EXCLUSIVE LICENCE
217 During the course of the proceeding, Brand Developers was joined as second applicant. Blue Gentian LLC asserted that Brand Developers is a proper party and entitled to relief as an exclusive licensee of the Patents pursuant to the Act.
218 Section 120(1) of the Act reserves the right to bring infringement proceedings to the patentee and "exclusive licensee".
219 An "exclusive licensee" is defined in Schedule 1 of the Act as:
a licensee under a licence granted by the patentee and conferring on the licensee, or on the licensee and persons authorised by the licensee, the right to exploit the patented invention throughout the patent area to the exclusion of the patentee and all other persons.
220 "Exploit" is further defined as including:
(a) where the invention is a product - make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or
(b) where the invention is a method or process - use the method or process or do any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use.
221 The central issue is whether an exclusive licence must confer all of the rights of the patentee on to the licensee to the exclusion of all, including the patentee, or whether it is sufficient that only some of the rights be conferred in the licence, so long as it is to the exclusion of all, including the patentee.
222 PMG disputes that Brand Developers is an exclusive licensee pursuant to the Act. It relies on the recent decision of Yates J in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v Apotex Ltd (No 5) (2013) 104 IPR 23 ('Bristol-Myers Squibb') where his Honour held that the grant of an exclusive licence only in respect of some of the rights of the patentee to exploit its patent is not an "exclusive licence" within s 120(1) of the Act.
223 Blue Gentian accepted that one licence did not include the right to manufacture and that more than one licence was in fact granted, and if the Court was to follow Yates J, then the licences to Brand Developers would not be exclusive licences within the meaning of the Act.
224 I will summarise the various licence agreements.
225 There are four relevant licences: the NEI Licence, the E Mishan Licence, the BD Licence and the Direct Licence. They are licences to exploit certain (but not all) of the rights of the Patents through a chain of licences from Blue Gentian to National Express Inc ('NEI') to E Mishan & Sons, Inc ('E Mishan') to Brand Developers.
226 The NEI Licence is an agreement between Blue Gentian and NEI which, following a First Amendment to License & Distribution Agreement dated 5 March 2013, grants NEI the "exclusive license, including the right to sub-licence, under the Licensed Patents … to make (or have made), use, sell offer for sale, import, market, promote and/or distribute" the "Licensed Products" in the certain markets in throughout the world ('the NEI Rights').
227 The E Mishan Licence is an agreement between NEI and E Mishan which is in generally the same terms as the NEI Licence, licensing the NEI Rights exclusively to E Mishan.
228 There is an agreement between E Mishan and Brand Developers dated 31 July 2013 by which E Mishan licensed the NEI Rights exclusively to Brand Developers in Australia and New Zealand (clause 2(b)), other than the right to manufacture, the "Licensed Products" (clause 3.4). The agreement purports to grant a "an exclusive licence to the Intellectual Property" which is defined to include the First and Length Patents.
229 Relevantly, the NEI Rights do not include the right to hire or otherwise dispose of the Licensed Products, offer to hire or offer to otherwise dispose of the Licensed Products or keep the Licensed Products for the purpose of doing any of those things. Accordingly, Blue Gentian LLC retained at least those rights notwithstanding the NEI Licence.
230 Lastly, on 31 July 2013, Blue Gentian and Brand Developers executed an "Exclusive Patent Licence Deed" ('the Direct Licence'). By the Direct licence, "Blue Gentian grants to Brand Developers an exclusive, royalty free licence for the duration of the term of this Deed to exploit", inter alia, the First and Length Patents within Australia and New Zealand. The term "exploit" in the Direct Licence is not defined and so should therefore be taken to have the meaning given to it in the Act.
231 It can be seen from the above that there are ultimately two purported exclusive licensees, namely to NEI and Brand Developers, and that there are a number of rights not conferred in each licence.
232 Justice Yates in Bristol-Myers Squibb declined to follow the judgments of Holmes J in Grant v Australian Temporary Fencing Pty Ltd (2003) 59 IPR 170 ('Grant') and Sundberg J in Pharmacia Italia SpA v Interpharma Pty Ltd (2005) 67 IPR 397 ('Interpharma'). In Grant, Holmes J held that it was not necessary for an exclusive licence to contain an exhaustive list of what is comprised in the right to exploit, and in Interpharma Sundberg J held, without finally determining the issue, that the licensee (whose licence was not exhaustive) arguably had standing to bring infringement proceedings.
233 A central point Yates J made in Bristol-Myers Squibb (at [435]) is that:
… The licence under which the licensee derives the status of "exclusive" licensee is one that excludes the patentee, and others deriving authority from the patentee from exercising the rights conferred by the patent with respect to the invention during the term of the licence. An exclusive licence cannot be one that reserves to the patentee or any other person any residual right with respect to the exploitation of the invention. It follows that there can only be one exclusive licensee.
234 His Honour continued at [438]:
This reasoning reflects, in my respectful view, the essential reasoning of the High Court in [Ex parte British Nylon Spinners Ltd and Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd; Re Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd's Patent (1963) 109 CLR 336 ('British Nylon Spinners')] with respect to the meaning of "exclusive licensee" in s 6 of the 1952 Act: the patentee has conferred on the licensee, exclusively, the exercise of the rights that the patentee itself has been granted under the patent. I am unable to see how, in determining the meaning of "exclusive licensee" in the present Act, this reasoning can be avoided by distinguishing the definition of the word "exploit" from the words "make, use, exercise and vend" in the corresponding definition of "exclusive licensee" in the 1952 Act. There are plainly differences between the two definitions in language and structure, including that the definition under the 1952 Act is exhaustive whereas the definition under the Act is merely inclusive. But, in my respectful view, these differences do not have the significance attributed to them in Grant. Regardless of possible differences in scope between "exploit" under the Act and "make, use, exercise and vend" under the 1952 Act, the definition of "exclusive licensee" in each Act refers to the conferral by the patentee of a single licence that precludes the patentee, and any person deriving authority from the patentee, from exercising the rights granted by the patent.
235 As a matter of statutory construction, I agree with the reasoning of Yates J.
236 Justice Yates' judgment accords with the approach of the High Court in British Nylon Spinners. In that case, when considering the definition of exclusive licensee under the Patents Act 1952 (Cth), the Court held (at 340) that:
[T]he introduction of the definite article into the definition suggests that the right must be found in a single licensee for it is the right to make use exercise and vend the patented invention which the licence must be found to confer. However this may be, the concluding words of the definition make it clear beyond doubt that the licence must confer that right to the exclusion of all other persons including the patentee.
237 In Uprising Dragon Ltd v Benedict Trading & Shipping Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 93, French J (as his Honour then was) considered (at 102) that although it was not necessary to decide the matter finally, the exclusion of a right of manufacture from a licence raised a question as to whether the applicant in that matter had standing to sue for infringement as an exclusive licensee under the 1952 Act, in light of British Nylon Spinners.
238 In my view, Brand Developers does not have standing to bring infringement proceedings against PMG.