8 At page 6 of her decision, the Deputy President observed that by the operation of Section 6 of that Act the legislation made express provision for the extra-territorial operation of the Act and this includes the powers given to the Tribunal.
9 A similar conclusion was reached in the recent decision of Senior Member Vassie in Froesch v Mohi [2005] VCAT 1933 [13 September 2005].
10 I acknowledge that Section 6 of the Act requires that there must be some connection with Victoria, albeit general or remote, see Reid (supra) at page 5. No evidence was produced at the hearing of the degree, if any, of the connection of the subject matter of the dispute with Victoria. Although, I note that there appeared to be common agreement that the subject matter of the contract or its performance that is in dispute involved the sale of fruit for consumption in Victoria. I consider this fact provides some connection with Victoria. Further, in its letter to the Tribunal of 28 July 2005 the applicant maintains that the contract was made in Victoria. This was not contradicted by the respondent and it is a clearly maintainable position by the applicant in this proceeding. Therefore, I consider that some form of connection with Victoria has been established that would ground the jurisdiction in Victoria and via the Act in the Tribunal. Therefore I consider the Tribunal has jurisdiction in this proceeding and it has the power to serve outside the jurisdiction.
11 In relation to the respondent's final submission that the Tribunal's Rules, specifically Rule 6.11(1)(d) requires that where a party is a corporation the application must include its Australian Corporate Number (ACN) and in this case there is no ACN stated and nor can there be as the foreign corporation that is the respondent is not registered in Australia and thereby has no ACN. I consider that the respondent's submission fails on a number of grounds. Firstly, although the words 'must ... include ...' are used in the Rule, such mandatory words can only be upheld if it is in the interests of justice. If such words were applied strictly in this context it would mean that no foreign corporation would ever be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether it was legitimately within the jurisdiction or not, solely for the reason that it could not and did not include an ACN on the application. Such an artificial limitation on what could be a proper party before the Tribunal would be detrimental to the interests of justice in this jurisdiction.
12 Looked at from the opposite viewpoint, what are the detrimental affects on the interests of the applicant if the respondent does not provide an ACN? In the context of this proceeding the applicant has not claimed any detriment; and I can see none as the respondent is clearly identified in the application by name together with the address of its solicitors, so that there can be no confusion over who is the proper respondent. The ACN in an application is not the primary identifier of a party, that is its name, what it does establish is prima facie evidence of registration, which in the case of a foreign tribunal is not required. Therefore, I consider there is no detriment to any party from the failure of a foreign corporation to put an ACN on the application. To require an ACN when it is clearly inapplicable would be to defeat the purpose of the Act. Thus, the requirement that all parties that are corporations have an ACN number stated on any application can only be directory and not mandatory.
13 This conclusion is reinforced and, in fact overtaken by the requirements of Section 159 of the VCAT Act, which provides: