That case is reported both in the Divisional Court, where Day J. gave the judgment of the Court, and on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Although that appeal was dismissed, Lord Esher M.R., with whose judgment Lopes and Kay L.JJ. concurred, took a quite different view of the matter from that adopted by Day J. Yet it is upon the judgment of Day J. that reliance has been placed in the Full Court. In the Divisional Court Day J. had rejected a submission that the provisions of s. 15 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, equating "the report or award of any official or special referee or arbitrator" to the verdict of a jury, meant that it was open to a party to canvass such an arbitrator's findings as being against the evidence. His Lordship apparently regarded the Act as applicable to the reference to arbitration there in question and was able to arrive at the conclusion he did only by giving to the words of s. 15 a quite limited meaning, one not affecting the finality of the award. However on appeal a quite different view was taken, one that did not involve any limitation upon the effect of s. 15. The reference to arbitration in question was held to be not a reference pursuant to any statutory power, whether conferred by the Arbitration Act, 1889 or by the Judicature Act, 1873 but, rather, a reference to arbitration, after the institution of proceedings, by consent of the parties. The long-established inherent jurisdiction of courts to make such orders, which result in true arbitrations and conclusive awards to which the statutory provision for references under orders of the court have no application, is described in some detail in the judgment of my brother Jacobs. It was upon this ground that Lord Esher M.R., in whose judgment Lopes and Kay L.JJ. concurred, dismissed the appeal. His Lordship remarked [20] that since the order of the court was "made by consent for the reference of all matters in difference" and was a "much larger order" than any which the Arbitration Act, 1889 could authorize, it must have been one made "under the general authority of a judge to act on the consent of the parties and appoint an arbitrator. The whole validity and force of the reference arises from the consent of the parties". There was, then, no question of the application to it of any provision of the Arbitration Act 1889: the award carried with it all the conclusiveness of a purely consensual award without recourse being had to any restrictive interpretation such as Day J. had thought he must place upon s. 15 of the Act if he were to achieve that result. The observations of Day J. as to the interpretation of s. 15 were, thus, consequential upon a misconception concerning the nature of the award in question. It follows that the Darlington Wagon Case is no authority concerning the operation of the legislation presently under consideration, nor does it represent any departure from the line of English authority to which I have already referred and which is reflected in the texts on the subject.