APPEAL
8 On appeal to this Court, the appellant, who was not represented on this occasion, relied on five grounds of appeal, each of which, I have carefully reviewed. The first was in substantially the same terms as that relied upon before the primary judge. The second ground was that the "real chance" test had not been correctly applied because the Authority had not properly considered the situation for the appellant into the reasonably foreseeable future if he were to return to Sri Lanka. The third ground was that the Authority had erred in not considering the possibility that certain post events had occurred. For this purpose, the appellant invoked a decision of the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220. The fourth ground was that the Authority had failed to deal with "accepted facts" and to consider whether these had enhanced the risk to the appellant. The fifth ground was that the Authority's finding that, by virtue of the appellant's departure from Sri Lanka, he would not be of interest to the authorities and paramilitaries was irrational and/or illogical. I shall address each ground as follows.
9 In my view, ground one, which was also relied upon below, represents an impermissible review of the merits of the Authority's reliance on country information to assess risk. The conclusions reached by the Authority on the issue of future risk were open to it, and it was a matter for it to decide how the country information was to apply to the particular facts before it: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]. In my view, the Authority reached its conclusion after detailed consultation of the available country information and also having regard to the appellant's personal circumstances. Ground one is therefore rejected.
10 Ground two is an iteration of the complaint the appellant makes about the "real chance test" and again, in substance, seeks to review the merits of the Authority's conclusion. Ground two is rejected.
11 In relation to ground three, in Rajalingam, Sackville J at par [67] said:
In general, however, the question of whether the [Refugee Review Tribunal (the "RRT")] should have considered the possibility that its findings of fact might not have been correct is to be determined by reference to the RRT's own reasons. If a fair reading of the reasons as a whole shows that the RRT itself had "no real doubt" (to use the language in Guo [(1997) 191 CLR 559)] claimed events had not occurred, there is no warrant for holding that it should have considered the possibility that its findings were wrong. Reasonable speculation as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution does not require a possibility inconsistent with the RRT's own findings to be pursued. A "fair reading" of the reasons incorporates the principle that the RRT's reasons should receive a "beneficial construction" and should not be "construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error": Wu Shan Liang [(1996) 185 CLR 259] at 271-272, quoting Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287. Only if a fair reading of the reasons allows the conclusion that the RRT had a real doubt that its findings on material questions of fact were correct, might error be revealed by the RRT's failure to take account of the possibility that the alleged events might have occurred (or the possibility that an event said not to have occurred did not in fact occur). If the fair reading allows of such a conclusion, the failure to consider the possibilities might demonstrate that the RRT had not undertaken the required speculation about the chances of future persecution.
In my view, a fair reading of the Authority's findings in relation to the issue as to whether the CID had questioned the appellant's mother about a photograph said to have been taken of him attending a Martyrs' Day celebration shows that the Authority had no "real doubt", in the sense that that phrase was used by Sackville J, about this issue. As the Authority said at par [29]:
I do not accept that the applicant's mother was shown a copy of the photos and questioned by CID officers about the applicant's location and activities following his attendance at the Martyrs' Day event. The applicant at interview could not explain how the photographs could have come into the CID's possession and the country information does not support that person with his level of involvement would attract ongoing interest. Having regard to my assessment that the nature of his support of the TNA party was not significant or ongoing, he did not hold a prominent profile within the party, and his involvement in the Martyrs' Day activities was nothing more than as an attendee, I have considerable doubt that he would attract this level of attention from the authorities. Further, I find the applicant's suggestion that the CID attended on his mother on the one occasion in 2015 only, and with no further contact in more than 12 months, to be implausible and inconsistent with his claim that CID are after him.
12 Ground four, in my view, has no merit. The "accepted facts" were never identified by the appellant.
13 Ground five contends that the Authority's findings were irrational and/or illogical. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, Crennan and Bell JJ said at par [131]:
But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
The conclusion reached here by the Authority concerning the factual issue as to whether the appellant's departure from Sri Lanka would be of interest to the authorities and paramilitaries was open to it on the evidence before it. That conclusion fell far short of being illogical or irrational in the sense described by Crennan and Bell JJ in the SZMDS decision. In my opinion, the appellant was again here in substance seeking to have this factual issue reconsidered on the merits. This ground accordingly is rejected.
14 Before me, the appellant sought more time to prepare his case and to find legal representation. It is, of course, profoundly regrettable that the appellant was not represented by counsel. However, he has no right to legal representation (see Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 20 at [27]), and, in my view, he was given a sufficiently reasonable opportunity to obtain legal assistance.
15 For these reasons, the order of the Court is that the appeal is dismissed, with costs as agreed or as assessed.
I certify that the preceding fifteen (15) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Steward.