The IAA Decision
7 On 30 May 2016, the Appellant was advised that the IAA had affirmed the Delegate's decision (AB 182-202). The IAA's decision referred to the decision of the Delegate as follows:
1. The referred applicant (the applicant) claims to be a Shia from Najaf, Iraq. He arrived in Australia by boat on 13 October 2012. On 9 September 2015 he lodged an application for a temporary protection visa (TPV) claiming that he faced harm from the Mahdi Army, a Shia militia, if he returned to Iraq.
2. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the delegate) was 'satisfied with the overall credibility and plausibility of the applicant's claims'. However, she relied on country information and information provided by the applicant indicating that he had not been threatened with harm since 2010, to find that he did not face a real chance of harm from the Mahdi Army now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. The delegate also considered a number of claims that were not explicitly made by the applicant but which she considered arose from the facts of the case. However, she considered that none of these gave rise to a real chance of persecution or a real risk of harm. She found that the applicant was not a refuge[e] and was not entitled to complementary protection.
8 The information before the IAA was referred to at [3]-[7]:
3. I have had regard to the material referred by the Secretary under s.473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
4. On 23 May 2016 the applicant's representative provided a submission addressing the delegate's decision.
5. The submission restates and clarifies the claims made by the applicant before the Department; corrects some perceived misinterpretations of the applicant's claims by the delegate; and includes some legal argument. To the extent that the submission is based on information provided by the applicant to the delegate, it is not new information, and I have had regard to it.
6. The submission also includes a media report which it is submitted suggests that there is now a risk of confrontation between different Shia groups. The report is dated 5 May 2016, the date of the delegate's decision, and refers to events which took place shortly before the delegate's decision, when supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr stormed the Green Zone in Baghdad protesting against the al Abadi government (which al Sadr previously supported but now opposes). The report notes that following the chaos of the demonstration, al Sadr's supporters and other Shia armed groups had emerged "almost instantly" and fighters had then spread throughout Baghdad neighbourhoods. An Iraqi government official had responded to this saying that the risk of a "Shi'ite on Shi'ite confrontation is there". Although the applicant stated in the TPV application "we are threatened from all the Shia parties that are present in Najaf. Najaf is the centre of all the Shia parties", it is evident from the totality of the information he provided to the Department that it is the Mahdi Army from which he fears harm; he never explicitly mentioned fearing harm of any kind from any other Shia militia that might have had a presence in Najaf.
7. The information relates to recent political developments in Iraq. Although the article itself was published on the day of the delegate's decision and concerns developments that had been evolving for some time, I am satisfied that the information about the demonstration inside the Green Zone and the possible implications of this was not and could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made, because it occurred such a short time before the decision was made and because the particular media report was not previously available. However, as the information relates to the possibility of violence between different Shia armed groups, with which the applicant has no connection; appears to be referring to the situation in Baghdad, not Najaf; and appears to be highly speculative, in that it cites only one source who states that there is a "risk" of confrontation between Shia parties with no analysis of the degree of risk or how or when it might develop in reality, or exactly how it might affect the applicant in Najaf, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which justify considering this information. I am therefore prevented from considering this information by s.473DD.
9 The IAA's decision summarised the Appellant's claims for protection. It noted (at [9]) that the Delegate had also considered a number of claims not explicitly made by the Appellant but that may be relevant: that he would face harm as a failed asylum seeker returning from a western country; that as a Shia he would face harm from Daesh or ISIS; and that he would face harm by reason of his religious profile as a Shia Muslin from Najaf.
10 The IAA referred to the documentary evidence submitted by the Appellant in support of his application. That evidence included death certificates for two of his brothers who had been shot. The documentary evidence also included evidence that the Appellant's brother and cousin had been employed at Camp Bucca as a teacher and cleric respectively.
11 Under the heading "Discussion of claims and findings", the IAA decision reads as follows:
15. I have doubts about some aspects of the applicant's claims. However, to the extent that he was able, I consider that the applicant has provided a consistent account of the events which he claims led to his decision to leave Iraq, which is supported where possible by documents and which is broadly consistent with country information.
Harm from Mahdi Army
16. The delegate accepted that the applicant may have been approached by the Mahdi Army to facilitate the release of its prisoners but she found that this and the threats of harm occurred in 2008, 2009 and 2010; and the applicant had left Iraq two years later without experiencing further harm. She noted that the Al Mahdi launched numerous attacks against mainly US military targets which peaked in mid-2007 and 2008, and continued sporadically from 2008 until the withdrawal of US troops in 2011. In 2008 the Mahdi Army had shifted its focus to socio-political activities. She found that the current activity of the Mahdi Army is focussed on fighting against Daesh.
17. The country information referred to by the delegate indicates that in 2007 the leader of the Mahdi Army, Moqtada al Sadr, ordered the Mahdi Army to lay down its arms, however, not all members followed this order and some individual units began to operate independently. This "rogue" Mahdi Army continued to fight despite al Sadr's orders, and may later have merged with other militant organisations. The Mahdi Army resumed military action in February 2008, provoking a massive Iraqi Security Force (ISF) offensive against Mahdi Army elements in Basra which resulted in thousands of Mahdi Army casualties. Sadr agreed to a ceasefire on 31 March 2008. Following the ceasefire, Sadr shifted the Mahdi Army's focus away from military operations to the provision of social services, assigning most of its members to a new branch officially known as the Mumahidoon, but which continued to be referred to as the Mahdi Army, and which provided services to Shiite communities in the suburbs of Baghdad and throughout Southern Iraq that included Koranic lessons, reconstruction, and garbage collection. Sadr retained a small elite military branch called the Promised Day Brigades (PDB) which was founded in around November 20086. The PDB was prohibited from attacking Iraqi citizens or Iraqi troops, but did continue to attack United States Forces (USF) until their withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.
18. In 2010 Sadr shifted the focus of the Mahdi Army from social services to politics. It competed successfully in the 2010 elections, entering into a coalition with the Maliki government which, by December 2011, al Sadr opposed. In August 2013 Sadr announced that he would retire from political activity and dismantle the Mahdi Army. However, after the fall of Mosul to IS in June 2014 he called upon his followers to take up arms against IS, under the name "Peace Brigades". Shortly afterwards, he pledged his support to the al Abadi government. Since then, the Peace Brigades have been working with the ISF and indirectly the USF against IS.
19. I accept that the applicant's brother … worked for the USF at Camp Bucca from May 2008 until February 2009. I accept that in March 2008 the applicant was approached by a person from the Mahdi Army who asked him to approach his brother for help in getting Mahdi Army prisoners released from Camp Bucca. He spoke to his brother about this, but his brother said that he did not know the names of individual prisoners, as they were known only by number, and he would not be able to help. The applicant informed the Mahdi Army that he could not help. Although the applicant has not claimed that they explicitly threatened him, I accept that the applicant feared that there was an implied threat that they would harm him.
20. I accept that in October 2008 and February 2009 respectively the applicant's brothers … were shot and killed. I cannot dismiss the possibility that these murders were carried out by the Mahdi Army and were connected with [the Appellant's brother's] work at Camp Bucca and the applicant's refusal to help the Mahdi Army.
21. I accept that later in 2009 the applicant was approached to work for the Mahdi Army in the Green Zone, and that he tried to put them off by indicating that he would think about this. Again, I accept that the applicant feared he would be harmed for refusing the help the Mahdi Army though he does not claim that they made any explicit threat against him.
22. The applicant worked in the carpentry shop in Al Hayraa until some time in 2010. In 2010 the applicant's house in Al Hayraa was damaged in a bombing or fire. The delegate noted in the primary decision record that the applicant stated at the protection interview that he was living there at the time; however, having listened to the recording of the protection interview, it is my view that he was not living there when the house was burned. He indicated at the protection interview that he left Al Hayraa in 2010 when the shop was closed, although again, it is not clear whether this was before or after the house was attacked, and it appears that he may have moved to another area, Al Daroof before moving to al Medina St, Al Jumhoori in 2011. This was the area where his family had lived many years before, so the applicant used his family address and did not need to register his new address (in rented accommodation). I accept that he was concerned that the Mahdi Army had infiltrated government offices and so he might have come to their attention had he registered his new address. The applicant remained in Al Jumhoori until his departure. About two years later his wife and daughters moved from Al Jumhoori to live with his parents in Al Hayraa. There is no suggestion that any of these family members have experienced any problems or threats of harm from the Mahdi Army. I accept the applicant's explanation that the women would not be targeted, although I have doubts about his claim that his father would not be, and I note that his brother … was apparently living with the family in Al Hayraa between 2012 and 2015, apparently without problems. I accept that [the Appellant's brother] migrated to the US at around the time of the protection interview in 2015.
23. I accept that after [the Appellant's brother] stopped working at Camp Bucca he lived in different locations, which I am prepared to accept was because he feared for his life - however it appears that he remained in Najaf. He migrated to the US in 2015 (around the time of the protection interview in November). I accept that he migrated with a Special Immigrant Visa issued to former employees of the USF deemed to be at risk because of that employment.
24. I accept that the applicant was viewed as both a collaborator and an opponent of the Mahdi Army because of his brother's employment with the USF and because of the applicant's refusal to assist them. The most recent UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for assessing claims of Iraqi asylum seekers (which date from 2012), noted reports that armed Shi'ite groups (including the Mahdi Army) which had in the past focussed on attacking the international and US forces, had also singled out Iraqis of various profiles for kidnapping and assassination, including persons considered as "collaborators" with the foreign forces, especially the USF. The Guidelines indicate that family members of such individuals were also targeted.
25. I accept that the applicant felt that he was at serious risk of harm in 2010 following the murders of his brothers and the attack on his former house. I accept that he made the decision to leave Iraq then. However, in my view, subsequent events indicate that he was not at risk of harm and that he did not face a real chance of persecution when he left Iraq in 2012.
26. The applicant stated that some time in 2010 he closed the shop in Al Hayraa and moved from there to the Al Jumhoori area where his family originated. I accept that he did not approach the authorities to register his new address, and that he did not work, having been forced to close the shop; however, he stated at the protection interview that he was able to live comfortably from his savings and said that life was "easy". He does not claim to have been explicitly threatened or approached by the Mahdi Army from this time up until his departure. During this period his brother … resided with the applicant's parents and worked as a carpenter up until his departure in 2015. There is no suggestion that [that brother] was threatened or harmed during this period. His brother … who had worked at Camp Bucca, remained in Najaf until he left for the US in 2015. The information provided by the applicant about his circumstances, and those of his remaining family members, therefore indicates that they were not at real risk of harm after 2010. In my view, this appears to coincide with and reflect the closure of Camp Bucca in September 2009, the change in focus of the Mahdi Army, and the withdrawal of the USF in 2011. Given these circumstances, I do not consider that there is a real chance that the applicant would be at risk of harm as a target of the Mahdi Army if he returns to Iraq now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. Country information indicates that the Mahdi Army no longer exists as an armed force in the same way that it did up until 2009 or 2010, when I accept that the applicant's family members were targeted and he was under threat. Its offshoot the Peace Brigades is now focused on fighting against Daesh. Moqtada al Sadr is engaged in the political process. There is no recent information to indicate that the Mahdi Army continued to target perceived collaborators after the period covered in the 2012 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines, and I note the country information stating that al Sadr expressly forbade attacks on Iraqi citizens at the end of 2008. While there is perhaps a small possibility that the applicant would be at risk from rogue elements in the Mahdi Army because of his previous profile, I consider that the chance that he would actually be harmed so long after the relevant events, and in the changed circumstances prevailing now, is remote and insubstantial. The available information indicates and I find that there is no real chance that he would face serious harm from the Mahdi Army, or anyone associated with it, if he returned to Iraq now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
27. The applicant's representative states that in the period before his departure from Iraq the applicant was living discreetly and keeping a low profile because of his fear of harm. He argued that it would be a legal error to require the applicant to thus modify his conduct in order to avoid persecution. The submission cites the High Court decision in S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71 as authority for this proposition. However, s. 5J(3) of the Act, which was introduced recently, provides that an applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if s/he could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution; but specifies certain modifications which it is impermissible to require an applicant to make. I consider that even if the applicant were required to live discreetly in order to avoid persecution, in the circumstances of this case this would constitute taking reasonable steps to avoid persecution, and would not involve any impermissible modification to his behaviour, as set out in s.5J(3)(a)-(c). In any event, because of the changes in the political and security situation since 2012 - the changed nature of the operations of the Mahdi Army and the apparent absence of any threat or risk of harm to the applicant's family members who remained in Iraq after his departure - I do not consider that it would be necessary for the applicant to continue to live discreetly in order to avoid persecution on return.
28. Overall, I am not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant would face harm from the Mahdi Army, or anyone associated with it, if he were to return to Iraq now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Harm for reason of religion as a Shia in Najaf
29. I cannot identify anywhere in the written or oral information provided by the applicant where he claimed that he faces harm as a Shia in Najaf for reason of his religion, nor does this claim appear to arise squarely from the facts of the case. Indeed, in the submission to the IAA the applicant's representative noted that the applicant had never made such a claim, stating "[b]eing a Shia by itself does not cause him any problems". It was argued that rather, the applicant's claim is based on imputed political opinion resulting from his refusal to assist the Mahdi Army which therefore regards him as an apostate.
30. Having considered the information put forward on behalf of the applicant and the country information considered by the delegate, I am not satisfied that the applicant faces harm of any kind as a Shia in Najaf, for the essential and significant reason of his religion.
31. As to the assertion by the applicant's representative that the applicant's refusal to help the Mahdi Army has resulted in his being viewed as an apostate, the applicant's own evidence indicates that his claim is that he would be viewed as a person generally opposed to the Mahdi Army. As the Mahdi Army is a sectarian political movement this could involve both political and religious opposition. The evidence does not suggest, however, that the applicant would face harm as an apostate separately and distinct from any harm he might face as a person viewed generally as an opponent of the Mahdi Army.
32. The applicant's claim that he faces harm as an imputed opponent of the Mahdi Army - whether for reason of his imputed political opinion or as an apostate - is dealt with above.
Inability to subsist, lack of services, economic issues
33. The applicant claims that he fears severe economic hardship affecting his ability to subsist, general insecurity, insufficient public services and lack of employment opportunities.
34. I accept that the applicant was forced to close the carpentry business that he ran with his brother. I note that he and his family were able to live on savings from earnings that he made from the business over the period from 2010 until he left Iraq, and he was able to pay for his travel from his savings.
35. Given my findings that the threat of harm from the Madhi Army has passed, I consider that the applicant could re-establish a business if he returned to Iraq. Moreover, he is university educated and qualified in teaching, although he claimed that he was unable to find employment in this field previously because he did not have the necessary connections with political parties.
36. As noted elsewhere, Shia Muslims constitute the majority in the southern provinces of Iraq, including Najaf. DFAT advises that "Shia Muslims face little to no official discrimination in Government-controlled areas. In Shia-dominated provinces, DFAT assesses that reported instances of discrimination are more likely to be associated with patronage, such as not having the right contacts to secure access to jobs or housing. Overall, DFAT assesses that official discrimination against Shia Muslims in Shia-dominated provinces rarely occurs". The information provided by the applicant at the protection interview indicates that he has access to family and tribal support in the area of southern Iraq to which he would return. Even if he were to have difficulty finding work because of his lack of connections, I do not accept that this would result in him being denied the capacity to subsist, or any other form of serious harm amounting to persecution.
37. Furthermore, any difficulties which the applicant may face in finding employment resulting from general conditions in Iraq including the current security situation, past conflict and political instability would not be directed at him for any relevant reason specified in s.5J(1)(a).
38. There is no information before me to support a finding that the applicant would be denied services to such an extent that his capacity to subsist would be threatened, or that in any way would constitute serious harm amounting to persecution.
Harm from Daesh
39. The applicant did not explicitly claim to fear harm from Daesh, also known as Islamic State (IS), but the claim was dealt with by the delegate.
40. Country information indicates that in June 2014 Daesh, supported by other Sunni militia, took control of large portions of the northern and central provinces of Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Diyala. In areas under its control, Daesh is targeting members of religious minorities, including Shias. Government forces, assisted by Shia and Kurdish militia, are fighting against Daesh in these areas, attempting to recover territory and prevent its further expansion.
41. I accept that as a Shia, the applicant may be at risk from Daesh in areas under its control. However, the applicant comes from Najaf, in southern Iraq. I am satisfied that this is his home area, and the area of Iraq to which he would return. Country information indicates that this part of Iraq is under the control of the central government, and Daesh and other militant Sunni groups have little or no presence there and little or no capacity to carry out targeted attacks.
42. Although in June 2014 IS declared its intention to march on Shia holy cities, including Najaf, there was no information before the delegate at the time of her decision, and there is none before me to indicate that any progress has been made to achieve this objective. The available information indicates that Daesh's presence in southern provinces including Najaf is minimal, and does not pose a real or substantial threat to the Shia population. Based on the available information I consider the possibility that, in the reasonably foreseeable future, Daesh would overrun the southern parts of Iraq including Najaf, is speculative and remote. In these circumstances I find that the possibility that the applicant would face harm from Daesh on return to Iraq is remote.
General insecurity
43. The applicant claims that he fears general insecurity.
44. Country information indicates that the security situation in Iraq has worsened over recent years. Much of the violence is ethnically, religiously or politically motivated and targeted, but can take the form of mass casualty attacks directed at large gatherings of the targeted groups, which then also result in many deaths outside of the targeted populations. DFAT reported in February 2015 that ethnic and sectarian violence was widespread in the northern, central and western provinces. However, it reported that southern Iraq (including the province of Najaf), where the population is overwhelmingly Shia, remained 'significantly more secure' than central Iraq in recent years, and had been 'relatively insulated from the increased level of violence in provinces in the north and west'. While generalised violence and targeted mass casualty violence - for example, against Shia pilgrims - occurs from time to time, it is at a significantly lower level than in Baghdad and the northern and central provinces. There have been fewer attacks by Sunni groups in Shia dominated provinces, with levels of violence in the south much lower than elsewhere in Iraq. Violence in the southern governorates is limited to sporadic terrorist attacks of decreasing frequency and intensity, and strict security measures are in place.
45. Overall, DFAT has assessed that Shias in Shia-dominated provinces of southern Iraq (including Najaf) are at a low risk of generalised violence. The available information indicates that while there are occasional targeted mass casualty attacks in the south, including in Najaf, these occur infrequently. I find that the prospect of the applicant being caught up and harmed in one of these occasional attacks in the south is remote. I am not satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant will face serious harm in Najaf as the result of a mass casualty attack targeted at any identifiable group or groups of which the applicant is a member (such as Shia), or as the result of an attack aimed at some other group, because he happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, or because of general conflict.
Failed asylum seeker from a western country
46. The delegate dealt with a claim not explicitly made by the applicant, that he would face harm as a failed asylum seeker returning from a western country on return to Iraq.
47. The information before me does not indicate that failed asylum seekers returning to Iraq from western countries are imputed to hold any political opinion, including one that would cause them to face persecution or significant harm.
48. There are reports of approximately 100 failed asylum seekers having returned from Australia to southern Iraq, with no evidence that they have experienced any problems. Further, there is evidence of a number of people voluntarily returning to Iraq from the US, Europe and Australia with no suggestion that they face problems or are unable to assimilate back into their communities. The Iraqi Government provides financial incentives for unsuccessful asylum seekers to return. DFAT reports that the practice of seeking asylum then returning home appears accepted among Iraqis and assesses that successful asylum seekers appear to commonly return to Iraq without difficulty. There is no evidence to suggest and no reason to suppose that the situation might be different for unsuccessful asylum seekers.
49. There is no information before me from any source to suggest that failed asylum seekers and/or returnees from western countries face persecution or significant harm for this reason. I find that the applicant does not face a real chance of being persecuted for any reason, including an imputed political opinion, as a failed asylum seeker from a western country or as a returnee from a western country.
12 The IAA concluded that the Appellant did not satisfy s 5H(1) of the Act and failed to meet the requirements of s 36(2)(a).
13 With respect to complementary protection, the IAA found as follows:
51. A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non citizen in Australia (other than a person who is a refugee) in respect of whom the Minister (or Reviewer) is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the person being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the person will suffer significant harm.
Real risk of significant harm
52. Under s.36(2A), a person will suffer 'significant harm' if:
• the person will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life
• the death penalty will be carried out on the person
• the person will be subjected to torture
• the person will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, or
• the person will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
53. The applicant has not raised specific claims for protection under the complementary protection provisions separate from his claims under the refugee criterion.
54. As set out above, I have found that there is not a real chance that the applicant faces harm in Najaf, the area of Iraq to which I find he would return, either from the Mahdi Army or other Shia militia, Daesh, in mass casualty attacks, or as the result of general insecurity, conflict or violence. Based on the same information, and for the reasons set out above, I am also satisfied that there is not a real risk that he would face significant harm from these sources.
55. As to his claims about economic harm and lack of services, I am not satisfied that the difficulties that the applicant may face - difficulty finding a job, family members scattered, and uncertainty due to the political and security concerns in Iraq - will result in any form of significant harm as defined. I find that any such difficulties will not comprise cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as I find that the necessary intention for the infliction of such harm would be absent as the harm arises from prevailing conditions in Iraq. Nor do I accept that there is a real risk that the applicant would face difficulties in finding employment or adequate employment that would constitute any form of significant harm, including inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. Apart from the harm itself not reaching the necessary threshold to constitute significant harm, I find that the necessary intention required for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is absent. I am also not satisfied that any such difficulties will result in the death penalty being carried out on the applicant, or in the applicant being arbitrarily deprived of life, or being subjected to torture.
56. As discussed above, there is no information before me to support a finding that there is a real risk that the applicant would face harm of any kind as a failed asylum seeker or a person returning from a western country.
Complementary protection: conclusion
57. There are not substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. The applicant does not meet s.36(2)(aa).
14 On 28 July 2017 the Appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the FCCA) for judicial review of the IAA's decision.