That course was strongly opposed by counsel for the appellant but pressed, with a similar degree of rigour, by counsel for the respondent.
10 Also raised with the parties was whether the Court should make an order along the lines of the fourth order made in SSWAHS v Kim and others [2007] NSWIRComm 241, that order being in the following terms:
4. The Chief Industrial Magistrate shall prior to any hearing and determination of the proceedings, pursuant to s 371 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 bring, or use its best endeavours to bring, the parties to the proceedings to a settlement acceptable to those parties; and, if such a settlement is made, to make an order that, to the extent authorised by the Industrial Relations Act 1996, gives effect to the terms of the settlement.
11 This matter being raised by the parties in view of the order made in SSWAHS v Kim and these proceedings (if the parties' agreement was accepted by the Full Bench) the sixth occasion in which the Full Bench of this Court had upheld an appeal from the Chief Industrial Magistrate specifically on the basis of failure to comply with the requirements of s 371(1) of the Industrial Relations Act. It might be noted here that the earlier five decisions to which we refer (and which were referred to by Staff J at para [24] of his decision on the extension of time) were Yetzotis v Crown in the Right of State of New South Wales (Commissioner of Corrective Services) (2005) 147 IR 50; Bilal (t/as The Hornsby Medical Centre) v Marshall (2006) 158 IR 269; Faber v Greyhound & Harness Racing Regulatory Authority of New South Wales [2007] NSWIRComm 207; SSWAHS v Kim and others [2007] NSWIRComm 241; Palimex & Co Pty Ltd v Rodriguez [2007] NSWIRComm 269.
12 We turn first to the issue raised by the provision of s 197(4) of the Industrial Relations Act, we note that counsel for the appellant opposed any direction being made under that provision in respect of the evidence of Mr Savchenko both on the basis of there being doubt as to whether there was power to make any such direction under that provision and, if there was such power, that it would be an inappropriate exercise of discretion because it could, first, unduly fetter the exercise of the Magistrate's discretion and powers when conciliation of the proceedings occurred under s 371(1) and, second, it would also unduly fetter the Magistrate's discretion in any contested hearing of the matter in respect of the evidence of Mr Savchenko.
13 We do not accept those submissions. In respect of the issue of power, true it is, that the subsection refers to the power to give "directions" rather than the power to make "orders" but nevertheless the power to issue or make directions is a wide conferral of power and there is no basis to find that the plain words of s 197(4) preclude the making of a direction of the kind under consideration.
14 As to the discretionary issues, at the outset we accept that it would be appropriate to make clear in any direction as to Mr Savchenko's evidence that the direction would apply only if and when conciliation failed. However, we discern no basis to find that the Magistrate's discretion or powers in conducting the conciliation would be affected inappropriately or adversely to either party by such a direction being made.
15 The other aspect which the appellant raised strenuously in this respects was its concerns that any such direction would unduly fetter the Magistrate's discretion as to the way in which he dealt with Mr Savchenko's evidence. In that respect, although counsel did refer to the power available to the Magistrate under the Evidence Act 1955, no specific reference was provided to the Court as to the relevant provisions thereof or how the appellant would approach that aspect in the proceedings before his Honour.
16 Although we have little doubt that there is available power under the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (see, for example, s 63 and clause 4 of Part 2 of the Dictionary to that statute), the Full Bench has before it a somewhat difficult and seemingly unique situation where there is clear prejudice in the circumstances that have arisen concerning the respondent through no fault of the respondent or that of its deceased member, Mr Savchenko, or of the Union represented by the respondent (the Australian Workers' Union). The problem that has occurred was because this was another in a series of failures by the Chief Industrial Magistrate to obey the mandate imposed on him by the legislature by s 371 of the Industrial Relations Act.
17 The prejudice which thereby occurred to the respondent was plainly recognised by Staff J but his Honour took the view (a view with which we completely agree) that the prejudice was not such that the appellant should be denied its extension of time within which to appeal because of the failure of the Chief Industrial Magistrate.
18 However, in those circumstances, it is appropriate on appeal for the Full Bench to take any reasonable step open to it in this very particular situation to ensure that the prejudice which has accrued to the respondent and to the estate of Mr Savchenko does not continue. A direction pursuant to s 197(4) in suitable terms as to Mr Savchenko's evidence will therefore be made. The weight to be given to such evidence will of course be a matter for the Industrial Magistrate hearing the matter.
19 Dealing with the issue relating to the making of an order adapted from that made in SSWAHS v Kim, counsel for the appellant submitted that such an order was not necessary in light of the observations of the Full Bench in Palimex & Co Pty Ltd v Rodriguez at [6] where the Full Bench said:
Unless and until the legislature acts to alter those requirements, all Industrial Magistrates are bound to observe them. It is a matter of significant concern to this Court, that there has been another failure to do so, particularly given the consequences for the parties in question.
20 We do not consider that the slightly different approach taken by the Full Bench in Palimex & Co Pty Ltd v Rodriguez qualifies the appropriateness of the making of an order along the lines of that made in SSWAHS v Kim particularly since this is the sixth occasion of remitter to the CIM's court in similar circumstances. Such an order will therefore be made.
21 The Full Bench makes the following orders:
1. By consent:
(a) Leave to appeal granted.
(b) Appeal allowed.
(c) The matter is referred back to the Chief Industrial Magistrate's Court.