Bell v R

Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)|2019-10-14|Before: Bell P, Hulme J

Ground 1 - error in assessment of objective seriousness

The following passage from the sentencing remarks relates to the judge's assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences: "[20] Because of her age, [the victim] obviously could not consent to either of the acts of sexual intercourse. [21] But there was no violence, threats, intimidation, or the like, used by Mr Bell. Each act of sexual intercourse was non-oppositional - to adopt an expression used by Counsel for the offender. [22] The objective seriousness of the first offence, for an offence of its kind, is slightly below the middle of the range. The objective seriousness of the second offence is at the middle of the range. [23] Each of the offences is aggravated by reason of the facts that they occurred in the home of the victim and the offender abused a position of trust. [24] The second offence is further aggravated by some slight degree of planning. [25] During the course of the sentencing hearing a Victim Impact Statement was provided to the Court. The contents of the statement reflect the age and intellectual development of the victim but, nevertheless, it is clear enough that the offences have caused significant psychological damage to her. [26] In this regard, it is appropriate to repeat what the Court of Criminal Appeal said in R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56 at [110]: 'This Court has observed that child sex offences have profound and deleterious effects upon victims for many years, if not the whole of their lives… Sexual abuse of children will inevitably give rise to psychological damage… The absolute prohibition on sexual activity on a child is intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity' (citations omitted). [27] As I have already mentioned, Mr Bell was 28 years of age when he committed these offences. He's now almost 30 years of age."
The applicant accepted that the question in relation to this ground was whether it could be established that the judge's characterisation of the objective seriousness of the offences was not reasonably open: Dawkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 278 at [36] (McCallum J, Basten JA and Bellew J agreeing). The Crown referred to the description of the question by Basten JA in Ramos v R [2015] NSWCCA 313 at [41], being whether the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending is shown to be outside the range properly available to the sentencing judge. His Honour added that this was "bearing in mind that the reasonableness of the range should not be too readily confined, nor error too easily inferred".
The applicant disavowed taking any issue with the judge's finding that each offence was aggravated because it occurred in the victim's home and involved an abuse of trust. Nor was there any issue about the judge stating that the second offence exposed the victim to a risk of pregnancy and/or sexually transmitted disease.
What was disputed, however, was his Honour's statement that because of her age, the victim "obviously could not consent to either of the acts of sexual intercourse". It was submitted that his Honour failed to take into account that there was consent, not just in the sense that she was not forced or coerced into the sexual acts, but that she was a willing and active participant. Counsel referred to the statement by McCallum J in Dawkins v R (at [34]) that "it may be accepted that the presence or absence of consent is relevant in the assessment of objective seriousness for an offence contrary to s 66C".
The second error contended for by the applicant was that the circumstance of aggravation element of the offences (s 66C(5)(f): cognitive impairment) was not as serious as other such circumstances may be. Section 66C(5) lists a number of circumstances of aggravation for the purpose of the section that were asserted to be more serious than the victim having a cognitive impairment: (5) In this section, "circumstances of aggravation" means circumstances in which: (a) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender intentionally or recklessly inflicts actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby, or (b) at the time of, or immediately before or after, the commission of the offence, the alleged offender threatens to inflict actual bodily harm on the alleged victim or any other person who is present or nearby by means of an offensive weapon or instrument, or (c) the alleged offender is in the company of another person or persons, or (d) the alleged victim is (whether generally or at the time of the commission of the offence) under the authority of the alleged offender, or (e) the alleged victim has a serious physical disability, or (f) the alleged victim has a cognitive impairment, or (g) the alleged offender took advantage of the alleged victim being under the influence of alcohol or a drug in order to commit the offence, or (h) the alleged offender deprives the alleged victim of his or her liberty for a period before or after the commission of the offence, or (i) the alleged offender breaks and enters into any dwelling-house or other building with the intention of committing the offence or any other serious indictable offence.
In particular, the applicant sought to contrast the circumstance of the victim having a cognitive impairment with offences that involved actual violence, threats of violence involving weapons, gang rape, and cases involving kidnapping or house breaking. These were said to "give rise to this type of offence being committed in substantially more serious circumstances than those of the present case". [3]
The third error contended for by the applicant concerned the judge's finding that the second offence was further aggravated by some "slight" degree of planning. It was submitted that the judge erred in finding that there was any planning and that even if he did not, he erred in finding it was sufficient to aggravate the offence pursuant to s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). Counsel observed that the judge provided no reasoning as to the basis of this finding.

Counsel's submissions on sentence

It is pertinent to note the submissions made by the applicant's then counsel as to the objective seriousness of the offences, as it provides a context for the findings made by the sentencing judge: [4] "In terms of the objective seriousness, I simply say that the second of the incidents might be categorised marginally as more serious. The sex was, on both occasions, penile/vaginal but on that occasion it was unprotected. In terms of where it lies, in my submission, using the appropriate terminology being "non‑oppositional", as I understand it, as opposed to "consensual", this would be a matter that would waiver [sic - weigh?] heavily in favour of a conclusion that this was below the middle range of offending."
In further submissions, counsel conceded that his Honour may conclude that there was a breach of trust. He said that his Honour could find "that at least they found some solace in speaking to each other, it may be making a connection", but "regrettably though, Mr Bell of course being the adult should have known and did know that the engagement of any intimacy with the victim was both inappropriate and illegal". He referred to there having been "no violence, no threats of violence" and that the conduct was "engaged in at succinct times separated by a period of time". [5]
It was counsel for the applicant who introduced the concept of "planning". He said: [6] "[T]he first offence might not be a matter of aggravation such that there was a degree of planning. Although, second offence, it might well be said, given that occasion, it had already been on foot first, and given what's written, there is at least some planning or ongoing nature of it." (Emphasis added)
The solicitor for the Crown submitted that the first offence was "around midrange at least" and the second offence was "above midrange". In submissions concerning discrete aspects which were said to be pertinent, he referred to the "non-oppositional" submission by the applicant's counsel and said, "These are not 61J offences, [7] and that must be borne in mind". In relation to the second offence, he referred to there having been "some planning involved". [8]

Failure to take into account the victim's "consent"

The finding by the judge that "because of her age, [the victim] obviously could not consent to either of the acts of sexual intercourse" was correct. He immediately followed this statement by an adoption of the submission that was made by the applicant's counsel: "there was no violence, threats, intimidation, or the like" and that "each act of sexual intercourse was non-oppositional". [9]
There was no error in the judge adopting those submissions. It has long been held that consent is not a mitigating factor in child sexual assault offences. In R v McClymont (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 17 December 1992, unrep), Mahoney JA (with the concurrence of Gleeson CJ and McInerney J) said, in relation to offences of having sexual intercourse with a 12-year-old girl, committed by a man aged about 20 years: "Taking full account of the extent to which she co-operated willingly in what was taking place, one has to bear in mind that the purpose of the law is to protect such a person from that kind of activity. It is to protect her from, in a sense, her willingly participating in such activities. … The law requires that protection be given to young persons even against their will."
Similar sentiments were expressed by Smart J (Hunt CJ at CL and Studdert J agreeing) in R v Brady (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 3 March 1994, unrep): "As has often been said, the legislation is designed to protect girls under 16 against male advances and against themselves. A 13 year old girl is in need of considerable protection from young men who are older. At the time of the offence the applicant was aged 18 years."
In R v Nelson [2016] NSWCCA 130, the Court was concerned with a Crown appeal against the manifest inadequacy of sentences imposed on the offender, aged between 18 and 19 years at the time of the offending, for sexual intercourse with three young girls, one just under and the other two just over the age of 14. The sentencing judge referred to there having been "no force or threats or violence utilised or relied upon by the offender" and he was satisfied that the intercourse was consensual. He said that even though this was not an element of any of the offences, "it does, however, impact upon the objective serious nature of the type of sexual intercourse undertaken". Basten JA, with the concurrence of Rothman J, responded (at [23]): "While acknowledging that lack of consent was not an element of the offences, the sentencing judge placed some weight on the fact that the activity as described by him "was consensual". No doubt the use of threats or force in overcoming resistance would be an aggravating factor; however, mere lack of opposition is otherwise irrelevant. The activity was not adequately described as "consensual"; it might be better described as not being the subject of opposition. To treat that as a mitigating factor is to misunderstand the nature of the offence. Lack of consent is not an element of the offence because persons of young age are deemed unable to give informed consent to sexual intercourse, no doubt because they do not appreciate the nature and consequences of the activity. The courts should accept that even when the activity is not opposed by the victim, it will be damaging. Early sexual relationships with adults will often exploit and exacerbate a precarious sense of self-worth and self-respect in the victim, which may have lifelong consequences, including an inability to form stable partnerships in adulthood and possible self-destructive behaviour."
In Dawkins v R, to which counsel for the applicant referred, McCallum J (at [34]) cited Hogan v R [2008] NSWCCA 150; 186 A Crim R 52 at [77] and Wakeling v R [2016] NSWCCA 33 at [47] in support of the proposition that "the presence or absence of consent is relevant in the assessment of objective seriousness for an offence contrary to s 66C". It was not said in either of those two cases that consent was a mitigating factor. The issue in each case was whether the sentencing judge had infringed the principle in The Queen v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383; [1981] HCA 31 when sentencing for offences against s 66C by taking into account a lack of consent, which was an element of the more serious offence in s 61J. The Court's response in each case was to characterise the judge as having done no more than refer to a matter that was relevant to the "relative seriousness of the offence" as compared to other offences which might be charged under s 66C: see Hogan v R at [77]; Wakeling v R at [47].
The sentencing judge in the present case was correct to approach the issue of "consent" in the manner in which it had been submitted by the applicant's counsel at sentence; namely, by taking into account the fact that each act of sexual intercourse was "non-oppositional" when assessing the relative seriousness of the offences.
The absence of consent is not an element, or inherent, in offences against s 66C. Forced intercourse without consent would be relevant as a matter of aggravation in assessing the relative seriousness of such an offence (if care is taken in the manner described in Hogan v R and Wakeling v R to not infringe the De Simoni principle). The absence of an aggravating feature does not mitigate the seriousness of the offences here in question: see, for example, R v Woods [2009] NSWCCA 55; (2009) 195 A Crim R 173 where the Court (Giles JA, Latham J and Mathews AJ) said (at [53]): "Offences relating to sexual activity between young children and adults are premised upon the vulnerability, dependency and immaturity of children. It is those attributes that render young children amenable to sexual exploitation by adults. The structure of the offences, and the legislative policies underpinning them, assume that young children are not capable, by and large, of understanding the significance of sexual activity (hence the absence of informed consent) or of asserting their will over that of an adult. How then, can the fact that a victim co-operates with an offender be relevant to an assessment of the objective gravity of an offence of this type? That is not to say that evidence of a victim's resistance and/or an offender's efforts to restrain a victim are not relevant to an assessment of objective gravity for offences of this type. Such a circumstance would aggravate a child sexual assault offence. But the absence of struggle or resistance (that is, the child's co-operation) cannot, in our view, mitigate such an offence."
Counsel in this Court, to her credit, acknowledged the force of the argument put against her on this point and did not seek to pursue the assertion of error any further. In the final analysis, the assertion is untenable.

The circumstance of aggravation could have been of a more serious type

The applicant's submissions incorporate an implicit assumption that the victim's cognitive impairment was necessarily less serious than other circumstances of aggravation listed in s 66C(5). However, as the Crown submissions point out, it was not submitted to the primary judge that his assessment of objective seriousness should include such a comparison and conclusion.
In Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 at [50], the High Court expressed caution about downplaying the significance of a "mild intellectual disability". The description "mild" does not suggest something inconsequential. Here, the child was aged 12, but that was just her chronological age.
It was not self-evident that the circumstance of aggravation averred in the charges was necessarily less serious than others listed in s 66C(5). The judge was correct to characterise the victim impact statement as reflecting the age and intellectual development of the victim, and there is no challenge to his finding that "it is clear enough that the offences have caused significant psychological damage to her".
This assertion of error must be rejected.

The second offence was not aggravated by some "slight" degree of planning

The first issue to be considered in relation to this asserted error is what the judge meant by "planning". In normal parlance, it suggests (at the least) forethought being given to some future activity. In the present case, it appears the word was used to contrast the second offence from one that occurred unexpectedly or spontaneously.
The applicant was a relatively intelligent adult who had deliberately fostered a relationship with a child who he knew was aged 12 and had an intellectual disability. She was thereby in no position to make any mature and considered choice about the matter. He engaged in forms of intimacy with her (kissing and cuddling) soon after he commenced living in the family home. On one occasion, the applicant had full penile/vaginal intercourse with her (the first offence). It was in the context of these events occurring over several months that, on 10 April 2017, the applicant and the victim were lying naked on his bed in the garage of the family home. The second offence then occurred.
I am satisfied that this was what counsel for the applicant was alluding to when he made the submission about "some planning", by his references to "it had already been on foot" and the "ongoing nature of it". I am also satisfied that the judge used the word "planning" in the very same loose way that counsel had.
I am of the view that the applicant's contention of error must fail for three reasons.
First, it was the applicant's counsel who suggested that the judge would make the finding. As a general rule, this Court "will not lightly entertain arguments that could have been put, but were not advanced on the plea, and will have an even greater reluctance to entertain arguments that seek to resile from concessions made below or are a contradiction of submissions previously made": Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44; (2012) 223 A Crim R 460 at [81] (Johnson J).
Secondly, the assertion that the judge incorrectly found that the aggravating factor in s 21A(2)(n) applied is not supported by the judge's remarks. He simply paraphrased the submission the applicant's counsel had made by saying "the second offence is further aggravated by some slight degree of planning". He did not (and counsel did not) refer to s 21A(2)(n), nor did he use the description in that provision: "the offence was part of a planned or organised criminal activity". Even though not a matter of aggravation pursuant to that provision, it remained open to his Honour to regard the background to the second offence (as I have described it above) as affecting the relative seriousness of the offence: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 21A(1)(c).
Thirdly, the complaint that his Honour provided no reasons for making this finding is groundless. The point was not in issue and thus it was unnecessary for his Honour to explain.

Conclusion

None of the errors asserted in relation to the judge's assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences are made out. His Honour's findings as to the relative seriousness of the offences were reasonably open to be made. Ground 1 must be rejected.

Submissions by the applicant

As identified by the applicant, the starting points for each of the indicative sentences before reduction by 25 per cent for the pleas of guilty were 7 years and 6 months and 9 years respectively.
The submission in relation this ground is encapsulated in the following paragraph of counsel's written submissions: [10] "In the instant matter, it is difficult to discern a specific error in relation to the length of the indicative sentences, the degree of (notional accumulation) and the absence of a finding of special circumstances but it is submitted that their combination resulted in a sentence which had the effect of being excessive having regard to the total criminality of the offender's conduct."
Counsel referred in written submissions to a paucity of assistance available by way of sentencing statistics and comparative cases. She accepted that the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period prescribed for the offence in s 66C(2) were points of reference. It was noted that the starting point for the second offence was a head sentence of 9 years which was equivalent to the standard non-parole period. The significance of this was not explained and it is not clear what the Court was to make of it. [11]
Despite the little to be derived from the foregoing, it was submitted that the indicative sentences were excessive when considering the criminality involved in the individual offences. Further, there was said to be, "perhaps", an erroneous approach to another issue that may explain the asserted manifest excess of the sentence, namely that in the (notional) accumulation of the indicative sentences the judge failed to give due regard to the principle of totality. [12]
Counsel accepted that it was necessary for some element of accumulation "to avoid any suggestion that what is in effect being offered is some kind of a discount for multiple offending": R v MAK [2006] NSWCCA 381; (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 at [18]. However, it was submitted that "the length of the indicative sentences, the degree of (notional accumulation) and the absence of a finding of special circumstances resulted in a sentence which had the effect of being excessive having regard to the totality of criminality of the offender's conduct". [13]
It was also submitted that there was a "significant overlap between the facts and circumstances of the two offences" as being pertinent in relation to totality. It was submitted that "they overlap in being committed upon the same victim, during the same period of time the offender was residing with her, within the course of the same 'relationship', in the same surrounding context". [14]

Submissions by the Crown

The Crown submitted that the aggregate sentence was not unreasonable or plainly unjust because of the following matters: ● There was a significant maximum penalty (20 years) and a standard non-parole period (9 years). ● Having regard to the various aggravating factors, it was open to the judge to find that the objective seriousness of the offences were "slightly below middle of the range" and "middle of the range" respectively. ● The applicant was disentitled to leniency because of his prior record, including breach of an intensive correction order. ● The applicant's prospects of rehabilitation were assessed as "guarded". ● The offending was found to have caused the victim significant psychological damage.
The Crown was critical of the applicant's reliance upon statistics and comparative cases. However, as indicated above, the applicant's counsel readily accepted in her written submissions that they were not of any particular assistance. Counsel who appeared at first instance adopted the same approach.
The Crown submitted (uncontroversially) that questions of accumulation of sentences are entirely discretionary and in this case it was open to the sentencing judge to (notionally) accumulate as he did. In support of this, the Crown noted that there were two discrete episodes of offending some three or four months apart and that the second offence involved additional matters of aggravation.

Consideration

The principles to be applied in the assessment of a ground of appeal asserting manifest excess in a sentence were summarised in Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221 at [443]: "When it is contended that a sentence is manifestly excessive it is necessary to have regard to the following principles … : ● Appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result arrived at in the court below is markedly different from sentences imposed in other cases. ● Intervention is only warranted where the difference is such that it may be concluded that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the reasons of the sentencing judge, or where the sentence imposed is so far outside the range of sentences available that there must have been error. ● It is not to the point that this court might have exercised the sentencing discretion differently. ● There is no single correct sentence and judges at first instance are allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and application of principle. ● It is for the applicant to establish that the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust." (Citation of authorities omitted.)
Where the subject of the assessment is an aggregate sentence, it is necessary to focus upon that sentence, although regard may be had to the indicative sentences and the notional degree of their accumulation in order to understand the foundation for the aggregate. The issue is whether the actual sentence imposed is proportionate to the totality of the offender's criminality. (See JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297; (2014) 246 A Crim R 528 at [40].)
It was necessary for the sentencing judge to make an assessment of the individual sentences (in accordance with Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57) that were proportionate to their objective gravity: R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242 at [15]. As previously mentioned, his Honour found the first offence to be slightly below, and the second offence to be within, the middle of the range of objective seriousness.
These findings by the judge as to the relative objective seriousness of the offences enable use of the maximum penalty and the prescribed standard non-parole period as legislative guideposts: R v West [2014] NSWCCA 250 at [27] (Adamson J). As mentioned, the former is imprisonment for 20 years and the latter is a non-parole period of 9 years.
The starting points for each indicative sentence before 25% reduction for the applicant's early pleas of guilty were 7 years and 6 months and 9 years respectively. The actual indicative sentences were 5 years and 7 months and 6 years and 9 months. In determining the aggregate sentence by applying the principle of totality, the judge uncontroversially, albeit notionally, accumulated one partly upon the other. The indicative sentences are each significant, but the degree to which they were accumulated to arrive at an aggregate sentence of 9 years and 6 months is quite substantial.
One does not know (and it was not necessary for the judge to say) whether the sentence for the first offence was accumulated upon the sentence for the second, or vice versa, or whether the judge simply looked at the two and made an assessment of what was appropriate for the totality of the offending. Simply put, in addition to the sentence for the first offence there is an additional 3 years and 1 month for the second offence. Or, in addition to the sentence for the second offence, there is an additional 2 years and 9 months for the first offence.
In Nguyen v R (2016) 256 CLR 656; [2016] HCA 17 at [64], Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ made the following observation about the operation of the principle of totality: "Ultimately the object of the sentencing exercise is to impose individual sentences that, so far as possible, accurately reflect the gravity of each offence while at the same time rendering a total effective sentence which, so far as possible, accurately reflects the totality of criminality comprised in the totality of offences. That is an exercise which involves a significant measure of discretionary moderation and accumulation of individual sentences according to the particular circumstances of each case. Up to a point, therefore, it is something about which sentencing judges might take different views of which neither could be said to be wrong. Generally speaking, however, the imposition of less severe individual sentences may call for a greater degree of accumulation in order to reflect total criminality whereas more severe individual sentences may necessitate a greater degree of concurrency."
There were a number of common features in the two offences (e.g. they both involved the same type of offending with the same victim), but there were additional elements of criminality that demanded an appropriate level of partial (notional) accumulation. Using the terminology of Howie J in Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 at [27], the sentence for one offence could not comprehend and reflect the criminality for the other offence. They were discrete offences committed some months apart and with the second offence involving additional aggravating factors.
There were a number of subjective matters of significance that had to be borne in mind in the assessment of sentence. They should not have lost their force, or been diluted in their effect, in the assessment of the aggregate sentence. They included the following matters as described by the judge: [15] ● The applicant derived from a dysfunctional upbringing [16] , marked by physical (including sexual) abuse; emotional abuse; illegal drug-taking by persons responsible for his upbringing; a lack of role models; and a lack of discipline or the imposition of appropriate boundaries. ● He experienced unresolved grief as a result of the death of his mother and sister in a motor vehicle accident in 1999. ● It was in the context of his dysfunctional upbringing and early exposure to alcohol and illicit drug use that the applicant commenced using cannabis and alcohol regularly as a teenager and later turned to "ice" and gambling. ● The applicant had an ability to achieve success in the work place; he was once the manager of a supermarket with 100 staff. The judge considered that this was indicative of a significant level of intelligence. ● The applicant had a number of normal intimate relationships with adult women. Two children had been born in one of those relationships. ● The applicant's working life and relationships had been adversely affected by his drug-taking. He had received treatment once and it was unsuccessful. ● The applicant had a criminal history that denied to him the leniency that could be extended to a first offender. He had spent two months in gaol in early 2016 when an intensive correction order was revoked. The judge noted that there was no prior offending involving children. ● The applicant had a major depressive disorder and long-term drug issues (which the judge regarded as probably associated with that disorder and his dysfunctional upbringing). He also had problems with impulse control. ● The judge found that the applicant was "genuinely remorseful", although his prospects of rehabilitation were "guarded". ● The applicant's early pleas of guilty warranted a 25% reduction of sentence for their utilitarian value. ● Imprisonment whilst on remand had been "harsh" because the applicant had been held in protective custody in that 15 month period. The judge was not persuaded that he would serve his sentence in protection.
The applicant's offences were very serious and warranted a stern response in sentencing in order to give effect to some of the purposes of sentencing listed in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). These include adequate punishment, deterrence, making the offender accountable, denunciation of his conduct, and recognition of the harm done to the victim. However, it was necessary also to make due allowance for those aspects of the applicant's subjective case which were favourable to him. The starting points for the indicative sentences give the appearance of reflecting the former, but not the latter. Having regard to the substantial degree to which the sentences were notionally accumulated, the same may be said of the aggregate sentence.
I am satisfied that the aggregate sentence of 9 years and 6 months is manifestly excessive.

Re-sentencing

My own assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences coincides with that of the primary judge. I have had particular regard to the fact that the offences were committed by a mature and reasonably intelligent 28-year-old adult who formed an abhorrent belief that he was in love with a 12-year-old girl. He said in his evidence that he was aware of both her age and her intellectual disability at the time. Both offences involved full penile/vaginal intercourse, the second occurring without any protection. The applicant concedes that the offences were further aggravated as they occurred in the victim's home and in abuse of his position of trust.
An affidavit by the applicant was read in the event of re-sentencing. He affirmed that he had involved himself in work and in education since he was sentenced. He is currently involved in a 12-month traineeship in heavy engineering and had completed other vocational courses. He had also completed the EQUIPS drug addiction program from which he claims to have derived considerable benefit.
The Crown read an affidavit to which was attached a number of documents describing some institutional disciplinary misconduct charges brought against the applicant. There are three such instances, but they are of a relatively minor nature and there have been no further incidents in the past nine months.
It may well be the case that the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation are better now than they were at the time of sentencing, but there are no expert reports available to assist with an assessment of this.
Counsel for the applicant submitted that there should be a finding of special circumstances thereby reducing the non-parole proportion of any new sentence imposed. One circumstance contributing to this was said to be the "accumulation of sentences". It appears that this submission is made quite often, but it is inapt where only one sentence with one non-parole period is imposed and nothing is actually accumulated. The other circumstance submitted was that the applicant should have an extended period of time on parole in order to assist with his rehabilitation through supervision and support. Almost all inmates would benefit from that. I do not see anything sufficiently "special" in the applicant's case when regard is had to the potential period of parole available when a sentence is imposed in the terms indicated below. This is particularly the case when all matters potentially supporting a finding of special circumstances have been taken into account in determining the overall sentence: R v Fidow [2004] NSWCCA 172 at [18].
In relation to the nomination of individual sentences as required by s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, I propose a sentence for the first offence of 7 years and a sentence for the second offence of 8 years. These are to be reduced by 25% for the applicant's early pleas of guilty, yielding sentences of 5 years, 3 months and 6 years respectively. For the purposes of s 54B(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, the non-parole periods are 3 years, 11 months and 4 years, 6 months respectively.
Applying the principle of totality in relation to those discounted individual sentences, I propose an aggregate sentence of 7 years, 6 months with a non-parole period of 5 years, 7 months.

Orders

I propose the following orders: 1. Grant leave to appeal. 2. Uphold the appeal against sentence. 3. Quash the sentence imposed in the District Court on 10 August 2018 and in lieu, impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 7 years 6 months with a non-parole period of 5 years 7 months dating from 18 April 2017. The offender will become eligible for release on parole upon the expiry of the non-parole period on 17 November 2022.

Endnotes

The definition is now (in identical terms) in s 61HD(1A).
Remarks on sentence (ROS), 10 August 2018, par 25.
Applicant's written submissions (AWS), 8 August 2019, par 32.
Proceedings on sentence (POS), 23 July 2018, p 20(24).
POS, 23 July 2018, p 20(39).
POS, 23 July 2018, p 21(2).
A reference to the offence in s 61J of the Crimes Act of aggravated sexual intercourse without consent.
POS, 23 July 2018, pp 22-23; 23(41).
ROS, 10 August 2018, pars 20-21.
Applicant's supplementary written submissions (ASWS), 10 October 2019, par 8.
ASWS, 10 October 2019, par 16.
ASWS, 10 October 2019, pars 17-18.
ASWS, 10 October 2019, pars 25-26.
ASWS, 10 October 2019, pars 27.
ROS, 10 August 2018, pars 29-49.
The judge alluded to the judgment of the High Court in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 in relation to this. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 October 2019

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] Mr Bell (the applicant) pleaded guilty to two offences of sexual intercourse with a child aged between 10 and 14 years in circumstances of aggravation, namely that the victim had a cognitive impairment. The applicant was sentenced in the District Court to imprisonment for 9 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 7 years. The applicant applied for leave to appeal against his sentence. There were two grounds of appeal: The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences. The sentence imposed is otherwise manifestly excessive. In respect of ground 1, the applicant asserted that the sentencing judge had made errors by failing to take into account the fact that the victim was a willing and active participant in the sexual activity, by failing to find that the victim's cognitive impairment was a less serious type of aggravating circumstance compared with the list in s 66C(5) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and in finding that the second offence was aggravated by planning. In respect of ground 2, the applicant asserted that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive because of the length of the indicative sentences and the degree to which the sentencing judge accumulated them. The Court (Bell P, Simpson AJA, and R A Hulme J) granted leave to appeal, dismissed ground 1 and upheld ground 2, holding: The sentencing judge did not err in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences because: It has long been held that consent is not a mitigating factor in child sexual assault offences, and the absence of consent as an aggravating factor does not mitigate the seriousness of the offences: [1] (Bell P), [2] (Simpson AJA), [29] (R A Hulme J). R v McClymont (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 17 December 1992, unrep); R v Brady (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 3 March 1994, unrep); R v Nelson [2016] NSWCCA 130; R v Woods [2009] NSWCCA 55; (2009) 195 A Crim R 173 applied. It is not self-evident that the circumstance of aggravation - a cognitive impairment - is necessarily of a lesser seriousness than the other aggravating circumstances in s 66C(5) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW): [1] (Bell P), [2] (Simpson AJA), [36]-[39] (R A Hulme J). Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 210; [2011] HCA 39 referred to. The finding that the offence was aggravated by "planning", used in a loose way to refer to the context of the relationship over a period of months, was suggested by counsel for the applicant on sentence. Courts are reluctant to entertain submissions on appeal that contradict submissions on sentence: [1] (Bell P), [2] (Simpson AJA), [41]-[44] (R A Hulme J). Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44; (2012) 223 A Crim R 460 referred to. The aggregate sentence imposed is manifestly excessive because: When assessing an aggregate sentence on appeal, the issue is whether the actual sentence imposed is proportionate to the totality of the offender's criminality: [1] (Bell P), [2] (Simpson AJA), [58] (R A Hulme J). Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221; JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297; (2014) 246 A Crim R 528 referred to. Where individual sentences are indicated pursuant to Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57, the maximum penalty and prescribed standard non-parole period can be used as legislative guideposts for an assessment on appeal: [1] (Bell P), [2] (Simpson AJA), [59]-[60] (R A Hulme J). R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242; R v West [2014] NSWCCA 250 applied. In applying the principle of totality to the assessment of an aggregate sentence, the sentence should reflect totality of criminality and the purposes of sentencing while also making due allowance for the favourable aspects of the offender's subjective case: [1] (Bell P), [2] (Simpson AJA), [63]-[66] (R A Hulme J). Nguyen v R (2016) 256 CLR 656; [2016] HCA 17; Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 referred to.

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