"Two preliminary comments should be made about
the way in which the case for the appellant
was presented. First, the argument at times
seemed to suggest that it is the intended use
of documents in litigation which attracts the
relevant privilege. This of course is not so.
The relevant head of privilege is legal
professional privilege which attaches to
communications passing between legal adviser
and client. Documents submitted by the client
to his solicitors for advice or for use in
anticipated litigation attract the privilege,
but it is very doubtful whether there is a
privilege for documents coming into existence
as materials for the purposes of an action to
be conducted by a litigant in erson (see
Jones v. Great Central Railway Co./1910} A.c.
4; In re Holloway (1887) 12 P.D. 167; Wheeler
v. Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch. D. 675 at p.681;
Kyshe v. Holt, Childs and Brotherton [isss|
W.N. 128: Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia
(1876) 2 Ch. D. 644 at pp.658-659; Halsbury's
Laws of England, 4th ed., vol.13, p.68). Of
course it may be that privilege can be claimed
on the ground that a document relates solely
to the case of the party, a head of privilege
still available in New South Wales. Secondly,
the argument did not always make clear the
distinction between the purpose for which
information is obtained and the purpose for
which a document recording information is
brought into existence."