Buksh v R

Reasons for sentence 28His Honour found "the present offences are objectively serious". He acknowledged the importance of "general deterrence and punishment", and to some extent "personal deterrence", for offences of this type. He thought that last consideration of lesser significance, doubtless, because of the findings he had made in relation to the low risk of re-offending and good prospects of rehabilitation. The primary judge found, no doubt having considered the other options, that in the light of the seriousness of the offending "there is no option but to impose substantial full time custodial sentences". His Honour indicated that he would allow a 25 per cent discount on the sentences that would otherwise have been imposed for the utilitarian value of the guilty pleas. 29His Honour also found a need to partially accumulate the sentences he had in mind for each offence to reflect the totality of the criminality of the offending. And he found special circumstances based upon a range of considerations including: that this was the applicant's first custodial sentence; the benefit the applicant will receive from the extended period of supervision; and the need for partial accumulation of the sentences. 30In dealing with the requirements of Division 1A of Part 4 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), his Honour said: In relation to the present offences, the legislation provides for a standard non-parole period of 10 years imprisonment. This applies for an offence falling within the mid-range of objective seriousness for such an offence following conviction at trial. Following a plea of not guilty the standard non-parole period is nevertheless a reference point for sentencing purposes... I am satisfied from the agreed facts that while each of the three offences involve different forms of penetration and the acts of vaginal and anal penetration involved unprotected sex, they each fall within the middle range of objective seriousness for such offences. After passing sentence as I have indicated at [4] above, his Honour said: For each offence the standard non-parole period has not been imposed having regard to the offender's earlier plea of guilty, the subjective circumstances and a finding of special circumstances.

The submissions of the parties 31Mr. H.K. Dhanji SC, who appeared for the applicant, pointed out that at the time the applicant was sentenced, the correct approach for the primary judge to follow for Pt 4 Div 1A offences was taken to have been determined by the dictates of Way at [117] - [118]. It was submitted that his Honour's adherence to that two-stage approach was obvious by reference to the two passages I have set-out in the immediately preceding paragraph. It was submitted that it is clear that his Honour classified each offence as falling "within the middle of the middle range of objective seriousness for such offences". This was stage one. The applicant submitted that His Honour then undertook stage two by expressing specific reasons for departing from the standard non-parole period. 32Mr. Dhanji reminded the Court that the High Court of Australia in Muldrock had disapproved of this approach at 132 [28], and to that extent Way had been overruled. Not only was the "two-stage approach to the sentencing of the offenders" disapproved of but there is no "need to classify the objective seriousness of the offending" (Muldrock at 132 [29]). This means there is no need to classify the subject offending by express reference to "the middle range of objective seriousness by comparison with a hypothesised offence answering that description and, in the event that it does, by enquiring if there are matters justifying a longer or shorter period": Muldrock 132 [28]. Naturally, giving content to s.54B(2) and (3) requires an assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence which is to be undertaken "without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders": Muldrock 132 [27]. 33Mr. Dhanji argued that the required instinctive synthesis had been overborne in the present case by the consideration of the standard non-parole period and adherence to the two-stage approach then required by R. v. Way. Learned senior counsel argued that the outcome "was affected by [a] type of distortion". As required by Muldrock (131 [26]), the primary judge should have approached the sentencing task by reference to the approach described by McHugh J in Markarian v. The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at 379 [51]. 34Mr. Dhanji argued that the applicant's strong subjective case had been overborne by his Honour's understandable error of principle. The assessment of the strong subjective case as part of the process of fully identifying the facts, matters and circumstances which bear upon a judgment about the appropriate sentence to be imposed, compelled the conclusion that a lesser sentence is warranted in law and should have been passed. 35Learned counsel for the Crown referred to the judgment of Davies J in Butler v. R. [2012] NSWCCA 23 at [26] (Whealy JA and Rothman J agreeing). On his Honour's analysis, in the ordinary case, error might be shown when a sentencing judge has adopted the approach of commencing with a standard non-parole period and then seeking to find factors which could "justify a variation from it". Generally there will be no error if the sentencing judge refers to the standard non-parole period "simply as a guideline or yardstick". The consideration that the primary judge referred to the standard non-parole period as a "reference point for sentencing purposes" demonstrated that his Honour's approach to the present case was permissible. Demonstrating that his Honour had otherwise followed "the dictates of Way" is not sufficient to demonstrate appellable error. 36The Crown argued that on the fair reading of the reasons for sentence as a whole, his Honour had in fact demonstrated adherence to the proper Markarian approach which was not undermined by either classifying the objective seriousness of the offending "within the middle of the middle range", or the mere expression of reasons for departing from the standard non-parole period, which was, after all, a statutory requirement: s.54B(4). 37The Crown argued that in any event having regard to the objective seriousness of the offending, the need to fix an appropriate sentence for each offence, the question of accumulation and the total criminality involved, the Court should be satisfied that no other sentence in law was warranted, the strength of the subjective case notwithstanding.

Decision 38With respect, I accept that Mr Dhanji's submissions accurately explain the effect of Muldrock. There is force in his submission that the use of the expression "the middle of the middle range of objective seriousness for such offences" suggests that his Honour classified the objective seriousness of the offending by "commencing with an assessment of whether the offence falls within the middle range of objective seriousness by comparison with a hypothesised offence answering that description". Moreover, the expression of reasons for departing from the standard non-parole period, following the pronouncement of the various sentences in the present case, may imply an inquiry as to whether "there are matters justifying a longer or shorter period": Muldrock at [28] - [29]. 39But this impression is reduced by the consideration that as his Honour fixed nine years as a total term for each of counts 1 and 2, which were free of the Form 1 offences, his starting point must have been twelve years before discounting for the early plea. By the application of s.44(2) of the Crimes Sentencing Procedure) Act, before the finding of special circumstances, this suggests a non-parole period of nine years, not ten, which is the standard non-parole period. There may not be much in it, but for this reason a supposed starting point of a non-parole period of nine years does not bespeak an automatic application of s.54B(2) to the finding of objective seriousness in respect of these offences. 40I accept the Crown's submission that the present case is like Butler. When one considers his reasons as a whole, his Honour did not adopt the approach of commencing with the standard non-parole period before looking for factors which could "justify a variation from it". Naturally, his Honour's reasons for sentence also must be read fairly. Adopting this approach, I am not persuaded that error has been demonstrated. 41Reading his Honour's reasons fairly and as a whole, in my view it is clear that he was, in fact, "mindful of two legislative guideposts: the maximum sentence and the standard non-parole period" as required by Muldrock at 132 [27]. (See the introductory paragraph to the reasons for sentence.) His Honour's reference to these considerations should not be read as indicative of adoption of an impermissible two-stage approach to the sentencing task. 42A consideration of all the primary judge said up to the first of two paragraphs I have quoted in full at [30] above, which appears on page 17 of the reasons, demonstrates that in substance, his Honour did "identify fully the facts, matters and circumstances which the judge [concluded bore] upon the judgment ... reached about the appropriate sentence to be imposed", notwithstanding that this sentence preceded the decision in Muldrock. After all, the instinctive synthesis approach was the usual approach to sentencing for all offences before the advent of the standard non-parole period provisions. In my judgment the two impugned passages from his Honour's reasons, which demonstrate adherence to Way, viewed through the prism of Butler, as a matter of substance, do not betray appellable error. 43I would reject the ground of appeal. 44Against the prospect that I am in error in this conclusion, I wish to state that I am not of the opinion that some other - here lesser - sentence is warranted in law, notwithstanding what Mr. Dhanji rightly represents as the strength of the applicant's subjective case. The considerations of the objective seriousness of the offence, the need for retribution, including the consideration of the effect of the offending on the victim, denunciation and general deterrence all called for a heavy sentence. 45As I pointed out at [26] above, his Honour laid emphasis upon the considerations of the need for general deterrence and punishment. As a unanimous court pointed out in R. v. AEM [2002] NSWCCA 58 at [94]: It must be stressed that all members of our society, including our young people, must be free to lawfully use the streets without fear of being subjected to either physical or sexual assault. The long term effects of the trauma invariably encountered by victims of either form of attack are well documented. It also bears repeating as Hunt CJ at CL said in R v Hartitiainen (unreported, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 June 1993) at 3, that non-consensual sexual intercourse is an extreme form of violence. It is a crime which must and will be denounced by the courts by the imposition of appropriate sentences. As Lee AJ (with whom Carruthers and Sully JJ agreed) said in R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391 at 395: "... it needs to be remembered that ... there must always be a reasonable proportion between the objective seriousness of the crime and the sentence imposed. In a serious crime, the court must show its denunciation of the crime committed. The moral outrage of the community must be taken into account." 46Lee AJ, speaking of sentencing young offenders, went on to say: True it is... that the courts consistently point out the need to give young offenders a chance and to refrain from sending them to gaol or dealing heavily with them if that course can be avoided ... However, there is a point at which the seriousness of the crime committed by a man of 19, even though a young man, is of such a nature, is so great, that that principle must, in the public interest, give way. The applicant is not a young person, he had well and truly reached the age of maturity and full responsibility at the time of offending, but it might be thought that his previous good character, taken on it's own, might also be, in the ordinary course, a factor calling for particular leniency; likewise the consideration that he has suffered significant extra-curial punishment by the probable loss of his profession. But by parity of reasoning with the dictum of Lee AJ in Nichols, the seriousness of the crime committed by the applicant, even though a man of previous good character, "is of such nature, is so great" that condign punishment, "in the public interest", is called for. 47Additionally, as Beazley JA (as her Honour then was) pointed out in R v Gorman [2002] NSWCCA 516; 137 A Crim R. 326 at [9]: In the present case, the three offences had to be considered separately. There was no common element in any of the offences, in the sense that notion is explained in Pearce [v the Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 at 623]. To characterise the offences, therefore... as "one episode of criminality" [misapplies] Pearce and [fails] to have regard to the specific circumstances of each individual offence. (See also Sperling J at [54]; and R. v. Hammoud [2000] NSWCCA 540; 118 A Crim R 66 at [67] per Simpson J). 48As the Court pointed out in AEM at [70], the principle of totality "requires that the effective sentence imposed upon an offender represent a proper period of incarceration for the total criminality involved". 49Considering the sentence passed below in the light of these principles, I am not persuaded that his Honour's discretion miscarried notwithstanding the strength of the subjective case, to which, in my opinion, the primary judge gave appropriate weight. 50The orders I propose are as follows:

1. Grant leave to appeal;
2. Appeal dismissed.

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