The applicants' position
41Mr Brennan, who is a barrister by profession, appeared as a litigant in person and made submissions on his and Ms Soden's behalf. In addition to his oral submissions, Mr Brennan prepared written submissions to assist the Court.
42As I understand it, Mr Brennan's position is that s 26(1)(e) of the EPA Act limits the TPO to the protection of any existing tree and therefore any provisions for requiring replacement vegetation are beyond the power of the EPA Act and the LLEP.
43The basis of his argument is that the scope of all valid delegated legislation in NSW is limited by s 32 of the Interpretation Act 1987. In particular he relies on s 32(2)(a). Section 32 states:
32 Instruments to be construed so as not to exceed the powers conferred by the Acts under which they are made
(1) An instrument shall be construed as operating to the full extent of, but so as not to exceed, the power conferred by the Act under which it is made.
(2) If any provision of an instrument, or the application of any such provision to any person, subject-matter or circumstance, would, but for this section, be construed as being in excess of the power conferred by the Act under which it is made:
(a) it shall be a valid provision to the extent to which it is not in excess of that power, and
(b) the remainder of the instrument, and the application of the provision to other persons, subject-matters or circumstances, shall not be affected.
(3) This section applies to an instrument in addition to, and without limiting the effect of, any provision of the instrument or of the Act under which it is made.
44Mr Brennan contends that it follows that anything in the Model Provisions that is not allowed under the EPA Act can be ignored for legal purposes. He asserts that s 26 of the EPA Act enables an environmental planning instrument to include provisions for, amongst other things, tree protection or preservation (s 26(e)) and protection and conservation of native animals and plants (s 26(e1). In essence, anything beyond the scope of s 26(1)(e), in the provisions of the Leichhardt TPO, is in excess of the power of the EPA Act and is therefore not valid.
45For the benefit of the argument, s 26(1) states:
26 Contents of environmental planning instruments
(1) Without affecting the generality of section 24 or any other provision of this Act, an environmental planning instrument may make provision for or with respect to any of the following:
(a) protecting, improving or utilising, to the best advantage, the environment,
(b) controlling (whether by the imposing of development standards or otherwise) development,
(c) reserving land for use for the purposes of open space, a public place or public reserve within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1993 a national park or other land reserved or dedicated under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, a public cemetery, a public hospital, a public railway, a public school or any other purpose that is prescribed as a public purpose for the purposes of this section,
(d) providing, maintaining and retaining, and regulating any matter relating to, affordable housing,
(e) protecting or preserving trees or vegetation, [emphasis added]
(e1) protecting and conserving native animals and plants, including threatened species, populations and ecological communities, and their habitats,
(f) controlling any act, matter or thing for or with respect to which provision may be made under paragraph (a) or (e),
(g) controlling advertising,
(h) such other matters as are authorised or required to be included in the environmental planning instrument by this or any other Act.
46Mr Brennan argues that the use of the words 'protecting' and 'preservation' in s 26(1)(e) limits the scope of the sub-clause to protection and preservation and does not extend authority to an order to plant new trees. In contrast however, he notes that s 26(1)(e1) uses the word 'conserving' which he maintains denotes reproduction and ongoing husbandry of the species and that this requirement only applies to native species and not exotic trees (such as the Jacaranda) which are only covered by the more limited s 26(1)(e).
47Further, Mr Brennan contends that the use of the word "conserve" in the stated aim of the Leichhardt Council TPO ["to conserve and enhance the tree cover....and general landscaping of Leichhardt"] is completely outside the delegated authority as this is used only in the context of s 26(1)(e1) which is limited to native species.
48In Mr Brennan's opinion, if council can impose a condition for a replacement tree why not a fishpond, or waterfall or anything else. In his view, the imposition of such a condition represents an unreasonable interference with the quiet enjoyment of his land and his right to garden where and when he chooses. He also considers it amounts to unacceptable control, by council, over private property. This, he says, was carefully contemplated when sub-sections 26(1)(e) and (e1) were drafted.
49Apart from questioning the jurisdictional basis of the imposition of a condition to replace the tree, Mr Brennan considers that on merit, the condition should not be imposed for the following reasons:
· The front garden is small and any tree planting would be in front of a south-facing bedroom window. Apart from blocking sunlight, the tree may also pose security issues by providing a screen behind which anyone could hide.
· The front garden contains pavers from a local primary school and have sentimental value; any planting would necessitate some disturbance to them.
· The front garden also contains gas and other pipes and tree roots may interfere with them or impede any future maintenance.
· A tree would be out of keeping with the frontages of the adjoining properties and the existing plants are sufficient.