Byrne & Anor v Australian Airlines

APPLICANT Mr R Reitano of Counsel SOLICITOR Mr J Ralston Pigott Stinson Ratner Thom RESPONDENT LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: Mr C Stomo of Counsel (for part of proceedings) SOLICITOR (16/11/00, 17/11/00/ 1/12/00) Mr N Pertsoulis Pertsoulis Lawyers SOLICITOR (1/3/01) Ms L Peterson Magney & Rhodes

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES CORAM: SAMS DP

BILL PASSAS AND SKOULOUDIS GROUP PTY LTD t/as O KOSMOS

Application by Bill Passas re unfair dismissal pursuant to section 84 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996

1 This is an application, pursuant to s84 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 ("the Act"), filed by Mr Bill Passas ("the applicant"), seeking relief in respect to his alleged unfair dismissal by Skouloudis Group Pty Ltd, t/as O Kosmos, ("the respondent"), on 23 May 2000. 2 The applicant is fifty-five years of age and had been employed as a journalist for eleven years with O Kosmos, a well known Greek newspaper. At the date of the termination of employment, he was the newspaper's acting editor. 3 The applicant had been the sports editor for seven years when, in January 2000, he became acting editor. His terms of engagement were altered. His weekly rate of pay was increased and converted to an hourly rate of $22.00. He was working fifty to sixty hours per week. At about this time, the applicant informed the respondent he would be travelling to Greece in June 2000 to visit his elderly mother. His employment appeared to continue without incident until 23 May. On that day and without warning, he was told by the company's accountant that he was dismissed. The respondent maintained that the applicant had resigned full time employment on 19 January and became a casual employee. As he was intending to leave in June anyway, the respondent decided to replace him before he left. 4 At directions and conciliation proceedings on 24 August 2000, Mr Ralston, Solicitor, represented the applicant and Mr Pertsoulis, Solicitor, represented the respondent. After private conferences, the Commission, pursuant to s87 of the Act, formed the view that the matter could not be resolved through conciliation. I set the matter for hearing and issued directions for the filing and service of evidentiary material. These directions were subsequently amended. However, the hearing dates in November were not affected. There was no appearance by the respondent at two hearings listed for return of subpoena.

5 At the hearing of the application on 16 November 2000, Mr Reitano, of Counsel, appeared for the applicant with Mr Stomo, of Counsel, for the respondent. The applicant's evidentiary case, including oral evidence from Mr Passas and his wife, proceeded and concluded uneventfully. 6 However, the proceedings took an extraordinary and unexpected turn midway through the respondent's evidence, when Mr Skouloudos withdrew his instructions to Counsel. Mr Stomo was forced to seek leave to withdraw from the proceedings and leave was granted. Mr Pertsoulis, the respondent's solicitor, immediately sought an adjournment to enable his client to instruct new Counsel, foreshadowing that the respondent would seek to admit new evidence. Mr Pertsoulis consented to a costs order, in favour of the applicant, for the wasted proceedings on 17 November. Mr Reitano reluctantly agreed to the adjournment subject to three provisos: one, that a costs order of $3,000 be made, payable within seven days; two, that one day only be set for the completion of the case and, three, that the only evidence in the case be that which had been filed in accordance with the Commission's directions. 7 The Commission made the costs order as proposed, set a further date for hearing and listed the matter for further argument as to the admission of fresh evidence. 8 On 1 December 2000, the case took another unfortunate turn. Mr Pertsoulis applied for a new date for hearing, made no application to admit fresh evidence and acknowledged that the costs order made fourteen days earlier had not been complied with. Mr Reitano pressed the Commission to make an order or direction under s162(2)(c) and (d) that the evidence filed to date be the only evidence admissible in the case. The Commission declined to do so. However, I stressed to Mr Pertsoulis that I expected the case to conclude on the next occasion. 9 Another bizarre turn of events occurred on 1 March 2001. Ms Peterson, Solicitor, now appeared for the respondent; Mr Pertsoulis having filed a notice of ceasing to act. Ms Peterson requested an adjournment as she had only received instructions the day before. She advised that if the adjournment application was not granted, she would seek leave to withdraw from the proceedings. She informed the Commission that Mr Skouloudis was in Melbourne and unable to continue his evidence. 10 Mr Reitano strongly resisted the adjournment application. He further advised that the 16 November costs order had still not been complied with. The Commission refused the adjournment application. Directing my remarks to the respondent, I said: Well, I regard the behaviour of your client to be impertinent. He is treating the Commission with contempt, and I will not tolerate it. There has been no explanation as to why he is not here, or sought to excuse himself from continuing his evidence which was mid stream on the second last occasion. His former solicitor was well aware that the proceedings today were to be continued, and indeed, concluded today. There was an understanding reached in respect of wasted costs when the indulgence of the Commission was sought on a previous occasion and granted. Well, the Commission does not propose to grant any further indulgences to your client Miss Peterson, and I have absolutely no hesitation at all in refusing your adjournment application. The case will proceed to conclusion today and assume that the evidence that is in now is the evidence that is to be relied upon by your client. In which case the corollary of that is your case, evidentiary wise, is concluded. Is that the case? PETERSON: There is nothing I can say to dispute it. We don't have any evidence here today. HIS HONOUR: I propose to continue the case. Mr Reitano, are we up to your submissions? PETERSON: Might I be excused from further attendance, your Honour, there is no further assistance I can give the court and I thank you for listening to me. HIS HONOUR: I am sorry you have been put in this position but there is only one person who is to blame for the position that the court finds itself in and whatever be the consequences, the respondent will have to wear them. I propose to continue the matter ex parte. Leave is granted for you to withdraw, Miss Peterson. 11 This chronology and extract from transcript should be sufficient to demonstrate the respondent's appallingly cavalier approach to this matter and this Commission's determination to protect its processes from such abuse and disrespect. The respondent's part heard evidence was not much better.

THE EVIDENCE 12 The applicant had worked in the Australian Greek media since 1974, commencing as a journalist for the Hellenic Herald. In 1989 he began work with O Kosmos, where in 1993 he was promoted to sports editor. In 1978, the ownership of O Kosmos changed. The new owner was Mr Jim Skouloudis. 13 The applicant was appointed editor of the newspaper on 20 January 2000. His weekly wage was increased and converted to an hourly rate. Each week, he would tell the accountant how many hours he worked the week before, (usually fifty-five or sixty) and was paid accordingly. He said that he had not resigned his full time employment and was not re-employed as a casual. He rejected the statement on the separation certificate that he had resigned his permanent position and was a casual employee. It is clear from pay slips tendered in evidence that the applicant's employment arrangements materially changed in January 2000; although the applicant said he didn't look too closely at the pay slips. Pay advice slips before 20 January reveal accruals for Long Service Leave, Holiday and Sick Pay (Ex'A'). A pay advice for 26 January to 2 February, discloses no leave accruals (Ex'B'). 14 The applicant described the work he performed as editor and gave evidence that his work was similar to that performed by previous editors of the newspaper. He said Mr Skouloudis was editor in name only, just as he was when the previous editor, Mr Messaris, was in charge. 15 The applicant gave evidence that it was common knowledge in the office that he would be taking two months leave at the end of May to visit his elderly mother in Greece so as to arrange for her placement in a nursing home. In order to assist in financing her placement, he asked for, and was granted, all his outstanding entitlements to long service leave, annual leave and sick leave. He said he claimed no more than he was entitled to. He said Mr Skouloudis knew of his plans and approved the payment of accrued entitlements. 16 Despite knowing of the applicant's plans, Mr Skouloudis offered him the position of editor. The applicant expected to return to the editor's position upon his return from Greece. He rejected Mr Skouloudis' evidence that he was intending to go to Greece, for an indefinite period, without his wife. 17 Sometime in March 2000, the applicant received a phone call from Mr Skouloudis, in which Mr Skouloudis offered him the management of his nightclub, Knossos, which operated two nights a week. The applicant declined the offer for health reasons as he was working long hours at the newspaper. He suggested that his wife might be interested. Mrs Passas was subsequently employed for two months. However, on 22 May, she was dismissed following a disagreement with Mr Skouloudis. I shall refer to this matter in discussion of Mrs Passas' evidence. 18 The applicant gave evidence that on 23 May 2000, at about 1.00pm, the company accountant, Ms Tsoutsouras, approached him. She told him "you are finished" and gave him his final pay packet. The applicant asked "why, what do you mean?" Ms Tsoutsouras said she had been told to tell him he was sacked. After inquiring as to his holiday pay, she said "you don't have holiday pay because you are a casual".

A short time later, all the staff came into the applicant's office with a farewell gift and a card. The applicant said he was " very emotional ", collected his personal items and left about 2.00pm. There was some suggestion the applicant might be paid for writing some articles for the newspaper while he was in Greece. 19 The applicant said he was given no reason for his dismissal; received no warning that his work was unsatisfactory or that his visit to Greece would precipitate his dismissal. 20 The applicant went to Greece on 4 June and returned on 20 August. Since his return, he has found it very difficult to find work as a journalist in the Greek media. 21 The applicant was not seeking reinstatement, as the employment relationship had broken down. Notably, Mr Skouloudis had made serious unsubstantiated allegations against him which were totally denied. 22 Mrs Julie Passas provided affidavit evidence; but was not required for cross examination. The substance of her evidence dealt with her employment at Mr Skouloudis' nightclub, Knossos, which operated two nights a week. She said Mr Skouloudis often visited the club, he sometimes was intoxicated and often asked why her husband was not at the club. 23 In early May 2000, Mrs Passas indicated that she didn't wish to work any more. On 22 May she complained to Mr Skouloudis about the stress she was under and the costs she had to meet out of her own pocket for some of the Club's expenses. Mr Skouloudis asked if she was leaving to go to Greece with her husband. Mrs Passas said that she wasn't going to Greece. While she had given notice, she offered to stay until a replacement could be hired. Mr Skouloudis' response was 'no, you go now". Her employment ceased immediately after this conversation. Her husband was dismissed the next day.

24 The Commission will refer to Mr Skouloudis' evidence only insofar as it conflicts with that of the applicant's. It is appropriate to highlight major differences in the evidence Mr Skouloudis attested to in his affidavit (Ex'C') and the evidence he subsequently gave in the witness box. 25 Mr Skouloudis said that in January 2000, he asked the applicant to help him with the newspaper layouts. Mr Skouloudis said the applicant was not the newspaper's editor. The applicant advised he would be leaving in May or June to visit his mother in Greece. A week later the applicant asked for all his entitlements and agreed to stay on a casual basis with an increased hourly rate. Mr Skouloudis had not expected the applicant to return to Australia from Greece. 26 As to Mrs Passas' employment at his nightclub, Mr Skouloudis said that she displayed "a certain amount of arrogance" and, on one occasion, she had insulted a friend and business associate, Mr Skalkos and his wife at the Club. He was unaware of a claim Mrs Passas had for reimbursement of a visiting entertainer's bill. He said Mrs Passas had resigned in May 2000. 27 Mr Skouloudis' oral testimony abounds with matters not mentioned in his affidavit. These include:

1. The applicant had not been dismissed, but was leaving of his own volition. In any event, he was a casual employee.

2. The applicant was threatening and blackmailing the staff. He was rude and arrogant.

3. The applicant went to the Sydney Olympic Soccer Club at lunch time and did not return on four out of seven days a week (T.p51).

4. Mr Skouloudis said he dismissed the applicant because his business was threatened.

5. The applicant had told Mr Skouloudis he was resigning and said " I'll do you a favour and stay on as a casual ".

6. Mr Messaris and the applicant were organising to destroy his newspaper (T.p59).

7. Mr Skouloudis said the applicant told him in January he was leaving in May 2000.

8. Mr Skouloudis said that in May he had a second conversation with the applicant and warned him of " the dangers he was taking my newspapers to " (T.p62).

Mr Skouloudis agreed that he omitted important matters from his affidavit. However, he said this was because he was too busy or simply forgot. 28 Even more curious were the different answers he gave to the same propositions during cross examination. For example:

1. Mr Skouloudis claimed he did not dismiss the applicant; rather, the applicant had resigned. However, the separation certificate (Ex'A') shows that the employee did not cease work voluntarily.

He then said the applicant was dismissed because he was jeopardising the business (T.p47).

2. Mr Skouloudis said he never offered the applicant the editor's position. He later admitted that he did (T.p55).

3. Mr Skouloudis denied that he sacked Mr Passas because he was upset with his wife who had resigned the night before. He denied that it was a good idea to get rid of them both at the same time (T.p67).

General Principles - "Harsh, unjust and unreasonable"

29 The Macquarie Dictionary defines these terms as follows:

Harsh - ungentle or unpleasant in action or effect Unjust - not acting justly or fairly Unreasonable - not based on or in accordance with reason or sound judgement

It seems plain enough that either of these adjectives could be described as a synonym for "unfair". However, applied to a termination of employment, each word has developed its own unique meaning. The meanings were discussed in Byrne & Anor v Australian Airlines (1995) 185 CLR 310. Here McHugh and Gummow JJ said at p465: It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted.

In Outboard World v Muir , 51 IR 167 at 182, a Full Commission put the matter this way: In much the same way, we consider that, while strict definitions of 'harsh', 'unreasonable' and 'unjust' may produce a degree of circularity of meaning, turning on the notion of 'fairness', it may be in a given case that a dismissal may be viewed as coming within the ambit of one of the three adjectives but not the others. To avoid the possibility of misunderstanding or error, the tribunal, when making that primary finding, should state explicitly the basis on which it is made.

More recently, an Appeal Bench in Bankstown City Council and Paris , 93 IR 209, reaffirmed the now well established principle that a particular dismissal requires a positive and specific finding on one, two or all of the descriptors for the dismissal to be held to be "unfair":

The Commissioner found that the dismissal by the Council of Mr Paris was 'harsh, unreasonable or unjust'. This phrase, contained within s84, is an important key to jurisdiction and does require some specificity of finding. As has been observed by the Commission on numerous occasions, a dismissal may be capable of being unreasonable but not harsh, or harsh but not unjust, other permutations may apply. In the present case, however, it seems to us that the dismissal of Mr Paris was capable of meeting not one or the other of those descriptions but each of them. Therefore, nothing turns upon the expression adopted by the Commissioner. We would observe that in a case where the conduct of the employer might satisfy one but not all of those heads, a positive and specific finding should be made.

Procedural Fairness 30 There is no obligation on an employer to follow any rigid or strict procedure leading up to, and including, the dismissal itself. (See Antanakopoulos v State Bank of New South Wales (1999) 91 IR 385). 31 In practice, the Commission prefers to approach a claim of procedural unfairness by reviewing the totality of the circumstances and arriving at a particular view as to the unfairness of the dismissal. In some cases, procedural deficiencies are easily identified or admitted. However, when balanced against the behaviour, or actions of an employee, are considered of insufficient weight for the Commission to interfere in the employer's decision to dismiss. See Wang v Crestell Industries Pty Ltd, 73 IR 454, Rapp v Wauchope RSL Club, 81 IR 116, Bigg & Anor v New South Wales Police Service, 80 IR 434, Burke v McGirr (1995) 87 IR 54, Busways v Johnson, 55 IR 255. 32 On the other hand, there is a positive obligation on an employer to comply with generally accepted contemporary standards of industrial behaviour in ensuring the process leading to the dismissal is fair and appropriate to the particular circumstances. For example, providing two written warnings is hardly necessary when an employee is found to have engaged in gross misconduct warranting summary dismissal. Alternatively, a dismissal for poor performance will usually be found to be unfair, if the employer fails to warn, or counsel the employee as to his/her performance or fails to provide an opportunity for the employee to improve. 33 The Act, however, identifies in s88 a number of matters which, sensu stricto, are matters relating to procedural fairness: 88 In determining the applicant's claim, the Commission may, if appropriate take into account:

a) whether a reason for the dismissal was given to the applicant and, if the applicant sought but was refused reinstatement or re-employment with the employer, whether a reason was given for the refusal to reinstate or re-employ, and

b) if any such reason was given - its nature, whether it had a basis in fact, and whether the applicant was given an opportunity to make out a defence or give an explanation for his or her behaviour or to justify his or her reinstatement or re-employment, and c) whether the warning of unsatisfactory performance was given before the dismissal, and

d) the nature of the duties of the applicant immediately before the dismissal and, if the applicant sought but was refused reinstatement or re-employment, the likely nature of those duties if the applicant were to be reinstated or re-employed, and

e) whether or not the applicant requested reinstatement or re-employment with the employer, and

f) such other matters as the Commission considers relevant.

a) whether the reason for dismissal had a basis in fact;

b) whether the applicant was given an opportunity to make out a defence of his behaviour;

c) whether the applicant was given any warning of unsatisfactory performance.

Sub para (f) provides the Commission with a broad and discretionary power to take into account any matters it considers relevant when determining the applicant's claim.

35 In view of the failure of the respondent to properly prosecute its case, the Commission only has before it the evidence of the applicant and his wife and the incomplete evidence of Mr Skouloudis. To the extent that the oral evidence dealt with material contained in affidavits filed by Ms Tsoutsouras, Mr Boyer and Mr Hagivasilis, this evidence is ignored. None of these deponents were available for cross examination. 36 I turn then to the respondent's incomplete cross examination. Mr Reitano was unable to complete his cross examination because of Mr Skouloudis' failure to attend (see paras 10 and 11). On that basis, I would have been content to reject the totality of his evidence. However, I am satisfied that Mr Skouloudis' evidence, such as it was, should be rejected for another more serious reason. His evidence raises serious doubt as to the credibility of the respondent's entire case. 37 Mr Skouloudis' evidence is riddled with extraordinary inconsistencies, omissions and wild and unsubstantiated allegations. When one examines the Commission's commentary on his evidence at para 26, one hardly needs to be convinced that the allegations against the applicant are of the most serious and grievous kind. They include threats, blackmail, sexual harassment, "arranging to destroy Mr Skouloudis' business", drinking at a club while on duty, arrogance and rudeness.

It is extraordinary that none of these serious allegations and slurs on the applicant's reputation were raised in Mr Skouloudis' affidavit. Mr Skouloudis claimed he was too busy or simply forgot to include such matters in his affidavit. This excuse is utterly unbelievable. 38 Such fundamental omissions would have been enough for me to seriously doubt the veracity of any of them. However, more importantly, there is not one shred of evidence to substantiate Mr Skouloudis' wild and irresponsible allegations. I am completely satisfied that Mr Skouloudis deliberately and wilfully concocted these allegations to slander the applicant and mislead the Commission. 39 To demonstrate the absurdity of Mr Skouloudis' allegations, one needs only to refer to the uncontested evidence concerning the offer of the manager's job at Mr Skouloudis' nightclub. 40 Here Mr Skouloudis was offering a manager's job to someone who he claims was threatening, rude and arrogant and attempting to destroy his newspaper. Such evidence is a joke. 41 Similarly, why would Mr Skouloudis raise all the allegations if, as he maintained, the applicant had resigned? There was no resignation - Mr Passas was dismissed and Mr Skouloudis' allegations were a pathetic attempt to construct a case against the applicant. 42 Blind Freddy could see the truth of the matter. Mr Skouloudis dismissed the applicant after a disagreement with the applicant's wife. He used the applicant's intention of going to Greece as a pretext to get rid of the applicant and his wife. When he was required to explain his actions after the dismissal, Mr Skouloudis falsely constructed a web of lies and false allegations. 43 Mr Skouloudis said it was a coincidence that the night before Mr Passas' dismissal, he (Mr Skouloudis) had a disagreement with Mrs Passas and she had resigned. For this to be a coincidence stretches credulity to breaking point. This was no coincidence, but Mr Skouloudis' convenient means of getting rid of both of them. 44 However, I am not a bit surprised that he should do so. It was indicative of his entire approach to this case, demonstrated by his abuse of the Commission's processes; not to mention his appalling behaviour towards his legal representatives who were unceremoniously dumped when proceedings got uncomfortable for him. Moreover, it illustrates his contempt and disregard for any sense of fair play towards Mr and Mrs Passas. Mr Skouloudis should be thoroughly ashamed of himself. 45 By way of stark contrast, I found Mr and Mrs Passas to be witnesses of credit. There was nothing Mr Passas said, or that could be detected in his demeanour, which would demonstrate he was arrogant or rude; let alone that he would engage in sexual harassment or blackmail.

Despite being obviously distressed by what was being said about him and his wife, he was calm and restrained throughout Mr Skouloudis' outrageous evidence.

In view of my findings of witness credit, I prefer to accept the applicant's versions of events over that proffered by Mr Skouloudis. 46 This finding is particularly relevant to the respondent's claims that:

1. The applicant was a casual and accepted he was so employed after January 2000; and

Mr Passas' evidence was that the word "casual" was never mentioned. He wished to be on a similar arrangement to that which the previous editor, Mr Messaris, had been on. In view of the applicant's long working hours, his request to be paid according to an hourly rate, was perfectly reasonable.

As to resigning, Mr Passas strenuously denied having done so. He wanted to assist his ailing mother, and take leave without pay to do so. He had every intention of returning to Australia, to his family and his job. It would be incredible if he had not wanted to do so; bearing in mind the limited options in his professional career and his family responsibilities. Mr Skouloudis' suggestion that he believed Mr Passas would stay in Greece is just nonsense.

I am safely able to find that Mr Skouloudis' two main arguments cannot be sustained and are rejected. 47 Having discussed the meaning of the words "harsh, unreasonable and unjust" and in view of the evidence in this case, I find each descriptor applies to the dismissal of Mr Passas. To my mind, it would be hard to imagine a set of circumstances which disclose more ghastly features of unfairness than this one. It comfortably fits the definition of all three descriptors as being "harsh, unreasonable and unjust", within the meaning of Pt 6 ch 2 of the Act. 48 To use the definitions in Byrne v Australian Airlines, I observe as follows:

1. The dismissal was "unjust" in that the applicant was not guilty of any allegations made, let alone guilty of misconduct.

2. The dismissal was "unreasonable" as it was decided on inferences which were not only unreasonably drawn, but were fabricated after the event.

3. The dismissal was "harsh", having regard for the applicant's age, length of service and economic circumstances. 49 Determining the appropriate relief to be awarded to the applicant in these circumstances has not been difficult.

Having regard for the applicant's limited professional opportunities in the Greek media, reinstatement would appear to be an attractive option. However, it would be impossible to restore any level of trust and confidence in the employment relationship having regard for the disgraceful behaviour of the employer. The Commission faced a similar situation in Herson v One.Tel (unreported) Sams DP, Matter IRC5181 of 1998, 18 February 2000. The comments I made in that matter are in para materia to this case and demand the same conclusion: As the primary remedy, the applicant seeks reinstatement. In the alternative, compensation is proposed. While I am attracted to the primary option, and appreciate the applicant harbours no ill will towards One.Tel management, I do not believe his long term professional interests would be served by reinstatement or re-employment. The employment relationship has suffered irreparable damage. I am not persuaded that the working atmosphere disclosed by the evidence would be conducive to an ongoing, mutually satisfactory arrangement. Consequently, I am satisfied that compensation is the only appropriate remedy. I propose to so order.

I agree with Mr Reitano that reinstatement is impractical and that compensatory relief at the higher end of the scale is warranted. I propose to so order.

1. The applicant was not a casual employee for the purposes of the exemption provisions in s83(2)(c) of the Act.

2. At no time, did the applicant resign from his employment. He had intended to return to his position after visiting his elderly and ailing mother in Greece. The respondent was well aware of the applicant's intentions.

3. The applicant was dismissed unilaterally, and without warning.

4. None of the allegations made by Mr Skouloudis were ever raised with the applicant.

5. The allegations are baseless and without foundation.

6. The applicant was dismissed for a reason never made known to him; namely, because of Mr Skouloudis' disagreement with the applicant's wife.

7. The undisclosed reason for dismissal was grossly unfair.

8. The respondent's evidence was incomplete and unreliable.

9. Mr and Mrs Passas were credible witnesses, whose evidence is preferred where it conflicts with that of the respondent.

10. The applicant's dismissal was "harsh, unreasonable and unjust" within the meaning of Pt 6, ch 2 of the Act.

51 In assessing the quantum of any compensation to be paid to the applicant, I have taken into account the following matters:

1. The gross unfairness as to both the merit of, and procedure, involved with the dismissal.

3. The limitations on the applicant's ability to secure alternative employment in his relatively narrow professional field.

4. The applicant's length of service and unblemished record.

52 Pursuant to s89(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1996, the Commission orders that:

1. The respondent, trading as O Kosmos, shall pay to the applicant, Mr Bill Passas, an amount of twenty-six weeks' pay.

2. The calculation of the weekly rate of pay shall be by reference to Ex'B' in the proceedings, i.e.

3. The above amount shall be paid within twenty-one (21) days of today.

4. Any application for costs shall be made by way of notice of motion filed within fourteen (14) days of today.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.