Consideration
28The legislative scheme and relevant legal principles have been outlined in the judgment in Yang v Firth [2013] NSWSC 676. I have concluded that the power under s 728 to order a legal practitioner to comply with a request by a client for an itemised bill of costs under s 332A is available and should be exercised by way of an order under its provisions. I am of the opinion that, in this case, s 350(5) does not stand in the way of the plaintiff's pursuit of the orders sought.
29In determining whether to exercise the discretion under s 728 I note the additional matters raised in the present proceedings in respect of the alleged abuse of process and make the following observations.
30The plaintiff was advised through the memorandum provided by the defendant of the solicitor/client costs to be paid out of the settlement monies on 19 July 2010. Subsequently, the plaintiff lodged a complaint against the defendant with the Commissioner on 16 May 2011. There is evidence, being the letter from Salvos Legal dated 10 October 2011, that indicates that the plaintiff received assistance from Salvos Legal in preparing that complaint.
31The plaintiff's main issues of complaint to the Commissioner were:
"(a) the solicitor failed to properly disclose their fees;
(b) the final settlement figure I received was substantially less than the amount initially claimed for;
(c) the solicitor did not act in my best interests throughout this matter." (Exhibit G)
32The Commissioner made a number of findings in relation to the plaintiff's complaint after receiving a response from the defendant. In the letter to the plaintiff on 25 August 2011, the Commissioner noted, inter alia, the following matters:
(1)There was a misunderstanding as to the amount of the plaintiff's Total and Permanent Disability benefit. Initially it was understood to be $108,000 but was later found to be $72,000;
(2)The plaintiff's claim was settled on his instructions for $70,000 which was almost the full value of the $72,000 benefit;
(3)The defendant had complied with his costs disclosure obligations under the LPA;
(4)It was the plaintiff's responsibility to seek clarification of any aspects of the costs agreement that he did not understand, either with the defendant or elsewhere;
(5)The plaintiff's legal costs of $65,000 were actually less than the amount estimated in the costs agreement;
(6)Although the amount of party/party costs reached by agreement was $35,000, the plaintiff was obliged to pay the difference out of the settlement monies;
(7)Prior to settlement the plaintiff had been advised that he would received a minimum of $30,000 in hand; and
(8)The plaintiff ultimately received approximately $40,000, which was more than the minimum estimate.
33In light of the findings outlined above the Commissioner was satisfied that the plaintiff's complaint raised no issues of misconduct on the part of the defendant.
34The legislative scheme regulating complaints by clients about legal practitioners is contained in Chapter 4 of the LPA which is entitled "Complaints and discipline". According to s 539 of the LPA, in considering complaints about the conduct of legal practitioners, the Commissioner may dismiss the complaint in whole or in part if satisfied that there is no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner will be found by the relevant Tribunal to have engaged in either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. Such a dismissal was ultimately made by the Commissioner in relation to the plaintiff's complaint.
35Despite the finding that there was no evidence of misconduct by the defendant, there remains a question which the plaintiff has raised as to the basis upon which legal costs in the order of $65,000 were charged for a claim of approximately $72,000. Whilst the plaintiff gave instructions to agree to party/party costs of $35,000, that does not of itself indicate that he is not entitled to apply for the exercise of the statutory power to order an itemised bill of costs under s 728. The fact that the maximum benefit of the plaintiff's Total and Permanent Disability policy was $72,000 may arise as a matter that is relevant to the question of whether the legal costs in question were fair and reasonable. Having said that, I do not suggest that that is necessarily so. However, the factual circumstances in which the question of costs arises provides a basis for the plaintiff to apply under s 728 for an order requiring the defendant to provide an itemised bill.
36The defendant's submission that proceedings were not genuinely instituted in pursuit of the plaintiff's statutory rights under the LPA must be considered in light of the chronology of events which I note is as follows:
(1)On 16 May 2011, the plaintiff lodged a complaint with the Commissioner;
(2)On 25 August 2011, the Commissioner was satisfied that the plaintiff's complaint raised no issues of misconduct on the part of the defendant;
(3)On 10 October 2011, Salvos Legal advised the plaintiff that he may wish to consider obtaining advice in regard to a professional negligence claim against the defendant and identified Wyatt Attorney as a firm that may have the expertise to assist;
(4)Subsequently, the plaintiff retained Slater & Gordon;
(5)On 6 February 2012, Slater & Gordon advised the plaintiff that based on their preliminary view, he had "strong prospects of successfully challenging" the defendant's bill;
(6)On 13 February 2012, the plaintiff directed Slater & Gordon to transfer his file to Barton Lawyers;
(7)On 17 February 2012, a request was made to the defendant for an itemised bill of costs;
(8)On 14 March 2012, the Summons in the present proceedings was filed.
37This chronology plainly demonstrates that the plaintiff has, at various instances since 19 July 2010 when the memorandum was issued to him by the defendant, taken some form of action to address a grievance he has had with the defendant on the question of the costs of the above proceedings. The evidence provides sufficient basis for an inference that Mr Brown has commenced these proceedings in another attempt to pursue his grievance with the defendant, at least to the point of obtaining an itemisation of costs charged, noting that past attempts have been, so far, unfavourable to him.
38The absence of evidence from the plaintiff himself is not a matter that translates into evidence that the proceedings were not genuinely brought by him. Whatever the circumstances by which Mr Brown came to retain Mr Barakat, there is evidence that a retainer exists (the Authority to Slater & Gordon signed by Mr Brown on 13 February 2012 to transfer and forward his file to Barton Lawyers). This is not a case where there is no evidence of a retainer between solicitor and client.