that is not the proper approach under s.202. Section 202 applies where there is a threat to commence an action for infringement of copyright in respect of a particular work or other particular subject matter and "empowers the Court to award damages only in respect of loss occasioned by an unjustified threat in respect of an infringement of copyright in relation to that specific work or specific subject matter". It follows, he says, that s.202 permits no more than an award of damages for loss resulting from any impediment to the enjoyment of the copyright in those four identified Williams' games; it does not authorise damages for loss relating to other Williams' games. Moreover, as the threats were made only to two of IGE's customers, the damages must be confined
to the loss occasioned by any decision on their part, caused by the threat, not to purchase more of the specific Williams' games the subject of the threat.
Counsel for the applicants, Mr Philip Taylor, argues that this approach is too narrow. He says that there is no restriction upon the recoverable damages, other than that they must have been caused by the unjustified threat. In his contention there is no difference between the approach to be adopted under s.202 and that under s.52 of the Trade Practices Act, or in an action in tort; "(t)he Court determines the loss that flowed from the wrong. This is derived by comparing the position which eventuated with the position which would have resulted had there been no wrong."
The nature of the right conferred by s.202 was discussed by members of the High Court in Avel. At 104-105 Dawson J applied to s.202 a comment made by von Doussa J in this Court in connection with s.121 of the Patents Act 1952, which is in similar terms. The comment was made in Townsend Controls Pty Ltd v Gilead (1989) 14 IPR 443 at 448:
"The provisions of s121 give no right to a patentee to make a threat. The purpose of the section, on the contrary, is to provide a statutory remedy for a person against whom a threat is made by a patentee who embarks on 'self help' measures instead of enforcing his claimed monopoly by instituting proceedings for infringement."
So the question that arises in respect of an assessment of damages under s.202 is what damage has been suffered by the person bringing the action as a result of the threat or threats. Although von Doussa J spoke of the action being brought by the person "against whom a threat is made", this being the factual situation in Townsend Controls, s.202(1) is not so limited. The condition of its operation is that "a person ... threatens (another) person with an action or proceeding in respect of an infringement of copyright". If that condition is fulfilled, "a person aggrieved may bring an action against the first-mentioned person ... and may recover such damages (if any) as he has sustained", unless the defendant establishes infringement. The term "person aggrieved" is not separately defined. It is plainly intended to include any person adversely affected by the threat or threats. The supplier to the recipient of a threatening letter of the goods the subject of the threat, who loses sales or potential sales as a result of the letter, falls within the concept of a "person aggrieved". That person may recover any damages sustained by him or her as a direct and foreseeable consequence of the threat. In considering what damages fall within that category, it is necessary to keep in mind the nature and extent of the threat. But it cannot be stated, as an absolute proposition, that the damages will be confined to losses in respect of the particular works that are the subject of the threat or threats. A threat in respect of one work may cause such a disruption of a commercial relationship as to
cause losses in respect of other works. The extent of the damage is a question of fact in every case.
Neither of the letters giving rise to the present case made a claim in respect of all Williams' machines. Each letter mentioned particular models. But each recipient reacted in a similar way, by returning to IGE all the Williams' machines it held on consignment. This reaction was, in my opinion, foreseeable. The recipients held the Williams' machines on consignment. They had made no significant outlay in respect of them. They had no capital interest in them. If a particular machine was sold, the consignee stood to make a few hundred dollars, perhaps a thousand dollars, but the derivable income was small. The income they could realise from the machines would be dwarfed by legal costs, if Avel chose to sue them. Furthermore, the consignees did not sell to ultimate consumers of video-games but to people who were interested in using them for commercial purposes - people in the trade. People in that category might be expected quickly to learn that Avel was making claims of copyright in respect of some used Williams' machines and to steer clear of them all. The fact is that, by reason of the threats (limited as they were), IGE lost the opportunity of selling items from this consignment through Zaccaria and Coin Play. Although IGE did eventually sell all the machines, it did so at a loss. The market was undermined by the fact that people within the trade became aware of Avel's threats.
I think IGE is entitled to recover the whole of its loss on the October 1987 shipment. I mean by this not only the actual loss sustained - that is, the difference between the cost of the goods sold and the total amount realised on sale, $17,031 - but also the estimated gross profit calculated by Mr Johnson, $50,978. Although Mr Cashion contended that the consignment prices fixed by Mr Cowan might not have been realised, all the evidence is that the market was strong, and these prices realistic, until the threats were made.
The two sums add up to $68,009. I propose to allow interest on that amount, but not for the whole period (about seven years) that has elapsed since these machines were sold, during which the applicants were responsible for significant delay. No doubt it was reasonable for them to await the outcome of the Multicoin litigation. But the High Court gave judgment in December 1990. If this proceeding had then been promptly commenced, and thereafter diligently prosecuted, it could have been concluded by mid-1993. Under the circumstances, interest should be awarded for a period of only five years.
I do not propose to apply the rates for pre-judgment interest prescribed from time to time by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. I prefer to take a single rate for the whole five year period. Interest rates were high during the period 1988 to 1993. It would be fair, I think, to allow 15% per annum for five years; a total of $51,006.
Consistently with his submissions in relation to the October 1987 shipment, Mr Cashion submits that the respondent's threats did not affect the later importation of used Williams' machines other than the four models referred to in the letters. As with the October 1987 shipment, however, I think the market was not so discriminating as that. I accept Mr Cowan's evidence that, from a practical point of view, it was likely to prove impossible to trade profitably in Williams' machines until the termination of the Multicoin litigation. I also accept Mr Cowan's evidence that, absent the threats and litigation, he would have imported further Williams' machines in the period 1988-1990. There is independent evidence that during this period, used Williams' machines were both available from America and in demand in Australia.
Mr Cowan said he had intended to import two container loads each year. While I accept the sincerity of this statement, I am not prepared to assess damages on the basis that his intention would have been fulfilled. A rate of two containers per year would have been higher than that achieved by IGE (for quality machines) in the post. Estimates like this tend to prove unduly optimistic. I think it would be fair to assess damages for lost future consignments on the basis that one container load would have been imported towards the end of each of the years 1988, 1989 and 1990, in time for the Christmas holiday trading period. I adopt Mr Johnson's calculation of a gross profit of $50,978 per shipment. Consistently with the attitude previously stated, I allow interest at 15% on the 1988 shipment for 3 years and 9 months ($28,675), interest on the 1989 shipment for 2 years and 9 months ($21,028) and interest on the 1990 shipment for 1 year and 9 months ($13,381).
In the result, I propose to enter judgment in favour of IGE in the total sum of $335,033. This amount is made up as follows:
$
1987 shipment
actual loss 17,031
lost gross profit 50,978
68,009
interest at 15% pa on
$68,009 for 5 years 51,006 119,015
1988 foregone shipment
estimated loss of gross profit 50,978
interest for 3.75 years
at 15% pa 28,675 79,653
1989 foregone shipment
estimated loss of gross profit 50,978
interest for 2.75 years at 15% 21,028 72,006