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[2017] FCA 1538
Federal Court of Australia
2017-12-19
O'Callaghan J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Applicant and the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Respondents: Mr E White
Solicitor for the Applicant and the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Respondents: Ryan Carlisle Thomas Lawyers
Counsel for the First to Third, Tenth to Seventeenth and Nineteenth to Thirty-Fifth Respondents: Mr H Borenstein SC and Mr T Borgeest
Solicitor for the First to Third, Tenth to Seventeenth and Nineteenth to Thirty-Fifth Respondents: Slater and Gordon Lawyers
JUDGE: O'CALLAGHAN J DATE OF ORDER: 19 dECEMBER 2017
INTRODUCTION 1 Ms Butler was a long-standing member of the Communications Division of the National Council of the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (the CEPU). In August 2016, the National Council resolved that she was guilty of two charges brought under the Rules of the CEPU (the Rules), the substance of which was that she had committed a "substantial breach" of the Rules, or had breached her "fiduciary duty" to the CEPU, because she had serially failed to attend meetings of the National Council from March 2014 onwards and that there was no good reason for her non-attendance. It was alleged that Ms Butler had not attended a total of seven such meetings. At the first meeting, Ms Butler was absent for half an hour, an absence the reason for which she explained before the meeting commenced. In respect of four of the other meetings, Ms Butler attended by sending a proxy and/or her apology for non-attendance was accepted. In respect of the remaining two meetings, Ms Butler neither attended by proxy nor asked formally for her absence to be excused. Having been found guilty of the two charges, Ms Butler was later "removed from all offices" within the CEPU by way of penalty. 2 The evidence before the National Council was that, to the extent that Ms Butler did not attend the meetings in person, it was because she was afraid to do so, because of the antipathy that had been shown, and threats made, to her since 2011 by other members of the National Council, whom she knew would likely be present at the meetings. 3 That antipathy had manifested itself in a number of ways over the years preceding the meetings the subject of the two charges. It is necessary to set out in detail the evidence later in these reasons. The substance of the evidence before the National Council, which Ms Butler said provided her with good cause not to attend the relevant meetings, may, however, be summarised as follows. 4 In 2011, Messrs Metcher, Murphy and O'Donnell, each a member of the National Council, called Ms Butler, and her colleague, Mr Taylor, "cunts". When Mr Taylor took issue with that description, Mr Metcher, in Ms Butler's presence, said: "I don't just make threats cunt, I carry them out". Ms Butler also told the National Council that: since 2011, she had feared for her safety and security; she had been subject to "an absolute tirade of abuse" from Mr Cameron Bird at a National Council meeting in November 2013; at another National Council meeting in Sydney in 2014, when she greeted Mr O'Donnell with the words "good morning", he responded: "it was until you got here bitch"; she was concerned about "violence and thuggery amongst some in the CEPU" and that "someone would be seriously hurt because of the 'pushing and shoving and general attempts at intimidation'"; since as long ago as August 2011, she had been "subject of a sustained campaign of abuse" from Mr O'Donnell, including a "bizarre campaign of lies, bullying, harassment & accusations against [her] …", as a result of which she complained to Victoria Police, who advised that the email material she received was "menacing" and constituted "using a carriage service to harass, annoy and offend" or "stalking"; Mr O'Donnell had referred to her in an email sent in February 2012 to Mr McVee, Mr Metcher and others as a "fucker"; in August 2014, Mr O'Donnell, in an email widely circulated to officials in the CEPU, including to Ms Butler herself, described her as "a horrible poisonous thing that calls herself a Trade Unionist that I know you personally amongst many despise", as a "useless individual no one has any respect for …" and as a "horrible, poisonous, useless oxygen thieving nutter"; in 2015, having received in excess of 80 hang-up or abusive calls late at night, including being warned "we are going to get you cunt", passed the incidents on to the police, as well as complaining to the CEPU and the Fair Work Commission; and that the police advised her not to attend National Council meetings. 5 Ms Butler says that as a result of these and other matters: (1) in circumstances where she in fact attended three of the seven meetings by proxy, and/or the National Council accepted her apologies for her absences, she was only properly to be regarded as absent for two meetings; (2) such an absence is incapable of constituting a "substantial breach" or "gross misbehaviour" within the meaning of the Rules, so that it was not possible under the Rules for her to be removed from office; (3) to the extent that she did not attend, she had "a good reason" not to, within the meaning of the relevant rule, such that reasonable people acting honestly could not have found her guilty of either charge; (4) Mr Metcher and Mr McVee ought to have recused themselves from the hearings because they were invincibly biased against her, such that findings of guilt and the penalty imposed with respect to both charges cannot therefore survive; (5) the charges were technically deficient.
This proceeding 6 Ms Butler brings her application under s 164 of the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) against the remaining members of the National Council, who are the respondents. 7 Section 164(1) of the Act provides that "A member of an organisation may apply to the Federal Court for an order under this section in relation to the organisation". For the purposes of s 164, "order" means "an order giving directions for the performance or observance of any of the rules of an organisation by any person who is under an obligation to perform or observe those rules": s 164(9) of the Act. 8 By an amended originating application filed 4 November 2017, Ms Butler seeks the following relief: 1 An order pursuant to s 164(1) of the Act that the Respondents perform and observe the CEPU Rules by treating the National Council resolution dated 3 August 2016, which found the Applicant guilty of charges laid by the Second Respondent under the CEPU Rules (the Charges), as void and of no force or effect. 2 A declaration that the National Council resolution of 3 August 2016 that the Applicant is guilty of the Charges is void and of no effect. 3 An order pursuant to s 164(1) of the Act that the Respondents perform and observe the CEPU Rules by treating the Applicant as having had a good reason for not attending the National Council's meetings of 6 November 2014, 25 May 2015, 27 May 2015, 30 June 2015, 20 August 2015 and 1 December 2015. 4 An order pursuant to s 164(1) of the Act that the Respondents perform and observe the CEPU Rules by treating the Applicant as not guilty of the Charges. 5 An order pursuant to s. 164(1) of the Act that the Respondents perform and observe the CEPU Rules by treating the second of the Charges as null and void. 6 A final injunction restraining the Respondents from giving effect to or any further effect to the Charges. 7 Further or alternatively to the preceding orders a Declaration that the Divisional National Councillors' resolution of 19 September 2016 to remove the Applicant from all offices within the CEPU (the Penalty Resolution) is void and of no effect. 8 An order pursuant to s 164(1) of the Act that the Respondents perform and observe the CEPU rules by treating the Penalty Resolution as void and of no force or effect. 9 A final injunction restraining the Respondents from enforcing the Penalty Resolution or treating it as operative. … 9 The parties agreed that the only evidence which is admissible on this application was the same evidence that was before the National Council and the Communications Division when the former found Ms Butler guilty of the two charges and the latter removed her from office. That evidence, it was agreed, was: (1) annexure VB-1 to the affidavit of Ms Butler sworn 12 May 2016; (2) the affidavit of Ms Butler sworn 1 June 2016, save for [13]-[21] inclusive; (3) annexures VB-27, VB-29, VB-30 and VB-33 to Ms Butler's affidavit sworn 18 November 2016; (4) the affidavit of Gregory Rayner sworn 21 December 2016; and (5) the affidavit of Nathan Metcher affirmed 18 September 2017.
The Rules 10 The Rules relevant to the application deal with various matters, including the power of the National Council to receive and process a charge laid by any member against another; the right of national councillors to appoint proxies to attend meetings of the National Council; the circumstances under which national councillors may be removed from office; offences, charges and penalties, and their duty to attend meetings. 11 Rule 7.1 relevantly provides: 7.1 Powers of the National Council 7.1.1 The National Council of the Union shall have exclusive power to deal with matters affecting more than one division and the general control and conduct of the business and affairs of the Union having regard to the requirements of divisional autonomy provided for in these rules. 7.1.2 Without limiting the generality of sub-rule 7.1.1 the National Council shall have exclusive power to:- … 7.1.2.9 subject to rules 24 "Suspension or Removal of Officers" and 25 Offences, Charges and Penalties", to receive and process a charge laid by any member against any other member in relation to any matter covered by Section A of these rules and to impose appropriate penalties including the removal from office of a member of the National Council or National Officer who in the course of his/her duties as a member of National Council or National Officer is found guilty of:- (1) misappropriation of the funds of the Union; (2) substantial breach of the Union's Rules; (3) gross misbehaviour; or (4) gross neglect of his/her duty. 12 Rule 7.15 is headed "National Council Proxies and Alternate National Councillors". Rule 7.15.2 provides: 7.15.2 If a National Councillor from the Communications Division: 7.15.2.1 cannot attend a National Council meeting, a proxy National Councillor appointed by the Branch Committee of Management from the same Industry Group and Branch shall attend the meeting in his or her place. 7.15.2.2 cannot attend a National Council meeting and there is insufficient notice for the Branch Committee of Management to appoint a proxy, he or she may appoint another councillor present at the meeting who represents the same Industry Group as his or her proxy for that session(s). 13 Rule 24.2 is headed "Removal from Office". It provides: 24.2.1 National Officers can only be removed from that office where they have been found guilty under rule 25 "Offences, Charges and Penalties" of: 24.2.1.1 misappropriation of the funds of the union; 24.2.1.2 a substantial breach of the rules of the union; or 24.2.1.3 gross misbehaviour or gross neglect of duty; or have ceased to be eligible to hold office. 14 Rule 25.1 provides: 25.1 Charges by Members 25.1.1 Matters in relation to offences and penalties confined to a Division shall be dealt with in accordance with the Divisional rules. 25.1.2 In relation to any matter covered by Section A of these rules, any member may charge any member including a National Officer with: 25.1.2.1 failing to observe any rule of the Union; 25.1.2.2 knowingly failing to observe any resolution of the National Council; 25.1.2.3 working in contravention of an award, order or agreement by which the Union is bound; 25.1.2.4 wrongfully purporting to occupy any National office or position or an entitlement to represent the National Council in any capacity (to which charge it shall be a defence that the member believed bona fide and on reasonable grounds that he/she was entitled to do so); 25.1.2.5 giving false or misleading information to, obstructing or failing to assist on reasonable request, an officer of the Union; 25.1.2.6 committing any fraudulent or unlawful act in relation to the funds or property of the Union or in relation to any election held under the rules; 25.1.2. 7 aiding or encouraging any other member in any offence under this rule. 15 Rules 25.3 and 25.4 provide: 25 .3 Power to Hear Charges The National Council shall hear charges under this rule. 25.4 Finding of National Council 25.4.1 If the National Council finds the member guilty, it shall refer the matter to those members of the National Council representing the Division to which the offending member is attached, who shall meet forthwith to consider the matter of imposing a penalty. After giving the member charged an opportunity to raise any matter relevant to the question of penalty the said members of the National Council may do one or more of the following - 25.4.1.1 Impose no penalty; 25.4.1.2 Impose a fine not exceeding $500; 25.4.1.3 Suspend the guilty person from membership or deprive him/her of any right or benefit of membership for a specified period, or until the happening of any specified event or until the performance of any specified act. Suspension from membership shall deprive a member of the benefits of membership, but shall not relieve him/her of the obligations of membership and shall not exceed six months for any offence. If the specified event has not occurred or the specified act has not been done at the expiration of six months from the date of suspension, the suspension shall then lapse; 25.4.1.4 Remove the guilty person from any office or position; 25.4.1.5 Expel the person from the Union. 16 Rule 29 is headed "Duties of Members of Governing Bodies". It provides: 29.1 The members of National Council, the Divisional Councils and Divisional Executive and Divisional Branch Councils, Conferences and Divisional Branch Executives and other governing bodies of the Union and its Divisions however named shall attend the meetings of the governing bodies of which they are members unless there is a good reason for their non-attendance. 29.2 They shall conscientiously attend to the business placed before the governing bodies of which they are members and deal with such business in accordance with the rules.
The Charges 17 The statement of charge against Ms Butler relevantly reads as follows: I, Allen Hicks, being a financial member of the CEPU hereby lay the following charges against Valerie Butler, a member of the CEPU and National Councillor: 1. That Valerie Butler is guilty of failing to observe the rules of the Union by serially failing to attend meetings of National Council. 2. That Valerie Butler is guilty of breaching her fiduciary duties as an officer of the Union by serially failing to attend meetings of National Council without good cause. … The grounds for the above charges are as follows: 1. The CEPU is a registered organisation pursuant to the Fair Work (Registered Organisations] Act 2009 ("the FWRO Act"). The CEPU is governed pursuant to its rules, as approved by the Fair Work Commission, the FWRO Act and the common law. 2. The CEPU's governance structure is diffuse, with various levels of responsibility at the National, Divisional and Branch level. The National Council is the supreme governing body of the Union, with broad responsibility for governance issues and matters impacting upon more than one division. 3. Members of the National Council (i.e. National Councillors) are officers of the CEPU, both within the meaning of the Rules, the FWRO Act and at common law. As officers, National Councillors are obligated, inter alia a. pursuant to rule 29.1, attend the meetings of National Council unless there is a good reason for their non-attendance; b. pursuant to their fiduciary duties as an officer, to attend to their duties in good faith, including by attending meetings of National Council; c. pursuant to rule 25.1.2.6, to not commit any unlawful act in relation to the funds or property of the Union; and pursuant to rule 25.1.5, to not obstruct an officer of the Union. Valerie Butler 4 Valerie Butler is a long standing officer of the CEPU with extensive experience in the trade union movement. As an officer, Valerie Butler is required to, and has, completed approved training that covers the duties of officers of organisations. 5. Relevantly for present purposes, Valerie Butler was elected to the National Council, in accordance with the rules, resulting from the 2011 quadrennial elections and again in the 2015 elections. The First Charge 6. The first charge against Valerie Butler alleges a breach of the rules of the Union by serially failing to attend meetings of National Council, with the relevant rule being Rule 29.1. [Rule 29.1 is then set out] 7. In turn, rule 25.1.2 prescribes the charges that can be made under the Section A rules, including relevantly: "25.1.2.J. failing to observe any rule of the Union". 8. Consequently, a National Councillor is required to attend meetings of National Council unless there is a good reason, with a failure to do so being a failure to observe a rule of the Union. 9. The following table details Valerie Butler's attendance at all meetings of National Council since November 2013: Meeting Date Attended Date of Notice of meeting 18-Nov-13 Yes 18-Sep-13 19-Nov-13 Yes 18-Sep-13 21-Mar-14 Partial, did not return following lunch break 3-Mar-14 6-Nov-14 No - provided Appology (sic) 24-Sep-14 25-May-15 No - refused to attend/appoint proxy 15-May-15 27-May-15 No - apology/proxy 25-May-15 30-Jun-15 No - appointed Proxy - John Ellery 9-Jun-15 20-Aug-15 No - appointed Proxy - John Ellery 11-Aug-15 1-Dec-15 No - appointed Proxy - John Ellery 19-Oct-15
Could reasonable people acting honestly have come to the decision to find Ms Butler guilty and to remove her from all offices?
Applicable legal principles 24 The parties agreed that the following passage from the judgment of Dixon J (as he then was) in Australian Workers' Union v Bowen (No 2) (1948) 77 CLR 601 (Bowen) at 628 sets out the standard by which courts must assess applications of this type: It is important to keep steadily in mind that we are dealing with a domestic forum acting under rules resting upon a consensual basis. It is a tribunal that has no rules of evidence and can inform itself in any way it chooses. Members may act upon their own knowledge and upon hearsay if they are satisfied of the truth of what they so learn and if they give the member with whom they are dealing a proper opportunity of answering the charge and defending himself. The tests applied to juries' verdicts, namely, whether there was evidence enabling a reasonable man to find an affirmative or whether upon the evidence a finding was unreasonable, have no place in the examination of the validity of such a domestic tribunal's decisions. But the tribunal is bound to act honestly, that is to say it must have an honest opinion that what the member before it did amounted to misconduct and its decision must be given in the interests, real or supposed, of the body it represents and not for an ulterior or extraneous motive (cf. Maclean v. The Workers' Union (1929) 1 Ch D 602, at pp 620-627; Stuart v. Haughley Parochial Church Council (1935) Ch 452, at p 462; (1936) Ch 32; Lamberton v. Thorpe (1929) 141 LT 638. See also Cleworth v Barrow (1978) 20 ALR 359 at 369 per J B Sweeney, Evatt and Keely JJ ("On any hearing by a court of proceedings such as the present the court considers whether reasonable [people] acting honestly could have come to the decision that the domestic tribunal did").
Consideration 25 If a person validly and in accordance with the relevant rules sends a proxy to represent her, then the person attends the meeting. That is so because a proxy "is a person appointed to represent another person at a meeting or a number of meetings, and authorised to vote on behalf of the latter person": see A D Lang, Horsley's Meetings: Procedure, Law and Practice (Lexis Nexis, 7th ed, 2015) at [16.1]. 26 If a person makes an apology for their non-attendance at a meeting which is accepted, they have a good reason for not having attended the meeting, because they were excused from doing so. 27 Those propositions are, one would have thought, axiomatic. But the National Council either did not understand, or it ignored, them. 28 It follows that the chart that was contained in the charges, if it is to reflect the true position, should read as follows: Meeting Date Attended Date of Notice of meeting 18-Nov-13 Yes 18-Sep-13 19-Nov-13 Yes 18-Sep-13 21-Mar-14 Partial, did not return following lunch break 3-Mar-14 YES (absent for half an hour, with permission) 6-Nov-14 No - provided Appology (sic) YES, apology given and noted 24-Sep-14 25-May-15 No - refused to attend/appoint proxy 15-May-15 27-May-15 No - apology/proxy 25-May-15 30-Jun-15 No-appointed Proxy- John Ellery YES, attended by proxy, noted and accepted; her apology also noted 9-Jun-15 20-Aug-15 No-appointed Proxy- John Ellery YES, attended by proxy, noted and accepted; her apology also noted 11-Aug-15 1-Dec-15 No-appointed Proxy- John Ellery YES, attended by proxy, noted and accepted; her apology also noted 19-Oct-15
29 Putting the matter at its worst for Ms Butler, it is apparent therefore that she "failed to attend" two meetings, not seven. 30 Self-evidently, such a failure cannot be regarded as a "serial" failure to attend, nor could it be regarded as a "substantial breach" of the Rules or "gross misbehaviour" within the meaning of the Rules. Nor could it be regarded, as the second charge asserted, as a "breach of fiduciary duty", whatever that means. In my view, no reasonable people acting honestly could have come to the decision that the National Council did to find Ms Butler guilty of the two charges. 31 The same conclusion must therefore be made in respect of the decision to remove Ms Butler from her office as a national councillor. 32 For those reasons alone, I would allow Ms Butler's application and grant the substance of the relief she seeks. 33 In any event, in light of Ms Butler's case about the threats that were made against her, and the way she was treated - none of which was contradicted - and which is detailed above, she clearly enough had good cause not to attend National Council meetings in person, but instead to send a proxy, as the Rules permitted, and/or to make her apologies. In my view, no reasonable body of national councillors, acting honestly, could have concluded otherwise. 34 Senior counsel for the first to third, 10th to 17th and 19th to 35th respondents, Mr Borenstein SC, described as his "principal submission" that the Court "should not, in this case, attempt to second guess the decision which was made by the National Executive in the way in which it [was] … submitted on behalf of the applicant". He submitted that the national councillors "no doubt, had a range of experiences and knowledge which they brought to the table from their time in the organisation, and in addition to the documents, there is also material which they would have received by way of the oral submissions and questions and answers which occurred". 35 The gist of counsel's principal submission is that the National Council may well have believed that Ms Butler was part of a group from the Communications Division of the CEPU who, for their own reasons, were acting in concert to ensure that at crucial times at some of the meetings, they rendered the meeting inquorate and that they were entitled to take that into account in voting to find her guilty of the charges and remove her from office. 36 The parties agreed on the content of the following document, about who attended and who departed four of the seven meetings the subject of the charges laid against Ms Butler. It reads as follows: 37 Senior counsel submitted as follows: [W]e say that the applicant here would have to persuade you that acting honestly and bona fide the members of the National Council could not find that they were [in] substantial breaches of the rules. And we addressed your Honour … [about] the sequence of meetings where Ms Butler and others stayed away and defeated the quorum of the meetings and so on. We rely on all of that to say to your Honour that your Honour doesn't have a sound basis to uphold Ms Butler's allegation that it could not honestly be found by these people on the National Council that her behaviour constitute[s] a substantial breach of the rules. There are those three meetings where they defeated the quorum, and there was the other meeting where there was the order of the Federal Court which she didn't comply with. 38 The reference to the order of this Court is to an order of Tracey J made on 18 June 2015 that Ms Butler attend the meeting of the National Council on 30 June 2015. (How and why the order was made was not able to be explained.) 39 The same general submission was also put in these terms: It's not just simply a matter of whether she had given a proxy or given an apology. If on an evaluation of the course of her behaviour over a period of time they form[ed] the view that in filing her proxies and in filing her apologies she was not acting genuinely, we submit it was open to them, to make the finding which they did. It was open to them, to form a view that she had manipulated the system to achieve a particular end. And that's - they are matters that are within the minds of the people in the National Council. We can't say what they - what their evaluation was, but it would be open to them, we say, to form a view of that kind on the material that was available, and we remind your Honour in particular of the sort of goings-on which happened in the meetings in March of 2014 and May of 2015. So we say that would be open, notwithstanding the proxy and the apologies. Those tools are available, but the council could form the view that they weren't genuinely used. 40 Those submissions must be rejected. Unless the governing rules provide to the contrary (which they do not here), "there is always to be read into them the underlying condition that the proceedings shall be carried on in accordance with the fundamental principles of natural justice": Bowen (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 631 per Dixon J, quoting O'Connor J in Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243. In this case, Ms Butler was not charged with acting in concert with others to render the meetings inquorate, or anything of the kind. In my view, if the national councillors did find Ms Butler guilty of the two charges on that basis (which is a purely speculative proposition in any event), they would have done so in breach of their obligation to afford her procedural fairness. In any event, as counsel for Ms Butler submitted, the notion that she engaged in some conspiracy to render meetings inquorate is contradicted by the evidence before the national councillors, for these reasons. 41 First, as to the first of the meetings upon which the respondents rely for their "inquorate collusion" case, namely the meeting on 21 March 2014, the minutes at agenda item 2 prove that Ms Butler was present at the meeting at that time, stayed there, spoke against the motion, and the resolution was put, moved and carried. She then left the meeting at 12:30, in accordance with her previous advice to the meeting. That would be a strange strategy to adopt to try to render a meeting inquorate. And the meeting was at no time inquorate. 42 Secondly, at the meeting held on 6 November 2014, Mr Hicks informed the meeting that the fact that no representatives of "The Victorian T&S" (of which Ms Butler was part) were present was for what he himself described as "genuine reasons". That suggests that even Mr Hicks did not regard Ms Butler's non-attendance at that meeting as giving rise to any criticism. 43 Thirdly, as to the meetings that Ms Butler did attend via proxy or for which she gave an apology which was accepted by the meeting, including the meeting that she was ordered to attend by Tracey J, as counsel for Ms Butler submitted: "it is not open for reasonable people acting honestly to find that this is evidence of part of a concerted action to render meetings inquorate". 44 For those reasons, I do not accept that it would have been open to the national councillors to find that Ms Butler had participated in an arrangement with others to render any meeting inquorate. If they had, they would have denied her procedural fairness, and they would have acted other than honest councillors acting reasonably. 45 Before turning to the next issue, I should address the allegation contained in what are in effect particulars to the first charge (at [17] above). Those particulars allege that Mr Hicks had: (1) offered and, in the case of the meeting on 2 May 2015, arranged for private security guards to attend at meetings of National Council; (2) offered to facilitate Ms Butler attending meetings of National Council via telephone; and (3) requested her to advise what further steps she considers necessary or appropriate to facilitate her attendance, and that Ms Butler still failed to attend and failed to say what steps she believed were necessary or appropriate to "facilitate" her attendance the meetings. Those failures to do so meant, so it was alleged, that she had no good cause for failing to attend the meetings. Unsurprisingly, Mr Borenstein SC did not persist with those contentions in this proceeding. The idea that an elected representative, or any member of a union, can only safely attend an official union meeting via telephone, or in person only in the presence of security guards, is preposterous. So too is the notion that it is for the member, not the governing body, to come up with ways that she or he may safely attend. 46 Although it is not necessary for me to do so in light of the view I take about the issues discussed above, I shall proceed now to deal with the bias point.
Applicable legal principles 47 Ms Butler submits that Messrs McVee and Metcher, who sat on the National Council at the meeting that voted to find her guilty of the two charges, and who voted in favour of the motion that carried to that effect, and who also sat on the meeting of the National Council representing the Communications Division for the purpose of determining penalty, were invincibly biased against her, and that they should have acceded to the requests made of them to recuse themselves. 48 "Invincible" in this context means "a bias that is incapable of being remedied by reason or argument during the period up to the making of the [National Council's] decision": see Cains v Jenkins (1979) 42 FLR 188 at 195 per J B Sweeney and St John JJ. Ms Butler contends that such a bias is to be inferred from their conduct: see Cains v Jenkins (1979) 42 FLR 188 at 195 ("[i]n many cases bias is inferred from previous conduct or a history of a relationship between contestants"). She does not press a case against Mr O'Donnell because his name appears in the minutes as "attending" and as an "apology", and it is therefore unclear whether he participated or not. 49 As Finkelstein J explained in Haritou v Skourdoumbis [2002] FCA 116 at [13]: The second complaint is that the respondents were disqualified from hearing the charges against Mr Haritou because of their "invincible bias" against him. This is an appeal to the rules of natural justice. As to this a number of things can be said. The first is that we are not dealing with a statutory tribunal, or a person acting in pursuance of a prerogative power, but with a domestic body acting under rules which have been agreed by its members. The requirements of natural justice for such a body will be different from those that regulate the conduct of statutory tribunals. One reason for the difference is that in the case of a domestic body the members have agreed to abide by a set of rules and the authority of a committee to enforce them. In the nature of things, such a committee may have predilections and prejudices resulting from their association with members. An apprehension of bias could exist for all sorts of reasons. So, if an apprehension of bias was a disqualifying consideration (as it would be in the case of a statutory tribunal), the consensual rules would be largely unworkable: see generally Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750. On the other hand, the cases do establish that where a member of a committee is "invincibly biased" against a person the subject of disciplinary proceedings before a domestic body, such as when a person who has promoted the charge and supports it as the prosecutor seeks to take part in the hearing of the charge, that person is disqualified from doing so: Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243. In Australian Workers' Union v Bowen No 2 (1948) 77 CLR 601 proceedings for relief against the expulsion of the applicants from a trade union arose out of a bitter and protracted power struggle in which the accused members, and the Executive which dealt with them, belonged to opposing factions. The High Court decided (by majority) that while the mere apprehension of bias would not disqualify the committee from hearing the charges against members who came from an opposing faction, if the members were "invincibly biased" against the accused as a result of his participation in the controversy their decision would be vitiated. 50 In Maloney v NSW National Coursing Association [1978] 1 NSWLR 161 at 171 per Glass JA (with whom Hope and Hutley JJA agreed) said: In the administration of justice by courts proper, and those acting in a similar capacity, public policy requires that there should be no doubt about the purity of that administration: Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration, per Lord Esher MR The rules being enforced have no consensual basis. The parties have not chosen the tribunal. The judges and those being judged are drawn from two groups of people so numerous and so placed in relation to each other that it is not only desirable, but also eminently feasible, to insist that the former should be purged of all bias towards the latter, whether real or apprehended. Domestic tribunals are usually established in circumstances which are radically different. The members, generally speaking, have agreed to abide by a set of rules and the authority of a committee to enforce them, if necessary by expulsion. The committee members cannot, in the nature of things, divest themselves of the manifold predilections and prejudices resulting from past associations with members. Apprehension of bias could be generated in all kinds of ways. If it was a disqualifying consideration, the enforcement of the consensual rules would be largely unworkable. There may be some circumstances where a suspicion of bias would operate to disqualify a member of a domestic tribunal. But generally speaking it does not so operate… … A domestic tribunal obliged by the general law to observe the minimum requirements of justice must give notice of the charge being preferred, extend an adequate opportunity to present a defence and concede all the other incidental safeguards of a fair trial which are covered by the audi alteram partem principle. Nothing less than a clear dispensation in the rules could exclude these requirements. Similarly with respect to the disqualification attaching to a party who is in the position of a litigant qua the party charged, as Mr Bell was, or whose mind is imbued with actual bias with respect to the issues to be judged or the member to be tried. But for reasons already given I am of opinion that suspected bias on the part of a member of a domestic tribunal such as the committee of the defendant association does not disqualify him, even if there be no rule which expressly, or by implication, so provides. (Footnotes omitted.) 51 This is not a case where the aggrieved party says that she was denied procedural fairness because a member of the tribunal (here, the National Council) that sat in judgment both promoted the charge and supported it as prosecutor: cf Bowen (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 631. Rather, Ms Butler says that, like the seven members of the NSW Branch of the Australian Workers' Union who were expelled or dismissed in Bowen (1948) 77 CLR 601, that Messrs McVee and Metcher, "because of the intensity of [their] antagonism to [her]" (Bowen (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 621) were invincibly biased against her; they voted for the resolution to find her guilty; and that the decision to find her guilty and the decision to remove her from office are therefore vitiated. (As to the decision being vitiated see Bowen (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 563: "If a person disqualified by such considerations sits with the tribunal and takes part in the decision, that is enough to vitiate it", citing Dickason v Edwards (1910) 10 CLR 243).
Consideration 52 In my view, the evidence, which was not disputed, that Mr Metcher called Ms Butler a "cunt" and told her "I don't just make threats cunt, I carry them out" and that threatening phone calls had been made to, and messages had been left with, Ms Butler which had originated from phone numbers linked to Mr McVee, including a call in which someone said "Gonna get you cunt" means that they are invincibly biased against Ms Butler. 53 The case against Mr O'Donnell is even stronger, given that the (undisputed) evidence is that, in correspondence copied to Mr Metcher and Mr McVee, among many others, he called Ms Butler a "fucker", a "a horrible poisonous thing … that … many despise", a "useless individual no one has any respect for …" and a "horrible, poisonous, useless oxygen thieving nutter". But, as I say, it is unclear whether he attended the August 2016 meeting. 54 In the context of this case, the fact that these things were said some time before the relevant meetings is neither here nor there. They are despicable things to have been said. They are misogynistic and spiteful. And they constitute, in part at least, threats of violence against Ms Butler. 55 In my view, Mr Metcher and Mr McVee ought to have recused themselves from both meetings. Their failure to do so is another reason, if one were needed, why the findings of guilt and the penalty cannot be allowed to stand.
One final point 56 Counsel for Ms Butler submitted, relying on the undoubted proposition that the specific offence with which a member may be charged under rules must be one known to the rules (Buchanek v Jones [1989] FCA 134; 29 IR 332 at [8]-[12]), that because, under r 24.2, National Officers can only be removed from office "where they have been found guilty under Rule 25", that the charges must therefore be found in r 25. 57 I do not accept that submission. It is abundantly clear that rr 24 and 25 are to be read together and that no difficulty of the type contended for by Mr White arises.
CONCLUSION 58 Accordingly, I propose to grant to Ms Butler the substance of the relief that she seeks in her amended application. I will also ask the parties to make any submission they may wish to make about whether any, and if so what, costs order should be made. I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice O'Callaghan.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES VID 456 of 2016 Respondents Fourth Respondent: JOAN DOYLE Fifth Respondent: JOHN ELLERY Sixth Respondent: MAUREEN PARKER Seventh Respondent: GREGORY COLBECK Eighth Respondent: PETER MILLER Ninth Respondent: LISA-MAREE BAHLS Tenth Respondent: NICK TOWNSEND Eleventh Respondent: ALEX JANSEN Twelfth Respondent: JAMES PERKINS Thirteenth Respondent: JIM METCHER Fourteenth Respondent: SHANE MURPHY Fifteenth Respondent: BARRY MCVEE Sixteenth Respondent: JOHN O'DONNELL Seventeenth Respondent: JOHN (NORMAN) TREDREA Eighteenth Respondent: PHIL HUGHES Nineteenth Respondent: NICOLE ROBINSON Twentieth Respondent: BRIAN KERSHAW Twenty-First Respondent: TREVOR GAULD Twenty-Second Respondent: JOHN ADLEY Twenty-Third Respondent: STEVE BUTLER Twenty-Fourth Respondent: JIM MCFADYEN Twenty-Fifth Respondent: LES MCLAUGHLEN Twenty-Sixth Respondent: PETER SIMPSON Twenty-Seventh Respondent: TROY GRAY Twenty-Eighth Respondent: GARY CARUTHERS Twenty-Ninth Respondent: GLEN MENZIES Thirtieth Respondent: PADDY MCRUDDEN Thirty-First Respondent: DAVE BROADLEY Thirty-Second Respondent: THEO SAMARTZOPOULOS Thirty-Third Respondent: BRIAN BINTLEY Thirty-Fourth Respondent: GARY O'HALLORAN Thirty-Fifth Respondent: MICHAEL WIECH
Butler
Setches
[1989] FCA 134
(1948) 77 CLR 601
(1989) 29 IR 332
(1979) 42 FLR 188
(1978) 20 ALR 359
(1910) 10 CLR 243