(c) The risk required a judicial warning. In Pfennig [61] differences appear in the reasoning of the majority of this Court and of McHugh J as to the approach which is to be taken to the admission of propensity evidence. No attempt was made in this case to reargue Pfennig. The facts here would, in any event, not provide a suitable vehicle for doing so, given that the evidence in question, being that of W, was concededly admissible for one other purpose [62] and, as I would hold, for yet another [63] . One common thread can be seen in most, if not all, of the cases where propensity evidence has been admitted. In such cases, the trial judge will ordinarily, even "invariably" [70] require the jury to consider very carefully the use which they make of the evidence of similar facts and to bear in mind the dangers of reasoning from a suggested propensity and their obligation to try the accused upon the counts of the indictment, not for other criminality or moral blemishes which those facts reveal. Thus in Donnini [71] it was the fact that the trial judge had given the jury a strong warning that they would not be entitled to draw any adverse inferences against the accused by reason of the volunteered information about his prior convictions that persuaded the majority of this Court [72] to confirm the conviction. A developing concern in the Court about the dangers of propensity reasoning can, I think, be seen in the course of decisions illustrated by Markby v The Queen [73] , Perry v The Queen [74] and Sutton v The Queen [75] . Perhaps as a reflection of this, a strong warning was given by the trial judge in Hoch [76] . However, it was not enough to save the convictions. In Pfennig strong and clear instructions were given to the jury by the trial judge [77] concerning the use which they might make of propensity evidence. That fact clearly influenced this Court in affirming the conviction in that case. In the present case, there was no such warning. None at all. The jury was left to fend for itself. This course was defended on the footing that counsel for the appellant had not specifically sought a direction, that there had been no undue or improper emphasis given to propensity at the trial [78] and that any elaboration of W's evidence by the judge would have given it an importance which the judge had sought to diminish by ignoring it altogether [79] . I turn finally to these considerations.