Penalties
8 First, in my view a pecuniary penalty ought be imposed on the union under the Act.
9 I am not satisfied that there is no evidence that the overtime policy was designed to have any adverse impact on the applicant. While it may well be that a key motivation for the development of the overtime policy was the union's concern for the health and well-being of its members, in my view an inference could also be drawn that another motivation was to force the applicant to hire more workers (including union members) rather than utilising the existing workforce, and thus increasing the applicant's costs. I draw this inference from the statement in the copy of the overtime policy affixed to the wall of the maintenance bay service area, and in particular the statement therein that:
There is a limitation placed on the amount of overtime you can work at Peak Downs. This helps us to get more new employees like yourself a job.
(Emphasis added.)
10 Further, I do not consider that any inference could be drawn that conduct of the union in respect of the overtime policy was in any manner accidental or inadvertent. To that extent any intention on the part of the union to impact the applicant was clearly intentional.
11 Second, I consider that any pecuniary penalty imposed on the union should be paid directly to the applicant. I note the extensive authority supporting the position that pecuniary penalties imposed by the Court will ordinarily be paid to the party prosecuting proceedings where that party is other than an enforcement agency (Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2011) 209 IR 302; [2011] FCA 949 at [148]; Gibbs v The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Altona (1992) 37 FCR 216 at [26]; Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (No 2) (2001) 110 IR 372; [2001] FCA 672 at [8]; and Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357 at [44], [65]; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 1384 at [25]). The applicant in this case is a corporation which has incurred expense in prosecuting proceedings under the Act, and there is no reason for the Court to do otherwise than adopt the usual approach in respect of payment of the penalty.
12 Third, I am satisfied that the contraventions of the Act the Court found in this case arose from a single course of conduct, and accordingly multiple penalties are not warranted.
13 In the case of multiple contraventions the Court will have regard to whether those contraventions amounted to a single course of conduct to ensure that the offender is not punished twice for the same conduct. As Middleton and Gordon JJ observed in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill (2010) 194 IR 461; [2010] FCAFC 39 at [41]:
… the principle recognises that where there is an interrelationship between the legal and factual elements of two or more offences for which an offender has been charged, the court must ensure that the offender is not punished twice for the same conduct. In other words, where two offences arise as a result of the same or related conduct that is not a disentitling factor to the application of the single course of conduct principle but a reason why a court may have regard to that principle, as one of the applicable sentencing principles, to guide it in the exercise of the sentencing discretion: Johnson v R (2004) 205 ALR 346; [2004] HCA 15 at [3]-[4] and [34] and Attorney-General v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84 at 92-3 (Tichy). It is a tool of analysis (Tichy at 93) which a court is not compelled to utilise: Royer v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 139 at [21]-[34] and [153]-[156] (Royer).
14 Similar observations were made in QR Limited v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2010) 204 IR 142; [2010] FCAFC 150 at [49] where the Full Court said:
Even if s 557(2) does not apply to a case to oblige to treat as one contravention all the consequences of a particular piece of conduct, it is open to the Court, in an appropriate case, to take into account, as a matter of discretion, the circumstance that the same acts or omissions have resulted in multiple contraventions by multiple breaches of a term cast in similar language in each of multiple agreements, by imposing a lesser penalty or even no penalty in respect of breaches of some terms, while imposing a substantial penalty in respect of breaches of other terms (Gibbs v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of Altona (1992) 37 FCR 216 at 233; Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14 at 17).
15 In this case, while the applicant substantiated its case that there had been contraventions of more than one section of the Act, a finding to this effect does not equate to multiple acts of the union warranting imposition of multiple penalties by the Court. In particular, the actions of the union in promulgating the policy (including providing material to new members and the display of the policy in the service bay crib room) constituted overlapping and inter-related conduct, such as to constitute a single course of conduct. I am not persuaded that this constituted a "range of acts" committed by the union to implement its ban on overtime.
16 Fourth, I am satisfied that a penalty should be imposed at the higher end of the scale. Both parties in this proceeding accepted that principles outlined by Tracey J in Kelly v Fitzpatrick at [14] provided a useful guide to the Court of relevant considerations to which the Court could have regard in determining an appropriate penalty, namely:
the nature and extent of the conduct which led to the breaches;
the circumstances in which that conduct took place;
the nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained as a result of the breaches;
whether there had been similar previous conduct by the respondent;
whether the breaches were properly distinct or arose out of the one course of conduct;
the size of the business enterprise involved;
whether or not the breaches were deliberate;
whether senior management was involved in the breaches;
whether the party committing the breach had exhibited contrition;
whether the party committing the breach had taken corrective action;
whether the party committing the breach had cooperated with the enforcement authorities;
the need to ensure compliance with minimum standards by provision of an effective means for investigation and enforcement of employee entitlements; and
the need for specific and general deterrence.
17 In this case:
The overtime policy was clearly a long-standing policy of the union at the Peak Downs Mine, with a wide circulation among new union members and existing workers at the mine.
The overtime policy was deliberately promulgated by the union through the Peak Downs Lodge, notwithstanding the terms of the BHP Coal Pty Ltd Workplace Agreement 2007 ("2007 Agreement") which the applicant and the union entered following extensive and detailed negotiations.
While it is not possible to specifically identify the nature of loss suffered by the applicant as a result of the overtime policy, it is clear that:
o the applicant had a right to require employees to work unrostered overtime in circumstances contemplated by the 2007 Agreement;
o the overtime policy unlawfully purported to restrict workers undertaking unrostered overtime as may have been required by the applicant over an indeterminate time, and it is reasonable to infer that union members worked in accordance with that policy;
o although a purpose of the overtime policy may have been beneficial in respect of workers employed by the applicant, I am not persuaded by the submission of the union that it was not designed to cause any harm to the applicant.
While the union may be a not for profit organisation, it is clearly an entity of considerable assets and resources.
18 Further, while I am not persuaded that there is any recent similar conduct of the union to which I can properly have regard in respect of determining an appropriate penalty, the union has exhibited no contrition for its conduct, and there is no evidence that it has taken any corrective action in respect of the publication or promulgation of the overtime policy. From the perspective of the need for specific deterrence I am satisfied that a penalty of substance is warranted. I take a similar view in relation to the need for the penalty imposed by the Court in this case to have an appropriate effect generally to deter the union and similar organisations from engaging in similar conduct.
19 In my view, and treating the contraventions in this case as relating to a single course of conduct, the appropriate penalty is the maximum which can be imposed for a single contravention, namely $33,000.