Consideration
30 The appellant's ground of appeal essentially raises two issues in relation to the claim to fear harm in Bamiyan following the withdrawal of foreign troops. The first concerns whether the Tribunal failed to consider Bamiyan and the second concerns whether the Tribunal failed to consider the risk of deterioration of the security situation following the withdrawal of foreign troops in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is in relation to the second aspect of the ground of appeal that the appellant has succeeded.
31 In order to consider the first aspect of the appellant's ground of appeal it is necessary to consider the detail of the Tribunal's decision.
32 At [46] of its decision record, because of evidence given by the appellant at his entry interview, the Tribunal rejected the appellant's claim that he was harmed on his return to Bamiyan and thus rejected the appellant's claim that he had damaged hearing as a result of beatings that occurred in Afghanistan. The Tribunal considered that the appellant had not been subjected to any personal harm when he resided in Afghanistan in 2012.
33 At [47]-[66] of its decision record under the heading "Claims" the Tribunal then turned to consider what it described as "a number of claims" made by the appellant as to why he believed he could not return to Afghanistan, including because he claimed to fear harm as a Hazara Shia and because of his extended departure from Afghanistan while living in Iran (1993-2012) and more recently Australia (August 2012 onwards). The Tribunal also noted that the appellant feared harm "because of his extended period of time in Australia, which could provide him with a pro-West imputed political opinion and that he could be a spy": at [47].
34 The Tribunal addressed the appellant's home area - Bamiyan. At [53] of its decision record the Tribunal set out country information about the security situation in Bamiyan, which it had discussed with the appellant, and at [54] it referred to a European Asylum Support Office (EASO) report of February 2015 (February EASO Report), a more recent report to that referred to in the Pre-hearing Submission. Among other things, the February EASO Report stated:
Bamyan is among the peaceful provinces in central Afghanistan where insurgent groups do not operate in any of its districts. Bamyan enjoys bolstered security. However, the province occasionally faces security challenges from the side of the province of Baghlan in the districts of Kihmard, Sayghan, and Shaiber, despite tight security.
35 At [55] the Tribunal referred to the Post Hearing Submission which referenced a different part of the February EASO Report and which noted that, while there have been some insurgents who had joined the government, an additional 30 people had joined the insurgents and some voters had complained about the presence of illegal gunmen in the area, fearing they may not be able to vote in April 2014. For completeness the Tribunal referred to the next sentence of the report, not included in the Post Hearing Submission, which stated that "officials rejected the complaint as being exaggerated, insisting that no significant armed groups operated in the district".
36 At [56] the Tribunal said that it discussed this information with the appellant, that in terms of locations within Afghanistan, Bamiyan "appeared to be one of the most secure locations within Afghanistan for Hazaras" and that the high concentration of Hazaras in the area provides a level of security and protection of which the appellant could take advantage. The Tribunal concluded that, based on the country information, the appellant "would be in a position to reside in Bamiyan without being subjected to harm" and that the appellant "does not have a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm arising from his Hazara ethnicity".
37 The Tribunal then considered the appellant's claim that Hazaras and Shias were being targeted across Afghanistan, a claim which it questioned based on the information about Bamiyan and more broadly, country information about Afghanistan. The Tribunal noted that the link between the appellant's Hazara ethnicity and Shia religion was very strong and referred to a January 2015 EASO report which said, among other things, that Bamiyan was predominantly inhabited by Hazara Shias and that 90% of its inhabitants belong to the Shia sect. The Tribunal noted that it had sought, but was unable to locate, any information that stated that Shias have been targeted in Bamiyan in the last 15 years: at [57]-[58].
38 At [59]-[61] the Tribunal considered an attack which had taken place in Kabul in 2011 that had targeted a mosque attended by Hazara Shias and which had been referred to in the appellant's Pre-hearing Submission.
39 At [63] the Tribunal considered the circumstances of Hazara Shias generally in Afghanistan noting that the overall weight of the country information indicated that there was no evidence of a general campaign by the Taliban insurgency to target Hazara Shias or that Hazaras are being persecuted on a consistent basis.
40 The Tribunal concluded that it did not accept that the appellant had a real chance of serious harm arising out of his Hazara ethnicity or his Shia religion in Afghanistan now or in the reasonably foreseeable future and that the appellant did not have a well founded fear of persecution for that reason nor did he face a real risk of significant harm: at [65]-[66].
41 As the Minister submitted the Tribunal's reasoning summarised in the preceding paragraph is dispositive of the appellant's claims to fear harm because of his Hazara Shia background as set out in his application for the Visa and the Pre-hearing Submission.
42 The Tribunal then went on to consider the other submissions made on behalf of the appellant, namely that: there had been reports of Islamic State in Afghanistan; the appellant claimed to fear harm travelling on the roads, particularly on the route between Kabul and Bamiyan; he claimed to fear harm as a returnee from the West; he claimed that the withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan would lead to a significant rise in violence; and finally, it would be very difficult to return to and live in Bamiyan.
43 The Tribunal addressed the effect of the withdrawal of western forces at [89]-[96]. That part of its decision, which appears under the heading "Withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan", commences after its finding at [86] that Bamiyan is under the control of Afghan authorities. In considering the issue the Tribunal, noting that the process is almost complete, referred to country information which considered the effect of troop withdrawal and which necessarily focused on those areas which were affected by that process. For example at [92] the Tribunal noted that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan had said that:
… as the withdrawal of international military forces and combat air support had continued in 2014, it had observed more frequent and larger ground operations by both the Afghan National Security Forces and Anti-Government Elements, notably in Helmand, Kunar and Faryab provinces, with fighting often occurring near district centres.
And at [94]:
The UN Secretary-General said that the most significant attacks had been in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the south, Ghazni, Paktia and Paktika in the south-east, Nangarhar in the east, Kunduz in the north-east, Faryab in the north and Herat, Farah and Ghor in the west.
(footnote omitted)
44 The country information referred to by the Tribunal also considered the effect of the troop withdrawal on Kabul. An article from the Wall Street Journal referred to by the Tribunal at [94] of its decision record included:
Most major cities remain safer for Afghan citizens than they were even four or five years ago. There has been some worsening on balance over the past one to two years, in Kabul particularly, and some smaller cities in the south and northeast. But on balance the country's largest cities after Kabul - Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif - are not becoming more violent or anarchic. Kandahar, where the Taliban movement originated, is probably safer than at any time in the past seven or eight years. Of the country's 34 provinces, no capital cities are inaccessible to the government.
45 The Tribunal concluded at [95] that:
The Tribunal considers that there is a violent situation in Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of troops has led to an increase in violence. However the Tribunal does not accept that the withdrawal has led to the deterioration of security to such an extent that the government has lost control of significant locations in Afghanistan, and most relevantly for the applicant, locations such as Kabul.
46 That conclusion follows from the consideration of country information of the nature set out above which, in turn, followed a finding that Bamiyan was under the control of Afghan authorities. The country information identified areas where there was an issue arising from the withdrawal of foreign troops which it seems, consistent with the Tribunal's finding at [86], did not include Bamiyan. The Tribunal's conclusion at [95] identified Kabul as the most relevant location for the appellant in the context of considering the issue of withdrawal of foreign troops because, of the places in which there was an issue, that was the only one of relevance to the appellant. That can be deduced from the Tribunal's earlier consideration of the route that the appellant would travel between Kabul and Bamiyan.
47 The appellant relies on dicta in Shrestha at [106]-[107] where Charlesworth J said:
106 There may be instances in which the reasons of an administrative decision-maker do not clearly delineate (whether by words or structure) between discrete aspects of a decision-maker's mental processes. In such cases, a particular part of the reasons may not be fairly read as being confined to one particular aspect of the decision-maker's task or another.
107 But that is not this case. The Tribunal's mental processes in identifying the existence of a ground for cancellation are clearly those set out in the Reasons under the heading "Does the ground for cancellation exist?" The question of whether the Tribunal erred in determining that discrete issue may be answered primarily by reference to that part of the Reasons. That part of the Reasons is, of course, to be read in the context of the Tribunal's decision as a whole and having regard to the cautionary principle that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are not to be scrutinised with an eye attuned to error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.
48 Here the Tribunal did not segment its findings in the way that appears to be the case in Shrestha. The headings adopted by the Tribunal in this case were a convenient way of organising a relatively lengthy decision, comprising 28 pages, and no doubt a way of delineating the issues that the Tribunal considered. However, the Tribunal's reasons need to be considered as a whole. They cannot be read in the segmented way urged by the appellant. That this is so is reinforced by the Tribunal's conclusions at [100]-[101] where it made its "cumulative findings" drawing its relevant findings together.
49 As is well accepted and referred to in Shrestha in the passages relied on by the appellant, the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are not to be construed minutely or with an eye attuned to error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. A fair reading of the Tribunal's decision does not lead to the conclusion propounded by the appellant. The Tribunal did not err because it focused on Kabul rather than Bamiyan. As I have already observed, it considered the appellant's claim to fear harm because of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and logically did so in light of its finding at [86] concerning the situation in Bamiyan, the appellant's own circumstances, the country information and its relevance to the appellant.
50 The second aspect to the appellant's ground of appeal is the allegation that the Tribunal focused on the past and present rather than the future in making its findings concerning his claim to fear harm as a result of the withdrawal of foreign troops. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal's findings at [95] focused only on the present yet his claim was about the withdrawal of troops which was not yet complete. The appellant contended that the Tribunal did not make a finding as to the future risk of harm he would face when the withdrawal of troops completed. As the appellant submitted, the primary judge's reasons do not address this aspect of ground two of the amended application filed in the Federal Circuit Court.
51 The Minister submitted that the Tribunal expressly considered the future when it said "now or in the reasonably foreseeable future", for example, at [65] and [95] of its decision record (although I assume the reference to [95] was intended to be a reference to [96]). It further submitted that these statements were not boilerplate as alleged by the appellant.
52 The Minister submitted that the Tribunal could only deal with facts up to the present before it then had to (and was permitted to) speculate about the future based on past events. The Minister argued that the Tribunal's reasoning about the withdrawal of foreign troops looked at trends and what has happened; that at [95] of its decision record, it said that the withdrawal of foreign troops had not resulted in a trend of deteriorating security to such an extent that the government had lost control of significant locations; and at [96], in reaching its conclusion about the future, the Tribunal correctly set out the test it was required to apply.
53 The Minister contended that the appellant was inviting the Court, despite the flow of the relevant part of the Tribunal's decision and the invoking of the right test, to find that the Tribunal did not do what it expressly said it did and what it looks like it did. The Minister submitted that this is clearly a case where the Tribunal has applied the correct test.
54 The appellant relies on SZGHS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1572 (SZGHS) at [2] where Allsop J (as his Honour then was) held that the reasons of the tribunal in that case demonstrated:
… a failure to assess the first appellant's claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution by reference to his claims, to the possibilities of future persecution, and to the reasonably foreseeable and not merely the immediate future.
55 Relevantly at [3] his Honour also said:
The Tribunal may be taken to have directed itself in respect of these matters uncontroversially in its template introduction. That does not, however, immunise its reasons from scrutiny or from a conclusion that, notwithstanding assertions in its reasons, its approach demonstrates a failure to employ the correct approach (which it has otherwise correctly stated to bind it).
56 In my opinion the same can be said about the Tribunal's conclusion at [96] of its decision record in this case.
57 In SZGHS the first appellant claimed to fear harm from extremists in Fiji due to his support of the Fiji Labour Party and of Indian Fijians. Before the Tribunal the first appellant described three incidents which gave rise to his claim including, among others, being abused and beaten to unconsciousness and being threatened. Allsop J considered particular parts of the Tribunal's decision and at [28] concluded that:
… looking at all of the reasons of the Tribunal, there was a failure to address the reasonably foreseeable future in the context of the claims made. The dealing with the three incidents was based on immediate facts - no elections looming and the character of the present government. This reflected a focus on immediacy which was no real assessment of whether in the future, with elections looming, with the first appellant campaigning for the [Fiji Labour Party], he would not face a similar beating for the same reasons, or threats from elements of the Taukei Movement who had already targeted him…
58 In the present case, in addressing the issue of the appellant's claim to fear harm because of the withdrawal of foreign troops, the Tribunal considered a range of country information, in part described at [34]-[44] above. The information referred to by the Tribunal in turn considered the impact and effect of foreign troop withdrawal up to the date of the relevant reports and seems to be forward looking in one case only - that is, in the opinion piece from the Wall Street Journal extracted at [94] of the Tribunal's decision record where it notes that "[t]his political reconciliation makes it likely that the security forces will continue to respect central-government authority". I accept the Minister's submission that it is permissible for the Tribunal to speculate about the future based on past events and present circumstances. But the vice in the Tribunal's decision is that it did not, in my opinion, undertake any such speculation. Its findings at [95] were limited only to the present. They cannot be construed as addressing the future. The Minister relies on [96] as the finding as to the future where the Tribunal stated:
The Tribunal does not accept that the [appellant] has a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm arising from the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future.
59 That conclusory statement does no more than set out the test. It is a bare assertion that is insufficiently explained and lacks logical connection to the material and analysis that precedes it. There is no consideration by the Tribunal of what may happen after the completion of the withdrawal of foreign troops and of how the country information demonstrates that the appellant does not face a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in the reasonably foreseeable future. Its focus on the near completion of the withdrawal of foreign troops looks to the past and present and, possibly, to the near future, and not to the reasonably foreseeable future.