Betfair's oral application in respect of particular documents
23 Betfair's claim for confidentiality in these documents was put on six bases:
(a) the risk that the respondents might accidentally or deliberately disclose its confidential information to its rival Tabcorp Ltd or its subsidiary TAB Ltd (collectively, "the TAB");
(b) the risk that the respondents might for the purposes of the litigation, seek to enlist the assistance of officials from the TAB and, in the course of that process, disclose the information to them;
(c) the fact that some of the information was provided to Betfair by third parties on a confidential basis;
(d) the hostility of the respondents to Betfair;
(e) the fact that the respondents held positions on an advisory committee whose functions included strategic advice to the TAB on gaming and wagering; and
(f) the fact that the respondents derived income from the TAB.
24 Matters (a) to (d) do no warrant the imposition of a confidentiality regime.
25 As to (a), the risk of deliberate or accidental disclosure of confidential information to the TAB is, as Mobil shows, ordinarily adequately addressed by the implied undertaking.
26 As to (b), the respondents proffer, and I accept, an undertaking not to seek to reveal information to the TAB for the purposes of the present litigation without first giving Betfair seven days' notice of its intention so to do; that is, in the circumstances, sufficient protection.
27 As to (c), I do not think that the fact that the material was provided on a confidential basis by third parties to Betfair requires, at this stage, any further protection beyond that which is supplied by the implied undertaking. There may come a time, if the material is ultimately sought to be tendered or used publicly, that some form of additional protection may need to be put in place. However, that time has not yet arrived.
28 As to (d), I accept that there is a degree of antagonism between the parties. However, I do not think that merely because the respondents seek robustly to put their position in the press demonstrates that the implied undertaking is not sufficient.
29 Matters (e) and (f) are, I think, to be put in a different category. I accept - contrary to the respondents' submission - that the presence of the representatives of the respondents on a committee established for purposes which include, inter alia, providing strategic advice on gaming and wagering to the TAB gives rise to a problem. Both the TAB and the respondents are parties to a contractual arrangement known as the Racing Distribution Agreement which provides for, amongst other things, the distribution of funds from the TAB to the respondents. Clause 16 of the agreement provides for the establishment of a business and strategy committee whose purpose is to consider and to make recommendations to the TAB in relation to "proposed strategies for TAB … which impact on wagering and gaming" and also in relation to "the business plans of TAB … for the conduct and promotion and development of wagering and gaming". The committee comprises eight individuals, four of whom are appointed by RacingCorp. RacingCorp is the company that represents the two respondents (and also the body regulating the racing of dogs) in their dealings with the TAB.
30 The problem is not that the respondents may accidentally or deliberately reveal confidential information to the TAB during the committee's meeting, or even by reason of those meetings. Rather, it is the impossibility of the respondents' representatives putting from their minds Betfair's confidential information when it comes to providing the strategic advice to the TAB which cl 16 calls for; that is, it is similar to the problem which arises in an ordinary trade rival case: cf. Mobil at 38.
31 The analogy with the position of a trade rival is enhanced because the economic interests of the respondents and the TAB are aligned, at least to the extent that the respondents derive income from the TAB which, in turn, derives income from taking money from people who bet on horses. Thus, the strategy input on gaming and wagering is likely to be influenced by a desire, borne of economic circumstance, to maximise the profitability and success of the horse racing industry and betting thereon.
32 The analogy is, however, not perfect. Betfair and the TAB compete in a number of betting markets which do not involve horses. It is not self-evident that Betfair's confidential information about, for example, golf or tennis would be relevant to the functions being performed by the committee. Unless it can be shown that that information is relevant to the committee's functions, the problem described in Mobil does not arise. If that be so, it would not be appropriate to impose anything beyond the implied undertaking.
33 The material before me does not presently satisfy me that Betfair's confidential information about sports other than horse racing and harness racing is relevant to the committee's deliberations. Thus, at least as presently advised, I see no basis for granting it the protection sought. I do not exclude the possibility that such evidence or explanation may be available.
34 On the other hand I can readily see why Betfair's confidential information concerned with gaming and wagering on horse racing and harness racing (both in New South Wales and interstate) would be relevant to the committee's role, and hence appropriately the subject of protection.
35 The question of financial material is more difficult. I would accept that very recent financial information, which is not publicly available, might be relevant to the committee's strategy functions. However, the evidence before me does not disclose how rapidly that relevance fades. My initial impression is that the outer limit may be about six months. If that be so, during the course of the proceedings information will continuously be released from the confidentiality regime upon reaching that age. However, there is not currently in the material before me sufficient evidence to permit an accurate answer to that question. I also incline to the view that Betfair's marketing information, at least in relation to horses and harness racing, is entitled to be kept back since it may impact upon the committee's strategic functions.
36 Most of Betfair's claims in its evidence proceeded upon the assumption that what was being protected against was deliberate or accidental disclosure. Insufficient attention has been devoted to analysing the issue by reference to the functions of the strategy committee.
37 In those circumstances, I decline to deal with Betfair's oral application that I determine the status of a number of particular documents. I should add that that application was made only during the hearing and was opposed by the respondents on the basis that the information before the Court was not sufficient for that purpose, a submission which I accept. Nevertheless I have made the comments above in order to give some guidance to the parties.