© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2002] WASCA 35
Court of Appeal (WA)
2002-02-25
Malcolm CJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : BUTTON -v- THE QUEEN [2002] WASCA 35
Criminal law - Appeal and new trial - Inquiry after conviction - Appeal by reference from Attorney-General of petition by appellant - Task and approach of Court - Applicable test: whether there was a significant possibility that in the light of the admissible evidence now available (including evidence given at the trial) a jury, acting reasonably, would acquit the appellant, giving rise to a miscarriage of justice
Evidence - Fresh evidence - New evidence - Principles governing reception
Evidence - Fresh or new evidence of confessions of a third party deceased to the commission of offence - Evidence previously given personally on appellant's application for an extension of time - Evidence then rejected as "worthless" - Whether additional, new or fresh evidence of confessions admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay or otherwise
Evidence - Fresh expert evidence based on knowledge and experience not available at the time of the trial or previous application for an extension of time for leave to appeal - Evidence tending to exclude involvement of appellant's vehicle and confirming possibility of involvement of vehicle driven by third party
Evidence - New evidence that injuries sustained by victim not consistent with having been caused by vehicle driven in manner described by appellant in his confession
Evidence - Fresh or new similar fact evidence of incidents in which other women had been run down at night in strikingly similar circumstances coupled with confessions by third party corroborated by the evidence of victims
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 65
Appeal allowed; conviction quashed; no order for a re-trial
Appellant : Mr T F Percy QC, Mr J A Davies & Mr W J Chesnutt
Ground 2(f), (h) and (j): Confessions by Eric Edgar Cooke 89
Grounds 1 and 2(a): Fresh evidence of hit and run victims 113
Ground 2(d): Fresh evidence of John Barry Hansen 134
Ground 2(i): Cooke's other assault/home invasion victims 139
Ground 2(j): Letter by Mr Cooke to his solicitor 139
1 This is an appeal which comes before the Court by way of a reference dated 31 May 2000 from the then Attorney General, the Hon Peter Foss QC MLC, pursuant to s 140(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). Section 140 of that Act provides that:
"(1) A petition for the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy in relation to an offender convicted on indictment, or to the sentence imposed on such an offender, may be referred by the Attorney General to the Court of Criminal Appeal either -
(a) for the whole case to be heard and determined as if it were an appeal by the offender against the conviction or against the sentence (as the case may be); or
(b) for an opinion on any specific matter relevant to determining the petition.
(2) The Court of Criminal Appeal must give effect to the referral."
2 As is apparent from the provisions of s 140 the case is to be heard and determined as if it were an appeal against conviction. This brings into play all of the provisions of the Criminal Code which are relevant to the hearing and determination of appeals against conviction.
3 In Mickelberg v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 990056; 12 February 1999 at 5 - 7 Malcolm CJ, Steytler and Wheeler JJ dealt with the approach to a reference of "the whole case" under s 140(1) of the Sentencing Act as follows:
"In Ratten v The Queen [1974] HCA 35; (1974) 131 CLR 510 Barwick CJ (with whom McTiernan, Stephen and Jacobs JJ agreed) at 514 commented as follows in regard to a reference of 'the whole case' by the Attorney General of Victoria:
'As the Full Court was required to treat the reference to it under s584 as an appeal, it was bound in dealing with it to act upon legal principles appropriate to an appeal. Thus, although all the material supporting the applicant's petition formed part of the whole case to be considered by the Court, the ordinary principles as to admissibility of evidence must be applied in the consideration of that material, so much of it as would be inadmissible being ineffective to influence the resolution of the matter.'
In Mickelberg v The Queen [1989] HCA 35; (1989) 167 CLR 259 it was held by Mason CJ, Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ that, subject to an issue being properly excluded as frivolous or vexatious, when a case is referred under s21(a) of the Criminal Code, it is the duty of the Court of Criminal Appeal to pronounce upon the whole case as presented. Toohey and Gaudron JJ at 311-312 (with whom Mason CJ and Brennan J agreed) described the function of the Court of Criminal Appeal on a reference of 'the whole case' by the Attorney General as follows:
'Prima facie, the reference of the whole case required the Court of Criminal Appeal to consider the case in its entirety, subject only to the limitation that it "be heard and determined ... as in the case of an appeal by a person convicted". That limitation necessitates that the matter be determined by "legal principles appropriate to an appeal": Ratten (1974) 131 CLR at 514 per Barwick CJ. See also R v Gunn [No 1] (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 23 at 25 and Allen, Allen & Winter (1910) 5 Crim App R 225 at 226.
It has been held that, where the whole case is referred, the Court may consider matters not relied on in the petition (R v Gunn [No 2] (1942) 43 SR (NSW) 27 at 31) and matters not specified in the reference (Reg v Chard [1984] AC 279). On the other hand, it has been said that, as a matter of practice, the considerations may be confined to those in the petition or the reference: see Re Matthews and Ford [1973] VicRp 18; [1973] VR 199 at 201; Reg v Chard [1984] AC at 292-293. And in R v Gunn [No 2] (1942) 43 SR (NSW) at 29 Jordan CJ stated:
"In a case in which there has already been an appeal which has been disposed of on the merits ... the Court, in the case of a reference such as the present, is not called upon to re-adjudicate upon any ground of appeal which has already been heard and disposed of, unless some new matter has come to light which makes a re-consideration of the ground necessary or desirable."
The words of s21(a) of the Code, so far as they require "the whole case ... [to] be heard and determined", permit of only one meaning. It is the whole case which must be passed upon by the application of legal principles appropriate to criminal appeals. That being so, the power to exclude matters from consideration is properly to be seen as an aspect of the inherent power of the Court to control its own proceedings. That power will authorise the exclusion of issues which are frivolous or vexatious: see Jackson v Stirling Industries Ltd [1987] HCA 23; (1987) 162 CLR 612; Tringali v Stewartson Stubbs and Collett Ltd (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 335; Metropolitan Bank v Pooley (1885) 10 App Cas 210. However, subject to an issue being properly excluded as frivolous or vexatious, it is in our view, the duty of a court to which there has been a reference of the whole case to pronounce upon the whole case as presented.'
In Mickelberg v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 970749; 13 March 1998 Malcolm CJ (with whom Steytler and Wheeler JJ agreed) said that in this State the approach to be adopted on a reference of the whole case by the Attorney General is the same as that described in Ratten v The Queen. The learned Chief Justice observed:
'The words of s21(a) of the Code, so far as they require "the whole case ... [to] be heard and determined", permit of only one meaning. It is the whole case which must be passed upon by the application of legal principles appropriate to criminal appeals'."
This appeal is to be determined in accordance with those principles.
4 The appellant was charged on an indictment dated 2 April 1963 that on 10 February 1963 he wilfully murdered one Rosemary Margaret Anderson ("Ms Anderson"). After a trial on 29 April - 4 May 1963 the appellant was convicted of the offence of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. An application to the Court of Criminal Appeal for an extension of time within which to appeal against his conviction was heard on 27 February and 7 - 9 April 1964 by Wolff CJ, Jackson SPJ and Virtue J and dismissed on 22 May 1964. An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was refused on 14 September 1964.
5 The appellant's application for an extension of time within which to appeal in 1964 was based on alleged confessions by Eric Edgar Cooke to police in which he said that he was the driver of a car which struck Ms Anderson and killed her on the night of 9 February 1963.
6 The present appeal to this Court is on five grounds. Ground 1 is as follows:
"The verdict of the jury in respect of the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory having regard to fresh evidence that has emerged since the hearing of the Trial, which evidence was not known, disclosed or available at the time of the Trial, the Original Appeal or the Special Leave Application."
7 Paragraph 2 of the grounds of appeal contains particulars of the fresh evidence sought to be relied upon to which I will refer later in these reasons. Suffice it to say that the fresh evidence relied upon falls into the following categories:
(a) Fresh evidence relating to seven alleged hit and run victims of one Eric Edgar Cooke who was executed on 26 October 1964.
(b) Fresh forensic evidence relating to the damage sustained by the appellant's vehicle, which is said to corroborate the evidence of the appellant at the trial and the testimony of Cooke at the original appeal, to the effect that the damage sustained by the appellant's vehicle was inconsistent with having struck Ms Anderson and having struck a pedestrian at all.
(c) Fresh evidence of Kathleen James, by which she has changed her testimony, in the form of an affidavit in the original appeal, concerning the presence of a dent in the hood of the car which was stolen from her by Cooke on the date the deceased was run down.
(d) Fresh evidence of one John Barry Hanson, disclosed subsequent to the trial, original appeal and the special leave application, in an interview on 10 November 1993, which contradicts the evidence of Detective Sergeant John Wiley regarding the position of the deceased's body and the actions of the appellant and which corroborates the testimony of the appellant at the trial and the testimony of Cooke at the original appeal.
(e) Fresh evidence by one Douglas Wilkie, given in an interview on 29 April 1995 confirming he was the rider of a Vespa scooter on a date, which was probably 9 February 1963, and corroborated by Cooke's confessions by confirming the presence of Cooke in the locality where Ms Anderson was fatally injured and the actions of Cooke on that date in deliberately attempting to run him down in the manner to which Cooke confessed.
(f) Fresh evidence in a statutory declaration made on 12 November 1964 by the Rev George Jenkins (now deceased), being evidence of a confession to the killing of Ms Anderson made by Cooke at Fremantle Prison on 23 October 1964; and a "gallows" confession to such killing made to him by Cooke at Fremantle Prison approximately 15 minutes prior to Cooke's execution on 26 October 1964, being made at a time and in circumstances when Cooke had no motive other than to tell the truth.
(g) Fresh evidence of a confession by Cooke of "other serious crimes" made by Cooke at Fremantle Prison to one Leon Blank on various dates in 1963.
(h) Fresh evidence, not disclosed to the defence before the trial and appeal, of confessions by Cooke to the murder of the deceased and to the murder of one Jillian McPherson Brewer at Cottesloe on 20 December 1959 being:
(i) a confession made to Rev Prestage Lucas Sullivan on 31 October 1963 at Fremantle Police Headquarters, which evidence was contained in a statutory declaration sworn by the latter on 6 February 1964;
(ii) a confession made by Cooke to his wife Sarah Cooke at Fremantle Prison on various dates following his arrest; and
(iii) a confession made to Prison Warder Seiler at 9.00 pm on 8 January 1964 to the effect that two men were serving time for his crimes.
(i) Fresh evidence supporting Cooke's confessions in respect of his other assault victims which supports his confessions to other assaults.
(j) Fresh evidence of a letter dated 7 February 1964 written by Cooke to his lawyer Desmond Heenan, expressing fear of retribution against his family by the appellant and one Darryl Beamish upon their release, which tends to contradict the Crown case that the confessions of Cooke were false and made to advance his own interests and those of the appellant and Beamish.
(k) Fresh evidence contained in the Prison Occurrence Books for the period 6 April 1964 to 13 April 1964 to the effect that "he [Cooke] would not eat until they hanged him", which tended to contradict the Crown case that Cooke made the various confessions in order to prolong his own life.
8 At the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant sought and was granted leave to amend the particulars of fresh evidence by the deletion of subpars (c), (g) and (k) and the addition of the following particulars:
"(A) Fresh forensic evidence of Trevor Stephen Condren that the damage to the appellant's vehicle was not consistent with it being the vehicle involved in the death of Rosemary Anderson.
(B) Fresh forensic evidence of Neil Alister Turner that the injuries sustained by Rosemary Anderson were not consistent with having been caused by a vehicle travelling in the manner described in the Button confession."
9 The application to amend was made at the hearing of the appeal on 28 May 2001 when senior counsel for the appellant sought to call Mr Condren. Mr Condren's evidence was in the form of an affidavit sworn on 12 October 2000 the admissibility of which had been the subject of objections resulting in certain parts of the affidavit being ruled inadmissible by an order made by me on 29 February 2001. The basis for the objection at the hearing was that the evidence was not related to any ground of appeal. It was this defect which was sought to be remedied by the proposed amendment. Leave to amend was granted on the basis that the Court would receive the evidence subject to any objection, and subject, if necessary, to the deferment of cross-examination to avoid any prejudice to the respondent. A similar objection was raised in relation to the evidence of Dr Turner, which was dealt with in the same way. On the face of it, in both cases it was new evidence which was not known to the defence at the trial, although in the relevant sense it was known to the Crown.
10 The remaining grounds of appeal were as follows:
"3. Having regard to the matters raised by the foregoing fresh evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeal in the Original Appeal was in error in failing to accept as similar fact evidence the evidence of the other crimes committed by Cooke.
4. Having regard to the fresh evidence referred to in ground 1, the Appellant lost a chance of acquittal which was reasonably open to him at the Trial had the evidence been disclosed, known of or reasonably available at the time of trial.
5. Having regard to the fresh evidence referred to in ground 1, in combination with the other evidence presented at trial and at the appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, it would not have been reasonably open for a jury to convict the Appellant with the offence of manslaughter."
11 At a directions hearing on 4 October 2000 an order was made that further and better particulars of the fresh evidence and other matters contained in the grounds of appeal were ordered to be supplied. Such particulars were supplied on 24 October 2000. I will refer to them in the context of the examination of the relevant grounds of appeal.
12 By a minute dated 15 May 2001 it was proposed to amend the grounds of appeal by adding the following ground as ground 6:
"(1) During the trial on the charge of the Wilful Murder of Rosemary Margaret Anderson which took place in the Supreme Court of Western Australia between 29 April and 4 May 1963, the jury was taken to in [sic] Stubbs Terrace, Shenton Park, in the absence of the accused to the alleged scene of the hit-run collision in which Rosemary Margaret Anderson was fatally injured to view and hear evidence from a witness who explained how the events had occurred and how the fatality had happened.
(2) The members of the jury were shown by the witness where Rosemary Margaret Anderson was hit, where she was found, and where her handbag, shoes and other items were found.
(3) The jury walked along Stubbs Terrace in the course of the view.
(4) John Button was unaware of the view taking place.
(5) Without the accused being present during the entire case presented against him and having an opportunity to consider and refute what was presented during the view John Button was deprived of a fair trial."
13 During the course of the hearing on 30 May 2001 counsel for the appellant informed the Court that the proposed amendment was not being pursued.
14 Where reliance is placed on fresh or new evidence the central issue is not whether the Crown withheld material or failed to disclose it, or whether there is now in existence evidence which was unavailable at the trial which could be categorised as either new or fresh. The central issue is whether, having regard to all of the material on which the appellant now relies, there was a miscarriage of justice at the trial. That is how the Crown formulated the relevant issue in Bradshaw v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 970228; 13 May 1997 as appears in my judgment at 9 - 11 (with which Pidgeon and Owen JJ agreed):
"I accept the submission on behalf of the Crown that, at the end of the day, the question is whether there has been a miscarriage of justice in the context of s689 of the Criminal Code. That issue also has to be looked at in the context of the right of an accused to a fair trial: Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 65; The Queen v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 56; and see R v Evans [1964] VR 71; R v Lucas [1973] VR 69; and R v Eastwood and Boland [1973] VR 70. In order for there to be a fair trial the Crown is obliged to disclose to the defence all material available to it that is relevant or possibly relevant to any issue in the case: R v Keane (1995) 99 Cr App R. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that this included material which went to the credit of Crown witnesses: R v Paraskeva (1983) 76 Cr App R 162 and R v Brown, unreported; The Times, 20 June 1994. In Archbold 1995 Vol 1, paras 4.265-4.272, the duty of disclosure to the defence by the prosecution is summarised. In R v Brown it was held that the Crown is obliged to disclose to the defence:
'That which can be seen on a sensible appraisal by the prosecution:
(1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case;
(2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use;
(3) to hold out a real as opposed to fanciful, prospect of providing a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2).'
'The present law is therefore fairly clear, although there remain areas of inconsistency, uncertainty and practical difficulty, most notably as regards: the scope of the prosecution's duty both in ascertaining all potentially disclosable matter and deciding upon its materiality in the absence of any adequate information as to the defence case; voluntary disclosure by the prosecution of matter which is, prima facie, covered by public interest immunity; disclosure of matter which goes only to the credibility of defence witnesses; and disclosure of matters held by third parties.'
'Matter which is "material" according to the above test must be disclosed, subject to the "exceptions" identified, post. This will include matter affecting the credibility of a prosecution witness. In R v Brown, ante, three examples were given:
(i) a previous inconsistent statement. Copies of such statements should be given to the defence, and it is submitted that it would not be sufficient simply to inform the defence of the existence thereof. Where the discrepancy relates to that part of a witness's evidence which is evidence against one defendant only, the statement should be supplied to any other co-defendant against whom the witness also gives evidence. (Baksh v R [1958] AC 167, PC);
(ii) the fact that a reward has been requested by a prosecution witness (R v Taylor and Taylor, 98 Cr App R 361, CA); and
(iii) previous convictions of prosecution witnesses (R v Collister and Warhurst, 38 Cr App R 100, CCA) or any other matter which is adverse to the character of a prosecution witness; see further the authorities cited post pars 4-342 et seq and pars 8-127 et seq'."
"In this appeal there is little or no dispute as to the relevant legal principles. The issue is whether the material available to the Crown at the time of the trial but not disclosed to the defence and the material that has since become available 'might well have influenced the result of the trial' had it been before the jury: Bryer v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 456 at 478. In deciding whether the material might have influenced the result of the trial the appellate court is required to assess the cogency of the additional material in the light of evidence adduced at trial and which the jury must be taken to have accepted: Ratten v R [1974] HCA 35; (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 518. The appellate tribunal must then decide whether there is a 'significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant': Mickelberg v R [1989] HCA 35; (1989) 167 CLR 259 at 273."
16 In Nolan v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 970260; 22 May 1997 I said (with the agreement of Pidgeon and Murray JJ) at 62 - 63:
"A Court of Criminal Appeal should quash a verdict of guilty if the material presented to it shows the applicant to be innocent, or raises such a doubt about his guilt in the mind of the Court that the verdict should not be allowed to stand. In either case, the verdict should be quashed even though the material presented to the Court comprises new evidence which was not fresh evidence which was not available to the accused at the trial, or which could not have been available to him by the exercise of reasonable diligence in the preparation of his case: Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 517 at 518 per Barwick CJ. The discretion to admit new evidence includes a consideration whether a miscarriage of justice may have occurred and whether there is a significant possibility that the jury acting reasonably would have acquitted the accused of the charge if that evidence had been before it: see also Gallagher v The Queen [1986] HCA 26; (1986) 160 CLR 392. Where the evidence is not fresh evidence but new evidence, as in this case, that is not necessarily fatal to the applicant. The question to be asked is whether the strength of the new evidence is such as to justify interference with the verdict: Gallagher at 395 per Gibbs CJ. The approach to the matter is first to ask whether the evidence is apparently credible and whether, if believed, it might reasonably have led the jury to return a different verdict."
17 The present appeal was opened by senior counsel for the appellant on the basis that the facts relating to the offence were set out in detail in the reasons of Wolff CJ in his judgment, on the appellant's application to the Court of Criminal Appeal on 22 May 1964, for an extension of time to make an application for leave to appeal.
18 On 9 February 1963 Ms Anderson, aged 17, was knocked down by a motor car in Stubbs Terrace, Shenton Park at about 10.45 pm and sustained injuries from which she died shortly afterwards. The appellant, then aged 19, was alleged by the Crown to be the driver of the car. The Crown case was that in a fit of temper the appellant deliberately drove the car at Ms Anderson with the intention to kill her.
19 Following his conviction no appeal or application for leave to appeal was lodged on behalf of the appellant within the prescribed time. The matter remained dormant until September 1963 when Mr Cooke claimed to have committed the offence. The time for an appeal or application for leave to appeal had expired in May 1963. While Mr Cooke's claim to have killed Ms Anderson was first made in September 1963, the application for an extension of time was not made until 4 December 1963. The application for an extension of time was made upon the ground that there had been a miscarriage of justice, in that Mr Cooke was the person responsible for killing Ms Anderson and had confessed to the commission of the offence.
20 The reasons for judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal dated 22 May 1964 were extracted by the appellant's solicitors from the application book in the application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. I shall refer to the page numbers as they appear in the appeal books for this appeal.
"In order to sustain the application for extension of time, the applicant must show some merit; not merely that Cooke says he committed the crime, but there is some cogent, reasonable and credible evidence according to the principles already discussed in the Beamish appeal in which we have just delivered judgment. This case differs from that of Beamish. That came before us as a reference from the Hon Minister for Justice under paragraph (a) of section 21 of the Criminal Code. Here the applicant Button starts off (by reason of the lapse of time) with the burden of demonstrating prima facie that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that an appeal would be likely to succeed, before the Court will grant an extension of time. It might have been better had the applicant petitioned the Minister as Beamish did. The principles are discussed in The Queen v Brown (1963 SALR p90). Nevertheless while dealing with the matter as an application for extension of time, the Court went very fully into all matters raised by the applicant's Counsel and at the conclusion of the motion received an assurance from him that on the hypothesis that the Court had granted the extension and the application for leave he would have had nothing further to offer by way of facts or argument: so that the Court is as fully informed as it would have been if an extension of time had been granted, and the Court had gone on to consider and had granted the application for leave to appeal."
22 The facts as related by the Chief Justice were that the appellant and Ms Anderson were on friendly terms. On 9 February 1963 she was visiting the appellant's parents' house in Redfern Street, Subiaco. The appellant's parents left the house in the evening, leaving Ms Anderson in company with the appellant and his younger brother. After an argument with the appellant, Ms Anderson said she would walk home to Graylands where she lived. To do this she would have had to walk about 3 miles going by the shortest practicable route. Prior to her departure the three of them had been playing strip poker. When Ms Anderson had lost certain articles of clothing, such as her jumper, stockings and girdle, the appellant sent his younger brother out and commenced to make improper advances to Ms Anderson, such as fondling her breasts. She objected and announced her intention to go home. Before the card game the appellant and Ms Anderson had gone to a nearby fish shop and purchased fish and chips. The three had played cards on the floor while eating their meal.
23 When Ms Anderson left she took her make-up from the appellant's car, leaving in the house some of the articles she had taken off, namely, her stockings and a girdle. The appellant followed in his car, a near new Simca, having first put the stockings and the girdle in the back of the car. On several occasions he drew up alongside Ms Anderson and tried to get her to enter the car and "make it up", but she refused. Eventually he stopped the car near the junction of Nicholson Road and Railway Parade which is 15 to 20 yards from the subway in Nicholson Road. He sat in the car for a few minutes. He watched Ms Anderson walk under the subway and turn left into Stubbs Terrace along which she would walk on her way home to Graylands, which was south of the subway.
24 The appellant made a statement to police. Prior to making the statement, he denied that he had hit Ms Anderson and said that after she had turned under the subway he followed her up Stubbs Terrace only to find her lying in the sand at the side of the road opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. He made more than one statement. In what was his final statement he said that he went after Ms Anderson and when she was nearly opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station, which was approximately 520 yards from the subway along Stubbs Terrace and 540 yards in a straight line from where he had been last standing with his car, he said he decided "to scare her by driving the car at her and as close as possible" at a speed of approximately 30 mph. He said that before he realised what had happened he had hit Ms Anderson with the left hand front side of the car. He heard a loud crunch and carried her a few yards on the front of the vehicle. He stopped his car and got out by opening the passenger side front door. He found Ms Anderson lying on the left hand side of the front of his car in the sand and a few feet off the edge of the bitumen. She was, he said, bleeding from a cut over the right eye. He lifted her up, inclined the back of the passenger seat backwards, put her through the front passenger door and closed it. In his evidence at the trial he said he ran around the front of the car to the driver's door, opened it, entered the car, closed the door and drove off at 60 to 70 mph to the surgery of a Dr Quinlivan in Alfred Road, Mt Claremont.
25 Almost immediately after the appellant got out of the car, two cars drove under the subway going south along Stubbs Terrace. The occupants saw the appellant's car. He was observed bending over the prostrate form of the girl as she lay in the sand. He was seen to pick her up and put her in his car and drive off. One car was a Morris Major Elite driven by a Mr Rogers. A passenger in this car, a Mr Rynn, saw the appellant's car at the side of the road with its headlights blazing and saw a man (who must have been the appellant) with a girl in his arms carrying her towards the car. Mr Rogers pulled up about 20 yards in front of the Simca. While some discussion took place between the persons in the Morris, the Simca drove off as described. The driver of the Morris tried to follow but the Simca was going too fast. However, the occupants got the appellant's car registration number as he sped by.
26 The other car was a Volkswagon driven by a Mr Hansen. A Mr Phillips was a passenger in the rear bench seat. This car was probably the first of the two cars on the scene. Mr Phillips saw a person (who must have been the appellant) bending over a body lying on the ground about 6 feet from the edge of the bitumen. There was a Simca car stationary alongside. It had its near side passenger door open. Its near side wheels were off the bitumen. The Volkswagon continued on, made a U-turn and returned, stopping opposite the Simca on the other side of the road. Mr Phillips said that at that stage the man was putting a body in the car. The Volkswagon remained parked opposite for about a minute during which the man put the body in the car "through the open door". The Volkswagon then drove a little past the Simca and made another U-turn, drove slowly up behind the Simca and then continued south along Stubbs Terrace. Not long afterwards the Simca passed the Volkswagon at a high rate of speed and the Volkswagon followed it to a Dr Quinlivan's surgery in Alfred Road, Mt Claremont. The appellant, who was the driver of the car, did not say anything to the occupants of these two cars. On arrival at Dr Quinlivan's surgery, Mr Phillips asked the appellant whether he wanted any help. The appellant replied "No".
27 At the doctor's surgery the appellant said that he did not know what happened. He gave no other information. As Wolff CJ put it:
"The circumstances seem suspicious and after giving the girl what attention he could at the surgery and arranging for an ambulance to take her to the Royal Perth Hospital, Quinlivan rang the police about 11.00 pm."
28 As set out at p 83 of the appeal book, Wolff CJ then described what followed:
"An inspection was made of the Simca which showed signs of damage on the front left hand side. Button was then taken to the scene where he pointed out where the girl had been lying, and articles were found scattered along the road North of this position. These articles were identified by Button as having belonged to the girl. The positions of certain blood stains where the girl had been lying and north of this position were also noted, and for reference the location of any articles or signs on the road was marked in chalk.
Early Sunday morning about 2.00 am a plastic, envelope type bag belonging to the girl was found in the junction of a street running off Stubbs Terrace near the scene. The bag was light and could have been blown from the scene by the wind.
The applicant Button made four statements to the police in connection with the matter. He made two verbal statements followed up by a written statement, all of which suggested the girl had been struck by a 'hit and run' vehicle. He studiously hid from the police the facts relating to the game of strip poker, gave a specious explanation at his trial of how the articles of clothing came to be in his car, and gave the reason for the girl's abrupt departure an argument over a piece of fish. Finally at a later stage in the evening after he had inquired about the girl and had been told she was dead, he said 'What have I done, it was all my fault', and on being asked 'Do you mean she was struck by your car?' he answered 'Yes'. He then gave a statement in writing concerning his running at the girl (as he said) to scare her.
At his trial his Counsel made strenuous objection to the admission of this statement, alleging that it had been got by improper means - that it had been forced out of Button by keeping him under detention for some hours at the CIB in Perth and that the police had despite his protestations of innocence plainly indicated that they did not believe him, and finally in order that he might be allowed to go home, he made and signed that statement on which the Crown relied.
Argument was heard on the voir dire for 11/2 days and Button himself gave evidence. At the conclusion the trial Judge held that the statement was admissible and gave a careful statement of his reasons for doing so. We have had the advantage of reading the learned Judge's reasons for admitting the statement and it is important to note that he formed an unfavourable opinion as to Button's credibility: an opinion which might be gathered by anyone reading his evidence let alone hearing it.
The mainstay of Button's case was the small amount of damage to the car, in view of the speed at which it was said the car was going, and the grievous injuries suffered by the girl.
From this it is argued that it could not have been Button's car that struck the girl. To draw any definite conclusions from the damage to a vehicle would be foolish indeed. Over a period of many years I venture to say each of the members of this Court has seen cases where the damage done to a vehicle colliding with a human being is of small significance where the injury to the person has been great. The weight of the vehicle, its speed, and the part of the vehicle which takes the main brunt of the first impact have a bearing on the resultant damage to it; so has the individual who is struck, the ground where he falls and how he falls. If a person is running out of the way or is hit at a particular angle, that will have a bearing. The factors that can affect the situation are of course infinite.
Listening to the argument on the motion, I got the impression that this application might have been an appeal in another guise against the jury's implicit finding of fact that Button's car was the one involved. The point was very thoroughly discussed at the trial and the jury fully informed of the implications of the evidence. Before leaving this point it should be mentioned that the car which Cooke says he was driving and which he says hit the girl sustained little damage, so that if the Court accepts Cooke's story as credible it is substituting one very little damaged car for another which may be similarly described. Nevertheless, there are certain features about the condition of Button's car as seen on the night of the 9th February and early morning of the 10th February, 1963 which are materially significant in pointing to the conclusion that it was the car that hit the girl."
29 Wolff CJ then detailed a number of signs of the collision observed on the roadway which led him to conclude that Ms Anderson had been hit by a car and "carried and/or flung a little over 60 yards". Reference was made to blood stains on the car. There was one thick stain about 2 inches long and half an inch wide which proved to be human blood group A, as had a number of blood spots on the road. Ms Anderson's blood group was A Rhesus Negative.
30 Wolff CJ then gave an account of the damage to the appellant's Simca and made his comments on it at 86 - 87 of the appeal book. I shall deal with this material later in the context of the expert forensic evidence relied upon by the appellant. At 87 - 88 of the appeal book Wolff CJ described the injuries suffered by Ms Anderson and concluded at 88 that:
"From the appearance of the injuries, the surgeon performing the autopsy gave as his opinion that the girl had been hit violently with some object and had then gone feet first with the front of her body sliding along the rough surface of the road. There were various indications on the skin of the sliding or scraping - in such cases the skin presents a parchment-like appearance and this was the condition observed at the post-mortem."
31 In the present appeal there was additional medical evidence called from Dr Turner, the doctor who treated Ms Anderson following her transfer to Royal Perth Hospital. I will refer to this in the context of consideration of the relevant ground.
32 Wolff CJ then considered the sworn testimony of Mr Cooke that it was he who drove the car that hit Ms Anderson on the night in question. I propose to deal with that in the context of the grounds of appeal so far as they rely upon Cooke's confessions which are dealt with by Wolff CJ at 88 - 102. Finally, in the first appeal, the appellant sought to rely upon evidence of "similar acts" involving incidents in which Mr Cooke was the driver of a car and ran down women on five separate occasions on and from 12 September 1958 to and including 20 May 1960. Wolff CJ dealt with that aspect of the first appeal as follows:
"One of these incidents concerned running at three women walking together on the road and he hit two of them, and on another occasion when he knocked down a woman he returned and stole her purse. While the applicant's Counsel denied that this evidence is introduced to prove the applicant's case by establishing a propensity, I cannot help thinking that despite the denial that is the tenuous ground on which it is sought to introduce it. In the result that would be the only 'evidence' (if it could be called by that name) to establish the applicant's case; the claim made by Cooke to have killed the girl Anderson, is so bad at its core and so obviously fabricated, that the admission of the other unconnected acts could not help the applicant against whom the evidence is very strong. As in the Beamish case these other alleged instances must be regarded as an open question so far as this Court is concerned, and the fact that the police have been willing to accept the evidence as implicating Cooke depends, of course, on the investigation of these cases and the general remarks made in considering similar evidence in the Beamish appeal apply with equal force here."
33 The references in the judgment in the appellant's first appeal to the judgment in "Beamish" are references to Beamish v The Queen (No 2), unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 20 of 1964; 22 May 1964. That was Beamish's second appeal, which I will refer to as Beamish No 2. On that occasion the court was constituted by Wolff CJ, Jackson and Virtue JJ. The second appeal by Beamish was by way of a reference from the Minister for Justice under s 21 of the Criminal Code, a predecessor of s 140 of the Sentencing Act 1995 and expressed in similar terms. There was an earlier appeal by Beamish to the Court of Criminal Appeal constituted by Jackson SPJ, Virtue and D'Arcy JJ reported as Beamish v The Queen [1962] WAR 85, to which I shall refer as "Beamish No 1". One curious aspect of the second appeal by Beamish was that the Court was then presided over by Wolff CJ, who had been the presiding Judge at Beamish's trial.
34 In Beamish No 2, as in the case of the appellant's first appeal, reliance was placed upon evidence by Mr Cooke that he had committed the offence in question. In each case Mr Cooke's evidence was rejected as being without credibility. The only connection between the two cases is that in both Beamish No 2 and in the present appellant's first appeal, reliance was placed upon confessions by Mr Cooke to the crimes of which each had been convicted.
35 It is convenient to deal first with the fresh forensic evidence relied upon by the appellant to establish that, contrary to the police forensic evidence given at the trial, there was no or no sufficient forensic evidence that would justify the conclusion that the appellant's Simca vehicle had collided with a pedestrian on the night in question.
36 In this context it is appropriate first to set out the reasons for judgment of Wolff CJ at 84 ff dealing with the forensic evidence and containing what the Chief Justice described as "a survey" of the "signs that appeared on the roadway and the damage to the car [ie the Simca], and the injuries sustained by the girl". The learned Chief Justice dealt with these matters as follows:
"The examination of the roadway revealed many signs of the collision. The following significant signs were observed:-
(1) A small cosmetic lotion bottle which belonged to the girl. This was found in a slightly convex curving track in the sand near the Eastern edge of the bitumen - this track was about 110 feet long. It commenced about 450 feet North of where the girl lay in the sand. The cosmetic bottle was found standing up - about 80 ft South down the track. The track could not be identified as being made by any particular vehicle;
(2) a straight scrape mark about 3 feet long near the Eastern edge of the bitumen lying at about 10 o'clock as one faced North;
(3) blood stains just off the bitumen about 180 feet from the cosmetic bottle and spread along some loose stones over a distance of about 30 inches. These proved to be human blood Group A;
(4) the right shoe of the girl about 45 feet farther down the road at the Eastern edge of the bitumen;
(5) the girl's lipstick a little East of the centre of the bitumen and about 40 feet farther down the road from the shoe;
(6) the girl's brush about 2 feet farther on and slightly more to the West of the centre of the bitumen;
(7) the girl's comb about 25 feet farther down the road and about 3 feet from the Eastern edge of the bitumen;
(8) the girl's left shoe about 15 feet farther down the road and approximately in the prolongation of the Western edge of the road and about 35 feet from the kerb;
(9) some blood spots; some alongside and some just off the bitumen on the Eastern side commencing about 85 feet from where the comb was found and the blood spots continuing over a distance of about 10 feet. These blood spots were identified as human blood, Group A. One patch was about 6" in diameter.
The distance from the bottle to the first blood mark was 175 feet;
and from the bottle to the second blood mark 366 feet;
and from the scrape mark to the Southernmost blood mark 223 feet.
The North end of the convex track in the sand was about 230 yards from the mouth of the subway.
From the circumstantial evidence it would appear that the girl had been carried and/or flung a little over 60 yards.
Mr Drummond, a pathologist, examined the Simca car. On the lift [sic left] headlight Mr Drummond saw small reddish brown smears and two smears in the centre of the glass. On the metal rim above the glass there were two spots and on the same rim below there were another two spots. These spots proved to be human blood but there was not sufficient for typing. The spots on the rim were about a pin head in size. Other blood stains and spots on the door frame and inside rear of the car were of neutral significance.
There was a patch of reddish brown stains over an area of about 5 inches in diameter near the top of the curve of the offside front mudguard. One stain was thick about 2 inches long and half-an-inch wide. This too proved to be human blood Group A.
The girl Anderson's blood group is a [sic A] Rhesus negative.
The damage done to the car was slight. It was difficult for an expert to say how much could be due to hitting the girl because about a month before Button's car had collided with the back of a small car at the junction of King Street in St George's Terrace. The impact was light. Button reported the accident, specifying that the grille and park light on his vehicle were damaged and said in reporting that he estimated the cost of repairing the damage at less than [sterling]25. Button ascribed all the damage to the car as it was observed on the 9th February following, to this collision, but he was contradicted in that by the girl's father who had seen the car after the St George's Terrace collision. In that impact the left hand or near side of Button's vehicle had collided with the back of the right hand or offside of a Ford Prefect belonging to a Mr Wilson. When Button's car was examined after the night of the 9th February, 1963, it was found that in addition to the damage to the radiator grille and the blinker light on the near side, the front registration plate was bent slightly underneath the bumper and the paintwork was chipped on the left side of the plate. The radiator grille lower surround panel was pulled away at the join of the mudguard; the left mudguard was dented inwards at the front below the headlights; the left headlight rim was buckled and slightly sprung from its mounting; the left side radiator air deflector was sprung from its mounting and pushed back; and the bonnet was slightly dented in four places on the top at the right side of the mascot. The headlights were tested for adjustment, and while the right or offside was in order it was found that the left or near side was badly out of adjustment; it would illuminate the roadway only 7 ft 6 in in front of the vehicle.
Button could not explain how the dents got on the bonnet of the car, although he said they were there before the night the girl was killed. When asked about the blood spots he could give no explanation, although at his trial he suggested they might have got there if he had put his hand on the car to steady himself as he ran around to the driver's door; that he had a lot of blood on his chest and hands and perhaps some blood got on the places specified when he may have touched them unwittingly.
The girl's father said in evidence that he had seen the car a week prior to the 9th February and that there was then no damage to the bonnet of the car.
Mr Wilson, the driver of the Ford Prefect, testified that he looked at the Simca after the collision and there was no damage to the bonnet, and that he saw the Simca on the 13th February, 1963, he saw the dents in the bonnet which had not been there before and fresh damage to the near side head lamp.
Referring to Button's explanation as to the blood spots, the explanation is incredible. One may 'explain' anything, but this is a case where the import of the blood spots cannot be explained away. It is highly unlikely that this kind of spotting accurred [sic occurred] at the several places by Button's steadying himself with his hand on the car as he ran round the front, even if this theory could be accepted as fact. The position of the spots on the left headlight glass and rim in particular will not square with Button's theory. As to the damage to the headlight and the bonnet, that does not fit in with the report he made, and Mr Wilson the driver of the Ford Prefect refutes Button's testimony that the headlight and bonnet were in the damaged condition they were found in after the 9th February, as a result of the January collision.
The girl died early after admission to the Royal Perth Hospital. A post-mortem examination indicated that she had been struck a very violent blow consistent with a motor car running into her.
She had numerous abrasions on the front of her body which may be summarised as follows:-
a large laceration with ragged edges over the right eyebrow;
a small abrasion 1/2 in above this;
an abrasion 11/2 in long under the chin;
small abrasions on the bridge of the nose and on the back of the left hand and of the five fingers of the same hand;
a large abrasion on the outside of the right forearm;
large abrasion involving the whole or the fronts and sides of both thighs and knees;
a laceration 1" long on the front of the iliac spines, that is to say, over the pelvic area on either side;
a laceration of the right big toe;
there was bruising on the outer side of both calves: under the left bruise there was a fracture of the upper quarter of the shaft of the fibula.
Internally:
There was intensive subarchnoid haemorrhage over the whole of the brain and small bruising on the inner surface of the right temporal lobe;
in the lungs there were areas of dark discolouration from haemorrhage;
the abdominal cavity was full of fluid dark blood and there was a tear on the anterior edge of the liver between the right and left lobes;
there was also extensive haemorrhage at the root of the spleen.
The cause of death was haemorrhage resulting from the ruptured liver and subarachnoid haemorrhage.
From the appearance of the injuries, the surgeon performing the autopsy gave as his opinion that the girl had been hit violently with some object and then gone feet first with the front of her body sliding along the rough surface of the road. There were various indications on the skin of this sliding or scraping - in such cases the skin presents a parchment-like appearance and this was the condition observed at the post-mortem."
37 Ground 2(b) of the grounds of appeal contended that:
"Fresh forensic evidence now available (full particulars of which will be provided prior to the hearing of this appeal) due to recent developments in forensic science relating to the damage said to have been sustained by the Appellant's vehicle on the night in question which evidence corroborates significantly the testimony of the Appellant at the trial and the testimony of Cooke as given at the appeal.
Particulars
Further testing by methods now available has established that the damage sustained by the Appellant's vehicle was inconsistent with:
(i) having struck the victim the Deceased, and;
(ii) having struck a pedestrian at all."
38 As I have already indicated these particulars were amended at the hearing of the appeal by making the above particulars par (a) and by the addition of the following:
"(b)(A) Fresh forensic evidence of Trevor Stephen Condren that the damage to the Appellant's vehicle was not consistent with it being the vehicle involved in the death of Rosemary Anderson.
(B) Fresh forensic evidence of Neil Alister Turner that the injuries sustained by Rosemary Anderson were not consistent with having been caused by a vehicle travelling in the manner described in the Button confession."
39 In this context the appellant sought to rely upon an affidavit of Trevor Stephen Condren sworn on 12 October 2000. Mr Condren is now retired. In 1963 he was a first class constable in the WA Police Force and a Fatal Accident Vehicle Examiner attached to the Traffic Branch, Perth. He gave evidence as a witness for the prosecution at the trial. His name was incorrectly recorded in the transcript as "Condron". He was the holder of an Institute of Automobile Mechanical Engineers Certificate (Member Grade) and an Australian Institute of Advanced Motorists Certificate (Advanced Driving and Police Pursuit). He had been a member of the Police Force since 1953. He carried out his duties as a vehicle examiner for some 18 years from 1956 to 1974. On 12 February 1963, at the request of officers of the Criminal Investigation Branch ("CIB"), he inspected the appellant's Simca and prepared a report. The request was made on behalf of the investigating officers, namely Inspector Douglas, Detective Sergeant Nielson, Detective Sergeant Deering and Detective Sergeant Wiley. Inspector Douglas was in charge of the Fatal Accidents Squad and Detective Sergeant Deering was the former's "right hand man".
40 Mr Condren's evidence was contained in an affidavit sworn on 12 October 2000 and served upon the respondent. At the hearing of the appeal an objection was taken to the admissibility of Mr Condren's evidence on the ground that it related to a matter which was not the subject of a ground of appeal or any relevant particular. Mr Condren's affidavit was one which was before the Court when, on 6 December 2000, sitting as a single Judge of the Court, I dealt with objections to the admissibility of a number of affidavits. The purpose of that hearing was to deal with any objections to the admissibility of evidence contained in such affidavits. At that time the Crown did not object to the admissibility of the affidavit. Counsel for the Crown merely informed the Court that the facts asserted and the opinion expressed were disputed.
41 While prior to the hearing of the appeal the precise basis upon which the evidence of Mr Condren was said to be admissible, other than under the general rubric of "fresh evidence" was not clear, during the course of the hearing of the appeal the appellant made available supplementary submissions in which it was submitted that the evidence of Mr Condren, insofar as it was fresh, confirmed and corroborated the evidence of Mr Haight. The evidence of the latter was that the damage to the appellant's Simca vehicle was inconsistent with the vehicle having struck a pedestrian in the manner described by the appellant in his confession or at all. The fresh evidence of Mr Condren was his opinion, which he formed at the time and which he still holds, that the physical damage to the appellant's Simca vehicle was inconsistent with the vehicle having struck a pedestrian. He did not give that evidence at the trial because he was not asked. His function at the trial was to give evidence of the results of his examination of the physical condition of the Simca motor vehicle alleged to have been involved in the incident in which Ms Anderson was killed. It follows that his evidence was not fresh, but new, although it was unknown to the defence at the trial.
42 His evidence was that the purpose of his examination was to determine the mechanical condition of the vehicle and the extent of any damage to it. The CIB officers to which reference has been made were present at the examination. When he commenced his inspection he was informed that the vehicle had been involved in an accident with a pedestrian and the driver had been charged and had confessed. He was also informed that the vehicle had been involved in a minor collision with a Ford Prefect some three weeks or more before. He confirmed the report which he prepared for the purposes of the prosecution of the appellant. The damage fell into two distinct categories. The first was some damage to the front left hand side and the second was some minor damage to the bonnet to the right of centre. The damage to the bonnet was of a minor nature. From his observation of the damage, he did not consider that the damage to the Simca was consistent with the vehicle having collided with a pedestrian. The basis for this opinion was that there were no apparent contact marks of a body such as blood, skin, hair, clothing or fabric, anywhere on the vehicle. The degree of damage was not severe.
43 Mr Condren said that he commented to the officers present that he did not think that the vehicle had struck a pedestrian. He did not express that opinion when he gave evidence in the court in 1963. He was not asked by anyone to express an opinion on that issue. He explained that his role at the trial was to give evidence of his examination of the vehicle in terms of its mechanical condition and damage. He said there was no mention in his evidence about a pedestrian or injury to a pedestrian, because he found no evidence of collision with a pedestrian. It was put to him in cross-examination that it was not his job to deal with blood or skin or clothing, but he said that "if they were adhering to the motor vehicle, it was his job to note them and report". He did not put his opinion in his report because his function was to make an examination of the vehicle for damage and prepare a report of such damage. He accepted that it was not his role in 1963 to express an opinion whether or not the vehicle had come into contact with a pedestrian. In his evidence at the trial on 30 April 1963 he was asked:
"And the object of your examination was to see what damage you could find, wasn't it?"
"Well damage and mechanical condition is the main consideration."
44 He confirmed in this Court that that was his function at the relevant time. He accepted that, at that time, there were others better qualified than himself to deal with the question whether the vehicle had come into contact with a pedestrian.
45 He remained in the Police Force for 22 years after the Button trial. He did not come forward to give evidence at the appellant's appeal in 1964 because he was not then "qualified to give that sort of evidence". His opinion when giving evidence in the present appeal was based upon his accumulated experience during his service. He said he had "very rarely" seen vehicles that had come into contact with people and there were no signs of the impact. As he said:
"This was alleged to be a major impact. If so, there would be signs of blood, skin, hair, fat, clothing and such like on the vehicle on the damaged areas."
46 He did not report his opinion at the time to Sergeant Court, who was the officer in charge of Traffic and Vehicle Examiners because it was an opinion of his "against four senior CIB officers".
47 Mr Condren said he became involved in the present proceedings after reading the book Broken Lives by Ms Estelle Blackburn. When he read the book he made contact with the author and commented on several matters, with the result that he was subsequently called to give evidence.
48 At the request of counsel for the appellant, the Crown produced a number of photographs being enlargements of original photographs produced from police custody depicting the damage to the appellant's Simca motor vehicle. The photographs were not in fact exhibited at the trial. Counsel for the Crown informed us that counsel for the appellant at the time, Mr K W Hatfield QC objected to the photographs on the basis that they did not truly represent the damage. The reason was that they tended to exaggerate the damage because they were over-exposed. In the present proceedings, they were being referred to by the witness to explain his current opinion to the Court, which was the opinion he had expressed to the CIB officers at the time. Mr Condren confirmed that the damage as depicted in the photographs was as he had observed and noted in his report. He confirmed his opinion that the damage was not caused by a collision with a pedestrian.
49 While the photographs themselves were not fresh evidence, I consider that they were admissible to explain and assist in understanding Mr Condren's evidence. They became exhibits 1 and 2 in the appeal. There was also a further photograph which was identified by Mr Condren as depicting damage to the left hand side of the vehicle. It was described to Mr Condren by the CIB officers as unrelated to the incident involving Ms Anderson. That photograph became exhibit 3 in the appeal.
50 In cross-examination Mr Condren recalled that the fourth police officer participating in the examination was Detective Sergeant Wiley. Inspector Douglas was the officer in charge of that squad. Detective Sergeant Wiley was the officer responsible for giving expert evidence at the appellant's trial about the vehicle and pedestrian damage. In cross-examination Mr Condren maintained that so far as his inspection was concerned, there was no evidence on the vehicle itself of any collision with a pedestrian. The following passage appears in the cross-examination:
"I suggest to you, Mr Condren, it was not your function to express an opinion about injury or otherwise?---Injuries, No.
Not at all?---No.
Nor was it your role to express an opinion as to whether or not the vehicle had made contact with a pedestrian?---The officers informed me that it had collided with a pedestrian.
Mr Condren, it was not your job, was it in 1963, to express an opinion as to whether or not the vehicle had come into contact with a pedestrian?---No."
51 Mr Condren also gave evidence at the trial that it was possible that the damage sustained to the left hand side of the Simca had been caused in the earlier accident with the Prefect. He was shown photographs of both vehicles and said that the damage to the Simca was consistent with being in contact with the rear of the Ford Prefect. Mr Condren did not believe that the damage to the Simca on the left hand side could have been caused in a collision with a pedestrian. In response to a specific question from the trial Judge whether he reached his opinion from what he saw or from what he was told or a combination of both, Mr Condren answered:
"Well, Sir, having been told that the vehicle had been in a previous accident, I would agree that it is possible that that could have been the damage from the previous accident."
52 Having read his evidence in conjunction with the cross-examination in the present proceedings, the effect of his evidence was that the damage to the left front of the Simca around the headlight, radiator and mudguard was consistent with the Simca having collided with the Ford Prefect in the manner described.
53 The relevant damage did not include the damage to the bonnet on the Simca. It was not suggested that that was caused in any way by the collision with the Ford Prefect on 7 January 1963. With the help of photographs which became exhibits 4 and 5, Mr Condren confirmed in re-examination that the relevant damage as depicted was "consistent with those two vehicles coming together".
54 Mr Condren's evidence at the appeal was that he could not exclude the possibility that the damage to the headlight may have occurred as a result of the incident in which Ms Anderson was injured. While acknowledging the possibility, Mr Condren said that he believed that all of the damage to the Simca at the left front arose from contact with the Ford Prefect. It was his opinion that, had the Simca been involved in a very heavy impact and driven at night, the filament of the headlight globe would most certainly have fallen off the light and the light would not work. When he examined the vehicle the headlight was working but the parking light was not.
55 In my opinion, in view of the fact that Mr Condren had formed the view that the damage to the Simca was inconsistent with the vehicle having struck a pedestrian on the night in question, that evidence would have been relevant and admissible, assuming that he was then qualified to express an expert opinion. The opinion he expressed was made known to Inspector Douglas and the others present, including Detective Sergeant Wiley. Detective Sergeant Wiley was the officer who gave expert evidence at the trial about the condition and damage to the appellant's Simca motor vehicle.
56 Mr Condren accepted that at the relevant time there were others better qualified than himself to deal with the question whether or not the Simca had come into contact with a pedestrian. When Mr Cooke had come forward saying he was responsible for the deaths of Ms Anderson and a Ms Brewer (for whose murder one Darryl Beamish had been convicted), he did not then go and see the prosecutor because he felt then that he was not qualified to give the evidence.
57 The question whether the damage to the Simca or any part of it was consistent with having struck Ms Anderson and caused the injuries which brought about her death was a critical issue at the trial. In my opinion, although Mr Condren's area related to the examination and report of physical damage to the vehicle, his observation that there were no indications of the vehicle having struck a pedestrian by way of blood, skin or hair on any part of the vehicle, coupled with his comments about the left hand headlight, were relevant and admissible. In particular, he had made known to Inspector Douglas and Detective Sergeant Wiley his opinion that there was no indication that the Simca had come into contact with a pedestrian. It must be noted, however, that contrary the observation of Mr Condren, there were blood spots on the Simca in the vicinity of the left headlight which were group A and the other signs of blood referred to by Wolff CJ.
58 The information and opinion of Mr Condren was known to Inspector Douglas and Detective Sergeant Wiley. It was on that basis available to the Crown. As I said in Bradshaw, supra, at 11 - 12, with the agreement of Pidgeon and Owen JJ:
"It was submitted that the duty of disclosure included the obligation to make enquiry to ascertain whether discoverable matter existed and to ensure its preservation: Archbold, para 4.268. Further, if material was available to the Crown, on the basis that it was known to the police, for example, the accused was entitled to it, whether or not its existence was known to prosecuting counsel: R v Ward (1991) UKHL 12; (1993) 93 Cr App R 1. I accept these submissions. In such a case, however, it is not necessary for the appellate court to determine whether there was any fault on the part of the prosecutor in this respect. Innocent failure to disclose relevant material may nonetheless constitute a miscarriage of justice: Clarkson v DPP [1990] VicRp 65; [1990] VR 745 at 755 per Murphy J; and see The Queen v Apostilides [1984] HCA 38; (1984) 154 CLR 563. If after conviction it came to the offender's knowledge that the Crown had in its possession or available to it during his trial documentary material which he had requested, but which had been innocently denied by the Crown, that is a situation which could lead to a miscarriage of justice, if the availability of the material might have influenced the result of the trial. See also Bryer (1994) 75 A Crim R 456 at 477-478 per Williams J.
It was accepted that the relevant criterion to be applied in determining whether there has been a miscarriage of justice is whether disclosure of the material in question to the defence might well have influenced the result of the trial: see Clarkson; and Bryer, above. So far as fresh evidence which was not available at the time of trial is concerned, it was also accepted that a miscarriage of justice will occur if evidence which is now available and not led at the trial was such that, if given, a jury acting reasonably must have entertained a reasonable doubt so as to entitle the accused to an acquittal. In the case of fresh evidence this involves a three stage test. First, it must be shown that the evidence relied upon could not, with reasonable diligence, have been produced by the accused at the trial (although this is not a universal and inflexible requirement). Secondly, the evidence must be capable of belief. Thirdly, there must be a significant possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the appellant had the fresh evidence been before it at the trial: Gallagher v The Queen [1986] HCA 26; (1986) 160 CLR 392 at 395 per Gibbs CJ; and see Mickelberg v The Queen [1989] HCA 35; (1989) 167 CLR 259."
59 While it may be accepted that Mr Condren, as he conceded, was not qualified in 1963 to give expert evidence concerning the issue whether the damage to the Simca was consistent with that vehicle having struck a pedestrian, I am of the opinion that he demonstrated before this Court that when he gave his evidence in this appeal he was sufficiently qualified to express such an opinion. There was no significant challenge to his present competence to express the opinion which he did. His evidence was relevant and admissible whether it be classified as fresh or new evidence. Standing alone, however, it was by no means conclusive, having regard to the evidence of blood stains, to which I have referred.
60 The appellant's case on the contention that the Simca had not been the vehicle which struck Ms Anderson relied primarily and substantially on the evidence of Mr W R Haight of San Diego, California, USA, an expert in traffic accident reconstruction. He is accredited as a Traffic Accident Reconstructionist by the United States Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction ("ACTAR") established by the United States Department of Transportation. He has held a certificate of qualification from ACTAR since 1991 or 1992. The purpose of traffic crash or collision reconstruction is the application of the science of physics to determine how the crash or collision occurred, the factors which led up to the crash or collision, what happened during it and what occurred after it as a direct result.
61 Mr Haight is a lecturer with the Texas A and M University where he teaches courses on accident reconstruction. He also practises as a consultant in relation to traffic collision issues. He has given expert evidence throughout the United States in both local courts and in the Federal Court of the United States as well as in Singapore and Australia. He has held a statutory qualification in California under s 40600 of the Vehicle Code of California which prescribes the minimum qualifications for police officers in relation to the investigation and reconstruction of traffic collisions. At the Texas A and M University Mr Haight teaches or is involved in some 11 courses dealing with different aspects of traffic accident reconstruction. This covers a range of collisions from low speed collisions to an analysis of damage and energy in crashes. One course relevant in the present context, which he has been teaching since 1990, relates to motor vehicle collisions in which a pedestrian or cyclist is involved.
62 Prior to taking up his teaching post at Texas A and M University, Mr Haight was an Adjunct Instructor for the Northwestern University Traffic Institute, and since he has been with Texas A and M, he has held a post-graduate position with the American Academy of Manual and Physical Medicine teaching accident reconstruction courses. He has also taught courses in Australia and New Zealand, including a course in 1995 for the Queensland Police and Queensland University of Technology in pedestrian and bicycle accident reconstruction. This was attended by police officers from various parts of Australia. He gave a course on general aspects of accident reconstruction in Brisbane in 1997 or 1998. In April 2001 he taught a similar course at the Royal New Zealand Police College. He has published 25 or 26 technical papers on aspects of accident reconstruction, including five or six papers on accident reconstruction involving pedestrians and cyclists.
63 From 1980 to 1984 he was a police officer with the Accident Investigation Bureau of the California Police Department in San Diego. He left the Department in 1984 to pursue a career as a consultant and teacher. He has served on committees and worked as a consultant in relation to accident reconstruction since then. He is a member of the Society of Automotive Engineers and several other professional associations, both national and international based in the United States and elsewhere, including Australia.
64 Since 1985 he has undertaken a substantial number of accident reconstruction tests, totalling some 770 as at May 2001. Of those, he has been personally involved in testing in relation to 250 reconstructions involving either a pedestrian or a cyclist in a collision with a motor vehicle.
65 In March 1999 Mr Haight was asked by a Mr Brett Christian, Editor of the Post Newspaper, to review documents and materials relating to the events leading to the charge against the appellant, his trial, conviction and appeals. The purpose was to evaluate the version of the events put forward by the Crown at the appellant's trial, with a view to determining the reliability of the Crown's case, insofar as it was based on the collision investigation technology at the time and in light of that which has been since developed.
66 For the purposes of this case Mr Haight examined photographs of the appellant's Simca motor vehicle, as well as other vehicles, photographs of the collision scene, the original reports for the purposes of the trial, as well as the transcript and documents relating to the trial and the appeal. He visited the scene of the collision in Stubbs Terrace, Shenton Park on three or four occasions. He subsequently reconstructed and carried out crash tests in relation to the collision involving Ms Anderson.
67 In Mr Haight's opinion the photographs and other documents relating to the present case were not only intact but well preserved, particularly the police photographs of the Simca vehicle. The scene photographs and the transcripts and other documents that had been preserved made this case an easy one to analyse in his opinion.
68 Mr Haight described how crash test analysis had developed. The first known reconstruction was in the United States in 1948. Development after that was relatively slow in the 1950s. It was not until the late 1970s that the motor vehicle manufacturers and the United States Government became involved in looking at vehicle damage, as it related to impact speed, and accident reconstruction was taken seriously. The first pedestrian crash tests had been undertaken by a Dr Severy at the University of California Los Angeles on 29 May 1963, which resulted in the first known paper on pedestrian-involved collision analysis. A real body of literature was developed in the 1970s and 1980s.
69 It is apparent from the evidence given by Mr Haight that there have been major advances in the investigation of vehicle crashes and collisions both of a vehicle to vehicle character and those involving a vehicle and a pedestrian since the 1960s. The Court is entitled to re-examine a previous conviction when there have been developments in technology or investigative techniques which indicate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. McIlkenny v The Queen (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 provides a significant example. This was the case commonly referred to as "The Birmingham Six". The appellants were each convicted of 21 counts of murder in 1975. An application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. An attempt to contest the verdicts of guilty in McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] 2 All ER 227 also failed. The plaintiffs had been found guilty of murder as a result of the bombing of two hotels in Birmingham. They claimed at their trial that they had been beaten up by police. Medical evidence that they had been beaten up before being imprisoned was rejected and confessions obtained were ruled admissible. They then brought an action against the Chief Constable claiming damages for assault by police officers.
70 The Chief Constable applied to have the action struck out on the ground that it raised an issue which had been determined at the murder trial on a voir dire. On the hearing of the application the plaintiffs adduced new evidence consisting of statements from prison officers and expert forensic evidence that at least some of their injuries had been inflicted before they left police custody. The primary Judge held that the new evidence prevented him from striking out the action because it was reasonably conceivable that another tribunal acting judicially might now accept at least part of the plaintiffs' case. On an appeal to the Court of Appeal Lord Denning MR and Sir George Baker, Goff LJ dissenting, held that the plaintiffs were estopped from raising the issue because it had already been determined against them in a court of competent jurisdiction in the criminal proceedings to which they were parties and in which they had had a full and fair opportunity to present their case. It was also concluded that the relevant evidence they sought to present could have been obtained for the purposes of the earlier proceedings by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
71 Lord Denning MR (with whom Sir George Baker agreed) said at 240:
"This case shows what a civilised country we are. Here are six men who have been proved guilty of the most wicked murder of 21 innocent people. They have no money. Yet the state lavished large sums on their defence. They were convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. In their evidence they were guilty of gross perjury. Yet the state continued to lavish large sums on them, in their actions against the police. It is high time that it stopped. It is really an attempt to set aside the convictions by a sidewind. It is a scandal that it should be allowed to continue. The issue was fully tried out and decided by Bridge J at the 'trial within a trial'. His finding on that issue is decisive unless there are circumstances which make it fair or just to re-open it. I see no such circumstances. I would allow the appeal and strike out these actions on the grounds of issue estoppel."
72 In 1987 the Home Secretary referred the case to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s 17(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (Eng). On 28 January 1988 these appeals were dismissed. On 29 August 1990 the case was again referred to the Court of Appeal by the Home Secretary as a result of still more fresh evidence which had become available. The appeal was allowed for two reasons. One was that fresh evidence had become available which showed that, in the absence of explanation, the police witnesses had, at the least, deceived the Court. The second was that, as a result of advances in science, fresh scientific evidence at least threw grave doubt on the prosecution expert's evidence. In that respect, Mr Haight's evidence is also based on the greater knowledge and experience there is available today. Such evidence and its significance must now be examined just as the availability of fresh DNA evidence might now be available in some cases to reveal a miscarriage of justice.
73 According to Mr Haight pedestrian-motor vehicle collisions are analysed in a number of ways. First, there is the "throw distance", or how far a body is projected as the result of a particular collision. Secondly, there is the relationship between the front end design of the vehicle and the potential for different injury types. These are the two primary categories dealt with in the literature. There are sub-categories in terms of the rotation of the body of the victim, for example.
74 The primary purpose of pedestrian crash test analysis initially was to examine the relationship between impact speed and how the body of the victim is projected to rest. As research has progressed, injury has tended to become a secondary consideration. The following passage appears in Mr Haight's evidence-in-chief:
"How has reconstruction testing contributed to this field of knowledge?---Doing the testing gives us an opportunity to test or evaluate the mathematical and theoretical assumptions made by reconstructionists. Doing a test, for example, to compare throw distance and impact speed gives us a known throw distance and a known impact speed which we can then apply to the different math models to see how well they reproduce that relationship. Then beyond that the uses are many. We use the crash testing to evaluate how people move, to a certain extent to make recommendations on vehicle design changes, make vehicles more pedestrian-friendly, reduce injuries to pedestrians struck by cars. We look at opportunities to improve traffic safety in a number of ways.
Can you tell us please what is the connection between body motion as demonstrated in crash test reconstruction and live pedestrian impacts in an actual accident? What is the connection between the body motion as demonstrated in those tests and the live collision?---Crash tests have been done with cadavers, pedestrian crash tests have been done with cadavers, as well as a human form surrogate, a dummy. The dummy's design has changed over the years as well; everything from a very stiff, almost like a department store mannequin-type dummy, through what frankly looks like an overstuffed sock, very, very flexible, just a tall rag doll. The dummy evolution has changed drastically. All of those types have been evaluated, but by themselves they don't stand up to an immediate comparison to real people without some sampling of real people being hit by cars and because we, I think, tend to frown on running over real people, we have to look elsewhere and so we have gone to the fortuitous examples of real people getting caught by surveillance cameras and what happens to those people when they're struck. Security cameras around department stores looking into parking lots, intersection cameras, have caught in virtually every country in the world pedestrians being struck and so we have undertaken at the college to compare those real, live crashes and the information from those to the data that we've collected in our pedestrian crash testing with dummies of different sizes and we find that there's a very, very repeatable, very favourable comparison between the two; that the testing we've conducted is virtually identical to what happens to a human body, an actual human body, in an unprepared crash.
Is the analysis of a pedestrian-involved collision more difficult than an analysis of another kind of motor vehicle collision?---It is, yes. It is because it takes into account a third dimension. Most car to car crashes, if you will, are done on a planar surface, an X and Y grid, looking down on it from above as though you're looking at a map. When we involve a pedestrian, necessarily we have a third direction or third axis. We get away from simply X and Y, we have to add a Z axis, because of the vertical height, the vertical position, of the pedestrian centre of mass and how it moves as a product of the collision.
In a collision analysis, what is the first feature - or in a pedestrian collision analysis, what is the first feature that an analyst such as yourself will look at?---The first and probably most telling relationship is the height of the pedestrian's centre of mass relative to the striking leading edge of the vehicle that's involved. This wouldn't be the bumper level but rather the leading edge, the bend if you will, at the forward position of the bonnet. That relationship is going to establish how the body moves as a product of the crash at any speed.
Where in the human being is the centre of mass?---55 per cent of a barefoot standing height, male or female, is about where the centre of mass is on the human body. Effectively it's at a point just below the iliac crown or the top of the hipbones and down into what would be called the pelvic girdle. Largely regardless of body shape, that's going to be where you find the centre of mass. Even as we, shall we say, start to get older and move toward that centre of mass, that centre of mass point still remains about the same height.
What are the physical characteristics relevant to pedestrian collision analysis?---There are a number of characteristics, primarily those located on the car and the body, that are relevant. We look at, for example, the motion laterally across a car. A pedestrian, for example, running perpendicular to a car is going to be carried across the front of that car and off the side more readily than one that's struck in line, for example, and so being able to analyse that lateral motion is important and is a physical characteristic that we'd look for. The length rearward on the front of the car that we find the contact with the body is an important characteristic and frequently once we've established the relationship between the height of centre of mass and the leading edge, is something that tells us about vehicle striking speed. Then, of course, the characteristics we find at the collision scene, light objects that the pedestrian may or may not have been carrying, may not have been wearing, clothing, that sort of business that we find at the scene, those are also important.
In your report the expression 'trajectory categories' is used. Would you explain that expression please?---Based on that initial relationship between the height of the pedestrian centre mass and the leading edge of the bonnet, we can predict how the body is going to move in a gross sense. There are effectively two trajectory categories or body motion descriptor categories; one is known as a wrap trajectory where the body's centre mass is above the leading edge of the vehicle. The other is what's known as a forward projection where the reverse is true. The centre mass is below the leading edge of the striking vehicle. The comparison would be, for example, a moving van or a ute with a high front-end striking a pedestrian, such that he'd be pushed along in front of the vehicle as opposed to a pedestrian struck by a smaller sports car where the leading edge is below the centre mass and the body then moves onto the hood and into the windscreen area and that would be a wrap trajectory.
The expression 'throw distance' which is referred to, can you provide us with an explanation of what is meant by that expression?---Throw distance is simply a measurement of the distance between the area of impact, the point of impact and the point where the body finally comes to rest; a straight line travel distance for that body."
75 Mr Haight explained that the "throw distance" would not vary depending on whether the victim was carried on the bonnet. The "throw distance" is related directly to speed and whether or not the body is trapped on the car. If the body goes through the windscreen it will stay there, so there will be no throw distance. A vehicle that drags the body underneath it has no independent throw distance. A body that is struck at point A and thrown to come to rest at point B is projected for a distance related to the speed of the vehicle. If, for example, the body lands on the bonnet, the time spent on the bonnet is measured as a "carry distance" which is a recognised component of the overall throw distance. Consequently, the throw distance will vary depending on whether the body is carried on the bonnet.
76 There is also a component known as the "slide distance". This is the distance the body travels after the first contact, which may or may not include simply sliding on the ground.
77 Mr Haight's description of what happened in the case of Ms Anderson was described as a "wrap trajectory". The centre of the mass of her body would have been higher than the leading edge of the striking vehicle, whether it was the Simca, or the Holden said to have been driven by Mr Cooke. In either case:
"... the body would have rotated, wrapped, necessarily on the bonnet. How it wrapped and how it moved would then be a function of the striking speed. An analysis done, say, 15 years ago would have taken into account or would have described the event solely in terms of fall and slide. More recent analysis would consider carry or a portion of travel where the body was on or in contact with the vehicle."
78 The most commonly practised method of pedestrian crash test and simulation designed to analyse what happened when a vehicle has collided with a pedestrian is the use of a dummy of the human form being struck by a vehicle. Comparisons are made with real pedestrian impacts captured on video surveillance cameras or police in-car video cameras. The body weight of the victim is a major factor, as is the actual part or area of the body which is struck by the vehicle. This was illustrated by Fig 2 in Mr Haight's report which contained a "scatter graph" illustrating the relationship between striking speed, impact speed and throw distance in a series of crash tests and actual pedestrian crashes.
79 In 1963 the understanding of what happened in a collision with a pedestrian was much less. The best that could be done forensically was to analyse the damage to the car by looking at the extent of damage in comparison with other known pedestrian collisions. That was not the most appropriate use of the information available. At the time there were no mathematical models to predict how far a body would be thrown at a given impact speed. The best that could be done would be to look at the damage to relate a vehicle to the collision or exclude it.
80 Mr Haight carried out tests with the Simca model of the same type and vintage as the appellant's vehicle. Three Simcas of the same vintage were obtained, as well as a Holden of the same model and vintage as that described in Mr Cooke's affidavits and evidence at the applicant's original appeal.
81 In his inspection of the Simcas, in their pre-test condition, Mr Haight noted that the bonnet was fairly thin and more easily prone to damage from a pedestrian or other object striking it. At the front, the leading portion of the grille above the bumper, there was a chrome ring and support structure that was "stiffer" than he anticipated. He was able to relate the height of the leading edge of the vehicle to the centre of mass of a person of Ms Anderson's height, but what was most striking was the "lack of strength" on the front of the Simca.
82 The primary objective of the tests carried out at the Claremont Showgrounds in February 2000 was to determine how the body of a person of similar size to Ms Anderson would have moved, if struck by the Simca or by the Holden, so as to evaluate Mr Button's earliest version of what had happened and Mr Cooke's "confession", to see which would be possible, given the types of vehicle and the anticipated body motion. Mr Haight was also interested in the throw distance and how the body moved relative to different striking speeds within a given range. An assessment of damage was made, both in relation to position on the vehicle and the depth of dents in a "gross sense".
83 The Simcas were virtually identical to the appellant's vehicle, as far as the front end was concerned, apart from one of them which had a missing signal light in front. The Holden was virtually identical to the Holden allegedly stolen by Mr Cooke at the time of this event.
84 The dummy used in the tests was made by a company in Texas which produces dummies for rescue and hospital training. The dummy is made to represent the human form in terms of mobility. It is the form of dummy used in testing and research in the United States. Ms Anderson was 5 feet 6 inches in height and weighed 139 pounds. The dummy was 5 feet 7 inches in height and weighed 104 pounds.
85 The dummy was supported from an overhead wooden structure. There were a series of infra-red time traps before reaching the dummy. Each trap was at a specified distance with a device recording the time, so that speeds could be calculated. The dummy was upright with feet on the ground and kept upright by a suspended length of fishing line with a breaking strain of 50 pounds (22.7 kg). The weight of the dummy was supported by the ground, but the fishing line was tensioned so that it was right at its breaking point.
86 In each of the three tests Mr Haight drove the Simca. In one of them the car engine was not working. A second car pushed the Simca up to the relevant speed and then swerved off so that the Simca struck the dummy at the desired speed. In each case Mr Haight established an area of impact based on his inspection of the photographs of the appellant's Simca and the description of Ms Anderson walking based on the evidence of the appellant (and that of Mr Cooke in the case of the Holden), the verbal descriptions and the pathology report. There was also a series of photographs, mostly action photographs, of the vehicles used in the tests depicting various points and areas of damage.
87 In the second simulation of the collision in the case of the appellant, using a blue Simca, the body was rotated up onto the bonnet, left the car and became airborne for some distance before coming to rest. There was a large dent on the bonnet and a dark smear where the head of the dummy struck the bonnet in front of the windscreen. These were also depicted in photographs of the damage to the vehicle. The large dent was in the middle of the bonnet immediately behind the hood ornament. Immediately behind the left rear trailing edge of the bonnet, if one was sitting in the car, was the dark smear where the head of the dummy made contact with the bonnet. The left front headlight was broken and in the photographs the actual breaking of the glass can be seen. These were the areas in which Mr Haight was interested, particularly for comparison with the actual vehicle driven by the appellant which sustained no damage in those particular areas and had suffered no damage of a comparable nature which would suggest a crash involving a pedestrian (see Exhibit 11A-E).
88 The Court was also shown a videotape made by the Australian Broadcasting Commission of the crash tests (Exhibit 15). This showed film of the four tests which were conducted. Test 1 using a black Simca involved a striking speed of 31 mph or 49-50 kph. The throw distance or projection distance travelled by the body was 62-63 feet or approximately 19 m. The body was struck immediately to the passenger or left side of the front centre line of the bonnet. The body then rotated onto the bonnet, striking at the upper left or trailing edge of the bonnet (viewed from the driver's position) and then rotating off the left side of the vehicle. The body then slid along the road in the same direction as the car. No measurement was made of the length of the slide.
89 The second test shown on the video was the one already described using the blue Simca and depicted in the photographs Exhibits 11A-E. The striking speed was 37 mph or approximately 60 kph. The throw distance was approximately 70 feet or 21-22 m. The body was struck in about the same position on the left front of the Simca, rotated in the same way as described with the body, torso and head striking in virtually identical places on the bonnet and rotating off the left side of the car with some contact with the aerial on the left side. The damage to the blue Simca in the second test was virtually identical to that in the first, notwithstanding the increase in speed.
90 The third test was carried out with the point of impact on the right of the centre line of the car and almost directly in front but slightly to the left of the driver position. The reason for this test was some discussion at the trial as to whether it would have made a difference whether the body was struck on the left or right of the centre line and some discussion also by witnesses, both at trial and at the original appeal, about exactly where Ms Anderson had been struck and, in particular, whether it was on the left or right and where Ms Anderson was found on the verge after the crash. The test illustrated that if Ms Anderson had been struck by the car to the right of centre she would have ended up on the right side. It also demonstrated that the minor dents on the bonnet of the appellant's Simca and the body motion were inconsistent with Ms Anderson having been struck by the right side of the vehicle. The impact speed in the third test was 27 mph or 43-44 kph. The throw distance was about 50 feet. Given that the vehicle was of symmetrical design, the damage location in the third test was virtually a "mirror image" of the damage in the first two tests. The head point transfer on the bonnet was in the same area but to the right side of the bonnet instead of the left. It was "a little more shallow" than in the previous two tests.
91 After the tests Mr Haight made a comparison between the data collected from the three Simca tests and the observations about such tests in the literature dealing with crash test research. Figure 2 in his report demonstrates the throw distance in feet. Figure 3 illustrates the data from the crash tests and observations of actual collisions, but also depicts in red the three tests with Simca vehicles and the test with the Holden vehicle. This shows in each case the impact speed in mph to throw distance in feet. There is a "trend line" illustrating the anticipated relationship between striking speed and throw distance. It shows where the dummy fell compared to the statistics contained in the available literature. Tests 1, 2 and 3 fall very closely within the projection line in the situations depicted by the tests.
92 The fourth test depicted on the ABC video was that involving a 1962 Holden with a sun visor on the front windscreen. This vehicle was identical to that which Mr Cooke said that he had driven on the night in question. The impact speed in the test was at 35 mph, approximately 55-56 kph. The throw distance was approximately 88 feet or 27 m. The vehicle was very well preserved. The paint work was very clean. There was no damage to the vehicle before the crash. The test was designed to examine the effect of the sun visor in a crash with a pedestrian, having regard to the evidence about the sun visor in the earlier proceedings. The front end of the Holden was slightly higher than the Simca and was closer to what the relevant experts call a "forward projection". This has the effect of causing a greater acceleration of the body at the point of impact. This is illustrated in Fig 3 by test 4 falling to the right of the dotted line. This results in a slightly longer throw distance than the average for any given speed.
93 The point of impact was to the left of the centre line just to the left of the "d" in "Holden". The video showed the body striking the bonnet, wrapping up onto the bonnet itself. It came close to the windscreen, striking the sun visor. There was a second video taken from inside the vehicle which clearly shows the impact with the sun visor. The body is then projected off the sun visor which snaps back. The body flies through the air before striking the ground and sliding along the ground before coming to rest.
94 In the tests with the Simcas the lateral movement of the body on the ground was just over 1 m, about 4 feet. In the test with the Holden it was closer to 6 feet. In Mr Haight's opinion, "a lot of" the difference was attributed to the presence of the sun visor on the Holden.
95 Mr Haight was asked to assume that in February 1963 Ms Anderson was walking along Stubbs Terrace and that the conditions on the road were as they had been described in the photographs and documents from that time which he had reviewed. He was also asked to assume that a 1963 Simca approached her and struck her from behind as she was walking along the verge. The following was recorded in the transcript of the appeal at 217 - 219:
"Is the damage that you have observed on the photographs of Mr Button's Simca consistent with such a collision?---No, sir, it's not.
What damage would you expect to the bonnet of Mr Button's Simca had it been involved in such a collision?---The damage on the front of the Button vehicle would have been greater and covered a greater area than what's visible in those photographs taken at the time, I understand, by the police. The photos of that Simca, to me, don't represent that that particular vehicle hit Ms Anderson or any particular pedestrian and they're wholly inconsistent with a pedestrian impact.
Assume that you had been presented with evidence that a 1962 Holden equipped with a sun visor was found with damage to the bonnet, assume it is suggested to you that it struck Ms Anderson as she was walking along Stubbs Terrace in the manner described by Mr Cooke in his confession to the police, his original written confession to that crime, based on the test you conducted with the Holden do you agree that the Holden can be ruled out as the vehicle responsible for the collision?---No, sir, I don't. My understanding is originally ruled out because of the presence of the visor and I don't think that that's consistent with the tests we've seen.
Are you aware that there was some previous evidence in this matter - it's pages 456 and 457 of the transcript. Are you aware that there is some previous evidence in this matter where Cooke claimed that when his car struck Ms Anderson, she came within 18 inches of the windscreen and then went over the roof? Are you aware of that evidence?---I have seen that in the transcript, yes, sir.
Are you aware that the Crown contention at the trial of Mr Button or at his subsequent appeal was that Cooke could not have been accurate in his description of the event because the sun visor would have trapped Ms Anderson on the front of the car at the windscreen? Are you aware of that contention?---I am, yes, sir.
Are you aware that the Crown suggested that at the speeds that Cooke said he was travelling in his confession, she would have necessarily have struck the windscreen? Are you aware of that contention?---I am, yes, sir.
Did your crash test with the Holden address these points?---It did, yes, sir.
Do you concur with those propositions as I have described them to you?---I don't concur with the notion that she would have necessarily struck the windscreen. In fact I think the visor, as we saw in this particular test, would have prevented her from making a full good contact with the windscreen, such as there might have been breakage. I do believe she would have come very close to the windscreen as we saw in the particular test we did with the Holden, but I again don't think we can exclude the Holden simply on that basis.
Bearing in mind the extent of the injuries suffered by Ms Anderson as detailed in the autopsy report and the photographs in the police records that you have viewed, is it impossible to look at a car and say that it did not kill a pedestrian? Is it impossible to do that?---We can tell from the autopsy, the pathology report, and in particular the photographs of a decedent's body, in this case the photos of Ms Anderson - we can tell from what direction she was struck, how she struck the pavement and how she moved along the pavement to rest. Those we can describe or evaluate with a great deal of certainty, particularly in this case, given the state of those photographs and such, but it would be very difficult to look at a car in absence of any other documentary evidence and say that car did or didn't kill a person. That would be a real tough one."
96 The expert evidence at the appellant's trial concerning the consistency or otherwise of the damage to the Simca with having struck a pedestrian was given by Detective Sergeant Wiley. He said that, in his opinion, there was no pattern in the reconstruction of damage to vehicles and injuries suffered, particularly fatal injuries suffered by a pedestrian. Mr Haight's comment on this was that, in the 1960s, there would have been virtually no information to support that statement. At that time, there had been no tests done to relate any kind of pedestrian motion or pedestrian contact on a car to the potential for injury. Since that time tests done on the basis of different projectories had enabled analysis to be carried out to determine the probability for body regions involved in the car parts for injury, as well as severity potential based on different trajectory types.
97 In his opening address to the jury at the trial, counsel for the Crown said:
"I was just saying to you, members of the jury, the significance of this evidence of the indentations on the bonnet is that the Crown case is that this damage has nothing to do with the impact with the Simca and in fact was caused ... with no projections to break the skin or lacerate the body."
98 In Mr Haight's opinion the indentations seen in the police photographs of the appellant's Simca were "not at all" consistent with a body striking the car in the manner suggested in that passage. Mr Haight was also of the opinion, having examined all of the relevant evidence and materials, that there was no objective physical evidence that the Simca driven by the appellant on the night in question had struck a pedestrian at any time.
99 By reference to photographs of the Simca vehicles involved in the tests conducted at Claremont in February 2000, to which reference has already been made, Mr Haight demonstrated that the kind of impact and location of the impact described in the evidence at the trial produced much more severe damage to the bonnet of the blue Simca vehicle and in a different location from the damage on the appellant's Simca. There was an indication of a head contact at the extreme left rear of the bonnet, as one sat in the car, which was inconsistent with the damage on the appellant's Simca and suggested that the latter vehicle had not struck a pedestrian. The scratching or slight displacement on the front bumper of Mr Button's Simca and the missing left front headlight were also inconsistent with what was postulated at the trial.
100 There was also a series of photographs of the black Simca used in the third test which caused similar damage to that suffered by the blue Simca. As was the case with the blue Simca, there were at the point of impact markings from the dummy's head, hair and the fabric of the clothes left on the vehicles. As Mr Haight explained:
"There are several things we look for and I teach police officers and engineers to seek out in investigations of pedestrian collisions and hit and runs and that would be fabric transfer for starters. At the leading edge of the bonnet right above the grille in this case, one would look to find an imprint of the fabric. Often you'll see a pattern. If the pedestrian is wearing jeans you'll see a reverse image of the jeans, the threads, the fabric weave. Colour transfer is frequently found there from the type of clothing and the colour of clothing worn. Moving back into the area where there's body contact we'll often see actual flesh transfer or smearing, a greasy smear in the area where flesh makes contact with the metal and frequently at that point embedded hair and sometimes, depending on what surface is there, some skin and hair."
101 So far as the damage to the appellant's Simca is concerned, Mr Haight's evidence with respect to the significance or otherwise of the damage as depicted in the photographs was:
"The question was in relation to the physical evidence, the two features of the physical evidence being the distance that the Anderson body has been projected and the physical evidence of the damage, if any, to Mr Button's Simca. Would you comment please on the relationship of those two aspects of the physical evidence?---The damage that we see to the Button vehicle by itself consists of a little dent, a very small dent, on the centre of the bonnet, maybe centre right if one were seated in the driver's seat, and looking at the range of tests that we conducted with the similar Simcas is easily below the threshold that we found on the lower end, the 27 mile an hour or the 43 kilometres an hour test, number 3, and would then be vastly inconsistent with the potential throw distance, the potential scene in total, as documented with the physical evidence from the accident scene itself, making a conclusion that the Button Simca hit Ms Anderson and then projected her as far as it was supposed to have with only that little amount of damage improbable or impossible."
102 Later he expressed the opinion that it could not "... be reasonably opined that the appellant's Simca had at any time struck a pedestrian". The damage to the Simca was not consistent with "a pedestrian strike". Mr Haight also regarded it as very significant that there was no evidence of human skin or hair or any fabric transfer on the appellant's Simca. So far as the absence of blood was concerned, Mr Haight's evidence was that the absence of blood was "less definitive" because, depending on the part of the body struck, the victim would not bleed immediately. The absence of evidence of the other three items, however, was "very probative" and "very significant" in Mr Haight's opinion. There was in fact blood found on the Simca, as was put to Mr Haight in cross-examination, but Mr Haight pointed out that these were blood "imprints" but not a "smearing" as one would find in a wounding.
103 A major part of Mr Haight's cross-examination by counsel for the Crown was directed to the observations made by Mr Haight of the evidence in relation to Mr Cooke and the conclusion that he reached in his various reports. In his report submitted to this Court Mr Haight said:
"The front end damage suggested in the body shop documents for the Holden Mr Cooke claimed to have used in this crime and his description of the damage before he ran into the tree are consistent with pedestrian impacts and with the damage observed in the testing conducted for this case.
I believe it becomes clear that the contention of the Crown that the Holden, with the visor intact, could not have hit the pedestrian is inconsistent with the crash tests conducted and that the distances suggested by the Crown in the prosecution of Mr Button are inconsistent with what we know today about the direct relationship between impact speed and throw distance.
On the other hand, I think that the crash tests make it clear that Mr Cooke's description of the motion of Ms Anderson's body onto the car and off to the road are consistent with the crash tests conducted, even chillingly so. Mr Cooke's estimate of his speed given the location of physical evidence found at the scene of the collision although it wasn't apparently memorialised until the 1964 appeal, are reasonably accurate given the understanding of such collision [sic] we have today which we would not have had in the early 60's or even into the 70's for that matter."
104 Mr Cooke made a statement dated 12 September 1963 which he signed and was witnessed by Detective Sergeant W Nielson in which he claimed responsibility for running down Ms Anderson. It is necessary to set out the statement in full. The material part is as follows:
"On the day of 10th February 1963 I left home at about 2 pm catching the local bus and alighting in Adelaide Tce outside of Fairlanes Bowling Centre. I met some people there and stayed playing bowls until about 5.30 pm. After having a snack at the Centre I caught another bus and went out to my parents' house in South Perth 31 Pitt St.
I stopped there about half an hour and walked up to the Hurlingham Hotel, had a beer and walked up to the Como Hotel where I had some more to drink. After leaving the hotel I prowled around some house in Norton St, South Perth. I went into a house in that street and took some money which was in a bank book. The bank book was in a dressing table drawer, the amount I took was [sterling]20, 2 ten pound notes and a bit of loose change in the kitchen. I think the time was about 7.30 pm. After leaving that house I prowled around some more and finally ended up in Como. At the corner of Saunders and Leonora Sts I took a Holden sedan car, two tone in colour, it was parked in the driveway of this corner house.
The keys of the car were in the ignition and I drove it out of the driveway, along Mary St up to the Narrows Motel turned into Melville Parade and drove along the parade to the Narrows Bridge. After crossing the bridge I went up Spring St and Malcom [sic] St through Subiaco-Wembley to Double View. In Double View I turned off the main road into Grant St along till Ewen St to Sydneham [sic] St, along this street to Scarbro [sic] Beach Rd. Again along the main road to St Bridgets Tce, along this terrace to Weaponess Rd.
I went along Weaponess Rd into Wembley Downs to a street on the right which I turned into this was Purdum St. I turned left off this street into Buxton and went along here till I came to Ken St. At Ken St I stopped the car and went back to prowl around some house I had seen, which were in darkness. I decided not to break into these houses at [sic] my wife's brother-in-law had told me a detective lived a little way up Buxton Rd. The length of time I were away from the car was about 10 minutes. I got back into the car and drove along Buxton Rd till I came to Empire Rd into which I turned and drove until I came to Alyth St, this street led to the Boulevard, Wembley. I drove along the Boulevard till I turned right into Brookdale St over Cambridge St to Stephenson Ave. I drove along this Avenue until West Coast Hwy where I turned left.
I drove along West Coast Hwy to Alfred Rd in the suburb of Mt Claremont - all the time, well within the speed limit. Along Alfred St through Graylands, as I neared the intersection of Alfred Rd and Stubbs Tce I saw walking towards me a woman and a man with a little child in between the two. I drove down Stubbs Tce past the Shenton Park railway station, I saw a young woman walking towards me, but on the right hand side of the road, she was between Smit's Splicing Service and Wembley Iron Works, I have indicated to detectives the spot where I had first seen her. She was walking at a normal pace towards Graylands, I drove past at 35 mph and down to the intersection of Cunningham Tce and Stubbs Tce where I did a U-turn, my intention to go back in the direction I had come was to run her down. I can remember wanting to hurt someone and so I decided on this girl I had seen.
I completed my U turn and drove back in the direction I had first come, my speed was at about 40 mph when I started up towards the walking girl. I didn't stop the car on my way back, the girl I had seen previously was still walking in the same direction and on the same side of the road and at the same pace. I saw her about opposite the Shenton Park railway station, I drove half way off the road straight at her. The left hand wheels were off the bitumen on the verge and I made a sudden swerve to the left to hit her. The car struck her, she was tossed on to the bonnet and bounced onto the hood and over the back of the car. I did not hear any noise apart from the first impact - no scream or that.
I struck her with the front right hand side of the car, in between the right headlight and the centre of the grill. I were doing about 30 mph when she was tossed over the car and I picked up speed - at no time did I stop or turn around to have a look, I looked in the rear vision mirror, but saw nothing. I don't know how she was dressed, but I have a recollection of something in one of her hands. I continued on till I came to Mengler Ave where I turned right until Brockway Tce I turned left in to Brockway Tce and stopped the car about half way between the next street.
I drove the car up onto the side of the road and parked it with the left wheels on the footpath, stopped the car, turned off the light and got out to survey the damage. The damage to the front of the car was on the right hand or drivers side of the grill - it was pushed in a bit. I remember thinking that there wasn't much damage really. Where she had struck the bonnet there was a dent and on the hood of the car were a few blood spots. These blood spots I removed by wiping away with my handkerchief. I can't recall if the car was equipped with a sunvisor or not. I looked around the outside of the car carefully and couldn't see any more blood or any more damage. I was parked there not more than 5 minutes. I have since indicated to detectives where I had parked this car and also where I estimated I had hit her on the road.
After looking at the car I got in and drove back towards where I had struck the girl - on the way to the scene I passed a couple of cars travelling towards me. My speed was about 35 mph. When I got to where I thought I had hit the girl I slowed down to have a look - but there was no trace of her. When I never saw her lying on the ground I thought some one must have picked her up and taken her to the hospital annex opposite.
I then drove under the subway along Nicholson Rd to Rokeby Rd, where I turned right and drove across Thomas St into Kings Park. I drove along and turned left into May Drive and along on the wrong side of the road and picked out a tree into which I drove the car. This tree was on the right hand side of May Drive as you travel towards the War Memorial, I have shown the detectives this tree, which I had deliberately driven the car against. I were travelling at about 20 mph when I hit this tree. When I had looked at the car earlier in Brockway Tce I saw what part of the car had been damaged and so I aimed this portion at the tree. My idea was to cover up any damage caused by me in the hit and run to look like it was due to the crash into the tree.
I jumped out of the car through the left hand door, my reason being to make believe there were more than one person in the car and also to jump clear of the soft sand and thus leave no footprints. I walked along Thomas St until I reached the gardeners House turned left and along a fire break until I came to a foot path. I walked along this path till I came out near Kings Park Rd and walked up to the Childrens Hospital and caught a taxi home. I never have owned a watch and estimate the time I drove around, from the time I picked up the car until I hit the girl would have been approximately 13/4 hours, that made the time of the hit and run about 10.15 pm. I arrived home at about 11.30 pm.
The following day I read about it in the paper and later on during the week read more details where she was found in Stubbs Tce near the Shenton Park railway station and that a car driven by her boyfriend who's surname was Button. The girls name was Rosemary-Something-Anderson and that she lived in Alfred Rd, Graylands.
My reason for running down the girl was just to inflict injury and pain on her. I never knew her, the reason I left this statement until I were arrested on other matters was
First:- When it happened I didn't want to be charged with this crime.
Second:- Now that I have been arrested on other matters and have so much more against me this bit can't hurt me and I'd like to see an innocent person like Button free.
I have volunteered this statement of my own free will without promises threats or inducements and is true as far as I can remember in detail."
105 Mr Cooke made a statement in February 1964 to Mr Button's solicitor in the form of a draft affidavit which was not sworn. The relevant portion of the affidavit is as follows:
"1. I have been advised by Mr B P Kakulas Solicitor on behalf of the abovenamed JOHN BUTTON that I am not obliged to sign this Affidavit nor give any information relating to the death of ROSEMARY ANDERSON. Despite such advice I desire to make this Affidavit and give such information as I am able with regard to the death of Rosemary Anderson.
2. No person has offered me any promise or inducement to make this Affidavit and I make it of my own free will and accord to clear my own conscience.
3. On Saturday the 9th day of February 1963 between the hours of 9 pm and 10 pm I stole a Holden Sedan motor car from a driveway of a dwelling house at the junction of Leonora and Saunders Streets Como. To the best of my recollection the Holden Sedan was coloured a two-tone blue.
4. I drove the car over the Narrows Bridge into the western suburbs and went to Doubleview and parked the car in a Service Station yard and prowled around in Doubleview for a short time. I broke and entered one house in Doubleview and after seeing no other opportunity I went back to the car which I drove to Wembley Downs along Perry Lake Stadium and turned into Stevenson Drive towards West Coast Highway. I drove to the junction of West Coast Highway and Alfred Street Mount Claremont. I then turned left towards Graylands and drove along Alfred Road when I was near the junction of Stubbs Terrace and Alfred Road. I saw on my left on the roadway a man and woman walking towards me. Between these persons was a little girl. As soon as I saw the man and woman I decided to run them down but I then saw the little girl and decided against it. I then turned into Stubbs Terrace and drove towards Shenton Subway. When I was near the Subway I saw a scooter driving towards me. There was a man driving and a woman on the pillion seat. I noticed that they were not wearing safety helmets and so I decided to run them over. I turned my vehicle and started after them. They were a considerable distance in front of me and I was about to hit them on the hill in Alfred Road when I noticed a vehicle coming towards me. I slowed down so that the vehicle would not see the accident and in the meantime the scooter went further ahead and made a right hand turn and drove in the direction of Claremont Mental Hospital.
5. I then turned up to Mount Claremont. I drove up Alfred Road to Servitus Street where I turned left towards the railway line. On the next turn left which goes down to the Lakeway Drivein I decided to turn there. There is a footpath only on the right hand side of the street. Here I saw a woman walking towards Devon Street on the footpath I decided to run over her. I then went around the block again to get behind her and when I reached Devon Street I saw that the woman was just going into the Drive-in. As I approached the Drive-in the woman was standing talking to a person in the ticket office. I then drove back to Alfred Street and down it to Stubbs Terrace. I turned around again and went back to the Subway in Shenton Park. When I reached the Subway I stopped to give way to a vehicle travelling west in Nicholson Road under the Subway. This vehicle continued travelling west into Selby Street. While I was waiting at the intersection I saw a young girl walking under the Subway on the southern side of the road. I decided that I would run her down.
6. I made a 'U' turn in Cunningham Terrace and parked the vehicle near a telephone booth and watched the girl walk up Stubbs Terrace. She was walking south towards Shenton Park Railway Station in Stubbs Terrace. I remember that she had a handbag in her hand which was a flat satchel type. I waited a few minutes for a few cars travelling towards her and me and then started the motor and drove up towards her. I was doing about 40 mph and I struck the girl with the right hand part of the front of the Holden car. She was scooped up onto the hood for a couple of seconds and then thrown over the bonnet to the left side of road. At this stage my left hand wheels were on the gravel and sand verge of the road. I drove up the road and made a right hand turn into Lemnos Hospital Drive and went back to where I had struck the girl. As I drove up I saw a Simca car at the approximate position where the girl landed. I cannot recall the colour of the car. Both left hand doors were open. However as I drove past I saw a man bending over the girl I had hit. This was near a tree stump opposite the Railway Station.
7. I drove back to where I had made my previous 'U' turn made a further 'U' turn and drove back towards Stubbs Terrace. As I drove past where I had hit the girl I saw on the road a few bits of cosmetics. By this time the Simca car and the girl had left the scene.
8. I then drove up to Graylands and into Mengler Avenue and then I turned into the first street to the left which straight leads to Lock Street Station. I parked my vehicle got out of the car and examined the damage. The right hand portion of the grille was stoved in between the right hand headlights and the centre of the grille. On the hood was a dent and on the bonnet or roof were about four spots of blood which I wiped off with my hanky. I then got back into the car and drove off.
9. I drove the vehicle under Shenton Park subway up Nicholson Road to Rokeby Road and then right into Kings Park and drove along in Kings Park and turned left into the drive. I drove about 40 yards and then picked out a tree and drove the car up against it. I did this so as to give the impression that somebody had taken the car on a joy-ride and lost control of it. I jumped out of the car through the left hand door and walked through the bush onto a path through to Thomas Street near the Home of Peace. I walked to Princess Margaret Hospital and rang for a taxi in which I went home.
10. I was arrested by the Police in relation to other matters on the 1st day of September 1963. After I gave them my statement the Police took me over the route I told them. When we got to the scene of the accident I asked them to stop the car and we went over to a spot on the left side of Stubbs Tce going towards Karrakatta and here I pointed out where the girl was when I struck her. I made a mark with yellow chalk and I was photographed pointing to this mark. We then went further up the road and near the tree stump I pointed out the approximated position where the girl landed after being flung off the car.
This was marked and photographed.
The Police said I was incorrect. Dt Deering and Dt Sgt Neilson said I was a liar. I ask him why and Deering he said I were out in the times and in the distances in which she fell after being struck. After told this by Dt Sgt Neilson that I were only trying to make a big fellow myself and were trying to get someone else in the shit & that I had read so much in the paper about it I believed I were involved. Neilson dictated to me a statement which I signed. I was questioned about many matters and I made a statement to the Police in relation to this matter approximately 10 days later.
11. What I have said here is the truth relating to the matters herein set out."
106 Mr Haight's comments on this material in his report were as follows:
"In analysing this case I took the approach to examine the different versions offered. They are summarized as follows:
(1) The position of the Crown and suggested by the 'Button Confession' is such that John Button allegedly drove his car recklessly toward the [sic] Miss Anderson walking along the left (east) verge of Stubbs Terrace north of the rail station. As he moved left in the road, perhaps to 'scare her' he struck her with the left front of his car, carried her a significant distance and then she fell off the car onto the road or verge to the left.
(2) The recollection of events suggested by Mr Cooke's confessions in this case are such that he, Cooke, struck Miss Anderson from behind with a Holden at about 40 mph (64 km/h) and she was thrown onto the 'bonnet, bounced on the hood and over the back of the car'.
In reviewing these versions, taken in light with what we know today about pedestrian-involved collisions, what we learned from the crash tests conducted in this case and those conducted with other motor vehicles on other occasions I believe it becomes clear that the version offered by the Crown fails to meet with the objective physical evidence found in this case.
The contentions of the Crown and police that the Simca could have struck Miss Anderson - or any other pedestrian for that matter, are little more than speculation and lack any foundation in reasoning or objective analytical sciences. There is absolutely no damage on that vehicle, as depicted in the photos taken by police which is consistent in the slightest way with a pedestrian collision at the speeds suggested or sufficient to project and injure Miss Anderson as described.
The Simca motor vehicles used in the crash tests I conducted specific to this case demonstrated that, at the speeds suggested or even at a lower speed, a body the same size as the late Miss Anderson's would have made contact with the leading edge of the car at the grille and headlight area and then would have made significant contact at the upper portion of the bonnet. There was no such contact on the Button Simca.
The front end damage suggested in the body shop documents for the Holden Mr Cooke claimed to have used in this crime and his description of the damage before he ran it into the tree are consistent with pedestrian impacts and with the damage observed in the testing conducted for this case.
I believe it becomes clear that the contention of the Crown that the Holden, with the visor intact, could not have hit the pedestrian is inconsistent with the crash tests conducted and that the distances suggested by the Crown in the prosecution of Mr Button are inconsistent with what we know today about the direct relationship between impact speed and throw distance.
On the other hand, I think the crash tests make it clear that Mr Cooke's description of the motion of Miss Anderson's body onto the car and off to the road are consistent with the crash tests conducted, even chillingly so. That Cooke's estimate of his speed, given the location of physical evidence found at the scene of the collision although it wasn't apparently memorialized until the 1964 appeal, are reasonably accurate given the understanding of such collision we have today which we would not have had in the early 60's or even into the 70's for that matter.
Mr Cooke claims he hit Ms Anderson at about 40 mph (64 km/h) (in his confession of 12/9/63). At that speed one would expect a throw distance of some 75-100 feet (22-30m). The location of the physical evidence documented in the 1964 police scene sketch suggests that the collision took place in the east verge of Stubbs Terrace in the area of the middle of the intersection with Selby Street. It may have occurred slightly further to the north nearer the northern extreme of that intersection, but it is more likely, given the speeds and distances involved, that the collision occurred within the confines of this intersection.
Finally, the speed suggested by Mr Cooke (that of 40 mph or 64 km/h) and the type of motion described by Cooke are consistent with the anticipated motion of a struck pedestrian: something Mr Cooke could not have known with such detail and accuracy because it wasn't really described in the literature until the late 1980's.
After crash testing began in Europe in the 80's and into the 90's supplemented by tests I have been involved in, we learned that a vehicle which is not braking and which is moving at higher speeds is more likely to project a pedestrian over the roof than one which is braking at impact. We also learned that the relationship between the height of the leading edge of the bonnet (measured vertically from the ground) relative to the vertical height of the struck pedestrian's center of mass plays a significant role in the resultant motion of a struck pedestrian.
Mr Cooke's description of the body moving onto the bonnet/hood and over the roof, although decried by the police at the time, is an eerily accurate description of the crash test conducted with the Holden some 37 years later but a few miles from the actual collision location and is consistent with the understanding of such collisions given the developments in the science of collision reconstruction."
107 Mr Haight summarised his conclusions as follows:
"(1) That there is no objective physical evidence that the Simca driven by John Button at any time struck any pedestrian not the least of which was Miss Anderson. The damage depicted in the police photos of the Simca is inconsistent with a pedestrian strike and the lack of damage which would be consistent with a pedestrian strike as seen in the three crash tests with similar Simca vehicles conducted specific to this case further eliminates the Button Simca from involvement in the Anderson collision.
(2) The contentions of the Crown and police that the Simca could have struck Miss Anderson - or any other pedestrian for that matter - are little more than speculation and lack any foundation in reasoning or objective analytical sciences. There is absolutely no damage on that vehicle, as depicted in the photos taken by police which is consistent in the slightest way with a pedestrian collision at the speeds suggested or sufficient to project and injure Miss Anderson as described.
(3) That, while the police at the time of this collision should reasonably have, based on their experience and other serious ongoing hit and run pedestrian collisions which occurred at about the same time, suspected the damage [to] the Simca was inconsistent with this car having struck a pedestrian, the state of the art in pedestrian collision investigation would have been insufficient to have allowed them an opportunity to better understand and/or analyze this collision from a factual scientific perspective.
(4) That the version of events provided by Mr Cooke in his confessions to the death of Miss Anderson and his testimony in the appeals hearing is consistent with the objective physical evidence and accurately describes the motion of a pedestrian which might be struck by the Holden as described.
(5) The notion put forth by the police and Crown that the visor on the Holden stolen by Mr Cooke would have caught Miss Anderson, while reasoned, could not be carried to a [sic an] objective conclusion until the testing I conducted Feb 2000 and demonstrated that the visor would not have been as speculated by police.
(6) The crash tests conducted Feb 2000 are evidence which could not have been available to the jury at the time of the original trial or during later appeals because (a) such testing was not widely done at the time given the limitations of existing technology and (b) the limited interest in the specialized field. Testing done specific to this case was the first time any such examination of Simca-to-pedestrian crash tests can be found anywhere in the literature on the subject and the first time such a Holden with a visor attached was used in a pedestrian crash test and the effect of that component examined in any detail.
(7) The version of the facts presented to the original jury and to the judges on appeal in this case do not stand up to the scrutiny of the sciences applied to pedestrian collision investigation and are little more than speculative and unsubstantiated assumptions based in the understandably inadequate understanding of this type of collision event at the time."
108 In cross-examination of Mr Haight, it was put to him that the sworn testimony of Mr Cooke and the affidavit he swore in 1964 as the final version of what he said happened to Ms Anderson was that he had driven at her at 40 mph, but the crash test with the Holden was at 35 mph. Also Mr Haight had struck the dummy in the centre, although Mr Cooke said that he had struck her with the right side of the Holden. Mr Haight explained that the fact was that she was thrown to the left. On the basis Mr Haight suggested that the apparent inconsistency could be explained on the basis that the reference by Mr Cooke to "right" may have been when facing or looking at the front of the vehicle. The majority of the damage to the Holden driven by Mr Cooke was located on the right from the point of view of the driver, but there was also damage to the left and in the centre. In the end, however, the majority of the damage was on the right hand front of the vehicle. Mr Haight's explanation for this was that, having regard to the type of damage which occurred, the majority of it was on the right hand side of the vehicle. According to Mr Haight, this damage was consistent with the majority of the damage being attributed to the vehicle being driven into the tree in Kings Park. The type of damage was to solid structures such as bumpers and engine mounts. It was not pedestrian related damage. The left hand parts which had to be replaced were the left hand front inner bumper and the left hand front outer section support, as well as the left hand rear engine mount and the bonnet. The damage to the vehicle was consistent with the vehicle being driven into the tree making contact at the right hand side. The damage to the vehicle was consistent with Ms Anderson having been struck with the left hand side of the vehicle rather than the right, from the driver's point of view. Mr Haight's conclusion was that Mr Cooke must have been mistaken about which side of the vehicle struck Ms Anderson.
109 Mr Cooke also estimated a throw distance of about 220 yards. Mr Haight said that was not consistent with either of the two versions he gave. One was that he saw Ms Anderson at the Floreat Ironworks. The other was that he may have struck her in that area. Mr Haight's opinion was that this was inconsistent with the point where she appeared to have come to rest. As he put it, it was impossible because it was not consistent with the physics involved. In other words, it was impossible to have struck her outside the Floreat Ironworks at 40 mph, whether on the left side or the right side, and leave her resting opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. This is consistent with what the Court of Criminal Appeal concluded in 1964.
110 According to Mr Haight the location of the physical evidence documented in the 1964 scene sketch map suggested that the collision took place on the east verge of Stubbs Terrace in the area of the middle of the intersection with Selby Street. In the opinion of Mr Haight it may have occurred slightly further to the north nearer the northern extreme of the intersection, although he considered that it was more likely, given the speeds and distances involved, that the collision occurred within the confines of the intersection. Mr Haight reiterated that he did not make inferences from what Cooke said, but based his opinion upon the objective information. In this context the following passage appeared in his cross-examination:
"Cooke says he struck her with the right front of the vehicle at a position in Stubbs Terrace and she ends up opposite the railway station in the vicinity of that tree stump. That's the left-hand side of the road?---Yes, Sir.
That does not fit with your testing which is to the effect, a vehicle that strikes a body with the right-hand side of the vehicle will not displace the person to the left-hand side of the verge?---It does fit. If he swerves off the shoulder and hits her with the right, she can still end up on the verge. You see, my point is it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter where she ends up relative solely to the road or relative to the car rather, it matters relative to the road. If he swerves off the road and catches with the right side, if we have got that, then he's had to swerve off the road and she can still be on the verge. That's something that I can't evaluate for a number of reasons, not the least of which it's not my job to evaluate his veracity."
111 According to the pathology report of the examination of the Simca owned by the appellant on 10 February 1963 and on subsequent days by Mr A F Drummond, the Principal Technologist of the Public Health Laboratory Service, on 10 February 1963 two small reddish brown smears or spots were seen in the centre of the glass of the left headlight, two spots on the metal rim above the glass and on the metal rim below the glass (two spots). These stains gave chemical reactions for blood and serological reactions for human blood. There was insufficient blood present to determine its group.
112 On the top of the right front mudguard a patch of reddish stains, about 5 inches in diameter, was noticed. One stain was thick, about 2 inches long and half an inch wide, and the remainder were thin and smeared. The thick stain was removed and in the laboratory proved to be human blood, group A.
113 On the pillar between the front and rear doors of the vehicle, on the left hand side, stains of what appeared to be blood were seen. These stains were smeared. They were on the front or leading side of the pillar and were covered by the front door when it was in the closed position. The staining material was removed and in the laboratory proved to be human blood, group A.
114 Stuck in the hood was a hair which on microscopic examination proved to be a brown human hair, about 1 inch in length, slightly curved, with a natural tip. It was broken off at the root, indicating forcible removal. It had a very pale medulla.
115 On the outside of the left door of the car, two spots of what appeared to be blood were seen. They had the appearance of drops which had fallen onto the vertical surface in a downward and backward direction. They were removed and in the laboratory proved to be human blood, group A. Horizontal smears of what appeared to be blood stained course sand were seen on the inside of the left front door. There were also vertical marks resembling blood on the back of the left front seat. They were removed and proved to be human blood, but the grouping was unsatisfactory. A matchbox and some papers from the floor of the vehicle, between the front seats, were examined and reddish brown staining material removed from them. It was proved to be human blood, group A.
116 As previously pointed out, Ms Anderson's blood was group A, Rhesus Negative. Group A blood was found at widely separated points along Stubbs Terrace, Shenton Park and in sand close to the road. Blood of the same group was found on the deceased girl's dress, cardigan and pants.
117 It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the absence of appropriate or relevant damage to the appellant's Simca conclusively established that it did not strike a pedestrian in the manner suggested in the Crown case or at all. The damage as depicted in the photographs, which counsel for the appellant at the trial had objected to on the ground that the toning of them exaggerated the damage, was said by Mr Haight to be not consistent with a pedestrian collision. He said that had there been a collision with a pedestrian the damage on the front of the Simca would have been greater and covered a greater area than what was visible in the photographs taken at the time. Mr Haight's opinion of the damage indicated in the photographs was that it was "wholly inconsistent with a pedestrian impact". There were no indentations seen in the police photographs consistent with a body being flung heavily onto the bonnet and no other physical evidence that the Simca at any time struck a pedestrian. Having regard to the objective physical evidence, Mr Haight was of the opinion that it could not be reasonably opined that the Simca at any time struck a pedestrian.
118 In his opinion, it was very significant that there was no evidence of the transfer onto the Simca of fabric, hair or skin. This he considered to be "very probative" and very significant. So far as blood is concerned, as has been seen there were some spots of blood or "blood imprints" on the Simca in the left front of the vehicle, but Mr Haight pointed out that these were "blood imprints" as distinct from "smearing" such as one would find in a wounding.
119 Mr Haight admitted in cross-examination that he did not make any actual measurements of any damage to the vehicles tested either in relation to the Simca or the Holden. The speed of the test vehicle was recorded in each case, together with the "throw distances". The "lateral distance" was not in fact given in the report, although it was measured for the second car test, which was 1.3 m. In the case of the Simca, the first car test produced a lateral distance of 0.5 m, the second 1.3 m and the third 3.9 - 4.6 m. The breaking strain of the fishing line was 50 lbs (22.7 kg) and the weight of the dummy was 104 lbs (47.27 kg). The dummy was a "Tough Kelly 100" which had been purchased in October 1999 and had never previously been used.
120 Reference was made in the cross-examination to a composite plan (Ex 21 in this appeal) which incorporated what Mr Cooke indicated to Det Sgt Nielson and other police officers in September 1963, and which was in evidence at the 1964 appeal.
121 That plan indicated where Mr Cooke said he first saw the girl walking along the road, as well as where he said he hit the girl with his car and where he said she came to rest. Having taken Mr Haight through the various details on the plan, Mr Stone then cross-examined Mr Haight about Mr Cooke's testimony before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964.
122 Mr Cooke's evidence was that he struck Ms Anderson with the right hand front of the Holden vehicle when travelling at about 40 mph when he was opposite or outside the Floreat Ironworks. He said he travelled 20 to 30 yards with Ms Anderson on the bonnet of his car. She then went over the top of the hood of the car and over the back. She landed almost immediately opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. The distance between the point of impact and where she came to rest was some 635 feet, which was said to be 220 yards, but 635 feet is in fact 211.66 yards, which is the equivalent of 193.5 m.
123 In the opinion of Mr Haight, "... there is absolutely no chance" that Mr Cooke struck Ms Anderson as far back as the Floreat Ironworks. Mr Cooke later said the point of impact was much closer to the Shenton Park Railway Station. Mr Haight dealt with this matter on the basis that, rather than accept the accuracy of what Mr Cooke had said, he based his opinion on the evidence at the trial and on the appeal as well as the damage to the Holden vehicle driven by Mr Cooke and his own tests. On this basis it was possible that the Holden travelling at 40 mph struck Ms Anderson with the front end of the Holden vehicle and the sun visor.
124 Faced with the situation that Mr Cooke said he struck Ms Anderson with the right side of the Holden and Ms Anderson's body was found off the left hand side of the road, Mr Haight's cross-examination by Mr Stone proceeded as follows:
"You struck on the left-hand side?---I struck in the centre.
Cooke said he struck on the right-hand side?---Yes, sir.
In reconstructing the event why didn't you adopt the final version Cooke gave before the Court of Criminal Appeal?---I'm not certain I follow you. I have nothing objective to go on apart from a description of the damage to the Holden and apart from knowing where Ms Anderson was found, and I know as demonstrated in the other Simca test a body struck on the right side is not going to end up on the verge to the left.
Exactly. That's why Cooke couldn't have struck on the right and landed her on the left. Isn't that right?---No, sir. Might I continue?
Please do?---Again, this highlights why I don't adopt what individuals say they saw when I'm analysing the crash. I dare say if we asked folks in here what they saw in the video from inside the car there'd be a number of different descriptions and that's the point of view that Mr Cooke had. He had an inside the car view approaching a potential victim and I wouldn't bet the farm, as it were, on his recollection of exactly how it happened.
I wouldn't either, Mr Haight, but that's not the point. He said he struck her on the right with the right-hand front part of his vehicle?---That was his recollection, but it was not clear - - -
That was his sworn testimony, Mr Haight?---Yes, sir, based on his recollection but whether it was right as you're facing the car, I don't know."
125 Mr Haight had access to the motor vehicle repairer's shop records and repair bills relating to the Holden driven by Mr Cooke. The Holden suffered damage to the right, left and centre. The majority of the damage could be attributed to the vehicle being run into a tree in Kings Park, as described by Mr Cooke and was on the right hand side of the Holden. Apart from the damage to the right, there was a reference to the left hand front inner bumper and the left hand front outer section support having been damaged. To end up on the left side of the vehicle, Ms Anderson would have had to be struck by the left hand side of the vehicle. While it was possible that Mr Cooke might have swerved off to the left and struck her, that was an "extreme" possibility. Mr Haight was of the opinion that Mr Cooke was mistaken about which side of the Holden had hit Ms Anderson when he gave his evidence in the Court of Criminal Appeal.
126 Had Mr Cooke struck Ms Anderson at the Floreat Ironworks, this would imply a 220 yard throw distance as calculated by Mr Haight. Mr Haight said that, while that may have been Mr Cooke's recollection, it was inconsistent with the physics involved. In his confession on 12 September 1963 Mr Cooke claimed that he was travelling at about 40 mph (64 kph) when he hit Ms Anderson. At that speed Mr Haight would expect a throw distance of 22-23 m or 75-100 feet. In other words, according to Mr Haight, it was impossible for Mr Cooke to have struck Ms Anderson outside the Floreat Ironworks when travelling at 40 mph with the result that she came to rest opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station.
127 The calculations made by Wolff CJ, based upon the circumstantial evidence the Chief Justice recounted at 84 - 85 of his judgment, was that Ms Anderson "had been carried and/or flung a little over 60 yards" (54.864 m). It was accepted by counsel for the Crown before this Court that the point at which blood was first found on the road was the most likely point of impact, although it was conceivable that Ms Anderson was struck or attacked on the road, ran further down the road and was struck by the car. The point is that the further back from where Ms Anderson's body was found she had been struck, the more likely it was that there would have been significant damage to the vehicle concerned.
128 Mr Haight put the point of impact at "somewhere round the intersection [sic junction] with Selby Street", rather than further back (north) on Stubbs Terrace. Mr Stone indicated that, as counsel for the Crown had contended at the trial, that the evidence of the cosmetic bottle, the right shoe, the blood on the road just above that, the comb, left shoe, etc, suggested that Ms Anderson was running from her attacker until she ended up severely injured in the area opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station.
129 It was also possible, as counsel for the Crown at the trial admitted in opening the case, that there could be any number of reasons why the objects ended up where they were found. There was a strong wind blowing and objects could have been blown in different directions. They could also have been hit and moved by cars.
130 It was in this context that the jury rejected the Crown theory that the appellant had deliberately driven his car at Ms Anderson. It was suggested that one possible reason for this was that there was very little damage to the appellant's Simca. Although it had been involved in some sort of collision, the question was whether it had come into impact with Ms Anderson.
131 In my opinion, based on the evidence at the trial and taking into account the evidence before the previous Court of Criminal Appeal, together with the evidence before this Court, it was significant that there was no fabric transfer from the clothes Ms Anderson was wearing onto the appellant's Simca. There were no blood stains or smears consistent with the vehicle having struck a pedestrian, although there were some drops or droplets of blood found on the left front of the vehicle and on the left front of the headlight area. Mr Haight pointed out that the blood stains on the appellant's Simca in the vicinity of the left rear door and on the left front of the vehicle and on the left headlight were not smears of the kind one would expect from impact.
132 There was a comparison made between Exhibit 12C in the appeal and the appellant's Simca, as well as the second Simca used in the tests conducted by Mr Haight. Counsel for the Crown submitted that the damage to the bonnet in each case was described as having a "ripple effect". It was contended that the photographs of the Simcas used in the tests conducted by Mr Haight and of the appellant's Simca, relating to the damage to the bonnet, all showed the "ripple effect". In other words, they all looked the same. Both the appellant at the trial (transcript 572) and Mr Haight on the appeal, referred to the damage as a "ripple" in the case of the appellant and as a "ripple effect" in the case of Mr Haight. The Crown sought to place considerable significance on this evidence.
133 The difficulty with this evidence is that one of the scenarios that could reasonably have been accepted by the jury was that Ms Anderson was struck a glancing blow on the left hand side of the vehicle which struck her. If that was so, the impact would not have caused the damage to the bonnet because the area of damage is to the right hand side of the bonnet looking from the position of the driver. If, as Mr Haight considered, there was a "wrap trajectory" and the impact was on the left, the bonnet damage would be on the left rather than on the right.
134 In the result, as counsel for the Crown correctly accepted, there was no comparison between the damage shown in the photographs Exhibits 11D, 11E and 12C and the damage to the appellant's Simca. In the case of Exhibit 12C, virtually the whole of the bonnet suffered some damage. Comparing Exhibit 12C to Exhibits 1 and 2, the damage in the bottom right hand corner of Exhibit 12C is considerably more than the damage on the right hand side of the brand badge in Exhibits 1 and 2.
135 Counsel for the Crown submitted, however, that the Court should bear in mind that the photographs relied on by the appellant were not taken by professional "motor vehicle reconstruction photographers". They were taken by Mr Haight himself, Mr Christian, a journalist and the Editor of the Post Newspaper Group, and another unnamed third person. It was submitted that there was a problem with photographs being used for the purposes of comparison because of variations in lighting and angles to determine the depth of dents and the extent of other damage. It was for this reason that counsel for the appellant at his trial, Mr Hatfield QC, insisted that the jury actually see the car itself, because the dark toning of the photographs taken by the police tended to exaggerate the depth of the dents in the vehicle. The car itself was the relevant exhibit relied upon by both parties. The only photographs of the car put before the jury at the trial were those which showed the location of blood on the appellant's vehicle.
136 It was conceded, however, and in my opinion rightly conceded, that the appellant's vehicle did not show any substantial damage. As Wolff CJ said in the first appeal at 83:
"The mainstay of Button's case was the small amount of damage to the car in view of the speed it was said that the car was going and the grievous injuries to the girl."
As counsel for the Crown submitted, that was the issue at the trial, the issue on the 1964 appeal and the issue before this Court. As counsel for the Crown put it, there was an expectation that if the vehicle struck Ms Anderson at a speed of 35 mph, it would be expected that there would be substantial damage. This is demonstrated by the tests carried out by Mr Haight. If, however, the theory put forward by the Crown that the vehicle was travelling at 35 mph was incorrect, and the vehicle was travelling at a much slower speed of the order of something between 20 and 27 mph, as Exhibit 12C depicted, there would not necessarily be the substantial damage that would be caused at the higher speed. The difficulty with this approach is that it is not consistent with the Crown case at the trial and the conclusion by Wolff CJ on the application for an extension of time for leave to appeal that Ms Anderson was probably carried or propelled over a distance of some 60 yards, or about 55 m. It was submitted on behalf of the Crown in this Court that the jury must have rejected the theory put forward by the Crown regarding how and where Ms Anderson was struck. Part of that theory was that she had been carried some 60 yards. As counsel for the Crown admitted, the jury may have accepted some part of the Crown case and rejected other parts of it in reaching their verdict. From this position, it was contended that Mr Haight had not really put before the Court anything that was not known in 1963 and that expert evidence was not needed to demonstrate that, if a pedestrian was struck by a motor vehicle travelling at 35 mph, there would be substantial damage. That was the basis upon which the case was fought at the trial. The point was made over and over again at the trial and on the previous appeal.
137 It was also contended on behalf of the Crown that the "wrap trajectory scenario" propounded by Mr Haight, meant that if a person was struck by a motor vehicle travelling at any of the speeds assumed, the pedestrian would at one point strike his or her head on the vehicle.
138 Dr Pearson, who gave evidence for the Crown at the trial, described an injury to the head consisting of "a large laceration of the whole of the right eyebrow with ragged edges associated with a subarachnoid haemorrhage". This was said to be a laceration consistent with the head of Ms Anderson coming into impact with a rough surface such as the roadway surface in the vicinity of Stubbs Terrace. The ragged edges indicated severe impact with a rough surface. There were also extensive abrasions on the front of the lower portion of the body which Dr Pearson described as:
"... abrasions consistent with skidding along a rough surface, probably the road, at some speed and burning off the outer surface of the skin. They're called parchment injuries because they look like yellow parchment. That's quite a common one in road accidents."
This would occur where the body traversed a roadway at sufficient speed to create that type of burning. Dr Pearson was also of the opinion that the body was likely to have travelled along the roadway feet first and face down. The bruising on the calves of the legs and the fracture of the left leg were injuries consistent with a vehicle striking a person who was moving along the roadway.
139 In the end, the substance of the Crown submission was that there was not any evidence to support a head strike on Ms Anderson of the kind demonstrated in the tests carried out by Mr Haight, and that all that was demonstrated was that Ms Anderson was struck in a way that did not result in her being thrown onto the bonnet and over the top of the car in the manner depicted in the tests carried out by Mr Haight.
140 It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the starting point for a consideration of Mr Haight's evidence was that the Crown case at the original trial was, essentially, as left to the jury by Mr Wilson in his closing address to the effect that there was, "... no pattern in the reconstruction of damage to vehicles and injuries suffered - particularly fatal injuries suffered by a pedestrian ...". Counsel for the Crown submitted to the jury that:
"... it is quite impossible I suggest to you to be able to look at a car and look at certain damage on a car and say 'that couldn't have killed a pedestrian'."
Counsel for the appellant contended in this Court that the evidence of Mr Haight demonstrated that, while these contentions may have had some validity in Western Australia in 1963 or 1964, that was no longer the case.
141 In summary, counsel for the appellant contended that, if the evidence of Mr Haight was accepted, the lack of appropriate damage to the appellant's Simca conclusively established that it did not strike a pedestrian in the manner alleged by the Crown or at all.
142 Mr Cooke's various statements and evidence each made recurring points, namely:
(a) Ms Anderson was struck from behind by the Holden he was driving;
(c) Ms Anderson's body rotated as it was flung over the roof of the Holden.
These points were exemplified by the body motion of the dummy in the Holden test conducted by Mr Haight.
143 Mr Cooke's confession included a description of the body of Ms Anderson being flung over the roof of the Holden. The evidence of the Crown at the trial was that this was impossible because of the presence of a sun visor. This evidence was demonstrated to be clearly incorrect by the crash test carried out by Mr Haight with a Holden fitted with a sun visor.
144 Significantly, Mr Haight's expert evidence was that the perspective of any witness to an impact is necessarily subjective. The evidence is very likely to be mistaken or inaccurate in estimates of quantities, measurements or location such as speed, distance and position. Mr Haight formed his opinions by reference to the objective facts, so far as they could be ascertained. Once this position is accepted, inconsistencies in the several statements made by Mr Cooke, both when giving evidence and out of court, did not necessarily mean that he was deliberately lying at any time.
145 I am bound to say that I was very impressed with Mr Haight's expertise and, in particular, his opinion that the damage observed in the photographs of the appellant's Simca was not consistent with a pedestrian collision. Had the vehicle been involved in such a collision, the damage on the front of the appellant's Simca would have been greater and covered a greater area than what was visible in the photographs taken at that time. This is of particular significance, given that the photographs themselves were not used in evidence because the tonings tended to exaggerate the depth of dents in the appellant's vehicle and hence the extent of damage. In Mr Haight's opinion, the damage to the appellant's vehicle was wholly inconsistent with a pedestrian impact.
146 This is of very considerable importance in the present context because the state of knowledge today compared with the state of knowledge in 1963-64 is such that, at the time of the trial and appeal in 1963-1964, the position in Western Australia regarding the absence of any pattern in the reconstruction of damage to vehicles or injuries suffered, particularly in the case of a pedestrian, was accepted as correct, as was the proposition that it was impossible for an expert to look at damage to a motor vehicle and say that "that vehicle could not have killed a pedestrian". The evidence of Mr Haight is clearly fresh evidence that would not have been available at the time of the trial or previous appeal.
147 Counsel for the Crown told the jury when opening the Crown case against the appellant that:
"... the significance of this evidence of the indentations on the bonnet is that the Crown case is that this damage has nothing to do with the impact with the Simca and in fact was caused when the car driven by the [appellant] struck Rosemary and she was flung heavily onto the bonnet of the car with her tummy, her abdominal region, thereby causing the serious abdominal injuries that I have described and which, by the way, were not attended with any external injury indicating that it was a very severe blow in this region on a smooth, flat or comparatively flat object with no projections to break the skin or lacerate the body."
148 The effect of Mr Haight's evidence, in the light of the accumulated knowledge since 1963, was that there was no physical evidence that the Simca driven by the appellant on the night in question at any time struck a pedestrian.
149 Mr Haight's evidence was that, had the vehicle struck a pedestrian in the manner described, fabric transfer would be expected at the leading edge of the bonnet. Wherever there has been body contact there is often, but not always, an actual flesh transfer or smearing, a greasy smear in the area where flesh has made contact with the metal. Frequently, at such a point, one finds imbedded hair and sometimes, depending on what the surface is, some skin and hair. The damage to the Button vehicle consisted of a very small dent on the bonnet to the right of centre. In the light of the tests conducted with similar Simcas, the damage to the bonnet was well below the threshold that was found at the lower end. The damage to the Simca was "vastly inconsistent" with the potential throw distance. Although, in my opinion, the damage to the Simca's bonnet was, perhaps, somewhat greater than Mr Haight's opinion would indicate, I have found Mr Haight's evidence that the conclusion that the Simca hit Ms Anderson and projected her as far as was supposed, namely, some 60 yards or 55 m, was at best improbable and at worst impossible, to be compelling. Mr Haight regarded the absence of flesh transfer, fabric transfer and hair and skin smearing as "very probative and very significant". He regarded the absence of blood smearing, as distinct from drops of blood, as very significant. The absence of blood smearing was "less definitive".
150 It is, of course, of great significance that the members of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964, having had the advantage of observing Mr Cooke in the witness box and hearing his evidence, rejected his evidence as worthless. As has already been seen, however, Mr Haight, with the advantage of his expertise, and examining the objective facts, has found significant support for Mr Cooke's evidence in those facts. Mr Haight's evidence before this Court needs to be evaluated on the basis that the Crown case at the appellant's trial, as left to the jury by Mr Wilson at p 636 of the trial transcript, was that there was no pattern in the reconstruction of damage to vehicles and injuries suffered in motor vehicle collisions, "particularly fatal injuries suffered by a pedestrian". Evidence and knowledge now available has demonstrated clearly that such a proposition cannot be sustained. Similarly, senior counsel for the Crown told the jury at the trial that:
"... it is quite impossible I suggest to you to be able to look at a car and say 'that couldn't have killed a pedestrian'."
151 In my opinion, Mr Haight clearly demonstrated the falsity of that proposition in the light of the current state of knowledge and experience. I found Mr Haight's evidence, so far as it went, both compelling and convincing.
152 In the context of Mr Cooke's evidence, it is of particular significance that it was accepted by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 that Mr Cooke's description of the body of Ms Anderson being flung over the roof was impossible because of the sun visor. The analysis by the Crown's witnesses at the trial was proved to be incorrect by the Holden test carried out by Mr Haight which showed the contrary. The dummy in fact struck the sun visor with the head and pivoted over the sun visor onto the roof and off the vehicle to the left hand side. This was demonstrated in a dramatic way by video film taken from inside the Holden which shows the sun visor vibrating or flexing when struck by the dummy and then returning to its original position afterwards.
153 In addition, Mr Cooke's various statements in evidence to the effect that Ms Anderson was struck from behind by the Holden driven by him; his speed at the time was about 40 mph and Ms Anderson's body rotated as it was flung over the roof of the Holden, were consistent with what happened with the crash test with the Holden conducted by Mr Haight.
154 In my opinion, Mr Haight made an important and valid point in his expert evidence that the perception of a witness to an impact is necessarily subjective. This means that it is likely to be inaccurate in relation to estimates of speed, distance and position. Hence, inconsistencies in Mr Cooke's several statements in evidence given on different occasions did not mean that what he said on any particular occasion was deliberately false. Mr Haight maintained that it was necessary to identify the objective facts and draw conclusions from them, rather than rely on the perceptions of witnesses, as distinct from actual observations.
155 One difficulty which I had with Mr Haight's evidence was that, at first impression, his interpretation of what happened was inconsistent with the forensic or pathological evidence of Dr Pearson that Ms Anderson suffered injuries consistent with her being pushed or dragged along the road face down for a considerable distance. Mr Haight, at pp 194 - 195 of the transcript on the appeal, explained the difference between the situation when a pedestrian is hit by the front of a vehicle and pushed along the road, and the situation in which the body is thrown up onto the bonnet and rotates over the roof of the vehicle. In the present case, there is an apparent difficulty in that, in the Simca tests, the dummy was struck to the left of the centre of the vehicle, thrown onto the bonnet and rotated off onto the left hand side, except in the third test where the point of impact was to the right of centre when the body was thrown onto the bonnet and rotated off the right hand side.
156 As I understood the evidence, however, there was nonetheless a distance which the body was thrown forward (the "throw distance") being the distance between the point of impact and the point at which the body came to rest. As Mr Haight said at pp 195 - 196 of the appeal transcript, the throw distance is related directly to speed and whether or not the body is trapped on the car. For example, if the body goes through the windscreen and stays in the car there is no throw distance. A vehicle that drags the body along the road has no independent throw distance. A body that is projected at point A and comes to rest at point B has a throw distance that is based upon the striking speed of the vehicle.
157 If the body lands on the bonnet and is carried for some time that is included in the throw distance, but is referred to as the "carry distance". As illustrated in Fig 1 p 6 of Mr Haight's report, there are two models illustrating two different categories or models of pedestrian collisions. In the first the pedestrian is struck by the vehicle and pushed for some distance before the vehicle stops. The pedestrian's body then continues to slide forward. Mr Haight described the first part of the movement as the "fall distance". The second part was the "slide distance". The total of the two movements was the "throw distance". This model was described as the two phase model.
158 In the second model, described as the three phase model, the pedestrian is struck in a manner that causes the pedestrian to be thrown on to the bonnet, carried there for some distance, projected on to the ground and slides some distance, before coming to rest. The first stage is called the "carry distance", the second is called the "fall distance" and the third is called the "slide distance". The throw distance will vary depending on whether the body is carried on the bonnet.
159 At the trial, the throw distance, or what appears to have been its equivalent, was estimated by Wolff CJ to be some 60 yards. The basis for that estimate is not altogether clear. The test carried out with the Holden fitted with a sun visor demonstrated clearly how the body would be flung through the air before striking the ground, sliding forward and coming to rest. How this movement compared to the estimate at trial of 60 yards is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. In the present case, Mr Haight explained that on the evidence as presented at the trial, there was what he called a "wrap projectory". At the point of impact the centre of mass of Ms Anderson's body would have been higher than the leading edge of the striking vehicle, whether it was the Simca or the Holden. In either case, the body would have rotated or wrapped back on to the bonnet. How it rotated or wrapped or otherwise moved would have been a function of the striking speed. An analysis done, say 15 years ago, would have taken into account or described the event only in terms of fall and slide. More recent analyses would consider the carry distance, being that portion of travel where the body was on or in contact with the vehicle.
160 In the end, the question is whether it was possible on the evidence, as it now stands, to be able to say that if the jury had the benefit of the evidence before this Court, the jury must have had, or at least would have been likely to have had, a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant. The Crown contended before this Court that nothing in the evidence in this appeal went beyond what was found by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964. It was submitted by counsel for the Crown that the forensic evidence now before this Court did not corroborate the evidence of the appellant at the trial, which was to the effect that he did not hit Ms Anderson with the Simca driven by him, but found her lying by the side of the road. It was further submitted by counsel for the Crown that, at its highest, the forensic evidence is capable of supporting the defence case at the trial that there was insufficient evidence of damage to the Simca to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it had been involved in hitting a pedestrian.
161 The evidence of Mr Cooke at the original Court of Criminal Appeal was that he had run down Ms Anderson with the stolen Holden. He maintained that, when travelling south on Stubbs Terrace at about 40 mph, he struck her with the right front of the Holden between the right headlight and the centre of the grille. According to Mr Cooke, the point of impact was outside or opposite the Floreat Ironworks. Mr Cooke's evidence at the original appeal was that he travelled for some 20 - 30 yards with Ms Anderson on the bonnet of the car when she went over the top of the hood of the car and over the back. She landed on the left hand side of the road almost opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. The distance between where Cooke testified he first struck Ms Anderson and where she fell off was 635 feet or 220 yards.
162 The point which emerges from all of this evidence is that neither on the appellant's account or on the account given by Mr Cooke is there any explanation for Ms Anderson being dragged for some 60 yards. In his affidavit sworn on 11 February 1964 Mr Cooke said:
"I was doing about 40 mph and I struck the girl with the right hand part of the front of the Holden car. She was scooped up onto the bonnet for a couple of seconds and then thrown over the hood to the left hand side of the road." (emphasis added)
163 This body of evidence needs to be examined in the light of Mr Haight's evidence. Mr Haight concluded that:
(a) the location of the physical evidence at the scene as depicted on the police plan suggests that the collision took place at the intersection (ie junction) between Stubbs Terrace and Selby Street;
(b) it was the left hand side of a car which would have to strike Ms Anderson to displace her to the left hand side of the road;
(c) the throw distance using a Holden at 35 mph was 88 feet (27 m) with a lateral projection of 6.5 feet (2 m); and
(d) the throw distance would be expected to increase to 75 - 100 feet (23 - 30.68 m) at 40 mph.
164 It was contended on behalf of the Crown that Mr Haight's conclusion regarding the point of collision, based on the physical evidence at the scene, ignores the possible movement of the objects found on the road between the time of the incident and when police observed the scene. It was said that Mr Haight was wrong to assume that the locations shown on the plan were the places where Ms Anderson had dropped the relevant items. It was pointed out that there was evidence that, on the night and early morning in question, there was a strong easterly wind blowing in the early hours of the morning after the incident. In my opinion, there was not a great deal that could be made of these criticisms.
165 There was also criticism that Mr Haight had relied in part on some material which was not in evidence at the trial, including some statements made out of court which were not in evidence, including reference to photographs on police files, which had not been formally proved. In my opinion, while there is some substance in these criticisms, they do not materially affect the general thrust of Mr Haight's evidence. In my opinion, there was nothing to suggest that the photographs were other than what they purported to be, namely, that they were photographs or copies of photographs which the Crown had sought to rely on at the trial. These photographs were objected to by defence counsel because their tone and lighting was such that the photographs tended to exaggerate the depth of dents and other damage. It was on the basis of these photographs that Mr Haight formed the view that the damage depicted in the relevant photographs was not consistent with the appellant's vehicle having struck a pedestrian.
166 In my view, Mr Haight's knowledge, experience and expertise, as detailed in his evidence, does form part of a body of knowledge and experience which is sufficiently organised to be recognised and accepted as a sufficiently reliable body of knowledge and experience to qualify him to give evidence as an expert in relation to the analysis of vehicle/pedestrian impact data which qualifies him to give relevant expert evidence to the Court.
167 In particular, I am persuaded that the methodology adopted in the tests which he carried out is designed to provide an illustration of and assist analysis of what happens in vehicle impacts upon collision with a pedestrian. Further, I am satisfied that Mr Haight should be accepted as an expert in the relevant field. Finally, for present purposes, I am satisfied that Mr Haight's opinion, insofar as it is relied upon by this Court, is sufficiently based upon admissible evidence, coupled with his expertise and experience in the relevant field: cf Pownall v Conlon Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370.
168 It was submitted on behalf of the Crown that the only manner in which Mr Haight's evidence cast doubt on the reliability of the appellant's confession in his second written statement to the police was to the effect that, had the Simca struck Ms Anderson so as to cause the injuries described, he would have expected more damage to the Simca. For the reasons I have already indicated I am unable to accept that submission. Mr Haight's evidence went much further than that.
169 Counsel for the Crown took Mr Haight through relevant portions of Mr Cooke's evidence in the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 which was to the effect that, when the Holden he was driving was travelling at about 40 mph, he struck Ms Anderson with the right hand front of the Holden. This was said to be outside or opposite the Floreat Ironworks. He said that he travelled 20 to 30 yards with Ms Anderson on the bonnet of the car and then she went over the top of the hood of the car and over the back, landing immediately opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. The distance between the point of impact and where she came to rest was approximately 220 yards. Mr Haight was of the opinion that, having regard to the objective facts and based on his expertise, there was "absolutely no chance that he struck her as far back as the Floreat Ironworks".
170 In the statement given to the police on 12 September 1963 to which I have already referred, Mr Cooke said that, when driving north on Stubbs Terrace, he had seen a woman walking along the right hand side of the road walking towards Graylands. He drove past to the intersection of Cunningham Terrace and Stubbs Terrace where he did a "U" turn with the intention of going back and running her down. He said that he saw her "about opposite" the Shenton Park Railway Station. He drove halfway off the road and swerved to the left to hit her. He said that he struck her with the front right hand side of the car. The car was half way off the road at the point of impact.
171 Mr Haight maintained that reconstruction should be based on the objective factual information, not on the subjective testimony of witnesses. In these circumstances, it was possible that the Holden struck Ms Anderson when travelling at 40 mph with the front end of the vehicle and the sun visor.
172 Mr Haight made the point that, in vehicle impact reconstruction, reliance is placed on objective factual information rather than the testimony of witnesses such as tyre marks, broken glass and bent metal. The statements of witnesses are not evaluated for truth or accuracy. Mr Haight maintained that on the objective facts in this case, it was possible that the Holden struck Ms Anderson when travelling at approximately 40 mph with the front end of the vehicle and the sun visor. On the basis of the description of the damage to the Holden and knowing where Ms Anderson was found, the vehicle must have struck Ms Anderson somewhere to the left of centre of the front of the vehicle rather than on the right. It was possible that, based upon his recollection, he was saying that the point of impact was on the right side as one faced the car. Alternatively, he was simply mistaken.
173 It was put to Mr Haight in cross-examination that he had all the body shop records and repair bills for the Holden which indicated damage on the right hand side. Mr Haight disagreed pointing out that there was damage on the right, the left and the centre. He agreed that the majority of the damage which could be attributed to the tree strike occurred on the right hand side. This was damage to solid structures such as bumpers and engine mounts, which was not pedestrian related damage.
174 Mr Haight also said that Ms Anderson came to rest on the left hand side of the vehicle when walking on the verge and ended up some distance to the left in the direction of the railway station. One possibility was that Mr Cooke's vehicle swung over to the left so as to strike her with the right hand side and then continued back onto the road. Mr Haight considered that this was "extreme". In his opinion, Mr Cooke was mistaken about which side of the vehicle hit. Mr Haight also considered that the throw distance of 220 yards estimated by Mr Cooke was not consistent with either of the versions he gave. One was that he first saw her in the vicinity of the Floreat Ironworks. The other was that he may have struck her in that area. His recollection was not consistent with the physics involved. It was impossible to strike her outside the Floreat Ironworks at 40 mph and leave her resting opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. It follows from Mr Haight's evidence, however, that, given that Mr Cooke was mistaken about which side of the vehicle struck Ms Anderson, his evidence was otherwise consistent with the objective circumstances.
175 Mr Haight concluded in his report that the location of the physical evidence documented in the 1964 police scene sketch suggested that the collision took place on the east verge of Stubbs Terrace in the area of the middle of the intersection with Selby Street. It is possible that it may have occurred slightly further to the north nearer the northern extreme of the intersection. This was an area where some white metal and blood was found. The evidence justified a conclusion that the collision occurred within the confines of the intersection. At one point Mr Cooke said that he struck the girl opposite the tree stump in that vicinity. Mr Haight said this was not consistent with what he described as "the physics", although it may be Mr Cooke's recollection. It was not consistent with the tests which Mr Haight conducted, although it fitted in with the test in terms of the speed of 37 mph which Mr Haight travelled in his test. Mr Cooke's testimony was that he hit her with the right front and Ms Anderson went over the top behind him as he passed along the verge. As to that, the following passage appears in the cross-examination at p 256 of the transcript:
"I understand what you're saying, but I just want to understand what your observations are in relation to his testimony. Cooke says he struck her with the right front of the vehicle at a position in Stubbs Terrace and she ends up opposite the railway station in the vicinity of that tree stump. That's the left-hand side of the road?---Yes, sir.
That does not fit with your testing which is to the effect, a vehicle that strikes a body with the right-hand side of the vehicle will not displace the person to the left-hand side of the verge?---It does fit. If he swerves off the shoulder and hits her with the right, she can still end up on the verge. You see, my point is it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter where she ends up relative solely to the road or relative to the car rather, it matters relative to the road. If he swerves off the road and catches her with the right side, if we adopt that, then he's had to swerve off the road and she can still be on the verge. That's something that I can't evaluate for a number of reasons, not the least of which it's not my job to evaluate his veracity."
Mr Haight agreed that he had not conducted a test along those lines to see whether Mr Cooke had swerved.
176 Counsel for the Crown then cross-examined Mr Haight about the test with the Holden. The throw distance using a Holden travelling at 35 mph was 88 feet with a lateral projection of 6.5 feet. If the vehicle was travelling at 40 mph Mr Haight would expect a throw distance of 75 to 100 feet. In his testimony, Mr Cooke estimated the equivalent of the throw distance as 220 yards, but on another occasion in his sworn testimony he thought it was 60 yards. Neither of those estimates accorded with Mr Haight's test results. As to that, if the area of impact was near the Floreat Ironworks, Mr Haight had expressed the opinion that it was necessary for the impact speed to have been in excess of 80 mph. In his report Mr Haight said that:
"Having personally conducted crash tests at speeds as high as 60 mph, I am confident that there is
(a) no way Ms Anderson would have survived a crash of that severity to have left the scene alive at all, and
(b) the extent and location of damage observed on any vehicle would have been substantially more than that observed in this series of tests, particularly the photos of the Button Simca taken by police."
177 In cross-examination Mr Haight would have expected substantially more damage to the bonnet, radiator core supports, additional pieces of the bonnet and the fender if the vehicle had travelled in excess of 80 mph. The damage would have been much more like the damage suffered by hitting a tree. There would also have been a body strike in the windscreen at that speed so there would be more damage in that area. This was not a reason to rule out Mr Cooke, but a reason to rule out that particular speed and location, but not to rule out the Holden as the relevant vehicle.
178 Mr Haight explained that his approach was to take what the Crown position was at the trial and analyse whether it was possible, rather than to adopt the position taken by either party.
179 Asked why he did not endeavour to demonstrate by testing that there was no way that Mr Cooke could have struck Ms Anderson with the right hand side of his vehicle to displace her to the left, Mr Haight said:
"I know that from my other testing it couldn't be the case and we demonstrated that with the three Simca tests where with the left side the body goes to the left side of the car, with the right side it goes to the right side of the car. I had no objective comparative features on what we'll call the Cooke Holden to make any further comparison and I believe, looking at the damage to the Holden was largely from the three impact on the right-hand side."
180 Mr Haight agreed with counsel for the Crown that it accorded with Mr Cooke's testimony that the damage to the Holden after striking Ms Anderson was "slight". When it was put to Mr Haight that the damage to the Simca driven by Mr Button could also be described as "slight", Mr Haight said:
"The damage that we saw in the Simca that I am convinced is not from a pedestrian might be described today as is viewed by us as slight. We may or may not have used the same word to describe any damage to the Holden that Mr Cooke had used."
181 So far as the blood on the Simca vehicle was concerned, it was put to Mr Haight by counsel for the Crown that the report submitted at the trial of the appellant indicated that there were "smears of blood" on the Simca. As to that the following exchange occurred:
"I think a smear is a misrepresentation, sir. The photos I've seen indicate clearly that they're a print, as though someone with blood on their hands had touched - or chocolate or something along that line, touched the surface of the car and made a print, a fingerprint. There's a significant difference between a smear made in a dynamic event and a print that shows the outlines of loops and such in a fingerprint."
182 It was then put to Mr Haight that there were smears of blood on the Button Simca. Mr Haight responded to that saying:
"We may not be using the same word. I see prints of blood in the photographs that I've reviewed. I don't see a smear as I would expect when a body is struck by a car."
Mr Haight made it clear that the description of the spots of blood he saw in the photograph were described in the pathology report as "... two spots of what appeared to be blood were seen. They had the appearance of drops which had fallen onto the vertical surface in a downward and backward direction". Mr Haight identified them as spots which he said were clearly the outline of basic fingerprints or handprints. The appellant gave evidence that he may have been responsible for the blood on the vehicle because he had carried Ms Anderson to the car and he had walked around the front of the vehicle after putting her in the car.
183 Mr Haight firmly adhered to his opinion that looking at the damage to the Simca driven by the appellant compared to the damage to the Simca cars that he tested, the damage to the appellant's vehicle was "clearly not consistent with a pedestrian hit". Mr Haight also said:
"My understanding of Officer Condren's affidavit was it was not a pedestrian hit in his opinion and the blood - if one looks at the objective evidence, the photographs, one can see that it's not from a splash but rather from a print such as someone putting their hand on the car - the door in this case - which is inconsistent with a splash from an impact, so the inference there would be that again this car wasn't involved on the basis of those bits of evidence."
184 In my opinion, when one examines the evidence of Mr Haight in the context of the evidence given at the trial, the absence of appropriate damage to the appellant's Simca raises a reasonable doubt whether the Simca struck a pedestrian in the manner alleged by the Crown at the trial or at all.
185 It was submitted on behalf of the Crown that Mr Haight's test results were more consistent with the Crown evidence and, in particular, the appellant's second written confession than with Mr Cooke's affidavit and evidence before the Court of Criminal Appeal, in terms of likely place at collision, throw distance and the motion of Ms Anderson after the collision, including the place where she came to rest some distance off the left hand side of the road to a vehicle travelling along Stubbs Terrace in the direction of Claremont.
186 Finally, it was submitted by the Crown that the evidence and the reports by Mr Haight conclusively established what the Court of Criminal Appeal concluded in 1964, namely, that Mr Cooke's evidence in his affidavit and subsequent sworn testimony before the Court of Criminal Appeal was not truthful. On the basis of these submissions it was contended that there was no foundation for the conclusion that the fresh forensic evidence of Mr Haight, in addition to the evidence at the trial and on the original appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, justified any conclusion other than that it was the appellant's vehicle which struck and killed Rosemary Anderson on 9 February 1963.
187 There was some evidence that there was more damage to the left hand side of the Simca driven by the appellant when inspected after 9 February 1963 than there was following the earlier accident. As against that, Mr Haight's firm opinion was that the nature of the damage was inconsistent with the Simca being the vehicle which caused the injuries to Ms Anderson. One exception to that was that there was evidence that there was no damage to the bonnet of the Simca prior to 9 February 1963, but there was damage to the bonnet observed on 9-10 February 1963. Mr Condren's evidence was that he did not consider that the Simca had struck a pedestrian because there were no relevant signs of blood, fabric or human hair on the appellant's Simca when he inspected it after the incident. This took account of the dent on the bonnet. There were the blood spots to which reference has already been made, but these were not thought to have been produced as a result of the impact. Mr Haight maintained throughout that the damage to the Simca (as shown in the photographs which were sought to be tendered by the prosecution at the trial) was inconsistent with the vehicle having struck a pedestrian at all.
188 In my view, Mr Haight's conclusion that the collision between the relevant vehicle and Ms Anderson involved what he called a "wrap injury" ought to be accepted. I also consider that his opinion that the point of impact was in the vicinity of the Selby Street junction with Stubbs Terrace and the speed of the relevant vehicle involved was 35 mph should be upheld. There is no reason to reject Mr Haight's reconstruction as indicating the impact point at the Selby Street/Stubbs Terrace junction at an impact speed of 35 mph. Likewise, there is no reason other than to accept that there was a "wrap" rotation of the body after striking the bonnet and the area above the windscreen of the vehicle in question. The test results clearly demonstrate that with a left side strike on a pedestrian, the body would go to the left. At 27 mph - 35 mph the body would rotate in a wrap trajectory and strike the bonnet on the left side and the roof before hitting the road surface. There was no relevant damage to the appellant's car on the left hand side. In Mr Haight's opinion, which he repeated several times, the damage on the left front of the Simca was caused by a car to car collision and not a pedestrian strike.
189 Mr Haight's evidence is truly fresh evidence based on accident reconstructions of situations where A drives a car which comes into contact with B; a pedestrian or a person in another vehicle can be reconstructed. Given the absence of the knowledge and techniques available today, this evidence would not have been available to any of the participants in his trial in 1963 or 1964.
190 According to Mr Haight, the testing of the Simca in this case was the first of which he was aware in accident reconstruction and the first such tests involving a Holden with a sun visor.
191 Counsel for the Crown sought to make much of the argument that the degree of relevant damage to the appellant's Simca was always a central issue. While the degree of damage to the appellant's Simca was always a central issue at the trial and on the original appeal, the evidence of Mr Haight was compelling. It was substantially evidence that was not available in 1964 having regard to the state of knowledge at relevant times. In my opinion, the evidence of Mr Haight, looked at in the context of all of the evidence at the trial, is such as would be likely to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a jury regarding the guilt of the appellant of the offence of manslaughter.
192 Dr Neil Alistair Turner is a duly qualified medical practitioner who practises as a plastic and reconstructive surgeon. In 1963 he was a first year resident at Royal Perth Hospital. He graduated in 1962 and commenced practice in 1963. He was then an orthopaedic resident. On the evening of 9 February 1963 he was on duty as the orthopaedic resident for orthopaedic surgery in the Casualty Department at Royal Perth Hospital. He was in Casualty when Ms Anderson was brought in. Dr Turner was informed that Ms Anderson had been involved in a "hit and run accident". She was very severely injured and, although Dr Turner did his best to resuscitate her, she died. Dr Turner gave evidence at the trial of the time of death and the fact that he certified her as dead. He was not asked about the cause of death or her injuries at the trial. She had suffered very severe head and abdominal injuries. She did not regain consciousness. She had one dilated pupil and no response to stimuli or pain, which suggested a very severe head injury. She had signs of bleeding into the intestines and abdominal cavity which suggested a very severe motor vehicle accident or a high-speed accident. He observed that Ms Anderson had extensive lacerations, abrasions, damage to parts of her body suggesting that she had been "taken along a road" plus the head and abdominal injuries which would only be caused by being struck by a car travelling at a high speed.
193 Shown a series of photographs of Ms Anderson which were exhibited at the trial, Dr Turner indicated that the extensive abrasions to both thighs and deeper damage to the hip joints, the knees, the elbows and the hand were indicative of a body moving across a rough surface at a high speed. These were typical of an accident that involved a motorbike where the person is thrown from the motorbike and "taken along a gravel road". Dr Turner was not asked to express an opinion about these matters at the trial. Dr Turner agreed that the body had travelled face down and feet first. In particular, the bruising on the calves of the legs and the fracture of the left leg were consistent with a vehicle striking a person who was moving along the roadway.
194 In my opinion, the significant point which emerged from Dr Turner's evidence was that the nature of the injuries was such that they would have been caused by a vehicle travelling at a much higher speed than that which had been described by the appellant, in relation to how he was approaching the accident scene. Dr Turner did comment that he was surprised upon reading the post mortem report in that it did not adequately describe the severity of her shocking internal injuries and internal bleeding which in his opinion were the cause of her death. When he read the post mortem report he expected there to be more internal injuries and more severe brain damage than was actually reported, but he said he had no clinical reason other than his own thoughts on the matter to be more specific or to challenge the report. It was clarified that what he now said about the report was in the light of what he saw at the material time in 1963, looked at in the light of the experience which he had accumulated since then. Dr Turner expressed the view that the speed which the vehicle would have been travelling, having regard to the nature of the injuries suffered, must have been in the vicinity of 80 to 100 kph, or in excess of 50 mph. The injuries were not consistent with a low speed in the region of 40 to 50 kph. In re-examination Dr Turner said that the injuries were not consistent with Rosemary Anderson having been hit at 35 mph or 56.3 kph. In his opinion the speed would have been much higher.
Ground 2(f), (h), and (j): Confessions by Eric Edgar Cooke
195 A major part of the appellant's case is that there was evidence which was not given at his trial or on appeal which suggests that Mr Cooke and not the appellant was responsible for the death of Ms Anderson. That evidence includes a confession or confessions by Mr Cooke to police and others that he was the person responsible for running down Ms Anderson rather than the appellant.
196 As set out in ground 2 of the grounds of appeal at sub-pars (f), (h) and (j), the appellant sought to rely upon confessions made by Mr Cooke to various persons regarding his responsibility for the death of Ms Anderson at times after his evidence had been rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeal and prior to his execution on 26 October 1964 when it was said he no longer had any motive other than to tell the truth. The first two of these in ground 2(f) were confessions made by Mr Cooke to the Rev George Jenkins (deceased) for the killing of Ms Anderson at Fremantle Prison, namely a confession on 23 October 1964 and a "gallows" confession made at the prison approximately 15 minutes prior to Mr Cooke's execution on 26 October 1964, both being made at a time and in circumstances when it was submitted that Mr Cooke had no motive other than to tell the truth. Ground 2(h) was that fresh evidence, not disclosed to the defence before the trial and the previous application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, of confessions by Mr Cooke to the murder of Ms Anderson and to the murder of one Jillian McPherson Brewer at Cottesloe on 20 December 1959. These were confessions made by Mr Cooke to Rev Prestage Lucas Sullivan on 31 October 1963 at Fremantle Police Headquarters; a confession made by Mr Cooke to his wife Sarah Cooke at Fremantle Prison on various dates following his arrest; and a confession made to Prison Warder Reginald Seiler at 9.00 pm on 8 January 1964 to the effect that two men were serving time for his crimes.
197 These confessions must in turn be examined having regard to the original confession made by Mr Cooke and witnessed by Mr I J Thorpe JP, the Deputy Superintendent at Fremantle Prison, on 2 December 1963. That confession was as follows:
"I ERIC EDGAR COOKE now of Fremantle Prison say. On the 10th Feb 1963 between 9 & 10 PM I stole a Holden sedan car, a two Tone, blue. This car was parked in the driveway of a houses [sic] on the junction of Leonora & Sounders St Como. The keys were in the lock, I removed the dome light globe. This car I drove over the Narrows Bridge & into the western suburbs. When I arrived in Double View, I parked this car in Vera Street in a Service Station yard. I then prowled around in that area for a little while. After getting into one house & seeing no other opportunities I went back to the car. This I drove through Wembley Downs & along to Perry Lakes Stadium. I turned right into Stevenson Drive & drove towards West Coast Hwy. From there I drove to the junction of West Coast Hwy & Alfred St Mt Claremont. Here I turned left towards Graylands, after driving down Alfred Rd, near the junction of Stubbs Tce & Alfred Rd. I saw on my left walking on the road towards me a man & woman. In between the two was a little girl in a white dress. As soon as I saw them I decided to run then down - But after seeing the little girl in the middle I didn't. For I thought of my little kids at home & how I would of felt if that had happened to one of them like that. Turning into Stubbs Tce I drove towards Shenton Park subway (Nicholson Rd) when I were near the subway I saw a scooter driven towards me, on it were a man & woman, the man was driving I then decided to run these two over as I saw they weren't wearing safety helmets. When I turned around & started after them they were quite a fair way in front of me & I just over took them in Graylands on the hill in Alfred Rd. When I were just about to hit them a car was coming towards me, in the other direction. So I waited a bit longer for another try, then after doing a right hand signal the scooter turned into Davis Rd & went in the direction of CMH. I then drove up to Mt Claremont where I turned around again towards the subway in Shenton Park. When I reached the subway I was obliged to stop for a car, which was on my right hand side. This car carried on in Selby St & while I were waiting for the traffic to clear, I saw a young girl walking from under the subway on the side of the road. After being cheated of two chances before I decided that I wouldn't be cheated again. I made a U turn in Cunningham Tce & parked the car, near a telephone booth & watched her walk up the road. She was walking up Stubbs Tce towards Shenton Park railway station. I can recall she had a handbag in her hand, a flat satchel type. I waited a few minutes for a few cars to go past her & me, then I started the motor & drove up toward her. When this girl was near a factory (Wembley Wrought Iron Works) I drove the car straight at her, at the time struck her I were doing 40 MPH. I struck the girl with the right hand part of the front of the Holden car, she was scooped up onto the hood for a couple of seconds & then thrown over the bonnet. My left hand wheels were then on the gravel & sand verge of the road. When I slowed down a bit I made a right turn into Lemnos Hospital drive & back again towards where I had struck the girl. As I drove up I saw in the approximate position where the girl landed, a Simca car, with both left hand doors open. I can't recall the colour of the car, when I drove past I saw a man bending over the girl I had hit. This was right near a tree stump, opposite the railway station. I drove back to where I had first made a U turn near the telephone box & made another U turn, then drove back towards the railway station along Stubbs Tce. As I drove past where I had hit the girl I saw on the road a few bits of cosmetic stuff, which usually is in a woman [sic] purse I thought it must of come from this girls purse. Near the tree stump where the girl had come to rest there was no sign of anything & the car which I had seen before was no longer there. I drove up to Graylands & into Mengler Ave & turned into the first street on the left, this street leads to Lock St Station. Half way up on the left hand side of the street, I parked the car with the left wheels on the footpath. I got out of the car & had a look at the damages, the right front grill was stove in - between the right head light & the centre of the grill. On the hood was a dent & on the bonnet or roof were about 4 spots of blood, which I wiped off with my hanky. I then got back into the car & drove the way I had come. Going under the Shenton Park Subway I drove up Nicholson Rd to Rokeby Rd there I turned right & drove the car into Kings Park. I turned left into the Drive & after going about 40 yards I picked out a tree & drove the car up against it. This was to give the impression that someone had used the car to joy-ride & lost control of it I jumped out the car through the left hand door & walked through the bush onto a path & through to Thomas Street near the Home of Peace. I walked up to PMH & rang for a taxi which I took home to Gladstone Road Rivervale.
I confirm that the above statement is true to the best of my recollection."
198 It was this confession and the oral evidence of Mr Cooke about it which was rejected in 1964 as "utterly worthless" by Wolff CJ in the Court of Criminal Appeal, which heard the appellant's application for an extension of time within which to appeal in 1964: Button v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; 22 May 1964 at 83 per Wolff CJ. Jackson SPJ at 118 described the evidence of Mr Cooke as "intrinsically incredible". Virtue J agreed. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Mr Cooke on 11 February 1964 which repeated the earlier confession he had made to the police. It also recounted that Detective Deering and Detective Sergeant Nielson had accused him of being a liar and that Detective Deering said that he was "out in the times and in the distance in which she [Ms Anderson] fell after being struck".
199 The Rev Jenkins was an Honorary Prison Chaplain attached to the Fremantle Gaol. He had known Mr Cooke when he was a young man. Following Mr Cooke's trial and conviction for the murder of a Mr Sturkey, the Rev Jenkins regularly visited Mr Cooke at the Gaol. On almost every occasion when he visited him, Mr Cooke repeatedly said that he was the person responsible for the deaths of Ms Anderson and Ms Brewer in respect of which the appellant and a Mr Beamish had both been respectively convicted.
200 The Rev Jenkins visited Mr Cooke on Friday 23 October 1964. At that time Mr Cooke was due to be executed on 26 October 1964. Mr Cooke discussed the fact that the date for his execution had been set and acknowledged the justice of the decision to hang him. As Rev Jenkins recounted it in a statement signed by him and dated 12 November 1964:
"On this day he said he was concerned about the fact that Beamish and Button were still being held for crimes which he had committed.
Without any prompting from me he took the Bible from me and said 'I swear before God I did these two.'
The reference to 'these two' was to Misses Brewer and Anderson.
I was alone with Cooke on this occasion.
I called to see him again on Sunday the 25th October 1964 and finally I attended with the Rev Ralph Thomas on the morning of the 26th October 1964.
Cooke's execution was to take place at 8 am on that day.
Between 7-45 am and 7-50 am in the presence of the Rev Ralph Thomas Cooke again took the Bible in his hand and said 'I swear before Almighty God that I killed Anderson and Brewer.'
Throughout the time I was with Cooke on the morning of the 26th October 1964 he was in a calm and controlled state of mind."
201 Cooke was executed at 8.00 am on 26 October 1964. The statement by the Rev Jenkins was part of the fresh evidence referred to in par 2(f) of the grounds of appeal relied upon in support of ground 1 of the grounds of appeal which contends that the verdict of the jury in respect of the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory having regard to the fresh evidence. Paragraph 2(f) of the grounds of appeal refers to:
"The fresh evidence contained in a statutory declaration made 12 November 1964 by Reverend George Jenkins (now Deceased) being evidence of:
(i) an unequivocal confession to the killing of the Deceased made to him by Cooke at Fremantle Prison on 23 October 1964, and;
(ii) a 'gallows' confession to the killing of the Deceased made to him by Cooke at Fremantle Prison approximately 15 minutes prior to Cooke's execution on 26 October 1964;
such confessions made at a time and in circumstances when Cooke had no motive other than to tell the truth."
202 The reference in the grounds of appeal to a "statutory declaration" was patently incorrect. The document was not a statutory declaration. It does not purport to be any more than a statement signed by "George Jenkins" and dated 12 November 1964. The statement was not witnessed. It was submitted on behalf of the Crown that from the date on the statement it would appear that, following the execution of Mr Cooke, the deceased witness recorded in statement form various occasions upon which Mr Cooke confessed to him to the killing of Rosemary Anderson and Jillian McPherson Brewer. The document appears to be signed but there was no evidence or admission that it was signed by the Rev Jenkins. There was, however, no objection to the admissibility of the statement as such. The objection was that the contents of the statement comprised inadmissible hearsay evidence. It was contended that it did not fall within any established exception to the rule against hearsay. In support of the objection counsel for the Crown relied upon the decisions in In re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163; and Bannon v The Queen [1995] HCA 27; (1995) 185 CLR 1.
203 In Bannon v The Queen the High Court most recently considered the application of the rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence in relation to out of court statements made by one co-accused, (who did not give evidence at the trial), which were said to be exculpatory of the appellant. The appellant in that case contended that the Court of Criminal Appeal of Victoria erred in not upholding a submission that the trial Judge should have admitted the co-accused's statements in exculpation of the appellant, although the statements were hearsay and not admissible to inculpate the appellant. It was contended in that case that the exceptions to the rule against hearsay should be enlarged to include statements against penal interest in addition to statements against proprietary or pecuniary interest by a person unable to testify. Further or alternatively, it was contended that there should also be an exception where the statements were made under circumstances which satisfied two conditions, namely, necessity and reliability.
"Out of court statements are not evidence of the truth of what is said unless the statement falls within an exception to the rule against hearsay. One such exception admits evidence of a confessional nature against the maker. Another renders admissible a statement made by a third party, since deceased, which is against his or her pecuniary or proprietary interest.
As the law stands in this country, there is no exception to the hearsay rule which renders admissible either against or in favour of an accused hearsay evidence of a confession by a co-accused or by a third party [See, eg, In re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163; R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504; Wade v Gilroy [1986] FamCA 6; (1986) 83 FLR 14; R v Greatorex (1994) 74 A Crim R 496]. No Australian court, at least in any reported decision, appears to have taken the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in England in R v Beckford [[1991] Criminal Law Review 833] that if the consequences of inadmissibility are that the jury does not hear an alternative version of the events giving rise to the charge, the conviction of an accused may be unsafe and unsatisfactory and accordingly set aside. It should be noted that in Beckford the co-accused did not give evidence and the prosecution was unable to give evidence of the confession because the trial judge held that it was not given voluntarily [In R v Rogers [1995] 1 Cr App R 374 at 381 a differently constituted Court of Appeal refused to apply Beckford on the ground that the decision 'turns upon its own special facts'].
In Lobban v The Queen [[1995] 1 WLR 877; [1995] 2 All ER 602] the Privy Council said that a judge in a criminal trial had no discretion to exclude the exculpatory part of a mixed statement containing admissions as well as an exculpatory explanation on which a defendant wished to rely, notwithstanding that the exculpatory material was prejudicial to a co-defendant. Their Lordships said that where the admission of evidence which was admissible against one defendant but not against his co-defendant resulted in real risk of prejudice to the co-defendant, the judge should ensure that the interests of the co-defendant were protected by explicit directions to the jury to the effect that the statement of one co-defendant was not evidence against the other or, in the last resort, by ordering separate trials [See also Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 56, 62-67, 80-81, 92-95, where the Court discussed the warning to be given when an accused gives evidence implicating another accused].
The appellant submits that while support for his submission is lacking in decisions of the Australian courts, this Court should adopt the approach taken in Canada and the United States and hold that a third party confession, at any rate a confession by a co-accused which exculpates an accused, is an exception to the rule against hearsay. The appellant prays in aid statements in decisions of this Court that the hearsay rule should not be applied inflexibly [The appellant referred to Walton v The Queen [1989] HCA 9; (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 293-294; R v Benz [1989] HCA 64; (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 117-118, 121, 143-144; Pollitt v The Queen [1992] HCA 35; (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 593-596, 609-611, 620-621]."
205 In R v Beckford; R v Daley [1991] Crim LR 833 Beckford and one Daley were both convicted of murder and other violent offences. It was alleged that Beckford, Daley and another co-accused, one Correia, stabbed to death a man named Johnson on the basis that Correia did the actual stabbing, but Beckford and Daley were parties to the offence. Correia confessed to stabbing Johnson unaided but the trial Judge ruled the statement inadmissible against Correia under s 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Eng) because the statement was made in the absence of a solicitor. Correia did not give evidence and was acquitted of murder, although he was convicted of another offence of assault on another person. Counsel for Daley sought to cross-examine police witnesses on the contents of Correia's statement, but the trial Judge refused the application on the ground that to introduce the confession of Correia other than by cross-examining him would offend against the hearsay rule. Daley and Beckford appealed against their convictions for murder on various grounds, including a ground that the ruling was wrong.
206 The Court of Appeal, Watkins LJ, Alliott and Cresswell JJ, held that the trial Judge's ruling to exclude the confession was correct. However, because Correia's confession had been excluded, the jury never heard from him. Had his version been given to the jury they might have acquitted Daley and Beckford. Hence their convictions for murder were unsafe and unsatisfactory. The equivalent in a Western Australian context could well be that they had been deprived of a reasonable chance of an acquittal with the result that there had been a miscarriage of justice for the purposes of s 689(1) of the Criminal Code.
207 In the passage I have quoted above from the judgment of Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ, reference is made to the judgment of the Privy Council in Lobban v The Queen [1995] 1 WLR 877 and the absence of discretion to exclude the exculpatory part of a mixed statement by a co-defendant also containing admissions as well as an explanation on which the appellant, who was a co-defendant, wished to rely, notwithstanding that the admission was prejudicial to the co-defendant who made the statement.
208 Their Honours went on to consider the limitation of the scope of the exception to the rule against hearsay of declarations by a third party to declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interest, but excluding statements against penal interest: Sussex Peerage Case [1844] EngR 822; (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85; 9 ER 1034. At 23 - 24 their Honours said:
"While the common law recognises an exception against hearsay in the case of a declaration by a third party, since deceased, against interest, traditionally the interest has been confined to a pecuniary or proprietary interest rather than a penal interest [Sussex Peerage Case [1844] EngR 822; (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 [8 ER 1034]]. That limitation has been much criticised [See, eg, Wigmore on Evidence, Chadbourn rev (1974), vol 5, pars 1476-1477; Baker, The Hearsay Rule (1950) pp64 et seq; Donnelly v United States [1913] USSC 104; (1913) 228 US 243 at 277, per Holmes J]. It is no longer accepted in Canada, following the statement by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v O'Brien [[1978] 1 SCR 591 at 598-599; (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 513 at 518; 35 CCC (2d) 209 at 214] that a 'person is as likely to speak the truth in a matter affecting his liberty as in a matter affecting his pocketbook'. Furthermore, the requirement that the declarant be deceased has broadened into a wider test of 'unavailability' [Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (1992) pp183-184]. This includes the disappearance of the declarant [R v Pelletier (1978) 38 CCC (2d) 515] and, possibly, circumstances in which privilege is claimed against the giving of such evidence [cf R v Agawa and Mallet (1975) 28 CCC (2d) 379 where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that it is insufficient that the declarant invokes the privilege against self-incrimination]. In the interests of 'fairness', the extension to declarations against penal interest operates only in relation to declarations which exculpate the accused [Lucier v The Queen [1982] 1 SCR 28; (1982) 132 DLR (3d) 244; 65 CCC (2d) 150]."
209 Their Honours also noted at 24 that in R v O'Brien [1977] INSC 185; [1978] 1 SCR 591 at 599 Dickson J, who delivered the judgment of the court, affirmed the requirements for admissibility stated by Hamilton LJ in Ward v H S Pitt & Co; Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co [1913] 2 KB 130 at 137 - 138, a decision reversed on other grounds: [1914] AC 733. One of the requirements was that a statement by a co-accused that he alone was responsible for the offence of being in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking was held inadmissible because the proceedings against the co-accused had been stayed and he did not believe he would be prosecuted. In Demeter v The Queen [1978] 1 SCR 538 an alleged confession to a friend by a person already sentenced to life imprisonment for another crime was held inadmissible.
210 The decision in that case, assuming it to be well-founded, would suggest that in this case the confession by Mr Cooke to the commission of the crime of which the appellant had been convicted at a time when Mr Cooke had already been sentenced to death for two other murders would likewise be inadmissible in the present case.
211 Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ said in Bannon at 24 - 25 that:
"In the last few years Canadian courts have taken a broader approach still to the admission of hearsay evidence, permitting such evidence to be adduced where the evidence is 'reliable' and its reception in hearsay form is reasonably necessary. In R v Khan [[1990] 2 SCR 531; (1990) 59 CCC (3d) 92], a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada delivered by McLachlin J, evidence against an accused charged with sexual assault against a young child was given in the form of evidence from the child's mother as to what the child had told her. Necessity was inferred from the fact that the child was incompetent to give evidence and reliability from a number of circumstances including the lack of a motive for falsification. Khan was followed in R v Finta [(1992) 92 DLR (2d) 1; 73 CCC (3d) 65] and it has been applied in a number of other Canadian cases [See, eg, R v Chahley (1992) 72 CCC (3d) 193; R v Smith [1992] 2 SCR 915; (1992) 94 DLR (4th) 590; 75 CCC (3d) 257; R v Unger (1993) 83 CCC (3d) 228; R v Kharsekin (1994) 88 CCC (3D) 193; R v Edwards (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 123].
This wider approach, which looks to 'necessary and reliable' criteria, has led to the admission of evidence which inculpates as well as evidence which exculpates an accused. And while, not surprisingly, the present appellant wished to confine any new exception to the rule against hearsay to statements exculpatory of him, he accepted that where a statement was capable of bearing both an exculpatory and inculpatory meaning, if an accused asked for the statement to be admitted as part of his case, there was no entitlement to a direction to the jury that they use the statement only if, or to the extent that, it carried an exculpatory significance."
212 Their Honours went on to consider the developments in the United States. Previously, the leading case was Donnelly v United States [1913] USSC 104; (1913) 228 US 243. In that case, it was held that the common law as it applied in the federal courts excluded hearsay evidence of a confession by a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which the defendant was charged. The majority held that the evidence was rightly excluded on the basis of authorities which included the Sussex Peerage Case. Holmes J at 278 dissented on the ground that there was no binding authority on the admissibility of the confession as a declaration against interest because "no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder".
213 It was against this background that Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ in Bannon at 25 - 26 referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Chambers v Mississippi [1973] USSC 32; (1973) 410 US 284 as follows:
"In Chambers v Mississippi [(1973) [1973] USSC 32; 410 US 284] the issue before the Supreme Court upon certiorari was whether there had been a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to due process by reason of a combination of two matters. The first was refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine a third party who had made but later repudiated a written confession; Chambers had called the third party and he was in court. The second was the rejection, as hearsay, of the testimony of three persons to whom the third party had confessed. The Supreme Court held [Chambers v Mississippi at 302] that, taking these two matters together, the result had been a denial of due process. The Court pointed out [at 301] that, in Donnelly, the declarant had been unavailable at the time of the trial. Further, since Donnelly there had been a change in the applicable law of evidence. Exclusion of declarations against penal interest was no longer required under the new Federal Rules of Evidence which took effect on 1 July 1973. Rule 804(b)(5) provides that, if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if a court determines that the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and the general purposes of the Rules and the interests of justice will best be served by its admission. However, such a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it has made known his intention and given particulars to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial to provide a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.
In Chambers, the Supreme Court was not ruling upon the common law of Mississippi. However, it noted [at 299-300] that a number of States had discarded the common law rule which denied any exception to the hearsay rule in favour of declarations made against the penal interest of the declarant, and stated that the rationale for the traditional position had been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism. The Court also observed that, in the instant case, the circumstances provided 'considerable assurance of ... reliability' [Chambers at 300. The existence of comparable circumstances is discussed in People v Craven (1973) 299 NE 2d 1; People v Fletcher (1975) 546 P 2d 980; People v Pietrzyk (1977) 369 NE 2d 1299. See also People v Edwards (1976) 242 NW 2d 739 where a majority of the Supreme Court of Michigan treated reliability as going to weight rather than admissibility]."
214 Their Honours noted at 27 that the tests of admissibility in Canada and the United States required that the confession must have been made to the "immediate prejudice" of the maker and, in the United States at least, it must have been corroborated by other evidence. Reference was made to the observation in Wigmore on Evidence, Chadbourn rev (1974) vol 5 par 1462 that:
"It must be remembered that it is not merely the statement that must be against interest, but the fact stated. It is because the fact is against interest that the open and deliberate mention of it is likely to be true. Hence the question whether the statement of the fact could create liability is beside the mark."
215 In the result, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ concluded at 28 - 29 that it was unnecessary and inappropriate for the High Court to determine whether it should follow the decisions of the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States to extend the exceptions to the rule against hearsay to third party confessions. This was because, on the facts, the requirements of prejudice and reliability which underlie the admissibility of such statements in Canada and the United States were not satisfied.
216 Deane J said at 12 - 13 that he was in general agreement with Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ in respect of what they said regarding:
"... the appellant's submissions supporting either a broad flexible relaxation of the hearsay rule to allow evidence of inherently reliable hearsay statements 'at the instance' of an accused or a widening of the exception from the hearsay rules of some statements made against interest."
217 Brennan CJ at 7 - 8 was opposed to the flexible application of the hearsay rule in a case of this kind based upon the criterion of reliability which had been proposed in some of the judgments in Walton v The Queen [1989] HCA 9; (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 293 per Mason CJ; R v Benz [1989] HCA 64; (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 143 - 144 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ; and at 117 - 118 per Mason CJ; and Pollitt v The Queen [1992] HCA 35; (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 565 - 566 per Mason CJ; and at 610 per Toohey J. Brennan CJ adhered to the reasons his Honour had expressed in Pollitt at 571 - 583 for rejecting the admissibility of hearsay evidence based "simply on the judge's opinion of its reliability". The Chief Justice then considered whether there should now be recognised an additional exception to the rule against hearsay to admit some confessional statements previously excluded. His Honour notes the rejection in the Sussex Peerage Case, supra, of declarations by deceased persons against penal interest and said at 8 - 10:
"That view, though followed by the Supreme Court of South Australia in In re Van Beelen [(1974) 9 SASR 163 at 206-207, 209], by the House of Lords in R v Blastland [[1986] AC 41 at 52-53], by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Turner [(1975) 61 Cr App R 67 at 88] and by the Supreme Court of the United States in Donnelly v United States [(1913) [1913] USSC 104; 228 US 243 at 273-276], was powerfully criticised by Holmes J in the last mentioned case [at 278]. In Queensland [See R v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572 at 574; but cf R v Greatorex (1994) 74 A Crim R 496] and in the United States [See People v Edwards (1976) 242 NW (2d) 739 at 741-742 and the references in R v O'Brien [1977] INSC 185; [1978] 1 SCR 591 at 598-599; (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 513 at 518; 35 CCC (2d) 209 at 214] the Sussex Peerage rule has been doubted. It was also trenchantly attacked by Wigmore [Wigmore on Evidence, Chadbourn rev (1974) vol 5 pars 1476, 1477]. Holmes J's criticism of the rule in Sussex Peerage struck a responsive chord in the Supreme Court of Canada in Demeter v The Queen [[1978] 1 SCR 538 at 534-535; (1977) 75 DLR (3d) 251 at 254; 34 CCC (2d) 137 at 140], R v O'Brien [[1978] 1 SCR 591 at 598-599; (1977) 76 DLR (3d) 513 at 517-518; 35 CCC (2d) 209 at 214] and Lucier v The Queen [[1982] 1 SCR 28; (1982) 132 DLR (3d) 244; 65 CCC (2d) 150]. The principles which the Supreme Court of Canada approved for the admission of an out-of-court confession by an unavailable [Lucier SCR at 33; DLR at 248; CCC at 154] declarant include the following [O'Brien SCR at 599; DLR at 519; CCC at 215; Demeter SCR at 544; DLR at 255; CCC at 141]:
'1. The declaration would have to be made to such a person and in such circumstances that the declarant should have apprehended a vulnerability to penal consequences as a result ...
2. The vulnerability to penal consequences would have to be not remote.
...
5. The declarant would have to be unavailable by reasons of death, insanity, [or] grave illness which prevents the giving of testimony even from a bed, or absence in a jurisdiction to which none of the processes of the Court extends.' [Principle 5 may not be exhaustive: see R v Pelletier (1978) 38 CCC (2d) 515 at 525]'
Unless principles of this kind are adopted to limit the admissibility of evidence of out-of-court declarations against penal interest, false confessions untested by cross-examination would bedevil criminal trials. Gaol-house confessions allegedly made by prisoners who would decline to admit guilt testimonially would be a commonplace.
In Canada, out-of-court declarations against penal interest are allowed as exceptions to the hearsay rule only in the case of declarations exculpatory of the accused, since the admission of hearsay evidence against an accused would rob him of 'the invaluable weapon of cross-examination which has always been one of the mainstays of fairness in our Courts' [Lucier SCR at 33; DLR at 244; CCC at 154]. Even if these conditions were adopted as criteria of admissibility of out-of-court confessions by an unavailable declarant, other requirements would have to be considered to safeguard against the risk of fabrication to which the Supreme Court of South Australia referred in In re Van Beelen [at 204-205].
The Supreme Court of Canada saw the whole theory of admissibility of out-of-court declarations against interest to be that the declarant knew the declaration to be against interest at the time when the declaration was made [Ward v H S Pitt & Co [1913] 2 KB 130 at 137-138, cited by Martland J in Demeter SCR at 545-546; DLR at 255-256; CCC at 141-142]. For that reason, a strict application of the Demeter principles 1 and 2 would restrict the Canadian exception to little more than confessions made to a police officer [See Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (1992) pp185-187]."
218 The Chief Justice went on to criticise the conditions of reliability, necessity and exculpatory effect governing admissions which had been developed in Canada in R v Khan [1992] 2 SCR 531; and followed in R v Smith [1992] 2 SCR 915; and R v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701. His Honour said at 11 - 12:
"... the broad tests of necessity and reliability advanced in Khan and Smith are hard to reconcile with the view expressed by Barwick CJ in Vocisano, by Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ in Walton and by me in Pollitt [And see the restricted exception allowed by McHugh J in Pollitt [1992] HCA 35; (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 621-622], namely, that a judge's opinion of reliability does not make hearsay admissible. The Khan test of reliability is reduced to a matter of judicial opinion.
'Necessity' adds very little if it means only 'that hearsay is the only available means of putting that evidence before the court' [Finta (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 1 at 135; 73 CCC (3d) 65 at 199]. Under that test, although direct testimony could not be obtained from an incompetent witness, a witness entitled to claim privilege or a co-accused, an out-of-court declaration by such a witness would be received. I would not adopt the Khan approach. It runs counter to the law of this country which treats hearsay as inadmissible unless it falls within a defined exception.
If the exception of declarations against penal interest were to be accepted as part of our law, there may be a question whether the principles approved in Demeter are appropriate or whether some other (possibly less restrictive) principles should be adopted, bringing our law closer to the Canadian law. I do not suggest that that is the desirable development. Rather it seems to me that any revision of the approach hitherto taken in this country would require a general review of the hearsay rule, its history, purpose and operation. But that must be a question for another day."
219 McHugh J at 32 found it unnecessary to decide whether the hearsay rule was subject to a "flexible exception" as formulated by Mason CJ in Walton v The Queen, supra. After reviewing the decisions in Canada and the United States adopting the exception to the hearsay rule for statements made against penal interest at 35 - 36, McHugh J concluded at 37 that, if the statement was truly against penal interest and reliability and corroboration were required as in Canada and some United States jurisdictions, the evidence in Bannon would not be admissible. His Honour went on to consider the necessary and reliable exception at 39 - 41 and concluded that it was unnecessary to determine whether that exception should be adopted in Australia because it would not assist the appellant because he was unable to satisfy the reliability threshold.
220 Some consideration was given to In re van Beelen and Bannon by Owen J in The Queen v Golightly, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 970040; 14 February 1997 at 20 and 23 - 29. In particular, Owen J noted at 26 - 27 that while in Zullo v R [1993] 2 Qd R 572 the Court of Appeal in Queensland had doubted the application of the rule in the Sussex Peerage Case, the High Court had declined to hold that the rule no longer applied in Australia. That is a question which must be considered in the present case, particularly in relation to any alleged confession made by Cooke regarding responsibility for the death of Ms Anderson at a time following his conviction and sentence to death for the murder of a Mr Sturkey.
221 The difficulty facing the appellant in the present case is that the confession to Rev Jenkins was made at a time when Mr Cooke had already been convicted of the murder of Mr Sturkey and was about to be executed. As Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ noted in Bannon, above, at 27, both in the United States and in Canada the confession must have been made to the "immediate prejudice" of the maker. In the passage I have quoted from the judgment of Brennan CJ at 8 - 10, his Honour considered that the principles to be adopted to make an out-of-court confession admissible, as an exception to the rule against hearsay, would have to be under circumstances where there was an apprehension to penal consequences as a result, and the vulnerability to such consequences should not be remote. In the present case, Mr Cooke had already given evidence to the Court of Criminal Appeal of his guilt and been cross-examined, where his evidence had been roundly disbelieved by all three members of the Court of Criminal Appeal who had the benefit of seeing and hearing him give evidence as a witness before them. Had the confession been believed or had been regarded as truthful, his execution could have been postponed pending a further trial for the murder of Ms Anderson, or for other murders to which he confessed. Thus, having been convicted of the murder of Mr Sturkey and then confessed to the murder of Ms Anderson, he was, at least theoretically, at risk of being tried for the latter murder.
222 One major difficulty is the decisive rejection by the Court of Criminal Appeal of Mr Cooke's actual testimony in support of the appellant's application in 1964.
223 Assuming that Mr Cooke's statement could otherwise be regarded as a statement against interest, it might be argued that it was admissible pursuant to s 79C of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). Counsel for the Crown submitted that it was not. In Caratti v The Queen [2000] WASCA 279 a statement against interest by the accused to a deceased civilian witness, a Mr Navratil, recorded in a statutory declaration, was held to be admissible in evidence against the accused. Mr Navratil had died by the time of the trial. But for his death he could have given direct oral evidence of the statement against interest made by the accused, Mr Caratti. In the present case the late Rev Jenkins recorded the conversation with Mr Cooke, a third party. It was submitted that the deceased reverend gentleman could not have given direct oral evidence of the conversations with Mr Cooke had he lived, which was a pre-condition of the operation of s 79C(i): R v Jenkins [1970] TasSR 13 at 22 per Crisp J; and Connell v The Queen (No 6) (1994) 12 WAR 133 at 195 per Malcolm CJ, Pidgeon and Nicholson JJ. I am unable to accept that proposition. If the evidence can be given at all it is given as an exception to the rule against hearsay, so that direct oral evidence or other admissible evidence of what the speaker said by way of a declaration against interest is admissible, provided the evidence is within the exception considered in Bannon.
224 Paragraph 2(h) of the grounds of appeal provided particulars of further fresh evidence relied upon by the appellant, namely:
"Fresh evidence never disclosed to the Defence before the Trial and the Appeal of confessions by Cooke to the murder of the Deceased and to the murder of Jillian McPherson Brewer ('Brewer') at Cottesloe on 20 December 1959 being:
(i) the confession made by Cooke to Reverend Prestage Lucas Sullivan on 31 October 1963 at Fremantle Police Headquarters which evidence was contained in a statutory declaration sworn by Reverend Prestage Lucas Sullivan on 6 February 1964;
(ii) the confession made by Cooke to his wife Sarah Cooke at Fremantle Prison by Cooke on various dates following his arrest;
(iii) the confession made by Cooke to Prison Warder Seiler on 9pm on 8 January 1964 to the effect that two men were serving time for his crimes."
225 It was pointed out by senior counsel for the appellant that the first of these items of fresh evidence was contained in a document at p410 of the Appeal Book. That document appears to be a copy of a statement witnessed by a Detective Sergeant Burrows and dated 6 January 1964, and also appears to be the last page from a larger statement. The statement as recorded at p410 is as follows:
"Prestage Lucas SULLIVAN
further states:
Concerning the other two, BREWER and ANDERSON, he [Mr Cooke] said that two men BEAMISH and BUTTON were serving sentence.
I was confused by two points (a) the variation in the number of crimes (murders), that is 3 to 4, and (b) the reversal of what he had said on the last occasion I met him - when he denied having committed three murders to which he had confessed earlier.
I didn't explore the deviation in numbers but talked at length on why he had reversed his denial. He stated that he was ashamed of the nature of the murders.
We discussed all his murders, but emphasised the two with which he hadn't been charged. I was more concerned about him confessing to crimes which he had not committed. I felt that he had not committed the murders of Brewer and Anderson, and pointed out to him the wrongs of releasing men who were in fact guilty.
I am sure he understood what I was saying, but he was adamant in his confession and went on with a great deal of detail about both the Brewer and the Anderson murders. These details meant nothing to me, but when joined by Det Sgt Dunne he was able to comment on details given by COCKS. I gained the impression in this conversation that Eric was trying to pick up where he had made mistakes, in his details of the murders.
When this opportunity of cross-checking his facts were denied Eric continued to insist that he was telling the truth and had committed the murders.
I came away from the interview convinced that despite the inconsistencies in the facts, Eric himself believed he was telling the truth."
226 It does not appear from the document in the Appeal Book that the confession was made on 31 October 1963 at Fremantle Police Station as stated in par 2(h)(i) of the notice of appeal. In my opinion the statement was not properly proved for the purposes of the appeal. The evidence was simply not admissible. It was said that Mr Sullivan was deceased, but no attempt was made to prove his death. The document also contains a number of statements of opinion or conclusions which are inadmissible in any event. Insofar as it contained evidence of an alleged confession it was objected to as inadmissible hearsay and not admissible under the exception canvassed in Bannon. In my opinion, assuming that the statement had been properly proved, the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Ms Brewer was found dead in the bedroom of her flat at Cottesloe. She had been killed in the early hours of the morning of 20 December 1959. Virtue J who delivered the most detailed judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal said in Beamish v R [1962] WAR 85 at 92 that her death "was the result of a deliberate and murderous attack with a small hatchet ...". The only evidence connecting Mr Beamish with the crime comprised four confessions alleged to have been made by him, two of which were oral and two of which were in writing. The grounds of appeal were that the confessions were inadmissible and that the learned trial Judge, Wolff CJ, misdirected the jury regarding the onus of proof. On 20 October 1961 the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal. An application for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was subsequently refused.
227 Subsequently, Beamish's case was the subject of a reference to the Court of Criminal Appeal by the Attorney General pursuant to s 21 of the Criminal Code (WA). As in the case of the present appellant Mr Beamish relied upon a confession by Mr Cooke to the murder of Ms Brewer, being the same confession made to Rev Sullivan relied on in the present case.
228 Wolff CJ presided at the hearing of the reference, notwithstanding that he had been the trial Judge.
229 In Beamish v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 20 of 1964; 22 May 1964 at 6 - 7 the Chief Justice set out in detail matters relevant to the strength of the case against Mr Beamish: cf Craig v The King [1933] HCA 41; (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 439 per Rich and Dixon JJ. These were:
"(2) the evidentiary weight of the assertion now made by Cooke that it was he and not Beamish who killed Brewer, and in that regard it is necessary to consider the circumstances leading up to and connected with the alleged confession, including a confession made at the same time in regard to the girl Anderson; retractions of both the alleged confessions; reaffirmations of the alleged confessions and variations and alterations in circumstantial detail which might be said to be put forward to supply obvious weaknesses and inconsistencies in prior statements;
(3) the time which has elapsed between the killing and the alleged confession by Cooke (nearly 4 years);
(4) the circumstances under which it was made - Cooke being under arrest for wilful murder on evidence which was so strong as to make it very probable that he would be convicted and sentenced to death. Cooke's motive for making the statement: is there any reason past or present why Cooke should seek to assume liability for this killing which he denied about a month after the Brewer murder?
(5) Cooke's general character as throwing light on his credibility. In speaking of general character in this case I not only refer to his reputation as a criminal and utter unreliability as a witness of truth in the normally accepted sense, but also his character as a person who is alleged to have an overwhelming desire for the limelight arising out of a sense of inferiority probably due to his being born with a hare-lip and a cleft palate;
(6) any circumstances proved to exist at the time of Brewer's murder which are at variance with the circumstantial account given by Cooke.
If it appears that Cooke's alleged confession is utterly unreliable in its central details in regard to the killing, that is the end of the matter and this Court would not be justified in taking the serious step of setting aside the jury's verdict and ordering a new trial: no miscarriage of justice would have been demonstrated."
230 Having reviewed the Crown case against Mr Beamish, the Chief Justice said at 508 - 510:
"In my opinion the case for the Crown was of great probative strength; such criticism as has been levelled I have dealt with. The criticism is no different from what one may expect to find in any case where as here the bulk of the evidence carries conviction.
I propose now to examine the alleged confession by Cooke in the light of this evidence. He first claimed to have killed Brewer in an oral statement to the police in September last year, nearly four years after Miss Brewer's murder. There are marked variations in his statement now before the Court, a statement which purports to be vouched for by his affidavit. Cooke's shocking character needs no expatiation. He has some odd notions as to his obligation to tell the truth in and out of Court. Out of Court he can, he thinks, lie as he likes and he does so. In Court his handling of the truth is no different. He took some pride in telling a pack of lies to Dr Prendergast, a mental specialist who examined him some years prior to the happenings discussed here. He draws a subtle distinction between an affidavit such as the one he made in this instance in support of the appeal being sworn 'by Almighty God', and the verification of the statement attached. Although he certifies on the statement that he read it through and found it correct, he averred in cross-examination that was not a fact. He said in cross-examination that he only read a part so that if there are mis-statements or untruths that does not worry him (pp337, 338 transcript). His statement that he did not read it through is a gross lie as Mr Smith, Beamish's solicitor was present, no doubt to see that as far as possible with a person like Cooke all precautions were taken. Later on, under cross-examination, Cooke changed his mind and admitted he did read the statement through before he signed it.
The nature of the crimes he has committed and in which his guilt is beyond question stamps him as a monster. But Mr Burt argues that is of minimal significance if it can be shown that his story is cogent and reasonable i.e. plausible - which seems rather difficult if not practically impossible to establish when one has to depend on him for the central or essential details. It is necessary to examine his story in the light of the central facts relating to the murder and see how far it is sustained.
It has given me the greatest satisfaction that the Court insisted on Cooke being called for cross-examination by Crown Counsel: that was an experience of great benefit in adjudging on the value of his statement that he was responsible for the Brewer murder."
231 The Chief Justice then proceeded to expand in his evaluation of Mr Cooke's character, describing him at 510, among other things, as a "gross fraud". Mr Cooke had confessed to police to both crimes on 10 September 1963. At 519 reference is made to the confession to the Rev Prestage Sullivan which was in evidence before the Court of Criminal Appeal as follows:
"Then he tells the Rev Prestage Sullivan on the 11th September that he had killed three people other than those with whose killing he had been charged and that in respect of one of those killings a man was serving sentence in Fremantle Prison. I note that Button was sentenced on the 6th May 1963, so that if Sullivan is correct Cooke had forgotten one of the killings. Sullivan was then in company with Nielsen and Dunne. Cooke declined to give any names as, according to Sullivan , Cooke said he did not want to involve Sullivan. Two days later Sullivan visited Cooke again with the same two detectives, and Cooke said to Sullivan, referring to the detectives Nielsen and Dunne, 'these two gentlemen have convinced me that I did not do those killings.' Then a few days later at the Fremantle Court House, Sullivan saw Cooke alone and Cooke switched back to an affirmation of his having done the murders of Brewer and Anderson. Sullivan asked Cooke his reason for changing his confession on the earlier occasion, and he said that the murders were of such a nature that he was ashamed of them."
232 At 520 the Chief Justice noted that on 19 September 1963 Mr Cooke had told his solicitor, Mr Heenan, that he had told the police he killed both Ms Brewer and Ms Anderson, but he also said that "the police had satisfied him that he could not have done it ...".
"On the 26th September 1963, he again mentioned the subject to Mr Hatfield QC, and Mr Heenan, saying that he 'believed until after my arrest that I had run down and killed Rosemary Anderson' and then went on to say that 'in fact I was on that night in the Shenton Park area, in a stolen car ...'. Then following that oblique reference to the retraction, he made statements to Messrs Hatfield and Heenan that he had, in fact, been responsible for the killing of both Brewer and Anderson. Under cross-examination he was questioned about some of the many marked discrepancies appearing in the several statements affirming his guilt in regard to these two women. Having seen him and heard him trying to explain these discrepancies, he emerges (not unexpectedly) as a low cunning liar, when cornered, will say anything to try and escape from a denouement. It is clear that he thinks that the more confusion he creates, the longer will be his chances of clinging to life. In fact, when asked in cross-examination why he had lied in regard to certain important matters he said that he had done it with that purpose. It is clear too that he is still trying to win support for his theory that he is the victim of compulsive insanity.
In his statement of the 12th September in reference to the Anderson killing, he wound up with the words:- 'My reason for running down this girl was just to inflict injury and pain on her. I never knew her, the reason I left this statement until I was arrested on other matters was -
first - when it happened I did not want to be charged with this crime;
second - now that I have been arrested on other matters and have so much more against me this bit can't hurt me' and he finishes up on a hypocritical note 'and I'd like to see an innocent person like Button free.' Himself first - his conscience is last.
But the whole thing indicates that when charged with Sturkey's murder he was trying to establish that he was acting under irresistible impulse. It is an arrestingly significant fact that he did not (as he might have done) refer to these killings in the trial for the wilful murder of Sturkey."
234 In these circumstances, on the face of it, the confession to the Rev Prestage Sullivan could not be entitled to any significant weight, even if it had been properly proved.
235 The next confession relied upon is in fact a series of confessions by Mr Cooke to his wife at Fremantle Prison on "various dates following his arrest": see ground 2(h)(ii). No specific dates were specified in the particulars. None were sought by the Crown. In an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2000 Sarah Cooke, the widow of Mr Cooke, says that in the months leading to his execution Mrs Cooke visited him regularly in the condemned cells at Fremantle Prison. She cannot recall the exact dates of these visits in 1964. Mrs Cooke had married her husband on 14 November 1953. They were married by the Rev Prestage Sullivan. Mrs Cooke says that:
"4. During these visits I ascertained that he was worried about Button and Beamish and the fact that they had not been released. He was under the impression that when he had said it was he that had killed Rosemary Anderson and Gillian Brewer they would be released straight away. He was upset that no-one would believe his confessions.
5. In one occasion I said to him 'They won't believe you because you have told so many lies' In response he said 'Well I am telling the truth now. I did kill Rosemary Anderson and Jillian Brewer."
236 This evidence was objected to on the grounds that it was inadmissible as hearsay. The Court reserved its decision on the objection. In my opinion, the evidence is inadmissible. It is hearsay which is not admissible under the exception canvassed in Bannon.
237 Mrs Cooke also deposed to a conversation she had with the late Rev George Jenkins who told her that Mr Cooke had confessed to him that he had killed Rosemary Anderson and Jillian Brewer. This evidence was also objected to on the grounds that it was hearsay. In my opinion the objection should be upheld.
238 In relation to ground 2(h)(iii) reliance was placed on a confession said to have been made to Prison Warder Seiler at 9.00 pm on 8 January 1964 to the effect that two men were serving time in Fremantle Prison for crimes that he, Cooke, had committed. For the reasons already stated, in my view this evidence, assuming that it was admissible, would not be entitled to any great weight.
239 The evidence in support of this ground consists only of the record purporting to be made by Mr Seiler. This was not known to defence counsel or the appellant's solicitors at the time of the trial or three previous applications for an extension of time. It was contended by the Crown that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Further, it was contended that if the evidence was tendered for its testimonial effect in the sense that two men were serving time for Mr Cooke's crimes, and there was an inference that the appellant was one of them, the evidence would not be entitled to any great weight. As it is, I uphold the objection that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. In any event, the entry in the occurrence book was not properly proved.
Grounds 1 and 2(a): Fresh evidence of hit and run victims
241 The appellant sought by ground 1(a) to rely on evidence relating to seven hit and run victims of Mr Cooke as similar fact evidence which was said to corroborate the evidence of the appellant at his trial; the confessions of Mr Cooke made at various times ("the Cooke hit and run confessions"); and the evidence given by Mr Cooke in the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964. It was submitted that the evidence of these witnesses was admissible on this basis and to "rebut" the adverse findings of credit made against Mr Cooke by the Court of Criminal Appeal. It was accepted by counsel for the appellant that in "general terms" evidence cannot be led at a trial to bolster the credit of a witness: R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834. It was submitted, however, that "given the unique nature of the present proceedings", the evidence should be received: cf Mickelberg v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 990056; 12 February 1999.
242 The starting point for the consideration of these submissions is that it must be possible for an accused A to defend a criminal charge by seeking to prove that the offence was committed by another person B: In re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 233 per Walters, Wells and Jacobs JJ. If that is right, logic suggests that A should be able to lead any evidence tending to prove that the offence was committed by B. This would include any similar fact evidence which would be admissible in a trial of B for the offence.
243 It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the evidence of prior hit and run victims of Mr Cooke was admissible as evidence of the facts relating to those events and as similar fact evidence, as going to show that Mr Cooke was the driver of the vehicle which killed Ms Anderson. It was further submitted that the general prohibition against the reception of propensity evidence was for the benefit of the accused and that such evidence was admissible on behalf of an accused to show that another person committed the offence: Cheney v R [1991] FCA 37; (1991) 99 ALR 360. In that case Von Doussa J (with whom Jenkinson and Miles JJ agreed) said at 367 - 369:
"The evidence adduced on the 'modus operandi point' was evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained by the appellant and his counsel before the trial. The premise underlying that evidence is that sufficient similarity exists between the features of the two attacks to raise, at the least, a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant. The principles which govern the admission of 'similar fact' evidence as part of the Crown case to establish identity against an accused person have been extensively discussed in recent years by the High Court in Markby v R [1978] HCA 29; (1978) 140 CLR 108; 21 ALR 448; Perry v R [1982] HCA 75; (1982) 150 CLR 580; 44 ALR 449; Sutton v R [1984] HCA 5; (1984) 152 CLR 528; 51 ALR 435 and Hoch v R [1988] HCA 50; (1988) 165 CLR 292; 81 ALR 225. Those principles require that there be a striking similarity between the circumstances of the offence charged and the circumstances of other offences about which evidence is sought to be adduced to implicate the accused. The requirement reflects the recognition that 'similar fact' evidence is likely to be unfairly prejudicial to the accused and that a jury might attach too much importance to it: Perry v R per Gibbs CJ (CLR at 585); Sutton v R per Brennan J (CLR at 547). Different considerations apply where it is an accused person who seeks to adduce 'similar fact' evidence as part of his defence. The risk that the jury will attach undue importance to the evidence and may misuse it to the prejudice of the accused will not arise: Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98 at 101-2, 108. Nevertheless the proposed 'similar fact' evidence must pass the basic test of relevance to be admissible.
Counsel for the appellant has argued the appeal on the assumption that the 'similar facts' put forward will be admissible if there is a 'striking similarity' between the crimes committed on 2 July 1988 and those committed on 4 July 1988. That the evidence must meet this stringent requirement finds support in R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 at 43-4. Where it is the prosecution which seeks to lead 'similar fact' evidence, that evidence, to meet the criterion of admissibility, must reveal 'striking similarities', 'unusual features', 'underlying unity', 'system' or 'pattern' (Hoch v R (CLR) at 294-5; Thompson v R [1989] HCA 30; (1989) 86 ALR 1 at 28), before it will have sufficient probative force to outweigh the risk of prejudice to the accused. But where that risk is not an issue, and recognising that to make good a defence the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt, there is reason to hold that the criterion of admissibility is somewhat lower. In Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones, Macrossan J at 108-9 expressed the opinion that the test of admissibility will be more akin to the test applicable in civil cases. The test to be applied in civil cases is discussed by the Full Court of South Australia in Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 at 102, 144-8, 155. Bollen J, with whom Prior J agreed on this point, considered (at 148) that evidence of 'similar facts' will be admitted in civil cases if that evidence is logically probative, ie if it is logically relevant in determining the matter which is in issue.
In Duff v R [1979] FCA 83; (1979) 28 ALR 663; 39 FLR 315 at 347-50 a Full Court of this court considered the admissibility of evidence which the accused at trial sought to lead as 'similar fact' evidence. The court said (ALR at 689; FLR at 348):
'Evidence of similar facts is admissible to prove a fact in issue when the connection between the alleged similar fact and the fact in issue is so close or immediate that in the common experience of mankind the fact in issue is likely to have occurred if the similar fact occurred. An allegation of a mere similarity between the way in which a person performs a particular task on one occasion and the way in which he is alleged to have performed it on another does not, at least in the generality of cases, show the kind and degree of connection between the occasions which is essential to the admission of evidence of the former occasion as a similar fact to prove the way in which the task was performed on the latter occasion.'
In my opinion, where the issue is one of the identity, 'similar fact' evidence to be admissible at the calling of the accused must be evidence which demonstrates a sufficient degree of similarity between the circumstances surrounding the crime charged and the circumstances of the other event to give rise to the real possibility, based on common experience of human affairs, that the person who committed the crime charged was the person responsible for the other event. In addition, of course, it would be necessary for the accused to lead evidence to the effect that the person responsible for the other event was not the accused."
244 In my opinion these principles are equally applicable in the present case where the issue is whether it was the appellant or Mr Cooke who ran down Ms Anderson on the night of 9 February 1963. In the present case such evidence is logically probative of the guilt or innocence of the appellant in the sense that, if accepted, it may, putting it at the lowest, raise a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant. While counsel for the appellant accepted that unless there was a striking similarity between the propensity evidence and the evidence relating to the circumstances of the death of Ms Anderson, the evidence may not be admissible, that test of admissibility may have been stated too highly. It was submitted, however, that each of the incidents relied upon did bear a striking similarity to the established facts surrounding the death of Ms Anderson.
245 The evidence was also relied upon to justify a re-examination of the rejection of Mr Cooke's confessions in the present case by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964. As has already been mentioned, according to Wolff CJ at 9, "His word in or out of court is utterly worthless". Jackson J at 3 said that Mr Cooke's evidence was "intrinsically incredible, devoid of cogency or credibility".
246 Mrs Neeltje Schneider gave evidence by affidavit that on 12 September 1958 she was living at 4 McKay Street, Bentley with her husband and two small children. At about 10.30 pm on that day she was cycling along Hill View Terrace, Bentley, returning home after attending choir practice and other church duties in Victoria Park. At the Jarrah Road junction she turned into Marquis Street and continued cycling toward home. She was then run down by a vehicle and suffered severe injury in the form of a fractured skull and resultant serious epilepsy. Mrs Schneider annexes to her affidavit a copy of the text of the handwritten confession by Mr Cooke to running her down which he made to police on 16 September 1963. She maintains that the details of the incident described in his confession are consistent with the facts as she knows them. This confession said that in September 1958 he was "prowling" in the Victoria Park area. He stole a Consul sedan car from the driveway of a house about 10.00 pm. He said:
"I drove it out of the drive & up Mackie St to Berwick St, where I turned left. I continued along Berwick St to the junction of Hill View Tce. As I turned into Hill View Tce I saw a woman riding a push-bike on the correct side of the road. I stopped the car for a couple of minutes & when had I decided she had gone far enough I drove down Hill View Tce after her. When she was near a junction of a couple of roads I hit her, as I drove off the bike was caught up on the front wheel of the car. My intention was to then stop & remove the bike, but as I turned a corner it fell off. I abandoned the car in Jarrah St & have shown the detectives the location of this hit & run & also where I left the car. This was the first time I had ever use [sic] violence in any crime. I did it in the desire to hurt her or anyone. I have given this statement of my own free will, it is true & correct."
247 In her oral evidence Mrs Schneider said that on that evening she had been to choir practice in church at Colombo Street in Victoria Park. Her recollection was that she had been cycling down Hill View Terrace and that she was hit after she had turned into Marquis Street which is consistent with what Mr Cooke said in his statement.
248 According to a report by Detective Deering dated 19 September 1958 a Ford Consul Sedan No 2638 was reported stolen on 13 September 1958 and had been recovered. It was stolen from 71 Mackie Street, Victoria Park between 9.00 pm on 12 September and 10.00 am on 13 September 1958. On 13 September 1958 the vehicle was found abandoned in Victoria Park.
249 The vehicle had been left parked in the driveway, unlocked, with the ignition keys left in the car. The vehicle was found abandoned in Victoria Park on the following day and returned to the owner.
250 Following the evidence of Mrs Schneider, counsel for the Crown indicated to the Court that the Crown did not wish to cross-examine any of the hit and run victims. However, the Crown's position was that it did not accept as established fact that Mr Cooke committed the five hit and run incidents the subject of affidavit evidence by the victims. The position of the Crown was that Mr Cooke's confession of his involvement in each of the hit and run incidents was inadmissible hearsay. It was not contested that Mr Cooke had told the police that he was responsible for running down each of the hit and run victims on whose evidence the appellant relied. It was submitted that the only admissible evidence connecting Mr Cooke with the five hit and run incidents was his testimony before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 at pp 268 - 270 of the transcript of those proceedings. The position taken by the Crown was that, although the police may have considered their "investigations indicate that each of the above confessions is substantially reliable", it would, as Walters, Wells and Jacobs JJ said in Re Van Beelen, supra, at 198-199:
"As we understand Mr Borick's argument, the course of reasoning leading to the drawing of the suggested inference included steps that may, and should, be thus expressed: Police are experienced and skilled in the investigation of homicides; they do not direct close attention to a particular person to whom their inquiries have led them unless there are good reasons for doing so; the interviews and tests undertaken suggest that the police were paying close attention to Sandercock, and therefore suspected him; the jury should, on that account, also suspect Sandercock; it follows there is a reasonable possibility that Sandercock is guilty and not the accused.
It seems to us that to reason in that way would be to deprive the jury of the most important power and responsibility that they possess, namely, that of using their own reasoning, based upon the ordinary course of events and the ways of men and women, and of coming to a conclusion upon the evidence duly adduced before them. It would be wholly impermissible for a jury to regard themselves as bound or even encouraged to accept police reasoning in substitution for their own. Unless the jury is working in an area covered, to their satisfaction, by opinion evidence, given by duly qualified expert witnesses, the act of discarding their own basis of reasoning would amount to an abdication of their constitutional function as finders of fact, and the liberty - a fortiori, the duty - to perform that function would be lost or repudiated. One can imagine the alarm and despondency that would be created if the prosecution were permitted to resort to similar reasoning to support the Crown case. It is perhaps desirable to add that what police officers do at a given time may, of course, be used to determine what they then believed, or what else they did, before, at that time, or subsequently, assuming that that belief or those actions are relevant; but a clear distinction must be drawn between the proper use of such evidence, and the sort of use Mr Borick urged us to make of the evidence above referred to."
251 The document entitled "Summary of Facts contained in confessions made by Eric Edgar Cooke to offences causing injury by running down by motor cars" dated April 1964 was tendered during the 1964 proceedings, on the application for an extension of time to appeal, at the request of the appellant and the Court. It was recorded in the transcript at 152 - 158. The Crown maintained that the matters canvassed in the document were not relevant. Counsel for the Crown informed the Court of the existence of the confessions to the hit and run incidents, upon which the document was based, and which may require "a ruling on admissibility later": see p 157 of the transcript.
252 In Ratten v The Queen [1974] HCA 35; (1974) 131 CLR 510 Barwick CJ (with whom McTiernan, Stephen and Jacobs JJ agreed) said at 514, in the context of an appeal by way of reference:
"... although all the material supporting the Applicant's petition formed part of the whole case to be considered by the Court, the ordinary principles as to admissibility of evidence must be applied in the consideration of that material, so much of it as would be inadmissible being ineffective to influence the resolution of the matter."
253 It was submitted by counsel for the Crown that, at its highest, the affidavit evidence concerning the five hit and run incidents established only that the victims were all female and struck by a car at night. It was contended that, of itself, this evidence did not disclose a modus operandi and that the same person was responsible in each instance. Further, the evidence did not identify Mr Cooke as the person who ran the victims down, or the person who ran down Rosemary Anderson. It was submitted that the evidence did not bolster the credibility of Mr Cooke's testimony on those issues. For these reasons it was submitted that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible: Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98. It was accepted by counsel for the Crown that where the issue is one of identity, the similar fact evidence to be admissible must pass the test formulated by Von Doussa J in Cheney, supra, at 369.
254 It was also accepted by the Crown that if a modus operandi could be distilled from Mr Cooke's testimony about the five hit and run incidents, it showed that his victims were female, run down at night, in a stolen car, that was subsequently abandoned. This was relied upon by the appellant to bolster Mr Cooke's credibility in respect of his testimony that he used a similar modus operandi to run down Rosemary Anderson. It was submitted by the Crown that this suggested no more than that because Mr Cooke testified he ran down seven other people in a particular way, his evidence was "more believable" when he said he ran down an eighth person in that way. It was accepted that such evidence would be admissible but there was a question about how much weight could be attached to it: cf B v The Queen [1992] HCA 68; (1991) 175 CLR 599.
255 After observing Mr Cooke under cross-examination in 1964, Wolff CJ, as previously noted, said that "his word in or out of court is utterly worthless". Jackson SPJ said:
"Cooke's present confession is intrinsically incredible. It is devoid of cogency or plausibility and no reasonable jury could believe it."
256 It was submitted that, in this context, there was nothing in the evidence of the seven hit and run witnesses in the present appeal which could rehabilitate Cooke's credit. For example, there was nothing in their evidence which could give credit to Cooke's sworn testimony that his vehicle carried Rosemary Anderson a distance of 200 yards, a feat which was not supported by the appellant's motor vehicle expert. Finally, it was submitted that the issues which arise for consideration in relation to this particular ground had been judicially determined previously and were not open for review: Ratten v The Queen, supra, at 514 per Barwick CJ.
257 In my opinion, having regard to the developments in the law of evidence as reflected in the judgments in Bannon, supra, the evidence of the confessions to the hit and run incidents is admissible as there was a sufficient indication of their reliability when read with the evidence of the victims which was before this Court. The relevance of the evidence is self-evident and there was a concession by the Crown in the proceedings in the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 that the police investigations revealed that the confessions were "substantially reliable". Furthermore, there was before that Court a statement of agreed facts signed by the solicitor for the appellant and the solicitor for the Crown which comprised a summary of facts and confessions made by Mr Cooke of the offences of causing injury by running down by motor cars which read as follows:
"1. At about 10.00 pm on the 12th September, 1958 at Hillview Terrace, Victoria Park, he knocked down a woman who was riding a push cycle on the road. He was driving a Ford Consul Sedan. He abandoned the vehicle in Jarrah Street, Victoria Park.
2. Between 6.30 pm and 12 midnight on the 9th April, 1960, he struck a woman walking on the road in Munt Street, Bayswater. He returned to the injured woman and took her purse. The car he drove was a Holden Sedan and was abandoned on the corner of Munt and Irvine Streets, Bayswater.
3. At a time unknown, he knocked down a woman walking on the road in Gabriel Street, Carlisle. He was driving a Holden utility. The car was abandoned in Oates Street, Carlisle.
4. At about 11.15 pm on the 13th May, 1960, he knocked down a woman walking on the road in Daly Street, Belmont. He was driving a Morris Minor Sedan. He bogged the car at the scene and abandoned it.
5. At about 10.45 pm on the 20th May 1960 he drove at three women walking on the road in George Street, Queens Park. He hit two of the women. He was driving a Chrysler Royal Sedan. He abandoned the car near the Oates Street Railway Crossing, Carlisle.
6. Police investigations indicate that each of the above confessions is substantially reliable."
258 It was submitted in this Court that while there was a statement of agreed facts, it was a document before the court upon which counsel for the Crown reserved the question of admissibility. In the result, the Court of Criminal Appeal received the document without ruling on its admissibility. It was submitted by counsel for the Crown in 1964 that whatever the police thought of the situation was a matter for them, but, so far as the Crown was concerned, it had not been established by admissible evidence that Mr Cooke was in fact responsible for the five hit and run incidents. The adoption of that position rested on the assumption that the confessions by Mr Cooke as to his responsibility for the hit and run incidents were not admissible in the proceedings on the former appeal. It was submitted by counsel for the Crown that the position was the same in relation to the present proceedings.
259 With all due respect to the arguments by counsel for the Crown and the view taken by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964, I am of the opinion that the agreed facts based upon confessions made by Mr Cooke and now strikingly corroborated by the compelling evidence of the victims fully justifies the previous concession by the Crown that police investigations indicated that they were "substantially reliable".
260 At the time of the 1964 application for an extension of time to appeal, Mr Cooke's solicitor, Mr B P Kakulas, who had been junior counsel at the appellant's trial and on the appeal, was aware that Mr Cooke had made confessions to the police admitting his culpability in hit and run vehicle attacks on Neeltje Schneider, Kathleen Bellis, Glenys Woosnam, Jill Connelly, Georgina Perks, Maureen Greenhalgh and Terese van den Bosch. These matters were investigated since it was being suggested that Mr Cooke's evidence was wholly incredible. A private investigator was engaged. As a result of some information obtained from him, the Crown conceded that Mr Cooke did have a propensity for running people down. In the course of an interview, Mr Cooke told Mr Kakulas that he had made a number of written confessions about these matters to the police. The Crown refused access to these confessions with the result that Mr Cooke's legal advisers were unaware of the details and of the fact that the confessions may have been corroborated by the evidence of the victims. As the Crown had made a concession about Cooke's propensity, the matter was not further pursued. Consequently, neither at the time of the trial or of the appeal did Mr Kakulas or senior counsel for the appellant have access to the statements by the various victims of the hit and run incidents. In cross-examination before us it was put to Mr Kakulas that the Crown did not accept that Mr Cooke was the perpetrator of the hit and runs. Mr Kakulas explained that it was on the basis of a concession by the Crown that the police investigations indicated that each of the confessions was substantially reliable that counsel did not call evidence from the three of the persons involved, whom they had been able to locate. It was made clear before us that by the Crown, however that, while the police may have accepted a number of propositions in relation to the hit and run incidents, the Crown did not accept as an agreed fact that Mr Cooke was the perpetrator.
261 This raises a question why the Crown acquiesced in the material being put in evidence in the Court of Criminal Appeal on the basis that Mr Cooke's confessions were substantially reliable. Counsel for the Crown before us said that the Crown was invited by the Court to put in, at the request of Mr Hatfield, a summary of additional matters. As appears from the transcript at the appeal in 1964 at p152 Mr Hatfield says:
"I can't tell you whether Cooke has ever been guilty of any hit and run crimes or suspected of them or confessed to them. If he had, your Honour may think it was a matter which should be considered."
There was a request for a list of admissions. Mr Kakulas' understanding was that the summary of facts was subsequently agreed in the sense that it was correct, although the question of its relevance was reserved. If the document was determined to be irrelevant it would be inadmissible. At all events, it was made clear before us that for the purposes of the present appeal the Crown did not accept that Mr Cooke's confessions in relation to the other matters were substantially reliable. The signature of Mr Dodd, who was junior counsel for the Crown on the document, indicated an agreement which went no further than that the police considered Mr Cooke's confessions ought to be accepted. However, as a result of the understanding by counsel for the appellant at that time, the evidence was not then called. In my opinion, the nature of the incidents concerned qualify them as similar fact evidence. I have reached this conclusion on the basis of the affidavits of the victims and other materials tendered in evidence.
So far as the prosecution is concerned, evidence of the character or conduct of the accused on other occasions showing that the accused had a propensity to commit crime, or crime of a particular kind, or was the sort of person likely to have committed the crime alleged, is not admissible unless the evidence is sufficiently highly probative of a fact in issue to outweigh the prejudice it may cause: Pfennig v The Queen [1995] HCA 7; (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 464; and 475 - 485 per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ; and see Cross on Evidence, 6th Aust Ed, par 21010 at 567. The evidence of the similar facts must bear a striking similarity to the facts in the case alleged against the accused. Where it is the accused who seeks to lead the evidence the degree of similarity is not as stringent as it is when the Crown seeks to lead the evidence: Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98. In the present case, as will appear, the nature of the evidence was such that it was highly probative of a fact in issue, namely, whether it led to a conclusion that, at the least, there was a real possibility that Mr Cooke had in fact been responsible for the death of Ms Anderson.
There is an additional point. Where the similar fact evidence is sought to be relied upon by the defence to show that the offence or offences there is no question of balancing probative value and prejudicial effect. In such a case the test is one of relevance in the sense that, as a matter of human experience, is there a sufficient similarity between the two acts as to led to a real possibility that the same person was involved: Cheney v The Queen [1991] FCA 37; (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 111 - 112 per Von Doussa J; R v Harmer (1985) 28 A Crim R 35; Duff v The Queen [1979] FCA 83; (1979) 28 ALR 663 at 689 per Brennan, McGregor and Lockhart JJ; Lowery and King (No 3) [1972] VicRp 109; (1972) VR 939 at 947 per .
The decision in the last-mentioned of these cases was affirmed by the Privy Council in Lowery v Reg [1974] AC 85; [1973] 3 All ER 662. Lord Morris delivered the reasons of the Privy Council. In the Full Court and the Privy Council it was accepted that the relevant evidence could not have been led by the prosecution. Their Lordships at [1974] AC 92 - 93; [1973] 3 All ER 671 - 672 expressly approved of the following passage in the judgment of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in Lowery at 944 - 955 that while it was not in that case competent for the Crown to lead evidence of the kind in question (unless it passed the relevant test):
It is, however, established by the highest authorities that in criminal cases the Crown is precluded from leading evidence that does no more than show that the accused has a disposition or a propensity or is the sort of person likely to commit the crime charged."
Their Lordships also approved the following passage at 945:
"It is, we think, one thing to say that such evidence is excluded when tendered by the Crown as proof of guilt, but quite another to say that it is excluded when tendered by the accused in disproof of his own guilt. We see no reason of policy or fairness which justifies or requires the exclusion of evidence relevant to prove the innocence of an accused person."
In the present case, while in the original appeal there was evidence that Cooke had confessed to the previous hit and run situations, the question was whether the evidence comprised in those confessions was of sufficient credibility to be taken into account by a jury. In my opinion, the confessions were to be given credibility because they matched the accounts given by the respective victims. To the extent that the appellant did not have access and could not have had access to this evidence at the time of the trial, the appellant may have been deprived of the reasonable chance of an acquittal at the trial and the Court of Criminal Appeal may have come to a different conclusion had the evidence of the victims been available.
The evidence of the remaining hit and run victims needs to be examined on the same basis.
262 On 16 September 1963 Mr Cooke made a statement to police in which he said that in about April 1960 he stole a Holden utility from the driveway of a house in Coode Street, South Perth opposite the Como School. He said he remembered the vehicle because it had a Geraldton numberplate. He then said:
"After taking this ute I drove into the Carlisle-Belmont area. The time was about 11.00 pm. I eventually ended up in Fulham St, Belmont - while driving down Fulham St I passed a bus & a little way further whilst driving past a street on my left I saw a woman walking on the left of the road. I drove until I came to another street where I did a U turn. I turned back & drove down the street where the woman was. I can't remember the names of the streets, but I have shown the detective the locations. At the intersection of Gabriel St & the street I drove down I hit this woman & the car ran a bit off the road. When I regained control of the car I drove further down Gabriel St & turned left. I drove until I came to Fulham St again. I then drove the ute over to Carlisle & at a Neptune garage at Oats St I parked the ute & walked to my house in Rivervale. A desire just to hurt people was my object & not to rob them or anything else."
263 In an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2000 by Kathleen Mavis Bellis it was said that in December 1958 she was residing at 9 Belinda Avenue, Belmont with her husband and three children. On Saturday 27 December 1958 she was returning from a waitressing shift in a tearooms in William Street, Perth. At about 11.30 pm she was walking towards her home along Homewood Street from the bus stop in Fulham Street, Belmont. It was dark and she was carrying a small torch and some leftovers from the shop. She heard a car behind her and thinking it was her husband there to pick her up she waved the torch to show where she was in the dark. She was almost at the intersection with Gabriel Street when she realised it was not her husband and she moved to the edge of the road to let the car pass.
264 As the car came nearer she realised from the speed and the "revving" that she should move further off the road. She hurried into a sandy paddock alongside the road. She realised that the car was revving and coming straight at her. She turned around to look and was dazzled by the lights. She said that she was certain the driver was aiming deliberately at her and the car hit her.
265 Mrs Bellis says that she woke up in hospital with a broken pelvis, broken leg, skull and spine fractures. When Mr Cooke was arrested she was living in Victoria. She was not informed that he had confessed to deliberately running her down or that the Western Australian Police had established him to be the perpetrator. She said that the details of the incident described in the confession are consistent with the facts as she knows them apart from the date, which was incorrectly stated as April 1960. She was never interviewed by anyone in relation to the appellant's trial or appeal. Apart from the discrepancy concerning the date of the incident, the detail contained in the confession is remarkably consistent with Mrs Bellis' recollection.
266 Mrs Glenys Woosnam says that in April 1960 she was single. Her maiden name was Peak. She was then aged 20 and living with her aunt and uncle at 2 John Street, Bayswater. Her evidence was that on Saturday 9 April 1960 at about midnight she had alighted from the train at the Bayswater Station. She was walking home along Beechboro Road with two friends, Betty Palmer and Barry Power. Betty left at the intersection of Foyle Road and she turned into Raleigh Road in the company of Barry. They continued along Clavering Road and parted company at Irvine Street, which she walked along alone.
267 While she was in Irvine Street she saw a car pass her and turn into Munt Street. It was an early model light-coloured Holden sedan. She did not see the driver clearly, but noticed he was a short man wearing something on his head. As she came to Munt Street, she looked to the right and saw the car stopped in that street, facing her, with its headlights on and the driver at the wheel. She then turned into Munt Street, in the opposite direction to the car. She heard the car start up again and the gears grate. It turned into Irvine Street again moving away from her and returning the way it had come.
268 She was walking in the centre of the road and had gone about 100 metres when she heard the car behind her, coming up Irvine Street and turning into Munt Street. She moved to the right side of the road to let it pass. She heard it accelerate behind her, then she heard it "roar". She turned and recognised the revving car as the one that had passed her earlier. It veered to the wrong side of the road and aimed straight at her. She tried to get out of its way, but it struck her, hitting her left hip and throwing her over the bonnet.
269 The car continued along into John Street. Knowing that was a dead end and the car would come back, she scrambled up, despite her injuries, fearing the driver would run her down again. She managed to get home before collapsing. She was taken to hospital with severe lacerations requiring stitches. She also suffered bruising. Later, the police returned her watch to her, which had been found at the scene. They later returned her white clutch bag which had been found in a nearby stormwater drain. There is exhibited to her affidavit a copy of the text of Mr Cooke's confession. Mrs Woosnam says that the details of the incident described in the confession are consistent with the facts as she knows them. She was never interviewed by the Crown or defence in relation to the proceedings involving the appellant. Again, there is a remarkable coincidence between these two accounts.
270 On 16 October 1963 Mr Cooke made a statement in which he said that:
"In May 1960 whilst prowling around the South Perth - Como area at about 10.30 pm one night I took a Morris Minor sedan car from the garage of some flats at the corner of Leonora & Bickley Sts. I have since shown these premises to the detectives. After driving this car for some time I ended up in the Belmont area. When driving this car south in Alexander Rd I saw a woman get off a bus and walk in the opposite direction to which I were travelling. After driving down the road a bit I came to the corner of Alexander & Aberdare Rds. I did a U turn & drove in the direction of the woman.
When I reached the bus stop where this woman got off I slowed down & when I were at the corner of Daly St I saw her walking on the left hand side of the road, travelling in a Westerly direction. I drove down Daly St past the woman & did another U turn in Daly St & Esther St & drove towards her. The woman moved off the road onto the sandy strip between the road & the fence, when she saw me coming. I drove the car straight at her, off the road & into the sand - the car got bogged in the soft sand. This was after I had hit the woman & I could hear her crying, near the rear of the car. I jumped out of the car & walked the [sic to] my house in Rivervale. There was no other reason for this act but to hurt someone & she was it for that night. This statement is true & correct & have given it of my own free will."
271 In an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2000 Mrs Jill Connolly says that on Friday 13 May 1960 she was a single woman, Jill Connell, aged 18, living with her parents at 242 Daly Street in Belmont. At about 11.45 pm on Friday 13 May 1960 she alighted from a bus in Alexander Road, after finishing her shift at the London Court Milk Bar, and began to walk home along Daly Street. She was walking close to the left edge of the road when a green car sped past her, very close so that it almost brushed her. It disappeared out of view. She was frightened and started to run. Her next recollection was waking up in hospital in great pain. Her leg was in plaster and she had stitches in her head.
272 In 1963 she was called to the Central Police Station where Detective Sergeant Nielson read to her a confession made by Mr Cooke. There is a copy of the confession dated 16 September 1963 exhibited to her affidavit. Mrs Connolly says that the details of the incident described in the confession are consistent with the facts as she knew them. She was never interviewed by the Crown or counsel for the appellant or Mr Cooke and did not give evidence at any trial or appeal. Once again, there is a remarkable coincidence and consistency between the account given in the confession by Cooke and the recollection of the witness.
273 On 16 September 1963 Mr Cooke made a further statement to police in which he said:
"In May 1960 I was temporarily employed in Victoria Park when I finished work the night in question - it was a Friday. I went into town & caught a train to Swanbourne. After prowling that area for a time, I took a Holden sedan car from a house in Rob Roy St. This car was parked alongside the house in the drive. As I was driving this car it started to rain & continued to do so for many hours. I drove this car into the suburb of Doubleview, where I parked this car outside of a church. I then walked over to the main road and down Grant St. I got into a house in Grant St ...
After leaving that house I walked to Ewan St up the hill, all the time prowling for more places to rob. At the corner of Ewan & Huntriss Sts I saw a big American make car a Chrysler or Dodge, the keys were in the ignition. This car was also an automatic transmission, I remember this for it's the first type I had ever driven. I drove out in the direction of Victoria Park & around these areas. After a while I drove this car along Railway Cres when I were near the Queens Park Railway Station I saw the train pull away & people crossing the road. I pulled over & waited for a while then started up again & turned into George St. As I drove up the street I saw on my left 3 people walking in the same direction as I were travelling, that is towards Welshpool Rd. As I passed these people I saw they were all females one of which was a girl of about 10 or 12. They gave me a sign as if they wanted a lift - for it was still raining. I took no notice & drove along till I came to Cross St into which I turned left & again left in Treasure Rd. [I went] Along Treasure Rd till I came to Centre St. I turned left again & stopped in the middle of that block for a couple of minutes. I then started up the motor & drove back to George St turned left again & along here to where these girls were walking.
I aimed the car at the 2 bigger girls - the youngest one was walking next to the verge of the roadway. I struck these 2 girls & I think I carried one of them on the bonnet of the car for a little distance. I turned again into Cross St - left into Treasure Rd, along Railway Cres till Oats St railway crossing turned left there & abandoned the car in one of the streets near there. Near the corner of Beatty Ave & Somerset St Carlisle - I then walked home to Rivervale. The time this hit & run was about midnight, I have shown the detectives whereabouts I had struck the girls in George St & it is about 200 yards along from the intersection of George & Centre Sts."
274 In an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2000 Mrs Georgina Perks says that on Friday 20 May 1960 she was a single woman named Georgina Pitman, aged 18 and living with her mother and her partner at 48 Donaldson Street, Queens Park. At about midnight on Friday 20 May 1960 she alighted from a train at Queens Park Station, returning home after a visit to Perth. It was raining. She looked for a taxi at the taxi rank opposite the station. There were no taxis, but parked at the rank was a white car with a brick-coloured stripe and a man sitting in the driver's seat wearing a brimmed hat. She walked along George Street in the company of two girls she met at the train station, Maureen Rogers and Terese Zagami, who had offered to share their umbrellas. She was walking between them.
275 They had not been walking long when a car passed them from behind, going at a high speed. She recognised it as the car she saw at the taxi rank and thought it must have been a taxi after all. She stepped out to flag it down but it did not stop. Immediately afterwards she saw the same car speeding toward them in the opposite direction. It disappeared out of sight behind them. Shortly after that she heard a car engine behind her and turned to see its headlights. She was hoping that it was a taxi, when, with its engine roaring and travelling at a great speed, it hit her and carried on, carrying Maureen on the bonnet. She recalled wandering around the road and sandy verge looking for her shoes and sitting in the front of an ambulance. Her next clear recollection was of waking up in hospital with cuts and bruising. There is annexed to her affidavit a copy of the text of the confession by Mr Cooke to the crime against her made to police on 14 September 1963. She says that the details of the incident described in the confession are consistent with the facts as she knows them. She was never interviewed by the Crown or defence counsel for Mr Button and did not give evidence at the trial or the application for leave to appeal.
276 In an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2000 Mrs Maureen Greenhalgh says that on Friday 20 May 1960 she was a single woman, Maureen Rogers, aged 16, who was living with relatives at 236 George Street in Queens Park. About midnight on Friday 20 May 1960 she alighted from a train at Queens Park in the company of her cousin, Terese Zagami. She recounts starting to walk home along George Street in the company of Georgina Pitman. She was walking nearest to the centre of the road. She recounts how a car passed them from behind going at a high speed and then returned speeding in the opposite direction. Shortly after that she heard a car engine behind her. There was a car speeding towards them and before she could do anything it hit her. Her next recollection was of waking up in hospital with a fractured leg, fractured cheekbone and severe cuts and bruising. An affidavit to similar effect was sworn by Teresa van den Bosch (the former Terese Zagami) on 11 October 2000 who was 12 years of age at the relevant time and whose evidence was to the same effect as the other two girls.
277 So far as the Morris Minor sedan stolen by Mr Cooke in May 1960 is concerned, evidence was given by David Priest in an affidavit sworn on 14 October 2000. On Friday 13 May 1960 Mr Priest was a single man living with his parents in an upstairs flat at 46 Leonora Street, Como on the corner of Leonora and Henley Streets. He had borrowed his mother's Morris Minor sedan, registration number 57-371. On his return he parked it in the open carports at the back of the flats, alongside Henley Street. At about 11.30 pm he went outside and discovered that the car was missing. He telephoned the police to report it. The next day he heard a radio report that a girl had been run down in Belmont and that his mother's car had been found bogged at the scene. He telephoned the police and after that he went to Police Headquarters to collect the car. He found that it was badly damaged with a big dent on the bonnet and the windscreen was pushed in. There is a photograph of the car exhibited to the affidavit together with a copy of the text of the confession by Mr Cooke made to police on 16 September 1963. He says that the details of the incident described by Mr Cooke are consistent with the facts as he knew them, apart from the cross-street which was Henley and not Bickley.
278 The circumstances of these particular cases were remarkably similar. All occurred within the metropolitan area of Perth. All occurred on a Friday or Saturday evening late at night. All occurred in secluded and dark locations. Six of the seven victims were walking in the street when attacked and the seventh was riding a bicycle. None of the victims was in the company of a male person at the time. In each case the car used to commit the offence was a stolen car. In each case the car was left abandoned immediately after the commission of the offence. Six of the seven victims had just alighted from public transport. All of the victims were female, young and on each occasion the offender showed a callous disregard for the welfare of the victim. Mr Cooke demonstrated a high level of knowledge and recall of the details of each of the incidents which, in my opinion, only the perpetrator could have known, although in the case of Ms Bellis, he got the date wrong. However, in my view, only the perpetrator could have known the detail.
279 It was submitted on behalf of the Crown that the only similarity between the Cooke hit and run incidents was that the victims "... were struck by a motor vehicle and left injured in the vicinity of the road". In my opinion, this was a gross over-simplification. I also do not accept the submission that the incidents were "remote, isolated and unconnected". The incidents (in the context of the other evidence regarding Mr Cooke's conduct) bear a striking similarity to the incident involving Ms Anderson.
280 In my opinion, the evidence in the nature of similar fact evidence given in this Court overcomes any difficulty which may otherwise have arisen relating to the statement of facts contained in the confessions of Mr Cooke of April 1964 signed by Mr Kakulas on behalf of the present appellant and Mr Dodd for the Crown relating to the five hit and run incidents. This Court now has the benefit of the direct testimony of the victims concerned. In any event, there has been no suggestion that the confessions made by Mr Cooke were false or tainted in any way.
281 Counsel for the appellant sought to rely on the evidence of Mary MacLeod in an affidavit sworn on 11 October 2000 in which she says that on the night of Tuesday 25 November 1958 she was aged 15 and living with her parents and her sister aged 9. She was asleep in her bed in the back sleepout of her parents' home at 55 MacLeod Road, Applecross. She has a vague memory of a man at her bed. Her next memory is that of waking up in the morning to find her parents at her bedside. She had a black eye and a bad headache. It was later discovered that she had suffered concussion and had a Y-shaped hairline fracture of her left temple. She was confined to bed for six weeks. Her parents and herself assumed that she had fallen out of bed and fractured her skull. The accident was not reported to the police. There was no sign of anyone breaking into the house and nothing was noticed to be missing. She was never interviewed by the police or by counsel for Mr Cooke or the appellant or Mr Beamish and did not give evidence at any trial or appeal.
282 The evidence that the appellant was responsible was a document said to have been produced from police files containing a list of details of incidents at premises where Mr Cooke was recorded by police as having pointed out premises where he had committed offences. The evidence was objected to on the grounds that it was hearsay. It was faintly argued that it was a document properly produced from police custody, but in my opinion the mere fact that it was in police custody and purported to record a statement made by Eric Edgar Cooke in which he pointed out where he had committed an offence did not make the document or its contents admissible in evidence. In any event the evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence in the context of the hit and run incidents. It was not relevant to any issue in the appeal.
283 Counsel for the appellant also sought to rely on an affidavit by Mrs Anne Pettit sworn 12 October 2000 who in 1962 was a single woman named Anne Melvin aged 23 living with her sister at 2/124 Broadway, Nedlands. On Saturday 3 March 1962 she went out for the evening and returned to her flat about 1.00 am on Sunday 4 March. In her affidavit she describes that she woke up finding she could not breath. Something had been tightly wound around her neck and one arm was tied to the bed. She saw a man standing at the bed. The bedclothes and the lower half of her pyjamas had been removed. She struggled and tried to scream. The man ran off.
284 Annexed to her affidavit is a copy of a handwritten confession of Mr Cooke made to police on 13 September 1963. Mrs Pettit's evidence is that the details of the incident described by Mr Cooke in his confession were consistent as the facts as she knew them. In my opinion, however, this evidence was neither relevant nor admissible. It does not go to any issue in the appeal or to the issue of propensity so far as the running down of women walking in the street is concerned. Similarly, the evidence relating to an assault committed on Carmel Madeline Read (now Madeline Tonks) in the early hours of the morning of 16 June 1963 is inadmissible as being of no relevance to any issue raised in the appeal.
285 In my opinion, the similar fact evidence of the various hit and run matters to which Mr Cooke confessed provided evidence of situations in which he used a motor vehicle to run down female victims in circumstances strikingly similar to those surrounding the death of Ms Anderson. Notwithstanding the extremely adverse view taken of the credibility of his evidence before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964, the evidence of Mr Cooke's confessions to these various instances, strongly corroborated as it is by the recollection of the various victims, is extremely compelling. Standing alone, this evidence could conceivably raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a jury regarding the guilt of the appellant, particularly taken in conjunction with the evidence of Mr Haight to the effect that, in his opinion, the damage and other signs of collision on the appellant's Simca were not consistent with that vehicle having been involved in a collision with a pedestrian. In addition, the similar fact evidence points directly to the likelihood that Mr Cooke was the attacker and strongly supports the credibility and reliability of his account of the attack.
286 In my opinion, the evidence now before this Court raises such a doubt about the guilt of the appellant that the verdict should not be allowed to stand. The evidence now before this Court gives rise to a significant possibility that the jury acting reasonably would have acquitted the appellant of the charge if that evidence had been before it: cf Ratten v The Queen [1974] HCA 35; (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 518 per Barwick CJ; Gallagher v The Queen [1986] HCA 26; (1986) 160 CLR 392 at 395 per Gibbs CJ; and see Nolan v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 970260; 22 May 1997 per Malcolm CJ at 62 - 63.
Ground 2(d): Fresh evidence of John Barry Hansen
287 The appellant contended that fresh evidence of John Barry Hansen disclosed subsequent to the trial, the original appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal and the application for special leave to appeal to the High Court contradicted the evidence of Detective Sergeant Wyley regarding the position of Ms Anderson's body and the actions of the appellant. The significance of the evidence was said to be that it significantly corroborated the evidence of the appellant at the trial and that of Mr Cooke before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964.
288 In an affidavit sworn on 12 October 2000 Mr Hansen says that on Saturday 9 February 1963 he was a single man aged 21 living at 36 Mengler Avenue, Graylands. At about 10.30 pm on that day he was driving his Volkswagon car in the relevant vicinity. He had two passengers, one Wilson White in the front and one Nigel Phillips in the back seat. He turned into Stubbs Terrace, Shenton Park, from the Nicholson Road subway, and was first on the scene after the hit and run attack on Ms Anderson. He gave a statement to the police on the following Thursday 14 February 1963 after John Button had been charged with wilful murder. He approached the police.
289 Mr Hansen was listed as a witness at the trial of John Button and attended each day of the court proceedings, but he was not called to give evidence by the Crown or the defence. He says that he has since re-read his witness statement and identified several errors and omissions that he did not notice at the time of signing. He believes that these would have been corrected at the time, if he had been questioned in the witness box. He says that in his statement he omitted the fact that he saw a person sitting in the Simca car parked at the side of Stubbs Terrace opposite the Shenton Park Railway Station. He saw that person leave the Simca and run about 3 metres from the road to where a body was lying in the sand. He watched him pick up a female figure and carry her to the car, struggling through the sand. He said he placed her in the front seat and drove off. During the time that he watched what was happening, he saw the person open both passenger doors. In his statement he said that he pulled up about 10 yards in front of the Simca when in fact he had pulled up about 10 metres behind the Simca.
290 He says that he followed the Simca he now knows to have been given by John Button to the surgery of Dr Quinlivan in Mt Claremont. He waited in his car at the surgery. He saw no-one there apart from the appellant and Dr Quinlivan, who examined the female figure on the path and then helped carry her into the surgery. He had a clear view and did not see any other woman in the house, garden or surgery.
291 Mr Hansen says that he has since been shown documents being statements made by Mr Cooke. In particular, he has read the affidavit of Mr Cooke sworn 11 February 1964, a copy of which is annexed to his affidavit, and confirms a statement by Mr Cooke that both left hand doors of the Simca were open was correct.
292 He said that when he first went past the Simca he saw a man getting in the car. He saw him get out of the car and go over and pick up the girl and bring her back to the car. The body was 3 to 4 metres off the side of the road. When he brought Ms Anderson back he opened the rear door. He was not sure whether the front door was then closed or open but the appellant put Ms Anderson on the front seat so he had to open the door. Apparently he had difficulty getting her into the back seat.
293 In cross-examination his deposition at the preliminary hearing in this matter was put to him. Mr Hansen was adamant that there were definitely two doors open at one stage during this incident that he saw. The appellant tried to put the girl in the back seat but could not manage it so he put her in the front seat. In a statement made to Ms Blackburn on 11 October 1993 which was recorded on tape and transcribed, he was recorded as saying:
"So we waited and we ... and the guy got out and I think all he was wearing was a pair of shorts. He had no shirt on and he - he went over to the girl, picked her up and I think he tried to put her in the front seat, but she was all arms and legs, pretty broken, I think, and he couldn't get her in, so I think he put her in the back seat. He may have tried to put her in the boot, but I think he put her in the back seat and then he closed the door and then he went up Stubbs Terrace up to Mt Claremont and to Dr Quinlivan's and I followed him all the way. I drove him all the way."
294 Cross-examined by counsel for the Crown, he agreed that what he told Ms Blackburn in 1993 was definitely wrong.
"All I can remember, he was having trouble trying to put her in the front seat and then he either - I'm pretty sure he put her in the back seat but whether he tried to put her in the boot or not, I don't know. I'd still debate about that. I remember there was something funny there."
296 He agreed that he was telling Ms Blackburn what had happened to the best of his recollection and that he did not deliberately lie to her but it was wrong. He said that his recollection was that the appellant definitely put Ms Anderson in the front seat. When he first drove past the appellant was sitting in the front seat. In his affidavit sworn on 12 October 2000 he agreed that he had omitted the attempt by the appellant to put Ms Anderson in the back seat. He agreed that he had been shown documents which he had been told were confessions made by Mr Cooke. This was prior to swearing his affidavit. He agreed that there were parts of what happened that night that he did not remember very clearly but parts of it he did. He said he definitely saw the appellant go over to pick up the girl and put her in the car and he was "pretty sure" he had trouble getting her into the back seat and ended up putting her in the front. In my opinion, the evidence of Mr Hansen is not particularly helpful but, as far as it goes, it tends to corroborate the evidence of the appellant at the trial as well as the testimony of Mr Cooke as given at the original appeal, although I must say that the evidence would not be entitled to significant weight.
Ground 2(e): Fresh evidence of Douglas Wilkie
297 It was contended that the fresh evidence of Douglas Wilkie corroborated Mr Cooke's confession in the matter of the Vespa Scooter observed by Cooke. This evidence, if accepted, would tend to confirm the presence of Mr Cooke in the locality where the deceased was fatally injured; and the actions of Mr Cooke on that date in deliberately attempting to run Wilkie down, in the manner confessed to by Cooke.
298 Ground 2(e) refers to the evidence of Mr Wilkie, given in an interview on 29 April 1995 confirming that he was the rider of a Vespa Scooter on a date, which was probably 9 February 1963, which confirms the presence of Mr Cooke in the locality where Ms Anderson died, when Cooke deliberately attempted to run him down in the manner to which he himself confessed. Ground 2(e) contended that Mr Wilkie's evidence corroborated Mr Cooke's confession in the matter of the Vespa Scooter observed by Cooke on 9 February 1963. It was said that if this evidence was accepted it confirmed the presence of Cooke in the locality where Ms Anderson was fatally injured, and the actions of Cooke on that date, in that Mr Cooke deliberately attempted to run Mr Wilkie down in the manner confessed to by Mr Cooke.
299 In February 1963 Douglas Wilkie was an apprentice bookmaker living at 45 Mengler Avenue, Graylands. In an affidavit sworn on 12 October 2000 he says that in 1963 at a date and a time he cannot recall, he was riding his Vespa Scooter north in Stubbs Terrace with a female passenger. Neither of them was wearing a helmet. In his rear vision mirror he saw a light-coloured Holden sedan speed towards him from behind. He sped up and turned west into Alfred Road. The car bore down on him, speeding and roaring. He was certain that the car was going to run him down. The passenger was screaming and he was terrified as the car came for them. Just as he was about to hit, another car appeared in front driving toward him and the Holden dropped back. Mr Wilkie said he quickly turned into Mimosa Avenue and sped around the back of Graylands Migrant Hostel. The Holden did not follow and he did not see it again. He did not see the driver and he knew of no-one who would want to run him down. Annexed to his affidavit is a copy of an affidavit sworn by Mr Cooke on 11 February 1964. In that affidavit Mr Cooke describes driving a Holden sedan and deliberately attempting to run down a couple on a scooter who were not wearing safety helmets on the evening of 9 February 1963. He said that the details of the incident were "entirely consistent" with the facts of the incident as he remembered them and he believed they described the same incident.
300 Mr Wilkie said that he contacted Ms Blackburn as a result of reading an account he assumed to be about the incident in which he had been involved. Mr Wilkie gave evidence that there was an occasion in and around February 1963 when he found himself in a position of danger. His recollection was that it was early morning about 8.00 o'clock. He had just left home. He had a female passenger but could not recall who it was. As he turned into Stubbs Terrace a light-coloured Holden, probably a 1963 model, was bearing down on him at great speed. He said he got very scared he was to be run down, but a car came in the opposite direction and the car following him dropped back enough for him to slide the bike around into a little spur street at the beginning of Alfred Road. Although the Holden tried to catch up with him again in Alfred Road he was able to turn into Mimosa Avenue and escape. As Mr Wilkie described it:
"Two of [sic or] three more incidents happened along that road. Each time I tried to get away from it, it kept coming up and with that different vehicles come along. A bus come along and another car or so and I just couldn't get away and each time he came very close behind the bike and in my mind he was going to just keep going, straight over the top. Eventually I was able to get a bit of a gap when he dropped back and there was a street loomed up and I shot around there ..."
301 That street was Mimosa Avenue which led into the back of the immigration camp which was located there at that time. He did not report the matter to the police. He did not think it was of any significance until he saw an article in the Post Newspaper in 1994 or 1995.
302 When cross-examined he said that he thought it was February 1963 because it was the particular weekend when there was a manhunt for a person named Robinson in the Gnangara Pine Plantation. He remembered it because he saw it on television when police called for volunteers to organise a man-hunt in the pine forest. He got married in April a few months after the incident. It was clear that Mr Wilkie was not sure whether the Holden was a sedan or a utility but his recollection was that it was a sedan. He thought it was an EK model with a built-in hood over the headlight, some sort of chrome. As he put it:
"It was very shiny with the sun on it, very chrome, but that stands out very clearly."
303 In the end, Mr Wilkie agreed that he did not know whether the vehicle was a sedan or a ute. Mr Wilkie was insistent that the incident occurred in daylight when, from other evidence, it was apparent that when Cooke was out and about it was usually at night.
304 While this evidence tends to confirm one aspect of the version of events given by Mr Cooke in his confession, it was conceded by counsel for the appellant that there is significant doubt as to its cogency. According to the evidence of Mr Cooke, the relevant incident took place at night on the evening of 9 February 1963 prior to the incident involving Ms Anderson. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the evidence should be regarded in the light of the effects of the passage of some 40 years on a witness' memory. In the result, it was submitted that in the overall context of the appeal, the evidence of Mr Wilkie was not of great weight or significance. In my opinion, its significance is that it provides some corroboration for the evidence of Mr Cooke in 1964, but cannot be regarded as of any real significance. In my opinion there was no substance in ground 2(e).
Ground 2(i): Cooke's other assault/home invasion victims
305 This ground contended that fresh evidence supporting Mr Cooke's confessions in respect of his other assault victims supported his confessions to the assaults in this case. It was submitted that such evidence was admissible to support the evidence of Mr Cooke given to the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 and to "rebut" the adverse findings of credit made against him by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal. It was accepted, in general, that evidence cannot be led at a criminal trial to bolster the credit of a witness: R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834. It was submitted, however, that given the "unique nature" of the present proceedings, the evidence should be received: Mickelberg v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 990056; 12 February 1999. In my opinion, no basis was shown for the admissibility of this evidence. Objection of the Crown that the "fresh evidence" referred to was irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay was well founded.
Ground 2(j): Letter by Mr Cooke to his solicitor
306 The fresh evidence sought to be relied upon in support of this ground comprised a letter dated 7 February 1964 written by Mr Cooke to his then solicitor, Mr Desmond Heenan (as he then was) expressing fear of retribution of his family by the appellant and one Darryl Beamish upon their release, which it was said tended to contradict the Crown case that the confessions of Cooke were false and made to advance his own interest and those of the appellant and Mr Beamish.
307 In support of this ground it was submitted that the evidence was admissible to contradict the position taken by the Crown before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 that Mr Cooke was simply attempting to extend his life by prolonging the proceedings to delay his execution. It is the fact that at one stage Mr Cooke sarcastically agreed to such a proposition when it was put to him by counsel for the Crown [see p222 of the appeal transcript].
308 In a letter dated 7 February 1964, more than a month prior to the commencement of the proceedings in the Court of Criminal Appeal Mr Cooke said that he had been contacted on several occasions by Mr Kakulas in connection with the Button case. The letter went on to say:
"When he interviewed me last Tuesday, he Mr Kakulas, said that he would be returning to have me sign the sworn statements I have made to him. Should I have your advice on this matter, or should I just carry on in this matter?
I spoke to Mr Kakulas of my fear that if & when Button or Beamish are released, as to the state of their feelings concerning my immediate family. My fear Sir, is that one of them or both, may decide to take vengeance against me in the form of punishment against my wife & children. This is my greatest fear & I would like some assurance that this position will not eventuate. I realise Mr Heenan you personally cannot give such an assurance to me. But please Sir, could you please in some way given me some peace of mind on this subject. For the way I'm feeling at the moment, the fate of those two I have mentioned is indifferent to me, inasmuch as my family are first & foremost. I have confessed all of my crimes to the authorities & it is now in their hands, & thus cleared my conscience a little.
I spoke to Mr Kakulas as to my fear, & his answer was to get in touch with you on this matter. I don't think I have thanked you enough for the way you conducted my trial & your attitude towards me. Once more thank you."
309 It was submitted that the content of this letter was contrary to the submissions made by the Crown in the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964 and again in the course of this appeal. [See p222 of the transcript in the 1964 CCA] This material does go some way to counter the suggestion that Mr Cooke's evidence in the Court of Criminal Appeal was calculated to defer his execution. Reliance was also placed on Mr Cooke's earlier letter to Mr Heenan dated 29 November 1963 in which he instructed Mr Heenan not to take any steps to appeal against his conviction for the wilful murder of Mr Sturkey and stated:
"I wish you immediately to arrange for the solicitors respectively for Darryl Beamish and John Button to interview me with regard to statements I wish to make to them with regard to the deaths of JILLIAN BREWER and ROSEMARY ANDERSON respectively."
310 The appellant's legal advisers were not aware of this correspondence when this matter was before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1964. In my opinion this material does not carry the matter any further.
Ground 2(k): Entries in Prison Occurrence Books
311 The fresh evidence sought to be relied upon in support of ground 1 of the grounds of appeal included entries in the Prison Occurrence Books for 6 April to 13 April 1964 to the effect that Mr Cooke refused to eat, stating that he would not eat "until they hanged him". It was contended that this evidence tended to contradict the Crown case that Cooke made the various confessions relied upon by the appellant in order to prolong his own life.
312 The Crown objected to this evidence as inadmissible hearsay which related to Mr Cooke's state of mind in February 1964 and, in any event, was irrelevant to any issue on the appeal. In my view the evidence was inadmissible hearsay.
313 At one stage the appellant sought to rely on evidence of an attempted hit and run incident alleged to have been witnessed by one Derek Tomlinson referred to in ground 2(j) in the further and better particulars of the notice of appeal dated 4 October 2000. This was not pursued.
314 In the result I have concluded that the evidence of Mr Haight supported by the evidence of Mr Condren is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt whether the appellant's Simca motor vehicle was involved in running down Ms Anderson on 9 February 1963. The evidence of Mr Haight also tends to substantially corroborate the evidence of Mr Cooke, whether the latter was mistaken about the side of the vehicle
which hit Ms Anderson or whether he swerved off the road in the manner he described and constituted the alternative scenario described by Mr Haight. The evidence of Cooke's propensity to seek out women walking on the side of the road and run them down is compelling. In my opinion, it overwhelms whatever doubts may have been held concerning its credibility by the remarkable coincidence between his recollection of the events described in his confessions and the recollection of the victims. The fact that Mr Cooke maintained his guilt in relation to the death of Ms Anderson in the "gallows" confession on 26 October 1964 shortly before he was hanged takes on some additional significance against the background of the other matters to which I have referred.
315 All of this material needs to be considered against the background of Mr Button's youth at the time, his actions in taking Ms Anderson's still living body immediately to the nearby doctor, his persistent denials when questioned and his confession only after several hours in police custody all combine to lead me to the conclusion that the verdict must be regarded as unsafe and unsatisfactory on the ground that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
316 For these reasons I would allow the appeal and quash the conviction for manslaughter. There could not and should not be an order for a re-trial.
317 WALLWORK J: I agree with the reasons for judgment of the Chief Justice and with the conclusions his Honour has reached except with respect to the admission into evidence of the confessions made by Mr Cooke. It follows that I also would allow the appeal and quash the conviction, with an order that there be no retrial.
318 I set out below my comments with respect to the confessions of Mr Cooke.
319 In Bannon v The Queen [1995] HCA 27; (1995) 185 CLR 1 Brennan CJ said that Holmes J's criticism of the rule in Sussex Peerage case had struck a responsive cord in the Supreme Court of Canada. Having discussed some of the circumstances relevant to the decision in Bannon, Brennan CJ said at p 10:
"It is therefore unnecessary now to decide whether, and subject to what conditions, the absolute exclusory rule in the Sussex Peerage Case should be discarded."
"If the exception of declarations against penal interest were to be accepted as part of our law, there may be a question whether the principles approved in Demeter are appropriate or whether some other (possibly less restrictive) principle should be adopted, bringing our law closer to the Canadian law. I do not suggest that that is the desirable development. Rather it seems to me that any revision of the approach hitherto taken in this country would require a general review of the hearsay rule, its history, purpose and operation. But that must be a question for another day."
321 Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ left open the question as to whether in certain cases, the relevant law in Australia should follow the decisions in Canada and the United States which have extended the exceptions to the rule against hearsay to third party confessions - p 28, "Conclusion".
322 In Bannon Deane J said he was in general agreement with what Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ had said about the appellant's submissions supporting either a broad flexible relaxation of the hearsay rule to allow evidence of inherently reliable hearsay statements at the instance of an accused or a widening of the exception from the hearsay rules of some statements made against interest.
323 In Bannon McHugh J said that it was not necessary in that decision to decide whether the hearsay rule is subject to an exception corresponding with that formulated by Mason CJ in Walton v The Queen [1989] HCA 9; (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 293.
"Even if such an exception exists, the statements of Calder (in Bannon) do not meet the required conditions of reliability and probative value"
"...because the admissions in those statements were reliable, the statements have sufficient reliability and probative value, to prove an implied assertion that Calder alone was responsible for the murders" - p 33.
326 McHugh J discussed the history of the relevant law as it has been applied in the Canadian and the United States decisions. Importantly, when discussing the rules applicable to the admission of such evidence, his Honour said at p 37:
"Like Canada, United States jurisdictions that admit declarations against penal interest impose conditions on admissibility. While these conditions vary, they nearly all contain a requirement of reliability, a requirement which is not satisfied merely because the declaration is against penal interest. Examples of these conditions are:
(a) the statement against penal interest must be corroborated by 'substantial' independent evidence (eg in Chambers v Mississippi [1973] USSC 32; (1973) 410 US 284 there was 'considerable assurance of ... reliability' (at 300) because the confessions were made spontaneously, there was corroborative evidence and they were unquestionable against interest. In State v Larsen (1966) 415 P 2nd Ed 685 there needed to be 'substantial evidence which tends to show clearly that the declarant is in fact the person guilty of the crime for which the accused is on trial');
(b) the declarant must be aware when making the statement that it is presently against his or her penal interest (see, eg, People v Riccardi (1972) 340 NYS 2d 996);
(c) the statement must be inconsistent with the guilt of the accused ..."
327 In one of the leading Canadian cases, R v Chahley 1992 72 CCC (3d) 193,where on a charge of murder, the accused sought to adduce evidence from the deceased's girlfriend that a few days before his death the deceased had said that a black man had pulled a knife on him and he could not go down town for a while, the trial judge held that this was inadmissible hearsay and excluded it.
328 On appeal the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the evidence should not have been excluded. When discussing the question of "necessity and reliability" the Court of Appeal said that the test of necessity was met because the declarant was dead and there was no evidence suggesting any other source of admissible proof for the event described in the deceased's statement. The Court also held that the statement was made under sufficiently reliable circumstances as to meet the test of reliability or trust-worthiness. It held that the statements attributed to the deceased were not made in his favour, were made before the dispute or litigation, and the deceased had a peculiar means of knowledge. It held that the issue was not the reliability of the witness who testifies as to the statement, but the trustworthiness of the out of court statement.
329 In Bannon McHugh J said that the test laid down by the Court in Chahley had been applied in subsequent cases in Canada. His Honour said it was unnecessary in Bannon to determine whether the principle of necessity and reliability as developed in Canada should be adopted in this country and that whether or not the principle should be adopted in Australia is a decision that should only be made when it is necessary to do so, to dispose of a case before the Court.
330 His Honour said that adoption of the Canadian principle would undoubtedly have beneficial effects on the law of evidence and that it would permit the admissibility of statements which common experience indicates can be acted on safely but which are now excluded by the rigid application of the hearsay rule. He recognised that there were reasons for not relaxing the rule, including that it would result in some cases in some uncertainty and additional expense in preparing cases, since it could not be known until the ruling whether the evidence was admissible and whether evidence in rebuttal was required.
331 His Honour noted that to some extent the rule has already been relaxed on the recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission by the enactment by the Federal Parliament of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which provides in s 65 that third party confessions exculpatory of the accused are admissible provided certain preconditions are met; also that New South Wales has adopted comparable legislation. His Honour said that the recent legislative activity in the field provides a sound reason for the High Court proceeding cautiously when invited to alter the settled rule against hearsay evidence and that if any change is to come about as a result of judicial law making, it should only occur after the Court had had the benefit of full argument from counsel representing the States and the Commonwealth.
332 The judgment which is often referred to when the question of relaxing the hearsay rule is being discussed, is the dissenting judgment of the great jurist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Donnelly v United States [1913] USSC 104; (1913) 228 US 243. In Donnelly, Lurton and Hughes JJ concurred in Justice Holmes' dissent.
"The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and commonsense, less hampered by history than some other parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this Court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man (Mattox v The United States [1892] USSC 208; 146 US 140, 36Led 917, 13 Sup Ct Ct Rep 50); and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive, I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have much weight. The history of the law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater length - 2 Wigmore: 1476, 1477."
334 In my view the words of Justice Holmes are as valid today as they were in 1913. They carry the same message as the words of Mason CJ in Walton at 293 when the Chief Justice said:
"The hearsay rule should not be applied inflexibly. When the dangers which the rule seeks to prevent are not present or are negligible in the circumstances of a given case there is no basis for a strict application of the rule. Equally, where in the view of the trial judge those dangers are outweighed by other aspects of the case lending reliability and probative value to the impugned evidence, the judge should not then exclude the evidence by a rigid and technical application of the rule against hearsay. It must be borne in mind that the dangers against which the rule is directed are often very considerable, as evidenced by the need for the rule itself. But especially in the field of implied assertions there will be occasions upon which circumstances will combine to render evidence sufficiently reliable for it to be placed before the jury for consideration and evaluation of the weight which should be placed upon it, notwithstanding that in strict terms it would be regarded as inadmissible hearsay."
335 The situation with respect to Mr Cooke's confessions is complicated by the fact that he had already given evidence to the Court of Criminal Appeal prior to his death on the 26 October 1964. Just prior to Mr Cooke's death he told the Reverend George Jenkins, who is also now
deceased, on two occasions that he was responsible for Ms Anderson's death. The first occasion was on the 23 October 1964 and the second was about 15 minutes before Mr Cooke died on the 26 October 1964. Those statements to the Reverend Jenkins were consistent with Mr Cooke's evidence before the Court of Criminal Appeal. Mr Cooke had also said the same thing to the Reverend Sullivan on the 31 October 1963 at Fremantle Police Headquarters and to Mrs Cooke on various occasions following his arrest. Mr Cooke also told Prison Warder Seiler the same thing on the 8 January 1964 and Mr Thorpe JP, the Deputy Superintendent of Fremantle Prison, on the 2 December 1963. It was the statement which Mr Cooke made to Mr Thorpe and oral evidence concerning it by Mr Cooke, which was discussed by the Court of Criminal Appeal when the present appellant applied for an extension of time within which to appeal before Mr Cooke died.
336 After Mr Cooke died on the 26 October 1964 the Reverend George Jenkins prepared a statement concerning what Mr Cooke had told him. That statement was dated 12 November 1964.
337 This Court is concerned with the question of whether or not Mr Button was the driver of the vehicle which struck Ms Anderson. In my view, it is significant that although the earlier Court of Criminal Appeal did not accept what Mr Cooke had said, he continued to insist that he had been responsible for Ms Anderson's death up until a few minutes before he died. Had he later recanted what he had told the Court of Criminal Appeal, that also in my view, would have been admissible before this Court on this appeal.
338 In my opinion, all the evidence of what Mr Cooke said is relevant when this Court is considering Mr Button's responsibility, because not only did Mr Cooke say in effect that Mr Button was not responsible for Ms Anderson's injuries and that Mr Cooke was, but Mr Cooke's statements could throw light on the other expert evidence which has been discussed in detail by the learned Chief Justice in his reasons for judgment. That evidence concerns the damage to Mr Button's vehicle.
339 In my view, the fact that Mr Cooke ran down other women on roads in the metropolitan area, is another reason why his statements should be admitted into evidence on this appeal.
340 OWEN J: I have had the advantage of reading, in draft form, the reasons for judgment about to be published by Malcolm CJ and Wallwork J. I agree with their Honours that the appeal should be allowed and the
conviction quashed. In the circumstances of this case, no question of a retrial arises.
341 Save for what I say in the next paragraph, I agree with the reasons for decision of the Chief Justice. It would serve no useful purpose if I were to set out in detail the reasoning process which I have adopted in coming to my conclusion because I would only be repeating what his Honour has said. Instead, I will mention one matter and then give a very brief summary of the way in which I have seen the issues presented to the Court.
342 Both Malcolm CJ and Wallwork J have relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on a general exception to the hearsay rule based on the relevance, inherent reliability and probative value of evidence of out-of-court statements made by Eric Edgar Cooke. There is, in my respectful view, much to be said for the proposition that we ought to recognise the existence of such an exception. This has been done in the United States and in Canada in decisions to which their Honours have referred. The issue was raised in Bannon v The Queen [1995] HCA 27; (1995) 185 CLR 1 but the majority of the Court did not find it necessary to answer the question. Brennan CJ, at pars 5 and 6, analysed earlier authorities such as Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR, Walton v The Queen [1989] HCA 9; (1989) 166 CLR 283, R v Benz [1989] HCA 64; (1989) 168 CLR 110 and Pollitt v The Queen [1992] HCA 35; (1992) 174 CLR 558 and concluded that Australian law did not accommodate an exception of the type being advocated. In my view, that is the state of the law as it presently stands in Australia.
343 Nonetheless, I have come to the view that the conviction cannot stand. I will now say why.
344 The appellant was tried and convicted by a jury. It is, I think, difficult to criticise the decision reached by the jury on the evidence that was presented to them. There were two bodies of evidence that must have been in the forefront of the jurys' deliberations. First, in the hours following Ms Anderson's death the appellant confessed to the killing. He later recanted and the veracity of the confession was squarely in issue at trial. The second body of evidence related to damage to the appellant's motor vehicle. There was evidence that the vehicle had been in an accident in the days prior to Ms Anderson's death. However, there was also evidence to suggest there was more damage to the left-hand side of the vehicle than had been apparent as a result of the earlier accident. Similarly, there was evidence that there had been no damage to the bonnet prior to 9 February 1963 but damage of that nature had been observed on 9 and 10 February 1963. Finally, there was evidence of some blood stains (smears rather than drops) on the left mudguard and near the left headlamp of the vehicle.
345 After the trial, evidence became available that Mr Cooke had confessed to the killing of Ms Anderson. He had stolen a car (not the appellant's vehicle) and had run her down as she walked along the street. In 1964 the Court of Criminal Appeal heard the appellant's appeal based on fresh evidence. Mr Cooke gave oral evidence to the Court in which he said that he was responsible for Ms Anderson's death. The members of the Court firmly rejected Mr Cooke's testimony and affirmed the appellant's conviction.
346 In my view, it must have been central to the prosecution case that the appellant's vehicle was involved in the accident which resulted in Ms Anderson's death. I also think that unless the jury were satisfied on that issue it is highly unlikely that they would have convicted the appellant. I say this because the appellant's confession to police officers involved the concession that he had run her down using his vehicle. If the jury were not able to conclude that the appellant's vehicle had been the instrument that struck Ms Anderson it is likely they would have entertained a reasonable doubt about the confession and therefore about the appellant's guilt.
347 It is in this context that the evidence presented to this Court by Haight and Condren is critical. The Chief Justice has analysed Haight's evidence in great detail and I agree entirely with what is there said. In my view, Haight's testimony was compelling. It was, in summary, to the effect that the damage to the appellant's vehicle (as shown in the photographs taken by police but not tendered at the trial because they tended to exaggerate the damage by their toning) was inconsistent with the vehicle having struck a pedestrian in such a manner as to cause the injuries suffered by Ms Anderson. Haight also testified that the absence of flesh transfer, fabric transfer and remnants of hair and skin was very significant. This evidence is supported to some extent by that of Condren. He had examined the vehicle at the time (1963) and had concluded it was not involved in a pedestrian impact because of the absence of blood, fabric or human hair. It turns out that he was wrong about the absence of blood but his testimony lends weight to Haight's conclusions concerning the other substances.
348 Science does not stand still and, in an appropriate case, courts are entitled to take notice of such advances: see, for example, McIlkenny v The Queen (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 at 295. This Court has had the benefit of evidence concerning the results of more advanced crash testing techniques than was available at the time of the trial or the 1964 appellate proceedings. In my opinion, had Haight's evidence and that of Condren been presented to the jury or to the members of the Court of Criminal Appeal there is a significant possibility that the relevant tribunal would have acquitted the appellant of the charge. On this basis alone, it seems to me that interference with the verdict is justified.
349 In the light of what I have just said, what follows is little more than a makeweight but I will mention it anyway. It relates to what has been referred to as the similar fact evidence, that is, evidence of other "hit and run incidents" occurring at around the same time and to which Mr Cooke had confessed. It must be the case, as the Chief Justice has said, that an accused can defend a criminal charge by seeking to prove that the offence was committed by another person. He or she can do so by leading any admissible evidence tending to prove that the offence was committed by another person. This would include similar fact evidence.
350 Here, Mr Cooke was disbelieved by the members of the Court of Criminal Appeal. The advantage that the earlier court had in seeing and hearing Mr Cooke cannot be underestimated. In any event, the considered and strongly expressed views of the judicial officers concerned must be treated with the utmost respect. Nonetheless, if a later court is presented with evidence which was not available to the earlier tribunal, it must not shrink from the task of assessing the material and reaching a conclusion that is in accord with justice: compare, for example McIlkenny v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [1980] 2 All ER 227 at 239-240 and the decision in McIlkenny v The Queen.
351 Mr Cooke made his confession to the killing of Ms Anderson in court under oath. No question of hearsay arises in relation to that material. It is difficult to construe the position taken by the Crown in the 1964 appeal as other than an allegation that Mr Cooke had fabricated his confession to Ms Anderson's killing. Quite apart from the general proposition that an accused can, by admissible evidence, seek to establish that someone else committed the crime, he or she would, it seems to me, be able to call evidence to rebut an allegation of fabrication. There is, I acknowledge, a very fine line between evidence called purely to bolster credibility and evidence which goes more directly to a fact in issue. In the very peculiar circumstances of this case I think the similar fact evidence would fall into the latter category. Once again, the Chief Justice has set out a very detailed and careful analysis of the evidence relating to the other hit and run incidents. I agree with that analysis and with the conclusion that it has all of the necessary attributes of similar fact evidence.
352 There is doubt as to the use to which the so called statement of agreed facts was put at the 1964 appeal. In my view, evidence could have been adduced from Mr Cooke as to his involvement in these incidents. In a sense it was, through the statement of agreed facts. That, in my view, is sufficient to link Mr Cooke to the incidents. If the whole story in relation to these incidents had been before the 1964 court, their Honours might well have taken a different view of Cooke's credibility, at least to the extent that it might have resulted in a retrial. It would then have been for a jury to assess the necessary questions in determining whether the appellant had committed the crime of which he was charged.
353 As it is now not possible to have a retrial, the appropriate course is simply to quash the conviction.
Button
The Queen [2002] WASCA 35
(1974) 131 CLR 510
(1989) 167 CLR 259
(1987) 162 CLR 612
(1983) 152 CLR 65
(1986) 160 CLR 392
(1995) 12 WAR 370
(1974) 9 SASR 163
(1980) 23 SASR 504
(1994) 181 CLR 41
(1989) 168 CLR 110
(1994) 12 WAR 133
(1933) 49 CLR 429
(1991) 99 ALR 360
(1978) 140 CLR 108
(1982) 150 CLR 580
(1984) 152 CLR 528
(1988) 165 CLR 292
(1989) 86 ALR 1
(1989) 53 SASR 97
(1979) 28 ALR 663
(1991) 175 CLR 599
(1995) 182 CLR 461
(1991) 28 FCR 103
(1984) 154 CLR 56
(1974) 131 CLR 517
(1984) 154 CLR 563
(1995) 185 CLR 1
(1986) 83 FLR 14
(1989) 166 CLR 283
(1992) 174 CLR 558