BOO17 v Minister for Home Affairs

ground 1 12 This is not one of those cases where it is put that the Authority has not dealt with the details or, as they are sometimes termed, integers of the visa applicant's claim. Rather, it is put that the way in which the Authority has reached a state of satisfaction as required, either in respect of the visa claimed or complementary protection under the Act, which is unreasonable or infected by illogicality or irrationality. 13 At common law, there is no duty on the part of an administrator to deliver reasons for an administrative decision: see Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656. With the aim of promoting better decision-making and also an understanding on the part of those affected by an administrative decision as to a particular outcome, Parliament has with respect to many, if not most, Commonwealth administrative decisions made express statutory provision for the furnishing of reasons. That is the case in respect of the Authority (see s 473EA of the Act). Given this, it is only natural that in the context of judicial review and the demonstration of jurisdictional error, attention will focus upon the reasons given by an administrator, in this case the Authority. But it is always necessary to recall the exhortation given by the High Court, notably, in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, not to read the reasons of administrators narrowly and with an eye for error. Their role is to inform. They must be read as a whole and with that in mind and fairly. 14 The Authority summarised the appellant's claim as follows at [5]: 5. The applicant's claims are contained in the information referred to the IAA. They can be summarised as follows: • He is from Ramindasherbug village, Chandipur, Chittagong in Bangladesh and is a Muslim. • He was a member of the BNP following in the footsteps of his father who volunteered for the party. From a young age he attended meetings with his father and then in 2004 he began contributing actively. After moving to Dhaka he would travel back to his village. • His role was secretary of one unit responsible for 10 villages. He would take the notes/minutes of meetings and handle financial matters including donations. The money was used for stationary supplies, renting meeting rooms and buying provisions and food for the poor. • After the AL came into power in December 2008 they sought to prosecute BNP members, arresting them and detaining them in jail. • The applicant took part in a protest against the AL with approximately 50,000 men. They were carrying banners and walked from Shurapur to Shadarghat. After walking half a kilometre they were attacked by armed police and members of the Satrolic party, a branch of the AL. They were armed with weapons, batons and steel rods. • The applicant who was at the front of the protest leading with other leaders of different units was injured along with many other people. They were taken by ambulance to the hospital. His head was split open and he received stitches. • The police and Satrolic party members surrounded the hospital intending to put the protestors in jail. The hospital security staff supported them and helped them to escape in the night. The applicant left Dhaka returning to his home village where he maintained a low profile. • In his village the local AL members informed the police he had returned and it was known he had taken part in the protest. The AL members would send harassment letters to him as secretary and as a member of the BNP demanding money and that he change his affiliation to the AL if he did not want to be killed. • Shortly before the applicant fled to Malaysia he was walking home from the market and was attacked by five or six men holding knives. They threatened him that he must join the AL or he would otherwise be sorry and he could expect to be killed. He tried to break away and sliced his finger on a knife. His screaming attracted the attention of the villagers causing the attackers to flee. • A few days later he went to Dhaka to meet with their BNP nationalist leader to discuss the current situation. He was advised to leave as it was a common occurrence of leaders and members being attacked by the police and AL members. They all feared they would be killed. • The applicant was assisted in obtaining a passport and paid money to have it processed without the authorities preventing it. • The applicant was assisted in obtaining a passport and paid money to have it processed without the authorities preventing it. • The applicant went to Malaysia where he stayed for two years. AL members in Malaysia became aware of he was there and he feared they would report him to the police and deport him to Bangladesh. • The applicant fears he will be arrested by the police who are corrupt and controlled by the AL and will jail him indirectly or kill him. 15 The Authority was not obliged to accept uncritically the evidence which the applicant gave in support of his claim. It is quite obvious from the analysis of the applicant's evidence, which appears in the Authority' reasons under the headings "Secretary of the BNP", "Participation and protest again the government", "Attack by AL members in his village", and "Assistance from BNP leadership in departing Bangladesh", that the Authority did not accept the applicant's evidence uncritically. Particularly having regard to the course of submissions below and in this court on behalf of the applicant, a pertinent example of this is in relation to the responses given by the applicant with respect to the BNP flag. The applicant merely described that flag as "nice and beautiful" (Authority's reasons, [12]), when asked to state its colours or to draw it. 16 Reading the Authority's analysis of the applicant's evidence under the headings given, it does not strike me that the Authority has approached the assessment of his claimed membership of and role in the BMP by subjecting the applicant to a requirement to pass an advanced examination in politics and government. Sometimes, in relation to claims based on adherence to a particular religious belief, it becomes apparent that a tribunal or authority has approached the assessment of such a claim on the basis that the visa applicant must be able to pass, and pass with distinction, an examination in advanced theology before it can be accepted that the asserted religious belief is held. That is not this case. Instead, the Authority has come to this view, as found in [29] and [30] of the Authority's reasons in relation to the applicant's membership of and role in the BNP: 29. I accept that the applicant is at most an ordinary member of the BNP. I accept that the applicant may have been verbally harassed by AL members in the past on his way home from party meetings; however, he was not seriously harmed. The applicant has provided no evidence of being politically active whilst in Australia but given his past support for the BNP I am willing to accept that on return to Bangladesh he might again continue his support as an ordinary member. DFAT assesses that under the current AL Government BNP leaders and JI members are subjected to a high level of official discrimination during periods of heightened political tension, particularly national elections. DFAT understands that J1 members are generally subjected to greater levels of harassment and intimidation than members of the BNP. BNP supporters or members in rural areas are subjected to a low level of violence associated with AL extortion. DFAT assesses that AL, BNP and Jamaat members are subjected to a low level of inter-party violence but notes that, despite the increase in inter-party violence since 2013, the number of casualties remains relatively low in proportion to the size of these parties. The applicant is not a BNP leader and as the country information indicates BNP supporters or members in rural areas are subject to low level violence associated with extortion. The applicant, prior to his departure from Bangladesh, resided and worked in Dhaka for six years. I find that the applicant would return to Dhaka. The applicant as a BNP supporter or member would not be subject to low level of violence associated with extortion in an urban environment. I find that given the number of casualties resulting from interparty violence remains relatively low in proportion to the size of the political parties there is no real chance that the applicant would be persecuted because of his membership to the BNP on his return to Bangladesh to either Dhaka or his village. 30. Furthermore, even if he returned to his village I am not satisfied there is a real chance that the applicant would suffer serious harm. The applicant has made no claims that he was extorted in the past apart from his claims that AL members made demands for money which I have not accepted. I find that any chance of harm that the applicant might suffer in his village associated with extortion is remote. Even if I am wrong and there is a real chance he will be the subject of extortion threats in his village, I find, on the country information that the real chance of harm does not extend to Dhaka where he has lived and worked in the past successfully for six years. [Footnotes omitted] 17 Those findings were informed by satisfaction on the part of the Authority member as to the role which the appellant had in the party, which was as but a member. Witness [15], where the Authority stated: 15. I am however satisfied that the applicant could provide some information on the BNP's objectives and aims consistent with the country information before the delegate regarding the BNP's constitution. Some of these aims and objectives include creating a healthy environment where democracy will reach the mind of the people (keep peace in the country and create a peaceful place), acquire pro-people economic development (help poor peoples) and protect and establish international friendship, amity and equality in foreign policy based on non-alignment (have good relationships with other countries). I am willing to accept that the applicant is a member of the BNP and that his father was also a member of the BNP; however, I am not satisfied that either of them held any particular role of importance within the party. [Footnotes omitted] 18 In fairness to the Authority in terms of its assessment of the appellant, it is also necessary to set out some elaboration which is found in relation to the Authority's consideration of the complimentary protection aspect. One finds at [35] - [37], findings concerning the appellant: 35. I have not accepted the applicant's claim that he was a secretary of the BNP or that he participated in a protest with other BNP leaders and was injured as a result or targeted by the police. I have not accepted that the applicant was threatened with harm in his village by AL members or that he received harassment letters and demands for money, or that he fled to Malaysia in fear. I have accepted that he supports the BNP and may be a low level member. I have found the applicant will return to Dhaka given he resided and worked there for six years prior to his departure from Bangladesh and on the information cited earlier I find that there is no real risk of significant harm in Dhaka. 36. I also find that there is no real risk of the applicant suffering significant harm as a result of interparty violence in either Dhaka, or his village, given the number of casualties remains relatively low in proportion to the size of the political parties in Bangladesh. 37. If the applicant returns to his village, I have not accepted the applicant was subject to demands for money in the past from AL members because he was a BNP member. Such demands for money are not necessarily accompanied by threats or acts of significant harm. I am satisfied that any risk of harm associated with any acts of extortion by AL members in rural areas does not amount to a real risk of harm. Even if I am wrong, I for the reasons given earlier, I am not satisfied that there is a real risk of this harm in Dhaka. I am further satisfied that it would be reasonable for applicant to relocate to Dhaka where he has lived previously lived and worked successfully for six years. 19 These findings were informed by both credibility assessments made as well as country information and the appellant's own evidence insofar as it was accepted by the Authority. 20 As to country information, the Authority, although for reasons which are a little surprising in terms of its omission from the Application Book, not the Federal Circuit Court, had the benefit of a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report of 5 July 2016 concerning Bangladesh. The Authority referenced these paragraphs in the DFAT report in which the following was stated: 3.55 Credible sources have told DFAT that the ruling party's fronts - student or otherwise - have historically controlled all public institutions. In this vein, DFAT understands that the AL's student wing (the Chattra League) has effectively controlled public university campuses and restricted the activities of BNP and JI student wing members since 2009. Chattra League members have reportedly prevented JCD and ICS members from sitting university examinations. AL members and activists have also reportedly extorted BNP business owners in rural areas, threatening them with violence if they fail to comply with demands for money. DFAT understands that JI members are generally subjected to greater levels of harassment and intimidation than members of the BNP. According to the International Crisis Group, the AL pressured Jatiya Party leaders into contesting general elections in 2014 to create the appearance of a competitive contest. … 3.1 DFAT assesses that under the current AL Government BNP leaders and JI members are subjected to a high level of official discrimination during periods of heightened political tension, particularly national elections. JCD and ICS members are subjected to a moderate level of harassment from members of the Chattra League. BNP supporters or members in rural areas are subjected to a low level of violence associated with AL extortion. … 3.62 DFAT assesses that AL, BNP and Jamaat members are subjected to a low level of inter-party violence but notes that, despite the increase in inter-party violence since 2013, the number of casualties remains relatively low in proportion to the size of these parties. Members of the A's student and labour wings are subjected to a moderate level of intra-party violence, while members of the BNP and Jamaat student and labour wings face a low risk of intra-party violence. … 5.21 Bangladesh accepts both voluntary and involuntary returnees. IOM's Assisted Voluntary Returns and Repatriation (AVRR) program provides assistance to Bangladeshi returnees in cooperation with the returning country and the Government of Bangladesh. DFAT understands that recent returnees from the United Kingdom have not been subjected to any adverse attention by the authorities or others. Although Bangladesh agreed to accept a number of Rohingya returnees during the Andaman Sea crisis in May 2015, Bangladeshi authorities have generally insisted on verifying the identity and Bangladeshi citizenship of returnees (including Rohingyas) before authorising their return. 5.22 DFAT assesses that most returnees, including asylum seekers, are not subjected to adverse attention regardless of whether they have returned voluntarily or involuntarily. Authorities may take an interest in high-profile individuals who have engaged in political activities outside Bangladesh, including people convicted of war crimes in absentia. 21 The Authority also regarded as a critical fact that the appellant had lived and worked in Dhaka for six years before his departure from that country. 22 Against this background it is nonetheless put, for the reasons set out in ground 1 of the notice of appeal, that the Authority's decision was unreasonable or illogical. 23 In relation to the jurisdictional error of a decision grounded in illogicality or irrationality of reasoning, in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496 (CQG15), the Full Court cited with approval a summary of principle offered by Wigney J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210 (SZUXN) at [52] and [54] - [56]: 52. As Robertson J put it in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [148], for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, "extreme" illogicality or irrationality must be shown, "measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions". And as McKerracher J (with whom Reeves J agreed) emphasised in SZOOR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1 (at [84]), a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. … 54. The Minister's submission in that regard is rejected. The judgment of Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS reveals that jurisdictional error may be able to be established on the basis of illogical reasoning or illogical or irrational findings "on the way" to the final conclusion (see [132]): see also SZRKT at [151]-[153]; SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51 at [61]-[62]. 55. Nevertheless, allegations of illogical or irrational reasoning or findings of fact must be considered against the framework of the inquiry being whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal: SZRKT at [148]. The overarching question is whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error: SZRKT at [151]. Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577 at [83]-[84] (Nicholas J); SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 140 ALD 78 at [113]. Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out: SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 135 ALD 276 at [66]; SZWCO at [64]-[67]. 56. An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal's decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal's decision-making processes from scrutiny: SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31]. Considerable caution must, however, be exercised before too readily acceding to a proposition that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error: SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451; 67 AAR 376 at [14]-[15]. That is because assertions of illogicality and irrationality can all too readily be used to conceal what is in truth simply an attack on the merits of the Tribunal's findings and decision. In SZMDS, Crennan and Bell JJ (at [96]) made it plain that the deployment of illogicality or irrationality to achieve merits review should not be sanctioned. 24 I did not apprehend that there was any difference between the parties as to principle in relation to illegality or irrationality. I take the principle to be as stated by Wigney J and as approved by the Full Court in CQG15. Likewise, it was common ground, as it correctly had to be, that having regard to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131], error was not to be found just because one particular conclusion had been preferred to another particular conclusion. 25 In this instance, I do not find anything irrational or illogical given the credibility conclusions as to the absence of any office holding role on the part of the appellant in the BNP reached by the Authority for the reasons given by the Authority, particularly at [29] and [30]. Nonetheless, it was submitted that the factors set out in ground 1 ought to have led to a conclusion that there was still a well-founded fear of persecution and that it was unreasonable not to have so concluded. 26 Determining whether there is such a jurisdictional error requires an understanding of the statutory context in respect of which the Authority was obliged to reach a state of satisfaction, one way or the other. Materially that statutory context included the definition of "well-founded fear of persecution" as found in s 5J of the Act viz: Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution (1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if: (a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and (b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and (c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country. Note: For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L. (2) A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country. Note: For effective protection measures, see section 5LA. (3) A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would: (a) conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person's identity or conscience; or (b) conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or (c) without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following: (i) alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith; (ii) conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin; (iii) alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs; (iv) conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability; (v) enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child; (vi) alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status. (4) If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a): (a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and (b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and (c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct. (5) Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph: (a) a threat to the person's life or liberty; (b) significant physical harassment of the person; (c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person; (d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person's capacity to subsist; (e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist; (f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist. (6) In determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person's claim to be a refugee. 27 I am not at all persuaded that the Authority misunderstood this statutory touchstone. Indeed, the key features of s 5J are expressly stated by the Authority at [27]. Even so, it was submitted that there was some overly rigorous test applied in relation to the term "real chance" which appears in the statutory definition. In this regard, reference was made on behalf of the appellant to observations made in respect of that term in the elaboration of the meaning of the expression "well-founded fear of persecution" as it appears in the Refugee Convention in Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379. In that case at p 389, Mason CJ stated: I do not detect any significant difference in the various expressions to which I have referred. But I prefer the expression "a real chance" because it clearly conveys the notion of a substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, of persecution occurring and because it is an expression which has been explained and applied in Australia; see the discussion in Boughey v. The Queen, per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ. [Footnotes omitted] Also in that case at p 429, McHugh J stated: The decisions in Sivakumaran and Cardoza-Fonseca also establish that fear may be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention and Protocol even though persecution is unlikely to occur. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Cardoza-Fonseca an applicant for refugee status may have a well-founded fear of persecution even though there is only a 10 per cent chance that he will be shot, tortured or otherwise persecuted. Obviously, a far-fetched possibility of persecution must be excluded. But if there is a real chance that the applicant will be persecuted, his or her fear should be characterized as "well-founded" for the purpose of the Convention and Protocol. 28 It was accepted on behalf of the Minister that these statements remain pertinent to an understanding of the term "real chance" as it appears in s 5J. Even allowing for this, having regard to the findings made and the conclusions reached at [29] and [30] of the Authority's reasons, it seems to me that the conclusion reached as to an absence of meeting the requirements of the definition of refugee and thus, materially, an absence of satisfaction as to a "well-founded fear of persecution" was, indeed, reasonably open. Obviously enough, there is an evaluation entailed but within the bounds of reasonableness that factual evaluation is for the Authority. The facts as found in the paragraphs cited in the country information report, in conjunction with the finding as to the low level involvement of the appellant with the BNP and his residence for six years prior to his departure in Dhaka, did admit the conclusion reached by the Authority.

ground 2 29 As to ground 2, I do not accept that there is anything illogical or irrational in relation to a conclusion as to credibility based on an absence of ability to identify from what the acronym BNP stands, given the claimed level of office holding made by appellant. It is akin to a conclusion reached that a person who asserted that he or she had held office as assistant treasurer of an ALP branch was not such an office holder because that person could not recall that ALP stood for the Australian Labor Party. 30 It is singularly important in cases of this kind to recognise the elements of judicial power and the role of those to whom administrative power is consigned. This particular conclusion was but one of many credibility assessments made by the Authority. Those credibility assessments are most emphatically not immune from challenge on judicial review. As to that, the following statement of principle by Flick J in SZUHJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 331 (SZUJH) at [24], commended itself to Allsop CJ in CWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 859 and to me, in BFF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1910: 24. The findings of fact made by the Tribunal were open to it upon the evidence and, in particular, upon the fact that the claimed incident that was said to have occurred in December 2009 was a "new claim" and a claim exposing inconsistencies. The task of fact finding has long been accepted as a task entrusted to the Tribunal: Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (No 2) [2010] HCA 24 at [19], (2010) 241 CLR 320 at 332 per French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ; Repatriation Commission v O'Brien (1985) 155 CLR 423 at 430 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ. So, too, has it been long-accepted, that findings as to credibility are the function of the primary decision-maker "par excellence": Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1 at [67], (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 per McHugh J . To confine the Tribunal to only being permitted to make a finding consistent with the factual account being given by a claimant in the absence of rebutting evidence and not by reference to inconsistencies in that factual account would be inconsistent with the task entrusted to the Tribunal by the legislature to make findings of fact by reference to the evidence before it and would be inconsistent with authority: CQG15 [2016] FCAFC 146, (2016) 70 AAR 413. Although the difficulties of proof which may be encountered by a claimant seeking protection may readily be accepted, the Tribunal is not obliged to accept uncritically a factual account given by, or submissions advanced by, a claimant: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 to 452 per Beaumont J. 31 Measuring the subject of the credibility conclusion challenge by reference to that touchstone, it must be concluded that the Authority (in respect not just of the BNP acronym, but other credibility assessments evident in the reasons), was entitled to make those particular assessments for the reasons the Authority gave. 32 All of the foregoing may well be a very long way of stating what, with respect, the learned primary judge did in a very compressed way at [28] where his Honour observed: 28. Whilst reasonable minds may differ, upon looking at the evidence, it seems to me that the conclusion that the IAA came to was one that was open on the evidence. Notwithstanding that another adjudicator may have come to a different conclusion is not to the point. The only way in which there will be a jurisdictional error is if the decision on this particular aspect by the IAA could not ever have been made by an arbiter of fact.

adequacy of judicial reasons 33 A helpful statement of principle in relation to the adequacy of judicial reasons was offered by the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court in RESI Corporation v Munzer [2016] SASCFC 15 in a passage cited with approval in a later judgment of the Full Court in Macks v Viscariello (2017) 130 SASR 1 at [517]: 517. In RESI Corporation v Munzer, the Court summarised the relevant principles as follows: Heydon J in AK v Western Australia stated the reasons why there is an obligation on Judges to give reasons for their decisions. First, he said, there was an obligation to give reasons as it promotes good decision making, secondly, that general acceptability of judicial decisions was promoted by the obligation to explain them and finally, that it was consistent with the idea of democratic institutional responsibility to the public that those who are trusted with the power to make decisions, affecting the lives and property of their fellow citizens, should be required to give an account of their reasoning by which they came to that decision. Thus the duty to give reasons is a necessary incident of the judicial process. Failure to provide sufficient or adequate reasons can promote a sense of grievance and may deny the fact and the appearance of justice having been done. Failure to give adequate reasons is an error of law. Of more recent times there have been many decisions on the question of the adequacy of judicial reasons. Many cases turn upon the facts in issue in the particular case. However, a number of general principles relating to the duty to give adequate or proper reasons may be extracted from the cases: 1. "The extent and content of reasons will depend upon the particular case under consideration and the matters in issue". While a judge is not obliged to spell out every detail of the process of reasoning to a finding it is essential to expose the reasons for resolving a point critical to the contest between the parties. 2. A court when considering the decision under appeal should not be left to speculate from collateral observations as to the basis of a particular finding. 3. A trial judge has a duty to refer to material evidence and make findings about material issues in the case. It is not appropriate for a trial judge merely to set out the evidence adduced by one side, then the evidence adduced by another and assert that having seen and heard the witnesses he or she prefers or believes the evidence of one and not the other. In other words, a bald statement of an ultimate conclusion may not be sufficient. A trial judge is required to engage with the issues canvassed and to explain why one expert is accepted over the other. 4. It will ordinarily be sufficient if by his or her reasons the judge apprises the parties of the broad outline and constituent facts of the reasoning on which he or her has acted. 5. Reasons for decision are to be read fairly and in the context of the manner in which the trial was conducted. Reasons may appear by necessary inference from what is stated expressly. 6. It is not the function of an appellate court to set standards as to the optimal, or even desirable, level of detail required to be revealed in reasons for judgment. The function of the appellate court is to determine whether the reasons provided have reached a minimum acceptable level to constitute a proper exercise of the judicial power. [Footnotes omitted] 34 In terms of ultimate conclusion, I do not differ in the end from the orders made by the learned Federal Circuit Court judge. That places in a similar position, given that I am disposed to reject grounds 1 and 2 in the notice of appeal, to that of the Full Court in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195 where it was stated at [32]: 32. Given that ground 2 has not been established, it follows that the complaint that the primary judge failed to give adequate reasons in ground 1 of the appeal must be dismissed. This Court is fully appraised of the judicial review action with which the primary judge was seized. Even assuming that the primary judge's reasons are inadequate, it is apparent that the appellant's judicial review application was correctly dismissed. In that circumstance, there would be no utility in remitting the matter to the Federal Circuit Court. 35 One might perhaps, with respect, have hoped for some detailing as to why it was that the Authority's conclusions were reasonably open on the material before it, but that cannot alter the position in law that they were. So the result then is that even though everything which truly can be said in favour of grounds 1 and 2 was put on the appellant's behalf. The appeal must be dismissed. 36 This is just one of those cases where having reached, as it permissibly could, particular credibility conclusions, the Authority then went on to make an assessment as to the existence, or otherwise, in terms of satisfaction of a "well-founded fear of persecution". In the result, the Authority was not satisfied, having regard to the findings that it made in relation to the applicant's evidence and the country information that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. There the matter must rest. 37 For these reasons, the further order will be that the appeal be dismissed. I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Logan.