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[2003] QSC 295
plaintiff. Order that the respondent pay to the applicant $7,500 by way of compensation for the injuries suffered by the applicant as a result of the commission of the offence against the applicant of which...
The respondent fired at a police car carrying the applicant and another constable. He was convicted on indictment of attempted murder, the indictment and jury verdict specifying the intended victim as 'Elaine Frances McMillan or another'. The court held that, given the Crown case and the fact both officers were under fire, the conviction could be treated as an offence against the applicant for the purposes of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. Accepting psychiatric evidence that the applicant suffered mental or nervous shock assessed at 10% under the statutory scheme, and that the applicant had not contributed to his injury, the court ordered the respondent to pay $7,500 compensation (10% of the scheme maximum).
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1,693 words · generated 05/09/2026
This application arose under the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. The respondent, Stewart William Palmer, was tried on an indictment charging, among other things, attempted murder arising from an incident on 4 June 2000 in which the Crown alleged the respondent fired a revolver from a moving car at a police vehicle driven by the applicant, Constable Matthew Byles, with Constable Elaine McMillan as passenger [1]. The indictment alleged for count 2 that the respondent attempted to kill Elaine Frances McMillan or another. The jury convicted the respondent on counts including count 2 (attempted murder) on 19 December 2001; the respondent was sentenced on 10 April 2002 to 17 years' imprisonment and his conviction was declared a serious violent offence [1]. Appeals were dismissed and further leave applications abandoned [2].
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The present application was by the applicant under s.24 of the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995, which permits the court before which the convicted person was convicted to make a compensation order where the person is convicted on indictment of a personal offence (or a personal offence is taken into account on sentence) and the person against whom the personal offence is committed applies for compensation [3]. The factual and legal issue the court had to decide was whether the respondent's conviction could properly be treated as a conviction of a personal offence committed against the applicant given the form of the jury's verdict, which identified the intended victim as 'Elaine Frances McMillan or another' [4]–[5].
The applicant had not suffered physical injury but had psychiatric symptoms. He was examined by Dr Peter Mulholland, whose report described features consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder or an adjustment disorder with PTSD features and quantified the mental or nervous shock at 10% under the scheme, anticipated treatment needs and a likely permanent impairment in the 5%–10% range (reproduced in the judgment at [6]). The court accepted these assessments and, noting that the applicant had not contributed to his injury (so s.25(7) reductions did not apply), awarded compensation equal to 10% of the scheme maximum, $7,500, ordering the respondent to pay that sum to the applicant [7]–[9].
Two linked legal questions drove the decision.
First, whether a conviction for attempted murder phrased as attempted murder of 'Elaine Frances McMillan or another' could be treated as a conviction of an offence against the applicant. The court focused on the Crown case as presented to the jury: the respondent fired at the police car intending to kill one of its occupants [5]. The jury's finding needed only to be that there was an intention to kill one of the occupants; it was not required to specify which. The judge rejected an interpretative approach that would allow the formal indeterminacy of the jury's verdict to defeat the statutory entitlement to compensation by producing the odd result that neither officer could recover. The court characterises the statute as remedial and states that where there is any uncertainty as to construction it should be construed liberally. Viewing the verdict in its factual context the judge concluded the conviction was properly regarded as of an offence committed against both police officers who were under fire [4]–[5]. That conclusion enabled s.24 to operate.
Second, quantifying compensation. The applicant's psychiatric evidence was accepted to the effect that he had experienced mental or nervous shock at a level equating to 10% under the statutory schedule. The judge explicitly accepts item 32 (mental or nervous shock, moderate) as the relevant category and the 10% quantification as appropriate, taking into account ongoing effects and likely treatment needs [6], [8]. The judge also notes that s.25(7), which allows for reduction where the applicant's behaviour contributed to the injury, did not apply because the applicant had not behaved in a way contributing to his injury [7]. On that basis the judge calculated the monetary award as 10% of the scheme maximum and ordered payment of $7,500 [8]–[9].
The decision thus rested on statutory construction (liberal construction of a remedial compensation statute), factual analysis of what the jury's verdict meant in light of the Crown case, and acceptance of expert psychiatric evidence to quantify injury under the statutory schedule.
What the judgment expressly uses as law is the Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. The judgment reproduces s.24 and relies on its language as the source of the court's power to order compensation for injury suffered because of an offence for which the respondent was convicted [3]. The court emphasised remedial statutory construction when interpreting whether the conviction operated as a conviction against the applicant [5].
The decision therefore clarifies (within its factual confines) that where the Crown's case is that a defendant fired on a vehicle intending to kill an occupant and the jury returns a general verdict identifying the intended victim as one of more than one occupant ('X or another'), the conviction can for the purposes of s.24 be regarded as an offence against each occupant who was under fire. The practical consequence is to allow the statutory compensation regime to function where an identifiability issue might otherwise defeat recovery. The judgment thus sets out a practical interpretative approach rather than announcing new statutory text.
Because the judgment does not engage with prior case law (no other authorities are cited in the text provided), it operates as an instance of applying the Act to the facts rather than as a doctrinally novel pronouncement altering a body of precedent. It is properly viewed as an application of remedial construction in service of the statutory purpose to compensate victims.
"Section 24 provides for orders for compensation" [3]. Plain English: s.24 is the statutory foundation permitting courts to order convicted persons to pay compensation to victims of personal offences.
"The Crown case ... was that the respondent fired at the police car intending to kill one of its occupants. It was not necessary for the jury to determine, and it did not determine, which occupant the respondent intended to kill provided it was satisfied that there was an intention to kill one of the police officers." [5] Plain English: The jury needed only to find the defendant intended to kill one of the people in the police car; it did not have to decide who specifically.
"Seen in that light - correctly I think - the verdict was of an offence committed against both police officers, each of whom was under fire." [5] Plain English: Because both officers were exposed to the shooting, the conviction is to be treated as a conviction for an offence against each of them for the purposes of the compensation law.
"A mathematical quantification ... is 10%." [6] Plain English: The psychiatric expert placed the applicant's mental injury at 10% under the statutory compensation schedule.
"I conclude ... an award of ten per cent. of the scheme maximum is called for." [8] Plain English: The judge accepted the 10% assessment and awarded compensation equal to that percentage of the statutory maximum.
The judgment is directly relevant where:
In such fact patterns, Byles v. Palmer provides authority for treating the conviction as a conviction against each person who was under fire, permitting recovery under the compensation scheme, provided the statutory elements otherwise are satisfied.
The judgment itself does not record later judicial treatment or subsequent citations. From the text provided, no later decisions or appellate treatments are discussed. Any statement about how courts after 2003 have treated Byles v. Palmer would require examining subsequent case law beyond this judgment. The present judgment stands as an instance of construction and application of the Act at trial level and should be checked against later appellate decisions for its subsequent precedential weight.
The judgment resolves the interpretative issue in the particular factual context described. It nonetheless raises or leaves open several questions that a future court might need to address:
These remain points for later decisions and are not decided in the text of this judgment.
This analysis is based only on the text of Byles v. Palmer [2003] QSC 295 as provided above. It is general legal information, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you rely on any of this, or use the draft or summary in any legal context, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.
[1] This is an application for compensation for injury brought under the
Criminal Offence Victims Act 1995. On 6 December 2001 the respondent came before me in Brisbane to answer an indictment in which he was charged with five offences. In count 2 it was alleged that on 4 June 2000 at Brisbane he attempted unlawfully to kill Elaine Frances McMillan or another. Count 3 was an alternative charge of unlawfully attempting to strike with a projectile, and count 4 a further alternative charge of serious assault. On count 8 he was charged with unlawful possession of a dangerous drug, and on count 9 with entering premises with intent to commit an indictable offence in them. The charge of attempted murder and the charges in counts 3 and 4 arose out of an incident in which, on the Crown case, the respondent, with a revolver, fired a shot from a moving car at a police car driven by the applicant, a constable of police, in which the only passenger was another police officer, Constable Elaine McMillan. The other person referred to in count 2 was of course the applicant. There was another man, Leonard Hite, charged on the same indictment with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (count 1), being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder (count 5), an alternative charge of being an accessory after the fact to unlawfully attempting to strike with a projectile (count 6), and a further alternative charge of being an accessory after the fact to a serious assault (count 7). Hite was the driver of the car from which the respondent fired on the police car. Each accused man pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and the trial proceeded until 19 December 2001 when the respondent was found guilty by the jury on counts 2, 8, and 9. Hite was found guilty on counts 1 and 5. The jury was discharged from giving verdicts on counts 3, 4, 6, and 7. There was some delay before the respondent and Hite could be sentenced. On 10 April 2002 I sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for seventeen years on count 2 and declared his conviction to be that of a serious violent offence. I sentenced him to imprisonment for four years and six months respectively on counts 8 and 9.
[2] The respondent appealed against his convictions to the Court of Appeal and applied to that court for leave to appeal against his sentence for attempted murder. On 6 September 2002 his appeal was dismissed and his application refused. He then applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court, but on 30 May 2003 it was certified by a Deputy Registrar of that court that his application was deemed to have been abandoned.
[3] In written submissions made on behalf of the applicant it is asserted that the respondent was convicted of the attempted murder of the applicant, indicating that this application is made in reliance on s. 19(1)(a) of the Criminal Offence Victims Act which provides that there may be a payment of compensation to an applicant `for injury suffered by the applicant caused by a personal offence committed against the applicant'. An `injury' may be `mental or nervous shock' (s. 20: meaning of `injury') and a `personal offence' is `an indictable offence committed against the person of someone' (s. 21: meaning of `personal offence'). Section 24 provides for orders for compensation:
24 Court may make an order compensating someone injured by personal offence
(1) This section applies if someone (the "convicted person") -
(a) is convicted on indictment of a personal offence; or
(b) is convicted on indictment and a personal offence is taken into account on sentence.
(2) The person against whom the personal offence is committed may apply to the court before which the person is convicted for an order that the convicted person pay compensation to the applicant for the injury suffered by the applicant because of the offence.
(3) The Court may make an order (a "compensation order") for an amount to be paid by the convicted person to the applicant because of the injury.
[4] Those provisions prompt the question whether it can be said that the respondent was convicted of an offence against the person of the applicant, because the jury's verdict goes no further than a finding that the respondent attempted to murder Constable McMillan or another, the applicant. The verdict could then, it might be argued, be seen as not excluding the possibility that the jury was satisfied that there had been an attempt to murder Constable McMillan but not the applicant. It would follow that it was not against the person of the applicant that the offence had been committed. The same argument, mutatis mutandis, could be used if Constable McMillan were to apply for compensation, thus leading to the result that neither police officer could be awarded compensation - an outcome that could be regarded as absurd.
[5] The Crown case as it was put to the jury was that the respondent fired at the police car intending to kill one of its occupants. It was not necessary for the jury to determine, and it did not determine, which occupant the respondent intended to kill provided it was satisfied that there was an intention to kill one of the police officers. Seen in that light - correctly I think - the verdict was of an offence committed against both police officers, each of whom was under fire. If there is any uncertainty as to the construction to be put upon the relevant provisions of the Act, which is a remedial statute, they should of course be construed liberally. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the respondent was convicted of an offence against the person of the applicant.
[6] The applicant did not suffer any physical injury as a result of what the respondent did but has suffered moderately serious mental effects. He was twenty-six years old when the offence was committed and is still a police officer, at present a senior constable attached to the Indooroopilly criminal investigation branch. He was interviewed and examined on 13 January 2003 by Dr Peter Mulholland, psychiatrist, who gave his conclusions concerning the applicant as follows:
21.1 Matthew Byles was a 26 year old police officer when during the course of his work whilst conducting a pursuit he was fired upon by a criminal. That criminal was subsequently convicted of an attempted murder charge and sentenced to 17 years and his conviction was declared to be a serious violent offence.
21.2 Matthew Byles does not have any past history of any form of psychiatric disorder and his basic personality-character is sound.
21.3 As a consequence of the shooting Matthew Byles has developed features of post traumatic stress disorder. It is arguable as to whether the features are severe enough to warrant a formal diagnosis or not. It is arguable as to whether he be regarded as being a mild case of PTSD or else he is in the borderlands of PTSD and has sub-clinical features of PTSD which more properly would be diagnosed as adjustment disorder (unspecified) with post traumatic stress features.
21.4 He has had some extensive counselling however his experience is that the process of counselling was leading to an increase of morbid preoccupations with the event and therefore he pretended that he was OK and had himself discharged from counselling.
21.5 It goes without saying that he has experienced a significant degree of emotional pain and suffering as a consequence of this event.
21.6 His working situation has been influenced by this event in that he has got himself into a working situation that he perceives to be safer. He also experiences significant anxiety from time to time when out and about at work and has accidentally gone through red lights on a few occasions due to being startled by seeing cars similar to the one that was involved in the chase. Fortunately there has not been any episodes of the latter recently.
21.7 It is also noted that there have been some stresses and strains put upon the relationship with his wife who is also a police officer due to his excessive concern regarding safety matters.
21.8 It is advised that Matthew Byles needs to have further therapy and it is suggested that he be referred to a psychiatrist who has special interests and skills in the area of treatment of PTSD. Such psychiatrists include the following who are named in no special order of merit or expertise:-
21.9 It is anticipated that psychiatric treatment will take the form of specialised counselling/psychotherapy.
21.10 It is not considered that psychiatric medication will be needed.
21.11 It is not considered that hospitalisation for psychiatric reasons is going to be needed.
21.12 Costs involved are always difficult to estimate in advance however the likely costs would be in the order of $5000 over the next approximately 2 years.
21.13 It could be assumed that his condition would improve with counselling however it will not entirely go away and the most likely long term result is that he will be left with a permanent impairment in the 5%-10% psychiatric impairment range. If he was to be exposed to similar events in the future then it is likely that his reaction would be greater than if he had not had this particular experience.
21.14 In terms of the Criminal Events [sic] Victims' Act 1995 Schedule 1 it is advised that he has experienced a mental or nervous shock at the junction of the top end of the minor mental or nervous shock range and the moderate mental or nervous shock range, i.e. at 10%.
21.15 In summary this man experienced a mental or nervous shock as a consequence of being fired upon. A mathematical quantification of that mental or nervous shock as per the relevant legislation is 10%. In terms of psychiatric diagnosis it is arguable as to whether he has a PTSD of clinical degree or not and he is in the borderlands of psychopathology necessary to make a diagnosis of PTSD. Alternatively the diagnosis of adjustment disorder (unspecified) with post traumatic stress features (of mild degree) is also appropriate.
[7] The applicant was not guilty of any behaviour that directly or indirectly contributed to his injury. Accordingly, there is no occasion for reducing, under
[8] I conclude that the applicant is entitled to an award under item 32, mental or nervous shock (moderate), and that an award of ten per cent. of the scheme maximum is called for. In reaching that conclusion I take into account the mental effects of the respondent's act still suffered by the applicant and the need for psychiatric treatment.
[9] It follows that the applicant should be awarded $7,500 by way of compensation. I shall order that the respondent pay to the applicant $7,500 by way of compensation for the injuries suffered by the applicant as a result of the commission of the offence against the applicant of which the respondent was convicted.
Order that the respondent pay to the applicant $7,500 by way of compensation for the injuries suffered by the applicant as a result of the commission of the offence against the applicant of which the respondent was convicted (see [9]).