The risk of the virus entering MITA
34 Each of the physicians who provided expert witness reports for the parties are eminently well-qualified to provide the opinions that they did. Professor Beaman and Associate Professor Mijch are particularly senior in the field of infectious diseases. Professor Beaman has 30 years' experience in infectious diseases clinical practice, including three years working in the United States and 10 years researching in Africa, and states that he is the most senior infectious diseases physician in Western Australia. Associate Professor Mijch is an Adjunct Associate Professor of Medicine at Monash University, and a consultant infectious diseases specialist with a special interest in HIV and STIs. She has worked as a consultant and mentor in infectious diseases and HIV in Southeast Asia and Oceania, has taught and researched in infectious diseases and public health, and was awarded an OAM for services to combatting and researching Infectious Diseases.
35 Their opinions regarding the risk that SARS-CoV-2 will enter MITA or other immigration detention centres and as to the risk of dissemination of the virus within the centre are, however, markedly different. In relation to their opinions it should be kept in mind that knowledge in relation to COVID-19 is rapidly developing, and there is a near constant stream of new research studies being released. It should also be kept in mind that the risk of infection with SARS-CoV-2 is a dynamic which is constantly evolving. The rate of community transmission in Victoria, which is one of the chief determinants of that risk, is markedly different now, in August 2020, as compared with April 2020, when the proceeding was filed. The application for an urgent interlocutory injunction was brought in circumstances where the rate of community transmission in Victoria had increased so significantly over the course of July 2020 that the Victorian government declared a state of disaster.
36 In the First Cherry report dated 7 April 2020 (later adopted by the First Mijch and Cherry report) Associate Professor Cherry said that:
….experience in overseas locations suggests that COVID-19 will almost certainly enter a detention facility once there is widespread community transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This is essentially inevitable with large numbers of staff moving between the community and the detention facility.
Later in the report she described the likelihood of COVID-19 entering an immigration detention centre as "very high". She said, somewhat presciently for Victoria:
…we are now entering a phase where we are seeing community transmission of COVID-19 (that is, new cases are occurring among individuals who have not travelled or had contact with a known case). Almost 100 cases of COVID-19 in Victoria so far cannot be explained epidemiologically. It is hoped that careful contact tracing and isolation, along with increasing social distancing will slow the ongoing spread of the infection ("flatten the curve"), however it is now inevitable that we are going to see continued community transmission. Movement of staff between the community and any immigration detention centre will then inevitably lead to introduction of COVID-19, with likely devastating consequences.
(Emphasis added.)
37 By the date of the First Mijch and Cherry report on 20 July 2020, the rate of community transmission in Victoria had increased. Stage 3 restrictions had been imposed in Victoria on 8 July 2020 because of the increase. The First Mijch and Cherry report said:
As outlined in the previous reports, and based on experience overseas, we believe it is inevitable that COVID-19 will enter MITA. We direct you to the previous reports for explanation of why we believe COVID-19 cannot be kept out of MITA, or any other detention facility, in the context of widespread community-based transmission. Since those reports were written, the rise in community transmission of COVID-19 in Victoria has only strengthened our conviction that this will occur.
A rise in community transmission of COVID-19 in Victoria has recently resulted in metropolitan Melbourne and Mitchell Shire being placed back in Stage 3 restrictions. Areas in Melbourne's North and West are particularly implicated as "hot spots" for COVID-19 community transmission. The location of MITA in Broadmeadows, and the necessary movement of staff (including security, catering and cleaning staff, among others) between MITA and the community, places the facility at extremely high risk for the introduction of COVID-19 via asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic staff with COVID-19. Emerging genomic data show security guards working at Melbourne's quarantine hotels have "seeded" many of the outbreaks of COVID-19 now spreading in our community. Experts in the area describe the nature of Australia's security industry as predisposing to such events, further heightening the risk of COVID-19 both entering places of detention, and of dissemination via such facilities to the wider community.
Our view remains unchanged that it is inevitable that COVID-19 will enter MITA. Given the current epidemiology of COVID-19 in Victoria (this has evolved from the predominantly overseas acquired disease seen during our first peak of cases in March, to the current situation of predominant community transmission) we now view this as likely to be an imminent as well as an inevitable event.
38 For that report Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry had been briefed with a number of the guidelines and detailed operational plans that the Department and its long-term external service providers, Serco and IHMS, relied upon or had put in place to reduce the risk of COVID-19 entering immigration detention centres and to contain the spread of COVID-19 should an outbreak occur, including:
(a) Department documents titled "COVID-19 Management in Immigration Detention Facilities Guidelines" dated 27 March 2020 and 1 April 2020;
(b) the CDNA guidelines issued 31 March 2020;
(c) a Serco document titled "COVID-19 Outbreak Management Plan for Immigration Detention Facilities" dated 5 April 2020; and
(d) an IHMS document titled "COVID-19 Outbreak Management Plan" dated 6 March 2020.
39 Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry described the guidelines and operational plans as "laudable attempts" to improve the safety of detainees and staff, but nonetheless said that SARS-CoV-2 would inevitably enter MITA. They noted that outbreaks of COVID-19 were then occurring in facilities where infection prevention was part of the "core business" of the facility and where extraordinary actions had been taken to prevent its introduction, including aged care facilities and hospitals. In their opinion, those matters highlighted the difficulties involved in keeping the SARS-CoV-2 virus out of group living facilities.
40 The Second Mijch and Cherry report, dated 5 August 2020, said that the rapid rise in community transmission in Victoria in the period since 20 July 2020 supported their view as to the risk of community transmission seeding an outbreak of COVID-19 in detention centres. Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry said:
At the time of writing, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to worsen both globally and also locally. A State of Disaster has been declared this week in Victoria in response to the fact that we now have widespread community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in this state, and today, for the second time ever, more than 700 new diagnoses of COVID-19 have been documented in the last 24 hours. In addition to an unfolding disaster in our aged care sector, we have documented infections in hundreds of healthcare workers, in staff working in places of detention, and outbreaks associated with numerous other workplaces in the state. Five hundred and thirty-eight Victorians are currently hospitalised with COVID-19, with 42 being supported in our ICUs. The numbers change on a daily basis, and those provided here will be out of date almost immediately.
They attached a graph illustrating the rapid escalation of daily new cases of COVID-19 diagnosed in Victoria. They said it was impossible to know when or if future waves of COVID-19 may occur in Victoria but "[a] the time of writing, the situation is NOT under control in Victoria" and areas in the north-west region of metropolitan Melbourne, including where MITA is located, are particularly heavily affected.
41 In their opinion it was "increasingly certain" that COVID-19 would be introduced into MITA, on the basis that:
With community transmission now widespread in Victoria, MITA situated in an area of particularly high rates of community transmission, and the frequent transit of staff between the community and MITA, we remain convinced of the near certainty that COVID-19 will be introduced into the centre. The risk of transmission from asymptomatic individuals…makes this impossible to prevent even with rigorous staff screening for symptoms or signs of infection. Even universal use of PPE is not foolproof, with increasing evidence suggesting that aerosol (rather than only respiratory droplet) spread may occur. Indeed, there have already been well documented transmissions of COVID-19 to healthcare workers at hospitals in Melbourne in recent weeks, despite careful use of recommended PPE to protect against respiratory droplet spread.
Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry said that it had been estimated that between 40 to 62% of all transmissions occur via respiratory spread from individuals without symptoms: WJ Wiersinga, A Rhodes, AC Cheng et al, Pathophysiology, transmission, diagnosis and treatment of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) A review. Journal of the American Medical Association (published online on 10 July 2020).
42 Professor Beaman took a quite different view. In the First Beaman Report, dated 28 April 2020, he said:
People can only acquire COVID-19 by being exposed (generally by coming within 2 metres of a symptomatic case without PPE, or touching surfaces contaminated with the virus). Such conditions are unlikely to occur in an Australian Detention Centre as detainees, visitors and staff are screened for symptoms including fever with testing (if required) and quarantined from the general detainee population if these conditions are met. In fact, it could be convincingly argued that the risk of being exposed to SARS CoV-2 is significantly lower in an Australian Detention Centre when compared to the general Australian community.
(Emphasis added.)
43 Professor Beaman did not refer to any risk associated with aerosol transmission of the virus. That may be because knowledge regarding SARS-CoV-2 is rapidly developing and that report was delivered before such a risk was recognised, but it is not clear. More curiously, he did not refer to the risk of infection through exposure to asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic persons suffering from COVID-19. In my view the screening for symptoms upon which Professor Beaman relied for his conclusion that it was "unlikely" that COVID-19 would be introduced into detention centres, could not realistically be expected to detect persons with COVID-19 who were asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic.
44 In the Second Beaman report, dated 30 April 2020, he did not accept the opinion of Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry regarding the "inevitability" of the introduction of COVID-19 into immigration detention centres. He referred to data as at that date which showed low levels of community transmission and described their opinion as "alarmist". He said:
…COVID-19 can only enter a detention centre from outside. If the risk is very small in Australia already, it is even lower in a Detention Centre (where there is more social isolation and entry screening than the community) which makes it the safest location in the country.
45 However, by July 2020 the position in relation to community transmission of the virus in Victoria had markedly changed. As the Third Beaman report of 26 July 2020 accepted, cases of COVID-19 in Victoria had begun to rise rapidly from early July up to 450 cases per day, with the peak not having been reached at that point. 1,253 cases did not have an identifiable source, which was suggestive of sustained community spread.
46 Professor Beaman was though unshaken in his opinion as to the risk of the applicant contracting COVID-19 while detained in MITA. In his opinion, risk factors such as allowing multiple visitors into a detention centre, having short-term detainees and having numerous staff, had been recognised and addressed by the operators of the detention centre network, who had adjusted their protocols to appropriately reduce those risks. He said that while it may be germane that security guards in quarantine hotels had seeded COVID-19 in the Melbourne community, the reports indicated that those guards were recruited without close scrutiny or extensive training which was different to the Serco workforce. Nor did he consider the emergence of large numbers of COVID-19 cases in Australian aged care homes to be of significance to the risk of the virus entering MITA. He said that the Aged Care Royal Commission had documented understaffing by poorly paid and trained staff in such institutions, which in his opinion could not be said about the staff at MITA.
47 Professor Beaman described Associate Professors Cherry's and Mijch's opinion regarding the inevitability of the emergence of COVID-19 in MITA as "one of faith, rather than established fact." He said that it was an "indisputable fact" that the risk of being infected by the SARS-CoV-2 virus was "much higher" in the general Melbourne community than in MITA, and noted that Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry accepted that "laudable" procedures are in place to prevent the entry of the virus into MITA. That was a slight mischaracterisation of what Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry said, as they had described the guidelines and plans as "laudable attempts".
48 In response, the Second Mijch and Cherry report rejected Professor Beaman's opinion that that the risk of being infected with COVID-19 was much higher in the general Melbourne community than in MITA. Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry said:
The risk of community acquisition of COVID-19 currently varies widely by geographic region in Melbourne. MITA is located in an indisputable "hot spot" of particularly high rates of transmission. We have seen clear evidence of failure of physical distancing recommendations at MITA (including in the dining facility, where face covering is impossible even if such measures were to be offered). The risk of COVID-19 entering the facility is a product of the number of staff entering the facility and the risk that each staff member has of acquiring the infection and attending work while infectious (as above, much transmission occurs prior to the onset of symptoms). We contend that this is much higher than the risk for an individual based in the community and adhering to current stage four restrictions, whereby each community member has as little contact as possible with people outside their immediate household.
(Emphasis added.)
Principles for identifying breach of a duty of care
49 The test for establishing whether there has been a breach of duty of care was explained by Mason J in The Council of the Shire of Wyong v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47-48, as follows:
In deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk. The perception of the reasonable man's response calls for a consideration of the magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant's position.
50 Mason J said (at 48)
The considerations to which I have referred indicate that a risk of injury which is remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable.
51 This application concerns the risk that SARS-CoV-2 will enter MITA and that the applicant will contract COVID-19 and suffer adverse health consequences, and perhaps die. As Wheelahan J explained in Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Splendido [2019] FCAFC 132; (2017) 271 FCR 595 at [129]-[130] the law treats proof of future or hypothetical events differently from proof of events that are alleged to have occurred in the past.
52 When looking to future events "the court must form an estimate of the likelihood that the possibility will occur": Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 639-640 (Brennan and Dawson JJ). Wheelahan J said, and I respectfully agree:
In a curial context, past events have to be proven on the ordinary standards, whether that be beyond reasonable doubt, or on the balance of probabilities. Where the issue that arises is the evaluation of a chance, prospective or hypothetical events relevant to the evaluation of the chance may not be capable of proof in the ordinary sense, but proof is required of any facts that are relevant to the identification and evaluation of a risk or chance of an event occurring in the future.
53 The application is interlocutory and urgent and the evidence was not fully ventilated. None of the witnesses were subject to cross examination. I accept the possibility that I may reach a different view of the evidence at trial, and my findings are for the purpose of this application only.
54 For the purpose of the application I am satisfied that the applicant established a number of matters which are significant to the identification and evaluation of the risk that SARS-CoV-2 will enter MITA in the near future.
55 First, it is undeniable that the COVID-19 pandemic has taken hold in Victoria leading to the declaration of a state of disaster. There is no evidence before the Court to indicate that any of the measures currently in place to bring under control the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Greater Metropolitan Melbourne will be effective, and if so when.
56 Second, Associate Professors Mijch and Cherry opine that it is inevitable or a near certainty that SARS-CoV-2 will enter MITA, and there is a basis for their view.
57 Third, for the purpose of the application the evidence establishes the following matters:
(a) the highly infectious nature of the virus;
(b) the high rates of infection in facilities such as aged care homes and hospitals;
(c) the high rates of community transmission of COVID-19 in Victoria at present;
(d) that MITA is located within a community hot spot for transmission;
(e) the large numbers of staff and others who must come into a detention facility the size of MITA each day;
(f) the CDNA guidelines (at 2.2) provide that people with COVID-19 "generally develop signs and symptoms, including mild respiratory symptoms and fever on an average of 5-6 days after infection (mean incubation period 5-6 days, range 1-14 days). In rare cases the incubation period may exceed 14 days." On average it will be 5-6 days (but possibly up to 14 days) before a guard or other staff member who has contracted COVID-19 knows that he or she has done so and therefore ceases to attend MITA;
(g) the Australian Border Force protocols for screening persons entering MITA involve temperature testing, and steps are only taken for temperatures detected above 38 degrees. But persons suffering from COVID-19 who are asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic are unlikely to be detected by temperature testing, and fever is not always a symptom, those persons will likely still be infectious but undetectable by that method;
(h) that neither the staff nor the detainees wear face masks or other personal protective equipment (PPE). The applicant's evidence in that regard was unchallenged; and
(i) cleaning and disinfecting practices at MITA are inadequate to protect detainees from the virus. I prefer the applicant's evidence as to the position "on the ground" to Ms Rees' evidence regarding mandated cleaning and disinfecting practices.
58 Having regard to those matters I am satisfied that there is a real and foreseeable risk that SARS-CoV-2 will enter MITA in the near future.
59 I do not accept the respondents' contention that there is nothing to suggest that the applicant is at any greater risk of contracting COVID-19 while in MITA than other persons in Australia. For the purpose of the application I am satisfied that the applicant is exposed to materially higher risk in MITA than he would be if he was in the community in Victoria, under Stage 4 restrictions, pursuant to which he would only be in contact with persons in his immediate household, would be directed to stay at home unless leaving for one of three specified reasons, and if outside the home required to physically distance and wear a face mask.