Parity of reasoning suggests that the Crown in right of the Commonwealth was not intended to be bound by the Planning Act. However, to rebut that suggestion, Counsel for the applicant pointed to cl. 142 of the Kingston Planning Scheme which is in these terms:
142 RESERVED LAND
Purpose
To identify land for public use, including recreation, roads, railways, airfields, schools, hospitals, cemeteries and other government and semi-government uses.
142-1 Use of land
Land which is marked on the Planning Scheme map in the ways described in the table below is reserved for the use shown or for use by the authorities and departments named in carrying out their lawful functions.
The land may be used as described in the table or:
* As it was lawfully used immediately before the approval date.
* For a use that is granted a permit.
Reserved land occupied by a public authority or municipal council may be used in any way the authority or council may lawfully use it, provided it is consistent with the use for which the land is reserved.
Land is considered to be vested in a public authority or municipal council if the authority or council is appointed a committee of management under the Crown Land (Reserves) Act 1978 or a corresponding previous Act.
Then follows a list of planning scheme map references, each with a corresponding "use" including "AF" for which the use is "Civil airfield", designating, I take it, the whole of the land comprised in the Moorabbin Airport.
In the light of the meaning of "public authority" to be derived from the Planning Act, I am unable to construe that prescription as intended to apply, in terms, to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. It is equally open to the interpretation that it adopts a convenient mechanism for describing the area of land occupied by the airfield against the possibility that it may, at some time, be used or developed by an entity bound by the Planning Act and the Kingston Planning Scheme. In any event, a planning scheme is a form of delegated legislation and the planning authority that is empowered under s. 8 of the Planning Act to prepare a scheme cannot, by the terms of the scheme, extend the scope or general operation of the Planning Act. The scheme is strictly ancillary; (Shanahan v Scott (1957) 96 CLR 245 at 250).
I have derived no assistance in answering this first question from Kangaroo Point East Association Inc v Balkin (1993) 119 ALR 305 on which Counsel for Ventana relied. In that case there was no consideration of the terms of the Brisbane Town Planning Act 1964 (Qld) under which the Town Plan for the City of Brisbane was promulgated. The majority in the Queensland Court of Appeal (Macrossan CJ and Davies JA) were content to note, at 309 that "applied in accordance with its tenor, the development plan would restrict the use to which the subject land could be put". That was clearly right having regard to the specific terms of the prescription and the fact that the land had originally been zoned "Special Uses (Commonwealth Government)". Their Honours then went on to consider the application to the land of s. 4 of the Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 and s. 52 of the Constitution.
It was also argued by Counsel for Ventana that the Planning Act should be construed from the starting point that it was intended to apply to all Commonwealth land to the fullest extent possible. However, nothing in the language of the Planning Act was indicated as supporting that premise. It was merely pointed out that a legislative scheme which is concerned to regulate in a coherent, aesthetically and environmentally sensitive way, the use and development of land throughout the State would be less efficacious if it were not applicable to a landholding entity as significant as the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. However, it is equally open to explain the absence from the Planning Act of any reference to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth by an assumption that the Commonwealth would not use or permit the use of its land in a way which ignored aesthetic considerations or the amenity of the area or was otherwise inappropriate or insensitive.
For these reasons, I have been unable to discern in the language or context of the Planning Act anything which, applying the presumption with all of the flexibility mandated by Bropho v Western Australia, warrants a departure from the starting point that it was not intended to bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the first question must be answered, no.
2. Is the FAC entitled to the privileges or immunities of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth?
A similar question in Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (supra) was regarded by Gibbs ACJ as presenting little difficulty because the Act establishing the Queensland Commissioner for Railways as a statutory corporation sole described the Commissioner as "representing the Crown" and prescribed that it "shall have and may exercise all the powers, privileges, rights and remedies of the Crown". His Honour, at 115, regarded as important whether the body in question is subject to direct ministerial control or is independent of the government, possessing discretionary powers of its own. The discharge of traditional public functions was also identified as a useful discrimen. See also State Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (1986) 161 CLR 639 where the High Court, in a joint judgment, arrived at a similar conclusion fixing on the facts that the State Bank had no corporators, was obliged to pay its profits into Consolidated Revenue, was subject to audit by the State Auditor-General and was empowered to make by-laws. It was also seen as significant that the seven members of the Board were to be appointed by the Governor of New South Wales although one of the appointees was required to have been elected by employees of the Bank.
However, in Townsville Hospitals Board v Townsville City Council (1982) 42 ALR 319, the fact that most members of the Hospital Board were appointed by the Governor-in-Council was not decisive of the present question. Gibbs CJ noted, at 325:
Although the Board is subject to quite stringent controls in relation to proposed building work, the Board retains an independent discretion to decide whether to engage in such work. The Board cannot be compelled to engage in the building work and whether it does so lies within its own discretion. However, if it does decide to engage in the work and needs to borrow or raise money or make
financial arrangements, it is subject to the controls provided by s 24. There is nothing to indicate that the purpose of those controls is to achieve any of the objects of the Building Act. The Minister, in deciding whether or not to approve of plans and specifications submitted by the Board, is not obliged to consider whether the Standard Building By-laws have been observed. The Minister in question is the Minister for Health or other Minister for the time being administering the Hospitals Act. No doubt the Minister might be expected to consider whether the building shown in the plans and specifications was a sound financial proposition. It may be assumed that he might also consider whether the building proposed was suitable for hospital purposes. It is unnecessary to decide whether the Minister might consider whether the plans and specifications complied with the Standard Building By-laws, for there is nothing in s 24 that obliges him to do so.
After a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Hospitals Act 1936 (Qld) it was held that it did not disclose an intention that hospitals incorporated under it should be accorded special privileges and immunities of the Crown not available to other legal persons. That case was applied by a Full Court of this Court in Paul Dainty Corporation Pty Ltd v National Tennis Centre Trust (1990) 94 ALR 225 where the Court emphasised the importance of "the statutory ability of the executive to control the instrumentality, whether in practice it does so or not," and concluded, at 251 in respect of the Victorian Arts Centre Trust:
The question is not an easy one to decide but, in our view, having regard to Gibbs CJ's reminder as to how easily the shield of the Crown can be provided for if that is the intention of the legislature, the better view is that the VACT, in its provision of a commercial service in the form of the Bass ticketing service, is not operating under that shield.
In Kinross v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1994) 129 ALR 283, Einfeld J examined the Government Insurance Office (Privatisation) Act 1991 (NSW) which had the effect of transforming the "old" Government Insurance Office, which had been a statutory body representing the Crown, into a company, the shares in which were owned by members of the public. The Privatisation Act sought to achieve that in two stages by vesting the business of the GIO in the first respondent and six months later selling shares in the first respondent to members of the public. The Privatisation Act provided that, in the interim period before public ownership, the Board of Directors of the first respondent were subject to the direction and control of the Minister. It was further provided that the first respondent and any of its subsidiaries were agents through which the State of New South Wales engaged in State insurance, and were, for that purpose, public authorities of the State. However, it was also stipulated that the first respondent and any subsidiary were not, and did not represent, the State of New South Wales except by express agreement with the Minister. In carrying out what he called a "finely balanced exercise", his Honour concluded at 293:
The Privatisation Act was clearly designed to provide a period during which an entirely new body to the former State-run and controlled entity (the old GIO) was to prepare the State's insurance agency for public sale. In essence this was the task of the directors of the first respondent subject to ministerial direction and control in particular matters thought necessary for the overall purpose. No doubt there was more than one purpose for injecting the intermediate Pt 7 status of the first respondent, but no specific purpose was disclosed by the statute for this status at all if ministerial control was at its heart. It would, as Townsville Hospitals suggests, have been simple enough to state such an intent unambiguously.
Furthermore, the function of the first respondent was essentially non-governmental - ie the promotion and sale of insurance policies and the conduct of money market and finance operations. It seems likely that the reserve powers of the minister were inserted to ensure that the political intention was not subverted and that the best possible presentation of the entity was achieved to ensure its successful public float. It must also be remembered that if the first respondent is immune from liability under the TPA, the second and third respondents, as companies completely independent of the State, are reaping the benefits of what would, on the present assumptions, otherwise have been unlawful conduct by them. This would be a manifestly unfair result which in the absence of express provision, the parliament should not be presumed to have intended.
Notwithstanding the extensive potential, even opportunity, for control by the minister given by the Privatisation Act, I find the absence of any express conferral of Crown status in Pt 7 such as assisted the task of French J in his Honour's conclusions on the old
GIO, and the manifestly commercial nature of the enterprise, to be decisive in favour of the applicant. Moreover, the first respondent was created as the first stage of the privatisation process, ie divestment of government ownership and control. In adopting the terminology used in Pt 7, especially s 36 where it would most obviously have been relevant, the drafters of the legislation deliberately ignored the express terms of s 3(3A) of the GIO Act bestowing Crown immunity on the old GIO. In my view, this was a sufficiently clear demonstration of the legislative intent to separate the first respondent from the Crown.
An illustration of the delicacy of the balance on which a resolution of this question can turn is afforded by Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Commissioner of Stamps for South Australia (1979) 145 CLR 330 where Barwick CJ and Mason J concluded that the Trust incorporated under the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) was a manifestation of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth so that acquisitions of property by it were not exigible to State stamp duty. Stephen and Aickin JJ, on the other hand, concluded that the Trust could not be characterized as the Crown or a servant or agent of the Crown.
In Hawthorn v State Bank of South Australia (1993) 112 ALR 691, O'Loughlin J held that the respondent bank was an instrumentality of the Crown and protected by Crown immunity from proceedings under the Trade Practices Act. His Honour based that conclusion principally on the presence in the State Bank of South Australia Act 1983 (SA) of s. 6(4) which provided:
Notwithstanding that the Bank is an instrumentality of the Crown, the Bank is liable to rates, taxes and other imposts under the law of the State as if it were not such an instrumentality.
A similar conclusion was also reached by the Queensland Court of Appeal (Fitzgerald P, Pincus JA and Demack J in Jellyn Pty Ltd v State Bank of South Australia (1995) 129 ALR 521 where reference was made to s. 6(4) of the State Bank of South Australia Act quoted above and the Court continued:
The appellants sought to read s 6(4) down by reference to s 6(3), arguing that the respondent is only an instrumentality of the Crown to the limited extent required by s 6(3); that is, in holding its property "for and on behalf of the Crown". As will be seen below, even that might be of particular significance: Launceston Corp v Hydro-Electric Commission (1959) 100 CLR 654 at 662. However, the two subsections, 6(3) and (4), taken together do not support the conclusion for which the appellants contend. While the respondent is an instrumentality of the Crown in holding its property for and on behalf of the Crown, there is nothing in the language or evident policy of the two provisions which restricts the respondent's role as an instrumentality of the Crown to that purpose; in particular, the liability imposed upon the respondent by s 6(4) is not confined to those "rates, taxes and imposts under the law of the State" which relate to property held by the respondent.
After reviewing a series of other authorities the Court of Appeal went on to observe at 536:
The conclusion which we draw from these authorities is that the statutory description of the respondent as an "instrumentality of the Crown" in right of South Australia in the State Bank of South Australia Act (SA) establishes or confirms that it is the statutory corporation by which the Executive Government of South Australia performs the functions prescribed by that Act, which may be compendiously referred to as the business of banking, but does not of itself indicate that the respondent is the Crown, or servant or agent of the Crown, in right of South Australia or entitled to immunity from the operation of statutes by which the Crown is not bound. The legislative intention with respect to the respondent's entitlement to the immunity of the Crown is to be derived from the entire statute (Townsville Hospitals Board at CLR 289), including the description of the respondent as an "instrumentality of the Crown" in s 6(4). That description is an important part, but not the whole, of the statutory context to be considered.
The Court of Appeal then proceeded to consider the South Australian Act "by reference to the modern tests which have been enunciated by the High Court to ascertain whether a body is entitled to the shield of the Crown", and concluded, at 542 that: