Misconstruction of Direction No 21
17 The applicant submits that the Minister misconstrued Direction No 21 in two respects resulting in jurisdictional error. First, he misconstrued the Direction insofar as it relates to the best interests of children and, secondly, insofar as it relates to other considerations.
18 The Act does not expressly state the matters the Minister must or may take into account in exercising his discretion to cancel a visa under s 501(2). Section 501 relevantly provides:
"(2) The Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:
(a) the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and
(b) the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test.
…
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person does not pass the character test if:
(a) the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7)); or
…
(7) For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if:
(a) the person has been sentenced to death; or
(b) the person has been sentenced to imprisonment for life; or
(c) the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more; or
(d) the person has been sentenced to 2 or more terms of imprisonment (whether on one or more occasions), where the total of those terms is 2 years or more; or
(e) the person has been acquitted of an offence on the grounds of unsoundness of mind or insanity, and as a result the person has been detained in a facility or institution."
(Original emphasis.)
19 The Minister is not bound to proceed by reference to the direction under s 499 of the Act, namely, Direction No 21: Howells v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 580 at 585 [31]. However, he may choose to do so. In this case, he said that he would proceed in accordance with the Direction.
20 The applicant submits that the third primary consideration referred to in Direction No 21, namely, the best interests of the child, is only relevant if there is a child. He points to paragraph 2.3(c) set out in [11] above and he also points to the following paragraph in Direction No 21:
"2.13 This consideration only applies if the child is or would be less than 18 years of age at the time when the decision is intended to come into effect. The best interests of any children aged 18 years or more is not a primary consideration but may be considered with other considerations under paragraph 2.17."
21 It should be noted that Direction No 21 makes it clear that although generally speaking it is in the child's best interests to remain with his or her parent, there may be circumstances in which the best interests are served by separation from the non-citizen.
22 I do not think the Minister challenged the applicant's submission that the best interests of the child with Direction No 21 can only be a relevant consideration if there is a child as defined. Rather, the argument centred on the proper construction of the respondent's reasons. As to the relevant part of the Minister's reasons, (see [11] above), the Minister's written submissions contend:
"This paragraph can fairly be construed as saying no more than that the question of the interests of any children was a matter for primary consideration, but that in this particular case, there was no child whose interests were to be taken into account.
At paragraph [14], the respondent then stated:
'The information relevant to this consideration weighs in favour of cancelling Mr Black's visa. I gave this consideration considerable weight.'
The subject of this paragraph is 'the information relevant to this consideration'. That information was the fact that the applicant had no children. 'Considerable weight' was given to that fact.
A fair reading of this paragraph, in the context of the Statement of Reasons, is that the Minister, having determined to follow the terms of Ministerial Direction No 21 (…) placed weight on the fact that there was no child; that a consideration which might otherwise have weighed in favour of not cancelling the visa, did not apply. In other words, he placed weight on the fact that this consideration did not apply to detract from the other considerations which the Minister considered weighed in favour of cancellation."
23 In the same way as the reasons of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the Refugee Review Tribunal are not to be approached "minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error", neither are the reasons of the Minister: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
24 Even adopting that approach, I am of the opinion that the Minister misconstrued Direction No 21. The Minister referred to "the information relevant to this consideration" and the only information to which that could have referred is the statement that the applicant has no children. That is the information the Minister said weighed in favour of cancelling the applicant's visa and to which he said he gave (as a consideration) considerable weight. In my opinion, that is a misconstruction of Direction No 21 because once the decision-maker finds that a non-citizen has no children, the matter or consideration became irrelevant. I do not think it is possible to construe the Minister's reasons as saying no more than that the matter of the best interests of the child was irrelevant and, as this was generally a matter in favour of not cancelling the visa, the other matters in favour of cancellation were not counter-balanced by this consideration.
25 The next question is whether the error of the Minister being a misconstruction of Direction No 21 amounts to jurisdictional error. The applicant referred to the following observations of French and Drummond JJ in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189 at 208:
"If a decision-maker, not bound to apply policy, purports to apply it as a proper basis for disposing of the case in hand but misconstrues or misunderstands it so that what is applied is not the policy but something else, then there may be reviewable error. In a limiting case a policy may be so broadly stated as to cover all considerations properly brought to bear on the exercise of the discretion. In such a case misconstruction of the policy may reduce to misconstruction of the statute or misunderstanding of its purpose."
26 It was accepted by the applicant that Direction No 21 is "not so broadly stated as to cover all considerations properly brought to bear on the exercise of the discretion". I think that approach is correct. In other words, where the decision under s 501(2) is made by the Minister, as opposed to his delegate, jurisdictional error is not established simply by showing a misconstruction of Direction No 21; it must be shown that the Minister acted outside the terms of the statutory power. Section 501(2) does not state the matters the Minister must or may take into account in exercising the discretion. In exercising an apparently unconfined discretion the determination of the limits of the statutory power is made having regard to the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the power and the Act in which it appears. In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, Mason J said at 40:
"In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard: see Reg v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd, adopting the earlier formulations of Dixon J in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury, and Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning. By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act."
(Footnotes omitted.)
27 As I understood it, the applicant also conceded that if all the Minister did was to take into account as a matter in favour of cancelling the applicant's visa the fact that the applicant had no children then although the Minister had misconstrued Direction No 21 that would not constitute a jurisdictional error. I think that concession was correctly made because there is nothing in the nature and purpose of the statutory provisions to indicate that the fact that the applicant had no children is a matter the Minister was prohibited from taking into account.
28 The applicant submits that the Minister in fact made a more serious error than simply taking into account that the applicant had no children and that the error he made was a jurisdictional error. I do not find it easy to articulate the more serious error identified by the applicant but, as I understand it, it was that the Minister had found that the best interests of the children favoured cancellation of the visa when in fact that there were no children. I reject that submission. A fair reading of the Minister's reasons is that he found that the fact that the applicant had no children was a matter in favour of cancelling his visa. That was a misconstruction of Direction No 21 but not a jurisdictional error.
29 The applicant put a similar submission in relation to the Minister's approach to the topic of "other considerations" in Direction No 21. I have set out the Minister's reasons in relation to that topic in [12] above. I am not persuaded that the Minister misconstrued Direction No 21 in relation to that topic but, even if he did, for the reasons I have given in relation to the matter of the best interests of the child, a misconstruction of that nature would not constitute jurisdictional error.