assumed that her husband had made an identical will. She took it to their neighbours who witnessed her signing it: MC1 [18], [19] and [20].
6. The defendants submit that even from Lady Campbell's affidavit evidence, what was being proposed was not a mutual wills agreement in the technical sense. There is certainly nothing they say, in my view correctly, in the conversation recorded by her in that affidavit to suggest that part of the making of those wills involved the corresponding promise not to revoke them. The defendants submit that Lady Campbell could not have had that belief, because she otherwise asserts at [35] in the same affidavit that she felt herself free to change her will at any time, depending on her personal circumstances or those of any potential beneficiary.
7. In passing, I note that there is no hint in the 1982 will of Sir Keith, executed by him on 13 January 1982, of any promise not to revoke that will. It is also common ground that there is no deed or accompanying documentation to that effect.
8. The defendants point out that in a further affidavit of Lady Campbell of 4 December 2014 (MC3) a number of additional statements are made by her. For example, she indicated that she was not certain that Sir Keith had actually used the phrase "mutual wills": at [12]. He may have used that term, but he might also have said that they should simply get wills done together: at [12]. Lady Campbell also indicated that she did not, at the time she affirmed her affidavit on 24 September 2014, understand the phrase "mutual wills" had any technical meaning, and that prior to the filing of the Amended Statement of Claim she was unaware that married couples could even make legally binding documents not to revoke their wills: MC3 at [16].
9. Importantly, she asserted that Sir Keith had never proposed that they agree not to revoke their wills in the future, nor did he suggest that the wills could not be changed once made: MC3 at [20]. Lady Campbell also asserted that Sir Keith and she did not promise each other that they would not revoke the wills, and whilst alive he never suggested that she was unable to do so: MC 3 at [20].
10. Lady Campbell also said that she would never have agreed to make a will in circumstances where she could never change it, and always believed she had the ability to do so: MC3 at [21] and [24].
11. Lady Campbell went on to say that when she signed her earlier will in 1981/1982 she did not believe there was any formal or informal obligation upon her not to revoke it or change it at a later point, nor was she aware, she says, of whether Sir Keith had signed the will he had discussed with her in 1981/1982 until he died: MC3 [26]. In any event, she did not know if her 1981/1982 will was in corresponding terms to Sir Keith's, although she thought it was in similar terms: MC3 at [27].
12. The defendants, in my view, correctly submit that the doctrine of mutual wills depends on the existence of an actual binding agreement between the two persons. They submit there is no evidence here to support such an agreement. Again I agree.
13. There is certainly nothing in the evidence given by Lady Campbell, at least in chief, to suggest that there was such an agreement, nor that such an agreement was ever proposed. The defendants submit that even if there was an agreement between Lady Campbell and Sir Keith regarding their 1981/1982 wills, there is no evidence to suggest it was a term of that agreement that they would not revoke their wills in the future.
14. It is pointed out by the defendants that Julie in her affidavit (JC1 at [24]) deposes to a conversation she allegedly had with her father in late 1982 or early 1983. Notably, they submit that in that conversation Julie does not purport to give any account of her father suggesting that there was some promise between him and Lady Campbell that they not revoke any wills they might make or had made.
15. The defendants also submit that, as in the present case, where the conversation is between two lay persons, without the intervention of a lawyer or express words to corroborate it, it would be unlikely in the extreme that the parties were proposing to make mutual wills to satisfy the respective criteria of the mutual wills doctrine in equity.
16. The defendants also point out that although there is a 1982 will for Sir Keith, there is no evidence of the existence of a corresponding will for Lady Campbell. In fairness, however, she did admit that she believed she had made such a will. I think the evidence at its highest would only support the proposition that she believed that will was in identical (or at least similar) terms to that which was made by Sir Keith. But that is as high as it goes. At T206/36-T207/10 the following exchange occurred in the cross examination of Lady Campbell: Q. Putting it a little differently, the position is though, that having gone down that path of making those wills together in the way I've been describing in these questions, you considered that it wasn't the case that he was simply free to then choose to do whatever he liked with his estate without telling you. Isn't that correct? A. I still can't imagine it. I'm afraid I find that very hard to answer because it just would never have happened. Q. While I appreciate that your trust in your husband was so strong that you can't contemplate it happening, the fact is that you would have been shocked if he had done it. That's I think something you've agreed with. Is that correct? A. Absolutely I would have been, yes. Q. Part of the reason that you would have expected that he wouldn't have done that was because your belief was that he was honour-bound to leave the estate to you in accordance with the wills that you'd made together after you'd gone through the process. Do you agree? A. Yes. Q. And the position that you were both in after you had gone through that process is that you knew that neither of you were then free to simply go off and make a fresh will whenever you wished unless you told the other. A. Absolutely.
17. In re-examination the following exchange occurred at T270/36: Q. Sorry, madam. Did you understand when you were asked that question the distinction between honour bound and legally bound? A. One is honour and the other is legal, by law. Q. When someone is legally bound by law as you say, what do you understand that to mean? A. That I could sue him if he had made another will, that he was bound by a legal constriction. Q. When someone is bound legally what did you understand the difference between someone being bound legally as opposed to someone being bound in honour? A. That he couldn't make another will if he was legally bound.
18. A number of things may be said about these exchanges. First, I do not regard Lady Campbell's evidence as amounting to any concession so as to prove the existence of an agreement to make mutual wills and not revoke them. The cross examiner, of course, was content to leave the issue on the basis of something which was honour-bound, without definition. The re-examiner clarified the position, as did Lady Campbell, in relation to her understanding as to the distinction between honour-bound and legally-bound. It is true, as the defendants point out, that the cross examiner never put to Lady Campbell that she was not only honour-bound but that she was indeed legally-bound. The crucial flaw in that line of questioning was that it was never put to Lady Campbell (the relevance of which may be debateable) that she believed that the survivor of her and Sir Keith was not free on any basis to change his or her will after one had predeceased the other. That is a critical element of the mutual wills doctrine. All of the questions, it seems to me, on a fair reading, were predicated upon Sir Keith and Lady Campbell being alive. Lady Campbell could not conceive it possible that Sir Keith would change his will during her lifetime without consulting her, presumably because they had a very close and intimate relationship and she would have expected him to discuss matters with her, as indeed she would with him.
19. It is clear from other evidence that Lady Campbell was at pains to say that she believed herself to be free to make a new will after Sir Keith had died. I regard her as a truthful witness and she never once hinted that the agreement they made included an express promise not to revoke her will - ever. Indeed, she gave evidence that she thought it was necessary for her to change her will in the light of his death (T238/7-17). That conduct, occurring so soon after they had made their alleged mutual wills, is of course wholly inconsistent with Lady Campbell believing she was bound in honour or in law not to change her will following Sir Keith's death.

A further amendment

1. At the very end of the trial (22 May 2015) counsel for the plaintiff sought a late amendment. I granted leave to the plaintiff to file a Second Further Amended Statement of Claim dated 26 May 2015 (2FASOC).
2. This was the third attempt by the plaintiff to address perceived deficiencies in the pleading on the mutual wills allegation.
3. The amendment was granted by consent and without admissions, and with an express notation that the defendants maintained the proposed amendment did not plead an arguable claim and that the particularised case was wholly inadequate.
4. It is clear that what is pleaded in terms is an agreement by which the relevant parties made promises not to change the terms of the will during the life of the other testator. This is to be contrasted with an agreement where the respective parties agree they will not to change their respective wills after the death of the other. It is the former which the plaintiff pleads here, but it is only the latter which equity will oblige the parties to adhere to.
5. Indeed, the pleading in [27] of 2FASOC makes it abundantly clear that it is an agreement not to vary their wills during their respective lifetimes. [27] [Lady Campbell] and the late James Keith Campbell entered into a contract each to make a will equivalent in its terms to the other's will (mutatis mutandis) and not to revoke it without notice to the other.
6. In my view the authorities make it clear that it is essential that the agreement must bind each person so as to oblige the survivor not to revoke or change his or her will after the death of the other.
7. I agree with the defendants' submission that the pleading in its third iteration is still defective in that regard. But even accepting that is what is meant, for other reasons the case fails.

The state of the evidence

1. Quite independently of the pleading issue, the defendants submit that the evidence is likewise deficient in relation to the agreement between Lady Campbell and Sir Keith, other than perhaps suggesting they agreed not to change their wills without notice to each other during the period in which they were both alive.
2. The evidence at the trial did not, it seems to me, ever rise any higher than some moral, perhaps legal, obligation not to change each other's will without asking the other during their respective lives. It never was put to Lady Campbell that the arrangement she and Sir Keith had was never to change the mutual wills after either of them died nor, unlike in Birmingham v Renfrew, does the evidence prompt me to find any express promise to that effect.

The implied promise not to revoke

1. The defendants again assert that the matters relied upon to support an allegation of this sort are wholly deficient.
2. The plaintiff contends that there was agreement between Lady Campbell and Sir Keith never to revoke their wills, and that this is to be found by necessary implication from the alleged agreement between them to make wills in "equivalent terms". Further, that content or the circumstances generally support such an implication. The circumstances are, first, that there was allegedly a proposal and agreement that Lady Campbell and Sir Keith make identical wills. Second, that there was a decision on the terms of the wills and, third, that Sir Keith and Lady Campbell likely had wills drafted together at or about the same time.
3. Put simply, it is submitted correctly by the defendants that an agreement to make wills in the same terms (whatever those terms may be) cannot carry with it a necessary promise (implied) not ever to revoke the wills. Such an implication, in my view, would not be necessary to give effect to the agreement "to make wills in equivalent terms", and it is by no means obvious or for that matter objectively reasonable: BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 283; Osborne v Estate of Frederick Osborne [2001] VSCA 228 at [29] per Buchanan J.
4. The assertion, for example, in the particulars that there were, for example, negotiations between Lady Campbell and Sir Keith from which an implication should arise, finds no support in the evidence. The fact that a husband and wife make wills at the same or similar times is no basis for inferring or implying, without more, the existence of a promise between them never to revoke those wills.
5. In the circumstances I consider that on the asserted implication never to revoke the mutual wills the plaintiff's case fails.
6. The defendants submit, correctly in my view, that there is no evidence from which it could be held that Lady Campbell and Sir Keith intended to enter legal relations in respect of their 1982 wills, other than perhaps regarding themselves as mutually bound to these wills during their lives.
7. In any event, the mere expectation or mutual desire as to the intended ultimate beneficiaries is not sufficient to give rise to an enforceable obligation, even if one party intended the arrangement to be legally binding.
8. Looking at the matter objectively, I do not think the plaintiff has established that there was a legally binding mutual wills agreement between Lady Campbell and Sir Keith.
9. When each made their will in 1981/1982 all four children lived at home, none were married, and it is clear Sir Keith did not expect to die the following year. Husbands and wives, especially those who are sophisticated, would, I consider, be wary about entering arrangements which they agreed would never be varied, especially without legal advice as to the repercussions. Mutual wills, in my opinion, are the product of special situations and this is not one of them. There is no suggestion that the parties, in making their wills, at the time looked very far beyond their immediate circumstances. To have the hands of the respective spouses clasped together tightly for eternity is a romantic notion. But to infer such an arrangement requires, in my view, the discharge of a heavy burden.
10. I am satisfied that no such agreement was in existence here at any time. The plaintiff therefore fails on this part of her case as well.

Contracts review and unconscionability

1. The defendants submit that if all else fails and the Court were to find that Lady Campbell and Sir Keith made a mutual wills agreement in 1981/1982, they assert that the agreement can be avoided by Lady Campbell on the basis that it was unconscionable or "unjust in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made". They call in aid the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) and general principles in relation to unconscionability.
2. The defendants further submit that the mutual wills doctrine operates only where there is a binding contract according to ordinary contractual principles. As such it is susceptible to the Contracts Review Act remedies. They have referred me to a decision of Cohen J in Carovski v Carovski (unreported, NSWSC, 28 April 1997) and an unreported decision of my own in White v Wills [2014] NSWSC 1160. In principle, I am satisfied that in the appropriate circumstances such a contract is theoretically susceptible to contracts review relief.
3. The defendants point to s 9 of the Contracts Review Act and to the various matters the court has regard to in determining whether there is relevantly an injustice requiring remedy.
4. The defendants submit that there was material inequality in bargaining power between Lady Campbell and Sir Keith, particularly having regard to their educational background. They point to the fact that Sir Keith was the Chief Executive Officer of a major public company whereas Lady Campbell had had little tertiary education and had not had any professional employment after the age of 24. Sir Keith, they submit, handled all the family's affairs. They also point out the agreement was not the subject of negotiation and that Sir Keith did not recommend Lady Campbell obtain, nor did she obtain, any independent legal or professional advice. Further, she got no explanation of the document and was unaware of the term "mutual wills" and whether or not it had any technical meaning. Further, it is submitted that if Sir Keith intended to enter a binding agreement he did not explain that to his wife.
5. It is submitted that Lady Campbell had no prior will and therefore did not understand what was being proposed.
6. Lastly, it is said that the agreement was being made in a familial rather than a commercial context. In the circumstances, it is submitted that Lady Campbell acted with "love and affection" rather than with a view to entering into any legally binding obligation.
7. In the circumstances the defendant invites me to refuse to enforce that agreement and declare it void.
8. The plaintiff, on the other hand, submits that the will could not be described as unfair or unjust. The plaintiff says that the wills were mirroring wills and both Sir Keith and Lady Campbell were subject to the same obligations. The benefit to Lady Campbell, it is submitted, is obvious, in that upon Sir Keith's death she was to inherit the whole estate. Indeed, it is submitted that it would be unconscionable for her to take the benefit of the contract without accepting its burden. The point of the mutual wills was to ensure that, from Lady Campbell's point of view, she and Sir Keith would be independent of their children on the death of the other.
9. It is submitted that the gift over to the children was not unwelcome, as evidenced by the fact Lady Campbell willingly made a new will in 1983 that had the same effect, and a further will in 1996 which, save for the continued occupancy of Susan, was again to the same effect.
10. It is submitted that Lady Campbell was not denied the opportunity of obtaining legal advice. That, if I may say so, is a little disingenuous. It was never proposed by Sir Keith, but I do not think that is determinative of the issue.
11. I do not consider what occurred, in the context in which it did occur, assuming it was a legally binding arrangement, was such as to lead to one person taking unfair advantage of the other or some inequality in bargaining power. This was not a negotiation, fairly obviously. It was an agreement between husband and wife where a pact was made to ensure each was treated the same and likewise their children. Had there been an agreement, neither the Contracts Review Act nor general notions of unconscionability have any part to play in the matter.

Conclusion

1. Given the various alternatives proposed by both parties, it is convenient for me to briefly summarise my findings in relation to each matter. Firstly, as a prelude to consideration of the alleged 1983 Agreement, I am not satisfied that any executed option agreement as alleged by the plaintiff existed.
2. Secondly, I am not satisfied Julie's account of the conversations and circumstances in which the 1983 Agreement was said to be formed was an accurate one. That being the case, I do not consider that any such agreement was made. However, had I been convinced of the truth of Julie's account and determined that a promise or agreement had been reached at the meeting with Mr Burges, I would not have considered that the parties had manifested an intention to enter legal relations. I would also, regardless of whether an option agreement had been executed, have been unsatisfied that adequate consideration for such an agreement had been provided. I would have considered the absence of a written agreement could not be overcome, as was suggested by Julie, through the operation of the doctrine of part performance, and I would further have considered that the operation of s 42 of the Real Property Act would defeat Julie's claim insofar as it pertains to Robyn's 5% interest.
3. Thirdly, had I been satisfied that any binding agreement had been entered into concerning the disposition of the Property, I would have considered that the operation of laches, acquiescence or estoppel would have precluded the plaintiff from recovery given her state of knowledge and her failure to complain until 2013.
4. Fourthly, I am not satisfied that Sir Keith and Lady Campbell entered into a mutual wills agreement by which each was bound not to alter or revoke their respective wills after (or before, without notice) the death of the other testator. Had I been convinced that such an agreement existed, however, I would not have considered that Lady Campbell could have avoided its operation through an allegation of unconscionability or through the operation of the Contracts Review Act.
5. In all the circumstances, in my view the plaintiff has been unsuccessful in all relevant respects and I would refuse any relief she has sought.
6. I invite the parties to prepare short minutes to reflect my reasons and if it cannot be agreed, to have the matter of costs argued.

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