42 I have already referred to Polcul Foundation Limited, which is a beneficiary named in the will of the Deceased. By the terms of that will the Deceased gave to that entity a one third interest in the Deceased's half share in the Bishops Avenue property. That is, the Deceased gave to that entity an interest identical to that which he gave to his stepson Tad Boniecki.
43 Polcul Foundation Limited (to which I shall refer a "Polcul") was established by the Deceased in 1980. The purpose of that entity has been to support persons who have contributed to the building of a free and democratic Poland. The Deceased took a great interest in Polcul during his lifetime, and was extremely generous towards that entity, both by way of financial contributions and also by way of giving generously of his time and energy to advance the aims and purposes of Polcul.
44 It is in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances that the Court must proceed to a consideration of the claim of the Plaintiff.
45 I have had the benefit of receiving a written outline of submissions and a chronology from Counsel for the respective parties. Those documents will be retained in the Court file.
46 The Plaintiff as a son of the Deceased is an eligible person within paragraph (b) of the Definition of that phrase contained in section 6(1) of the Family Provision Act. As such he has the standing to bring the present proceedings. The other eligible persons in relation to the Deceased are the Deceased's widow, Mrs Zofia Boniecki, who is an eligible person within paragraph (a) of the foregoing definition; the Deceased's daughter, Jadwiga, who is also an eligible person, within paragraph (b) of the foregoing definition; and the Deceased's stepson Tad Boniecki, who is an eligible person within paragraph (d) of the foregoing definition, in that he was a member of the same household as the Deceased and was partly dependent upon the Deceased.
47 None of those other eligible persons has made a claim for additional provision out of the estate of the Deceased. However, each of those persons, and also each of the other beneficiaries named in the will of the Deceased (being Danielle Gibbins, Anna Kondracka and Polcul) has indicated his, her or its opposition to any alteration to the testamentary dispositions of the Deceased.
48 The claim of the Plaintiff must be approached in the light any competing claims upon the testamentary beneficence of the Deceased. In the circumstances of the instant case the only such competing claims are those of the other three eligible persons, and the other three beneficiaries.
49 It is quite apparent, both from the terms of the will itself, and also from the evidence given on behalf of the Defendant, that the Deceased had a close and affectionate relationship with Jadwiga (although there was an estrangement between them in the later years of the Deceased's life), and especially with Jadwiga's daughter Danielle, and with Tad Boniecki, who was treated and regarded as a son rather than as a stepson to the Deceased. Polcul, created by the Deceased, occupied a very special and very important place in the Deceased's life. Little information concerning the finances of Polcul was placed before the Court (apart from the fact that it presently has a base capital of about $1.6 million and that the Deceased during his lifetime gave to it about $200,000).
50 It was submitted on behalf of the Defendant that any order for provision which might be made in favour of the Plaintiff should not have the effect of reducing, let alone extinguishing, the testamentary provisions made by the Deceased for those whom the Deceased considered entitled to have such provisions made in their favour.
51 In performing the first stage in the two-stage process identified by the High Court of Australia in Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 208-210 the Court must first consider whether, in consequence of the testamentary dispositions of the Deceased, the Plaintiff has been left without adequate provision for his proper maintenance. (See, also, Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 79 ALJR 731, in which the High Court affirmed the correctness of the foregoing test in Singer v Berghouse.)
52 Essentially it was the case for the Plaintiff that his principal need was for the acquisition of a residence. Not only would the purchase of a residence significantly reduce the Plaintiff's outgoings, by the amount of $270 a week, which he presently expends on rent, but the purchase of a residence would, in the submission of the Plaintiff, provide for the future security of his wife and himself.
53 The acquisition of a residence is a laudable ambition on the part of any adult, be it as spouse, parent or child. It must, however, be appreciated that an adult son has no absolute entitlement to look to a parent for the provision of an unencumbered residence.
54 Under the terms of the will the Plaintiff is entitled to an interest in the Bishops Avenue block of residential flats, which interest has a monetary value of about $171,000. However, it will be appreciated that, if the Plaintiff, as a co-owner of that property, requires its sale, then the costs associated with the sale must be deducted from the proceeds, with the consequence that the Plaintiff, and each of the other co-owners, will receive somewhat less than the monetary value of their interest therein. It should also be appreciated, however, that (as I have already observed) the Plaintiff and the other co-owners will be entitled to share in the income generated from the rental of that property in the period since the death of the Deceased.
55 Whilst upon the material available to the Court it is difficult to conduct a precise calculation, it is likely that, if the Bishops Avenue property were to be sold, the Plaintiff would receive not much less than the amount of $171,000 which is the monetary value ascribed to his share in that property. Such an amount will go very far towards the acquisition of a house property of the nature desired by the Plaintiff in the Bateman's Bay area. I query whether it is necessary for the Plaintiff and his wife, having no dependents, to acquire a three bedroom brick residence in that area, rather than a two bedroom residence, which, it would appear, could be acquired for a lesser price. No evidence has been placed before the Court on behalf of the Plaintiff concerning the nature of any housing loan which the Plaintiff and his wife might be able to obtain in respect to the acquisition of a residence of the nature desired by them.
56 For most of the Plaintiff's life he had no contact with the Deceased. That absence of contact is in no way to be attributed to the Plaintiff. Indeed, he made overtures to his father, which were largely repulsed. The Deceased, whilst generous to Jadwiga, to Tad, to Danielle, to Mrs Kondracka and to Polcul did not manifest any generosity towards his only son, and, indeed, from the time when he severed connections with the Polish government in 1963, did not even make payments of child maintenance for the Plaintiff.
57 I do not consider the lack of contact between the Plaintiff and the Deceased to be a factor which would militate against the claim of the Plaintiff for an order for provision from the estate of his father.
58 I am satisfied that the financial and material circumstances of the Plaintiff (including the present limitation on his working capacity resulting from his injury and his wife's limited working capacity resulting from her injury) have the effect that in the light of the testamentary benefits given to him by the will of the Deceased, the Plaintiff has been left without adequate provision for his proper maintenance. Any additional provision which might be given by the Court must, of course, have the effect of reducing the benefits to be received by the other beneficiaries named in the will of the Deceased.
59 The residue of the estate is by clause (g)(i) given to the Deceased's widow, Mrs Zofia Boniecki. However, almost the entirety of that residue (which on my calculations will total nearly $234,000) will go to meeting the liabilities of the estate, in an amount of almost $226,000. Provision must then be made for the costs of the present proceedings, in a total amount of about $93,000. I have already referred to the income generated by the Bishops Avenue block of flats. No evidence has been placed before the Court concerning any income which may have been or may currently be being produced by the other items of real property in which the Deceased held an interest at the time of his death (being unit 3, 21 Manning Road, Double Bay; unit 10, 27 Balfour Road, Rose Bay; and unit 1, 67 Curlewis Street, Bondi).
60 In my conclusion it is appropriate that the Plaintiff, in addition to the benefits given to him by the will of the Deceased, should receive a legacy in an amount which, in addition to those benefits, will enable the Plaintiff to acquire a residence in the Bateman's Bay area, either absolutely or with the need to resort to only a small housing loan. I consider that the appropriate amount of such a legacy is $150,000. To the extent that the residue of the estate of the Deceased is not sufficient to meet such a legacy, then I consider that that legacy be borne by the interest which under the terms of the will is given to Polcul.
61 I make the following orders: