"I should also say that the structure of Section 109 does, despite Mr Peake's submission to the contrary, create a presumption that costs lie where they fall. So far as I am aware this is the light in which Section 109(1) has been seen in this and all other Lists of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, Section 109(3)(d) provides in itself a justification for departing from the general rule. Ordinary permit review proceedings might be regarded as legitimate differences of opinion between parties as to the proper exercise of administrative discretion. No party contends for a particular view of fact or law to be found by the Tribunal. Therefore, despite the outcome, in most cases nobody can be said to be "right" or "wrong" in an ordinary permit review proceeding. An enforcement proceeding however, stands in a very different character. Just as in ordinary court proceedings, one party alleges and another party denies a particular state of fact and to apply the law to the facts which it finds, in the same way as a court does. Hence the circumstances surrounding the matter are required to be proven by proper evidence which is taken on oath, in contradistinction to the manner in which ordinary permit review applications are conducted with matters being simply asserted in the course of submission. See for instance Svanosia v Shire of Strathfieldsaye (1989) 2 AATR 26. Nevertheless as Mrs Komesaroff observed in Bayside City Council v T A Campbell (1999) 3 VPR 79, 82 at [17] "there is no general rule [that costs follow the event in enforcement orders] and each case must be judged on its merits.".