Draft orders 3, 4 and 5
20 In relation to her claim that judgment be entered for her in the sum of $675,000 against the defendants, it appears that Ms Bird relies on r 26.01(1)(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which entitles a party to apply to the Court for an order for summary judgment where the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding.
21 The evidence of Mr Mylne in his affidavit affirmed 1 March 2012 is not disputed by the defendants. I am satisfied, following an examination of Mr Mylne's affidavit and the annexures thereto, that the requirements of Recitals B, C and D of the Settlement Agreement have been complied with.
22 It is clear that the proceedings before the Court were compromised in the Settlement Agreement executed 20 July 2011. There is no suggestion that the Federal Court has no jurisdiction to entertain Ms Bird's claim that she is entitled to invoke the aid of the Court in enforcing the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Indeed, following the decision of the Full Court in Darling Downs Investments Pty Ltd v Ellwood (1988) 18 FCR 510 it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain and determine such a claim pursuant to powers conferred by s 22 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The terms of that section, which have remained unchanged since the decision in Ellwood, are as follows:
Determination of matter completely and finally
22. The Court shall, in every matter before the Court, grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks just, all remedies to which any of the parties appears to be entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by him or her in the matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided.
23 In Ellwood the facts before the Court - which in a general sense resemble those before me - were summarised by Pincus and Einfeld JJ at 520-521 as follows:
A purchaser under contracts for sale of land paid the total price, but received no conveyance. Subsequently, asserting that he had been misled, the purchaser claimed damages including the price, by proceedings brought under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The respondent vendor agreed to pay $77,500 "all up", and the matter was settled on that basis; being so informed, Pincus J adjourned the case to the Registrar. Subsequently, the vendor, not giving any substantive reason, reneged on the settlement and Spender J gave judgment in the proceedings for the agreed sum, less $20,000 which had been paid under the compromise.
24 After extensive consideration of the authorities their Honours summarised their approach to as follows:
It is clear that s 22 cannot have been intended merely to give the Court power to make orders of particular kinds "in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction"; that work is explicitly done by the following provision, s 23. What the Court is required to do by s 22 is to grant all remedies to which any party appears to be entitled in respect of a claim properly brought forward in a matter. Is an order enforcing a compromise of a case such a remedy? On general principles it would seem at least arguable that the enforcement of a compromise of a claim is a remedy in a new claim and in a separate case. However, both Smith J and McPherson J, in the cases above mentioned, have taken the contrary view. If, as McPherson J held (in our respectful opinion, correctly), the Queensland equivalent of s 24(7) of the English Judicature Act enlarged the circumstances in which a compromise may be enforced by order in the action compromised, that was only so because such an order is a remedy of the kind referred to in the section. McPherson J did not decide the case before him on the basis that what was sought was nothing but a remedy in respect of a fresh cause of action in contract; nor should we do decide this case. (at 525-526)
25 Ellwood has been followed in numerous cases in this Court, including Reid v Interarch Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1328, Needlework Warehouse Pty Ltd v Chansonette Pty Ltd [2005] 226 ALR 252, AG Cowley Holdings Pty Ltd v Central City Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 199 and ACT Cross Country Club Inc v Cundy (t/as Cundy Sports Marketing) [2010] FCA 782.
26 In this case the Settlement Agreement provides, unequivocally, that Ms Bird is entitled to payment of $675,000 by the defendants within six months of 20 July 2011 in settlement of this proceeding. Clearly, this has not occurred. Unlike in other cases previously before this Court where the proceedings have been complicated by the involvement of third parties not parties to the relevant settlement agreement (for example, note the discussion of the Full Court in this respect in Pallas v Finlay (1985) 61 ALR 220), in this case the parties to this proceeding are the same as the parties to the Settlement Agreement. To that extent, Ms Bird is entitled to the aid of the Court in enforcing payment of that sum.
27 Clause 5 of the Settlement Agreement requires Ms Bird to pursue "all reasonable avenues of recovery from the second to sixth defendants prior to being entitled to recover from the first defendant". In this case it appears that the avenues of recovery taken by Ms Bird have been:
to communicate with the defendants, through her solicitor Mr Mylne, demanding that they fulfil their obligations under the Settlement Agreement;
to seek to communicate with the defendants, through and including Mr McComb, and through solicitors previously instructed by Mr McComb, informing them that Ms Bird would take legal action to seek to enforce the Settlement Agreement; and
to engage in further - although ultimately fruitless - settlement negotiations on 20 February 2012.
28 Mr Cooper submitted that these actions did not satisfy clause 5. In the circumstances however, I consider that these actions were "reasonable avenues of recovery from the second to sixth defendants". I take this view because:
it is clear from the material before the Court that the second to sixth defendants are under the control of Mr McComb;
any decisions on behalf of the second to sixth defendants will be made by Mr McComb;
engaging in further settlement discussions with Mr McComb in an attempt to settle the proceedings on 20 February 2012 was a reasonable attempt to recover from the second to sixth defendants; and
in light of the events leading to the hearing of 20 February 2012, including further settlement discussions and briefing her solicitor to pursue inquiries of the defendants in respect of compliance with their obligations, in my view it would be unreasonable to require Ms Bird to incur more expenditure in commencing new proceedings against the second to sixth defendants.
29 There is some duplication in draft orders 3 and 4. When viewed with draft order 4, in my view draft order 3 is otiose (and could also lead to the confusing prospect of judgment being given to the plaintiff in respect of two separate amounts of $675,000, which is not contemplated by the Settlement Agreement).
30 I am prepared to make an order in accordance with the terms of draft order 4 (subject to deletion of reference to the seventh and eighth defendants, being Brimin Gem Pty Ltd and Austral Pacific Queensland Pty Ltd in their capacities as trustees of The B.M Family Trust), including the requirement that judgment be stayed against the first defendant for seven days.
31 In the further absence of submissions contesting an order in terms of draft order 5 or demonstrating good cause as to why an order for interest payable should not be made in accordance with the statute, I order that interest be payable on the judgment debt of $675,000 pursuant to s 51A and s 52 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).