Brisbane Shipwrights' Provident Union v Heggie [1906] HCA 4

'The respondent was employed as a shipwright in the service of the land Government, at one of the Government Docks. When to join the appellant union and pay the entrance fee, he appellants, representing the union and by its express direction, Government that, if the respondent were not dismissed, the union employed at the dock would be called out, and as long as the employment continued, they would not be allowed to resume jury found that the officer of the Government was induced and _ these representations to dismiss the respondent, and that the ap combined and conspired together to procure his dismissal with of injuring him and depriving him of the opportunity of earning his as a shipwright," until he should become a member of the ap In an action by the respondent for damages for the injury su by reason of those representations :

the facts as found by the jury disclosed an actionable wrong.

. Flood, (1898) A.C., 1; Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) A.C., 495, con- and applied.

nciples of law applicable in an action against a trade union and its rs, for conspiring to procure the dismissal from his employment of a unionist, considered.

from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland, yy 1905. (Real J.)

was an action brought by the respondent against the its for damages for, amongst other things, maliciously ig to induce, procure, and cause the proper officer of the ernment of Queensland to dismiss the respondent from his ployment as a shipwright under the Government and to e to employ him, and to refuse to employ him further 'he would join the defendant union and pay the entrance he action was tried before Real J., and a jury, to whom questions were put, and which were answered as follows: - stion 1 - In or about the month of June 1903, did the de- s, the Brisbane Shipwrights' Provident Union, James John Dawson, and Thomas Mitchell, with others, combine, and agree to induce, procure, and coerce the proper officer ie Government of the State of Queensland, under whose con- plaintiff then was, and the said Government, through its flicer, to dismiss the plaintiff from his employment under Government, and to cease to employ him, and to refuse to employ him? Answer. - Yes.

2. • In pursuance of the said combination, conspiracy, ent, did the defendants, Arcus, Dawson, and Mitchell, Bead. with the seared of the said Union, and es the

missed, the shipwrights then at work would be called out, an no union shipwright would be allowed to work in the for the Government whilst the plaintiff was employed Government therein? Answer - Yes. a Question 4. - Did the defendants, by the statements a sentations of the defendants Arcus, Dawson, and Mitch at the interview aforesaid, mean and intend the aforesaid o of the Government to understand, and did he understand, th statements and representations to mean, that if the plaintiff not dismissed, the defendants would, so long as he was re in the Government employment as a shipwright at the said ¢ forbid any Union shipwright working for the said Gover and had the power and would use the power, to pu shipwright who might, contrary to their request, take such 1 and that the Government would be prevented from obt sufficient or competent shipwrights to perform the work nec and proper to be, from time to time, done at the said dock the Government? If not, say what they did mean and inte Answer - Yes. Question 5. - Did the defendants, by the statements a presentations made at such interview by the defendants
Mitchell, and Dawson, to the aforesaid proper officer Government, induce, procure, and coerce the said proper off the Government, and the Government through him, to miss the plaintiff from his employment under the Gover the 6th day of June 1903, and to cease thenceforth to e him, and to refuse to further employ him? Answer - Yes. Question 6 - Did the defendants do the acts aforesaid wit intent to injure the plaintiff and to deprive him of the o of earning his livelihood as a shipwright - (a) absolutely; he paid the defendant Union the sum of £2 for entrance fee, applied to become a member of the Union? Ans absolutely until he paid the defendant Union the sum of £ entrance fee, and applied to become a member of the Unio Question 7. - Were the acts of the defendants found by 0 your answers to the previous questions wrongful and m Answer - Yes. Question 7A. - Did the defendants do the acts aforesaid

Union? If yes to (a) or (b), say how. Answer - («) y procuring the dismissal of Heggie; (b) yes, in accordance ir interpretation of the rules.

tion 8 - Did the defendants do the acts aforesaid to warn that the members of the Union would not work with onists? If yes, say for what purpose or purposes, if any.

• Yes, for reasons already given in the answers to previous

ners was the officer of the Government in charge of the Damages were assessed at £100. On these findings, both sclaimed to be entitled to judgment. After argument, the Judge entered judgment for the plaintiff, and from this the present appeal was brought by special leave.

on the findings of the jury as they stand, the appellants

'itled to judgment; but on the evidence some of the

tH C.J. - This is an appeal direct from the decision of

not from the refusal by the Court to grant a new trial,

efore, the verdict must be taken as it stands, and the

'cannot be inquired into further. That has already been

the findings are contradictory and entitle the defendant

ritH C.J. - We cannot investigate the facts, except so far

was here proposed by counsel to read the rules of the nt union.]

ARTON J. - Are they not all swallowed up by the findings? ]

they are necessary toa complete understanding of the

In Allen vy. Flood (2) all the facts were gone into.

by our decision in Musgrove v. McDonald (3). If this

an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court refusing a

.R., 132, at p. 149. (2) (1898) A.C., 1. (3) 3C.LR., 132,

ir own interests, and (b) to carry out the rules of the 4. ©. or A. 1906.

new trial, the facts could then be gone into. But the be referred to, so far as is necessary to make tl intelligible.] On the findings as they stand there has been no y any legal right at all; and even if there had been, abundant excuse for it. The whole question involved, isy coercion, such as was proved in this case, is illegal. [GrirritH C.J. - The use of the word "coercion" h particular significance.] If the act, found by the jury to have been performed lawful act, the fact that it was done maliciously does not illegal. To use coercion is not unlawful, provided a per exercising a legal right. The term "injury" connotes an intent to do wrongful r Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1) per Bowe approved of by Watson LJ. in Allen v. Flood (2). The appell have a right to (1) combine, (2) refuse to work, and (3) m their employer of their refusal. Evil intention or malice i irrelevant: Rogers v. Rajendro Dutt (8); Bradford Corpor v. Pickles (4); Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & 0 This case is very similar in its facts to Allen v. Flood (6), that in the latter there was the motive to punish. A man perfect right to choose with whom he will work, and that) extends to enable him to let the employer know what his is (7). No right of action arose from the intimation by Union that no union shipwright would be allowed to work in dock, while the plaintiff was employed therein (8). combination, the agreement not to work with respondent, ar giving notice to that effect, was all done in exercise of a legal r In Hutley v. Simmons (9), the notices were the same ash no cause of action arose: Kearney v. Lloyd (10); operative Society v. Glasgow Fleshers' Association (V combination of two or more without justification or

(2) (1898) A.C., 1, at p. 93. (8) (1898) A.C., 1, at (3) 13 Moo. P.C.C., 209. Herschel L.3., and at pp. 163: (4) (1895) A.C., 587. per Shand LJ.

(7) (1898) A.C. 1, at p. 98, per (11). 85 Se, L.R., 645.

s to break their contracts with him or not to deal with

'or continue in his employment, is, if it results in damage to 'actionable: Quinn v. Leathem (1). But in that case the

combination to injure and ruin another, not where it was e the parties' own trade interests. The object in this was to preserve the interest of the unionists. In Quinn v. (1), there was persecution of the worst kind. There the iffs had no interest in Leathem's customers or servants. reir C.J. - But was there an unlawful act ?]

rd Shand says the act was unlawful because the motive was

ritH C.J. - The chief difficulty arises from the use of "wrongful" throughout. It is often capable of two

judgment of Lindley LJ. (2) shows that an act is not l unless it is an infringement of the rights of another. rire C.J. - Then the question remains - What are the of others ? ] jout being guilty of any unlawful act the appellants could nbine a right to resolve and a right to inform their employer of it resolution and act upon it. At any time unionists may not to work with non-unionists, and may tell the employer being guilty of any wrongful act. This is primd facie which is lawful, and, therefore, it is not necessary to show ification. Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stone- of England, Ireland and Wales (3), has no bearing question arising in this case. There the defendants justification. [They also referred to Giblan v. National ated Labowrers' Union of Great Britain and Ireland Glamorgan Coal Company v. South Wales Miners'

(5).] egor, for the respondent. There are two classes of (4) (1903) 2 K.B., 600.

was whether an action will lie where injury has resulted PRovip

man in his trade by inducing a man's customers or 4. C. or A.

pal Barspaty: Surp- WRIGHTS' Provipest Uxtox », Hecer.

individual, and (2), where there is an element of co present. Even in the absence of conspiracy, any action, if done without just cause or excuse, which i another in his trade, is an actionable wrong: Mogul 8 Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1). To put the respondent's 4 the strongest possible light, the appellants would be liab individually, they stated their refusal to work unless respon was dismissed. In directing the jury in Reg. v. Drui Bramwell, B., stated the law as follows : - * The liberty man's mind and will to say how he should bestow hi his means, his talents and his industry, was as much a su of the law's protection as was that of his body." National Amalgamated Labourers' Union of Great Bri Ireland (3) also assumes that any interference with the liberty another is an actionable wrong. So interference with anot! contractual rights is actionable, and also interference to p1

Gow & Oo. (4); The King v. Eccles (5); Gregory y. D Brunswick (6). Allen vy. Flood (7), is entirely refer individual, and not concerted action. Six of the Judges ¢ upon to assist the Lords held that a man's labour w immune from interference as his property. In that case was no proof of molestation, obstruction, intimidation, or coere all of which features were present in Quinn v. Leathem (8 the present case. The decision in Lemperton v. Russell (9 still law and applies to this case: Leathem v. Craig (10). In case the defendants combined and agreed to communicate to employer their intention to injure him and deprive him of | livelihood unless he employed union labour exclusively. was the sole object of their conspiracy. The answers given | the jury to the questions 7 (a) and 8 have been relied upon by appellants as showing a mixed motive. This is not so. 1 object was to prevent any but unionists obtaining work,

(1) 23 Q.B.D., 598, at p. 613, per (6) 6 M. &G., 205, 953.

(2) 10 Cox C.C., 592, at p. 600. (8) (1901) A.C., 495.

(4) 23 Q.B.D., 598, at p. 614, per (10) (1899) 2.R., 667, at p. 773, Bowen LJ. Holmes LJ.

Ireland and Wales (1) is not a sufficient justification action was to protect their own interests. Giblan v.

nd (2); Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of vay Servants (3); Martell v. Victorian Coal Miners' Asso- (4), "Picketing," as a means of interfering by third s with trade relations of others, has been held to be a ful act and unlawful. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins (5), in was stated that the earlier of these degisions was not by Allen v. Flood (6), nor varied by anything laid therein: Charnock v. Court (7); Walters v. Green (8); j v. Kiers (9). ritH C.J. - The effect of those decisions is that interference a man's liberty is primd facie wrongiul, and if it takes place purpose of injuring another, then it is unlawful. NOR J. - If instead of a direct threat being made the is informed of the facts and probable consequences, is onable in the same way as a threat 7] n individual, it is questionable; if by a combination, it y is: Criminal Code, sec. 543.

in reply. The Queensland Criminal Code, sec. 543, has ion to the facts of this case. In sec. 543 the word signifies, according to Bowen L.J., more than an intent to connotes an intention to do a wrongful act. The intent can be negatived by reference to the rules of the Union. ONNOR J. - I can understand the exercise by you of a right union men, but does that give you the right to go it and affect other relationships ?]

appellants do not go beyond that right ; what is done consequence of it.

J - It was important in Allen v. Flood (6), that the 2K.B., 88, 732. 255.

475; 25 A.L.T., 120. (8) (1899) 2 Ch., 696. Ch., 811; (1899) 1'Ch., (9) 20 N.S. W. W.N., 45.

r for their action. Nor is there justification in the finding p,

g to Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons H. C. or A

onal Amalgamated Labourers' Union of Great Britain and Provivext

delegate had no distinct authority behind him to enfor His statement therefore did not amount to a threat.)

If the acts themselves are not wrongful the i immaterial: Boots v. Grundy (1).

The judgment of the Court was read by GrirritH C.J. [After stating the materia] facts His proceeded]: As no application was made to the Supren ( for a new trial, it is not now open to the appellants to the findings of the jury. The matter must, therefore, sidered exclusively upon the facts as found by the jur appearing upon the record, in the same manner as formerly a bill of exceptions or a special verdict: Musgrove v. McD (2). :

For the appellants, reliance was placed upon the case of 4 v. Flood (3), while the respondent relied mainly upon the ca Quinn v. Leathem (4). Allen v. Flood was an action for m ously and wrongfully, and with intent to injure the procuring his employers to, break their contract with not to enter into any new contract with him, and also for fully and maliciously conspiring with others with the s There was, however, no evidence of any conspiracy. was tried by a jury, who found for the plaintiff on the action first stated, and judgment was given for him. ment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. On appeal to th of Lords, the Judges were summoned, and the following qu was put to them - *Was there any evidence of a cause of fit to be left to a jury?" In the very elaborate opi given by the learned Judges who advised the House, and speeches of the learned law Lords, the whole subject of in ence with liberty of trade was very fully considered, and | divergent opinions were expressed ; but as was pointed Quinn y. Leathem (4), the actual question for de whether there was, in that case, any evidence fit to be

(1) 82_L.T., 769, at p. 771, per (3) (1898) A.C., 1.

he majority of the law Lords (Lords Watson, Herschell, |, Shand, Davey and James of Hereford ; Lords Hals- .C., Ashbourne, and Morris dissenting) held that the for the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants had tted any unlawful act. The only point of law involved in jon was that an act which does not amount to a legal does not become actionable by reason merely that it is e with a bad intention, or a bad motive. See per Lord aghten (1). 'This case, therefore does not govern the , in which it is not open to the Court to examine the for the purpose of inquiring whether it justified the m of the jury that the defendants had been guilty of a racy to injure the plaintiff.

ease of Quinn v. Leathem (2) also turned upon the facts, | were very different from those found by the jury in the ent case. In the discussion of both cases frequent reference e to a passage in the judgment of Bowen LJ.,in Mogul mship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (3) : - * Now, intentionally at which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to e, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other s property or trade, is actionable if done without just or excuse. Such intentional action when done without Ise or excuse is what the law calls a malicious wrong : (see v. Prosser (4); Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty |. The acts of the defendants which are complained of here ntentional, and were also calculated, no doubt, to do the fisdamage in their trade. But in order to see whether ere wrongful we have still to discuss the question whether done without any just cause or excuse. Such just € or excuse the defendants on their side assert to be found in positive right (subject to certain limitations) to carry on trade freely in the mode and manner that best suits

nd which they think best calculated to secure their own

C., 495, at p. 508. (4) 4B. & C., 248. )A.C., 495, (5) 7 App. Cas., 741, at p. 772, per D., 598, at p. 613. Lord Blackburn.

(1), remarked : - *The notion that there may be a dif respect between acts affecting trade or employment acts seems to be largely founded on certain dicta of Bo in the case of The Mogul Steamship Co. It must be that these were obiter dicta, for the decision was defendants were not liable. The passage perhaps ch upon is the following : - Now intentionally to do that calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, does in fact damage, another in that other person's pr trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excus intentional action when done without just cause or excuse the law calls a malicious wrong.' It will be noted that the k Judge here makes no distinction between acts which with property and those which interfere with trade. purpose then in hand the statement of the law may be act enough, but if it means that a man is bound in law to j excuse every wilful act which may damage another in his or trade, then I say, with all respeet, the proposition is wide; everything depends on the nature of the act, or whe is wrongful or not." Subject to this limitation, whieh, respect, seems to be implied in the concluding words of B LJ., not quoted by Lord Herschel, that very learned J we understand him, accepted the doctrines propounded passage which he was criticising, and which, in our opi good law. In Quinn v. Leathem (2), Lord Lindley said: - 'As plaintiff's rights. He had the ordinary rights of a Brit He was at liberty to earn his living in his own way, provid did not violate some special law prohibiting him from so d and provided he did not infringe the rights of other people. liberty involved liberty to deal with other persons who | willing to deal with him. This liberty is a right recognize law; its correlative is the general duty of every one no prevent the free exercise of this liberty, except so far as hi liberty of action may justify him in so doing. But ap liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do $0. (1) (1898) A.C., 1, at p. 139. (2) (1901) A.C., 495, at p. 534.

ference is justifiable in point of law, he has no redress. such interference is wrongful, the only person who can pect of it is, as a rule, the person immediately affected another who suffers by it has usually no redress; the to him is too remote, and it would be obviously pratically sible and highly inconvenient to give legal redress to all who om such wrongs. But if the interference is wrongful and ded to damage a third person, and he is damaged in fact ther words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at others, and is thereby damnified - the whole aspect of is changed: the wrong done to others reaches him, his ts are infringed although indirectly, and damage to him is jote or unforeseen, but is the direct consequence of what ndone. Our law, as I understand it, is not so defective him a remedy by an action under such circumstances. collected in the old books on actions on the case, and strations given by the late Bowen LJ. in his admirable nt in the Mogul Steamship Company's Case (1), may be med to in support of the foregoing conclusion, and I do not erstand the decision in Allen y. Flood (2) to be opposed to it." edo not think it necessary to discuss in further detail the opinions expressed by the learned Judges who took part he decisions of these cases, and the other cases referred to in guments addressed to us, but we think that they establish 'rules or doctrines applicable to all actions for what are called us injuries, which will go far towards solving the questions in the present case. e first rule is that any interference with the rights of , Which in fact occasions damages to him, is actionable, s such interference is authorized, or justified, or excused by In this proposition the term " rights" includes the right ich every man possesses to the free enjoyment, subject to any fic rule of law, of his personal liberty ; which, again, includes fom to make, subject to any specific rule of law, such employ- Bh of his capacities, mental or physical, as he may think fit, 'to invite the co-operation of any person he may think fit in B.D., 598, at pp. 613, 614. (2) (1898) A.C., 1.

with their liberty to deal with him affects him. If H.C. or A

a, Brisbane Snip. WRIGHTS" PRovIpENT UstonHecetr,

any enterprise in which he proposes to engage. On this need only refer to the authorities quoted by Lord Bray Quinn v. Leathem (1) viz. : - * Primd facie it is the pris trader in a free country in all matters not contrary to | regulate his own mode of carrying it on according toh cretion and choice. If the law has in any other matter or restrained his mode of doing this, the law must be obe ye no power short of the general law ought to restrain his fre cretion." (Per Alderson B., delivering the judgment Exchequer Chamber in Hilton v. Eckersley (2) ): - * Al ar to trade upon what terms they will." (Per Lord Halsb in the Mogul Steamship Co.'s Case (3) ) : - " The man's mind and will, to say how he should bestow hii his means, his talents and his industry, was as much as the law's protection as is that of his body." (Per Bra in R. v. Druitt (4) ): - " Every person has a right under' as between himself and his fellow-subjects, to full freedom i posing of his own labour or his own capital according to hi It follows that every other person is subject to the cor duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstru the fullest exercise of this right, which can be made con with the exercise of similar rights by others." (Sir W. Trade Unions, p. 12) - Familiar instances of acts author absolutely protected by law, which may be harmful intangible right in question are afforded by statements mat Courts of Justice, and by prosecutions of persons actually I of offences. Competition in trade, which at common absolutely lawful, is another instance.

II. Interference which results merely from the exercise of | competition in trade is not wrongful, and is, therefore, not able. Of this rule, the Mogul Steamship Co.'s Case (5) illustration.

But in the infinite variety of human affairs, it often and must happen, that acts which in themselves are neu which are neither absolutely authorized nor express,

(1) (1901) A.C., 495, at p, 525. (4) 10 Cox C.C., 592, at p- 6 (2) 6 E. & B., 47, at p. 74. (5) (1892) A.C. 25, (8) (1892) A.C., 25, at p. 38.

damage, although the mind of the doer was not at all to the person to whom the damage is caused, and the 'a mere incidental or accidental consequence of the act. eommon law is characterized by a kindly regard for the s of human nature, and never lays on men's shoulders a too grievous to be borne. It does not, therefore, hold the ily responsible for damage arising under such cireum- but requires a further inquiry to ascertain whether the ge was really a mere incidental or accidental result of an wrongtul, or whether the doer took advantage of the stances to enable him to do some harm to another person n he desired toinjure. In the latter case he is not entitled to fit of the ambiguous or neutral circumstances. But the of showing that the doer did so take advantage lies upon arty alleging the fact. This is, we think, the principle which 8 actions for malicious prosecutions, and actions for de- on privileged occasions, as well as actions such as that before us. It may be expressed in the following further

nS : : Tf the circumstances attending an act which occasions nce with the rights of another, and which is, primd facie, |, are such that the interference may be a merely incidental dental consequence of the act, the act is to be regarded as, acie, neutral, and as being justitied or excused, until the is shown; and the burden of displacing the presumption e lies on the person complaining.

obligation, which the doer owes, or believes he owes, to

It the interference is not in fact merely incidental or ac- , but is deliberate, and is actuated by a desire to do harm

on whose rights are interfered with, whether accom-

not by some other motive, the protection which would

tion on a privileged occasion afford familiar instances. It

e the effect of interfering with the rights of some per- H. ©. or A.

used to be said that malice, so called, was an essential the cause of action in these cases; and hence difficultie to imputing malice, which, it was said, imports a state of toa corporation. This particular difficulty is now 0 the recognition of the principle that the liability of a corpor in such a case attaches on the ground that it is responsib acts of its authorized agents. But, while the innocence or w fulness of the acts in these cases depends, in one sense, upo state of mind of the doer, this, properly regarded, is not b that state of mind is an element of the cause of action, but be the state of mind of the doer is such as to deprive him o benefit of the ambiguous circumstances, which, but for it, 1 afford him protection. Unless, however, the act complain is an infringement of a legal right, this question does not Of this the case of Bradford Corporation v. Pickles (1), a an illustration. In that case, the act complained of was a done in the lawful exercise of a right of property, an involve the infringement of any legal right of any other pei The motive of the doer was, therefore, held to be immat in Allen v. Flood (2), and the Mogul Steamship Co.'s Case

VI. If the interference is the direct result of the carr; of an unlawful enterprise, propositions IL. and IV. haw application, and the cause of action is complete as soon as damage follows. ;

These rules are, we believe, consistent with all the They appear to us to be in accord with common sense, wl good test to be applied in ascertaining whether a su proposition is, or is not, a rule of the common law.

It appears, then, that cases of this kind fall into three el (1) Cases in which the alleged interference is not a violatior any legal right, but is a mere incidental or accidental ef lawful act (in this case no action lies); (2) eases in which it

or wrongfulness depends upon the motive operating on th of the doer. Thus, in the cases of malicious prosec' defamation on a privileged occasion, the existence or non-exist

(1) (1895) A.C., 587. (2) (1898) A.C., 1. (3) (1892)

per motive determines the character of the act. In the question is really one of motive, as distinguished tion. The terms are not synonymous, and confusion imes arisen from a failure to distinguish between them.

passage quoted by Lord Macnaghten from Parke B., is speech in Quinn v. Leathem (1). For instance, a man he intention to kill another, and kills him. His motive ing that intention may, or may not, be distinct from the on. It may be a desire for revenge for a real or fancied in which case the motive precedes, and is distinct from, intention. In other cases, it may be so involved in the inten-

to be undistinguishable from it. When aman deliberately by his act to do harm to another, it is impossible to say rt, at least, of his motive is not the desire to produce that In criminal law, motive, as distinguished from intention, m material. Indeed, at common law, the case of defama- the only one that occurs to us. In the case of a fraudulent f eence under the English bankruptcy law (which depends mn motive), a person who makes a payment with a view to give ice to a particular creditor obviously intends the creditor n the preference. But in general, the motive which aman to form an intention is distinct, and should be hed, from the intention itself. This distinction is clearly yn in sec. 23 of the Queensland Criminal Code. In all 'of interference with liberty, not purely incidental, an inten- interfere may probably be predicted, but it does not follow e motive is always improper. No doubt, a difficulty often n determining the motive by which a person whois charged 1a wrongful act was actuated. But this difficulty, so far i being peculiar to cases like the present, is common to all for so-called malicious injuries, and the tribunal must the motive in the best way it can upon the evidence toit. The doctrine laid down in Proposition V. seems en, in substance, the view taken of the law by Romer mv. Nutional Amalgamated Labowrers' Union of ain und Ireland (2), and by Real J., in the present case.

A.C., 495, at p. 508. (2) (1903) 2 K.B., 600, at p. 619. aa 49

1906, i BRISBANE Surr- WEIGHTS' PROVIDENT Usi0on v. Hecere.

Within which class, then, does the present case fall? ' we think, within the second. For, by sec. 543 of the Criminal Code, any person who conspires with another any person in his trade or profession is guilty of a mis and the findings of the jury are, in effect, that the defe 1 engaged in such a conspiracy, and that the damage complain resulted from it. '

It is suggested that the answer of the jury to Question may modify the finding as to a conspiracy, The rules menti in that answer may, we think, be referred to for the pu interpreting it. The rule in question is No. 33, and isas foll

33. • (1) Members are prohibited from working with: wrights who are not members of this union, e strangers to the port, who shall be allowed fo days' grace. Should any person who has been a n of this union, and whose name has been struck |

shall not work with such person, unless he such terms as may be satisfactory to members job.

(3) Any shipwright working with the tools must member of the union, otherwise members are p from working with him.

Having regard to the terms of this rule, the answer 0 jury, in our opinion, only amounts to a finding that the defe ants, when breaking the law, thought that they were justifi doing so because of a duty which they supposed themselves to to their union. This would not be a defence to a prosecu! we do not think it is a defence to an action for ae The doctrine which allows a neutral act, done in the disel a supposed duty, and without any desire to cause inj another, to be treated as innocent, has no application to prohibited by positive law. With respect to acts not so proh but which may be rightful or wrongful according to stances, the conditions on which the rightfulness or w ' depends are part of the common rule of law governing the case determine, therefore, whether the act itself is rightful or wr

our opinion, the findings of the jury also involve a H. ©. oF A. te desire on the part of defendants to injure the plaintiff. aes

s view their action, actuated by this intention, was itself Brisnaye |, so that, even if the case fell within the third class, the 3!" are not entitled to the benefit of the rule expressed in ee IV.,but are liable under that expressed in Proposition V. v. view which we take of the law, as applicable to the

e facts found by the jury, it becomes unnecessary to consider

act question of what other motives would be improper,

at would be sufficient evidence of an improper motive to be

toa jury, when the rule expressed in the fourth Proposition

As to the objection that the defendant Union cannot lawfully

leemed guilty of a conspiracy, we think, and indeed it was not

, that this Court is bound to follow the decision of the

'of Lords in Laff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society

these reasons we are of opinion that the appeal fails.

licitors, for appellants, Atthow & McGregor. icitors, for respondents, Crouch & Darvall.