Consideration
18 The first step is the identification of the benefit or advantage expected to accrue to the applicant in return for the provision of the guarantees in question. The provision of the guarantees was a voluntary act on the part of the applicant. The immediate advantage flowing therefrom was the provision of the facilities by Ford Credit and Westpac to BMM which were supported by the guarantees. In a practical business sense the provision of those facilities to BMM was of benefit to the applicant, both by reason of its investment in BMM, and by reason of the trading relationship which subsisted between the two companies. It is not a case of BMM "incidentally deriv[ing] an advantage of a capital kind" from the provision of the guarantees "in which the taxpayer does not share" (South Australian Battery Makers at p 656-7). The quid pro quo which the applicant expected to derive from Ford and Westpac in return for its guarantees was the extension of credit facilities to BMM.
19 On the agreed facts, a motive for the provision of the guarantees, or an indirect objective which the applicant hoped to secure as a result of the provision of the guarantees, was the continuation of the trading relationship which subsisted between itself and BMM and from which it derived assessable income. Although the agreed facts state that the objective was not to protect the company's investment in BMM, but was to ensure the continuity of the income producing dealings between the two companies, achievement of the latter objective would probably secure the former.
20 If the benefit or advantage expected to accrue to the applicant in return for the provision of the guarantees was the provision of financial facilities to BMM, or the preservation of its shareholding interest in BMM, then its liability under the guarantees would be capital in nature. If the benefit or advantage expected to accrue was the continuation of the trading relationship between the two companies then its characterisation of the liability may depend upon whether the provision of the guarantees is seen as a normal incident of the applicant's trading activities, or whether it is seen as a non recurring transaction of a special character intended to secure an enduring advantage for the applicant's business.
21 It will be apparent from the above that the selection or identification of the benefit or advantage expected to accrue to the applicant from the provision of the guarantees at least influences, and may determine, the characterisation of payments made under the guarantee, subject to the second and third of the considerations referred to by Dixon J in Sun Newspapers.
22 "One of the most difficult aspects of the problem of characterizing an outgoing is the assessment of what, if any, weight is to be given to indirect objects which a taxpayer had in mind in incurring the outgoing. Such objects form part of the relevant circumstances by reference to which the problem of characterization must be resolved": Ure v FCT (1981) 81 ATC 4,100, 4,110 per Deane and Sheppard JJ; cf Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd v FCT (1980-1981) 33 ALR 213, 235 where Deane and Fisher JJ accepted that both direct and indirect objectives, and irrespective of whether pursuit of them should be seen in terms of "purpose" or "object" or "motive", may be taken into account in determining whether an outgoing is properly deductible under the second limb of s 51(1) of the Act. In NMRSB Ltd v FCT (1998) 98 ATC 4,188, 4,204-4,205 Sackville J, whilst declining to accept a submission that the character of the advantage obtained by a taxpayer is to be determined exclusively by reference to the contractual or other legal rights the taxpayer received for the payment, nonetheless thought it appropriate, in the circumstances of that case, to determine the character of the advantage by reference to the contractual quid pro quo obtained for the payment in question. His Honour agreed with the observation of Brennan J in Magna Alloys & Research that "other than perhaps in unusual cases" whether s 51(1) is satisfied does not depend upon the taxpayer's state of mind, at least where the payment is not voluntary.
23 The giving of the guarantees is, however, analogous to the making of a voluntary payment. In the present case, a description of the benefit or advantage expected to accrue to the applicant as a result of the giving of the guarantees which left out of account the anticipated beneficial effects upon its income would involve a distortion of the practical realities of the situation. The benefit or advantage expected to accrue to the applicant as a result of the giving of the guarantees can thus be described as the provision of funds to BMM so as to provide it with a stronger base from which to carry on its business, including purchase of goods from the applicant in the expectation that the applicant would continue to derive assessable income from its dealings with BMM.
24 The giving of a guarantee is analogous to the applicant making a loan of the funds guaranteed to BMM. "Losses incurred as the result of loans made to another company in order to secure a fixed source of supply or other enduring benefit are to be regarded as capital losses and not deductible": C.I.R. v Shipbuilders Ltd [1968] NZLR 885 at 901, unless it is part of the regular business of the company to engage in money lending.
25 In Barrett & Green's "Principles of Income Taxation" (5th Edn) (1996) the matter is put this way at par 9.54:
"The principle emerging from the Snowden & Wilson case and the John Fairfax case, as well as the earlier authorities, is that where expenditure is directed towards the maintenance of the taxpayer's position in a given field or facilitating its continued operations in that field (as in the cases of Hallstroms and Snowden & Wilson) it will generally be regarded as an outgoing on revenue account deductible under s 51(1). Where, on the other hand, the outgoing is directed towards the improvement of the taxpayer's position or the acquisition of some additional asset, right or business advantage, including the forestalling of potential competition, it should be regarded as an outgoing of capital. The nature and scope of the taxpayer's existing income-producing activities will be indicative of the character to be given to the outgoing."
In FCT v Consolidated Fertilizers Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 385, 399-400 the Court said:
"… a distinction must be made between expenditure incurred for the purpose of preserving and protecting a business as such, being expenditure for a particular purpose on an isolated occasion, and expenditure which the nature of business may require as part of the prudent management thereof."
26 In John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd at p 48 Menzies J said:
"To make a payment to acquire or to defend the acquisition of a favourable position from which to earn income or to enter into arrangements that will yield income is not in general an outlay incurred either in gaining or in carrying on business for the purpose of gaining assessable income; such a payment in the case of a trading company, occurs at a stage too remote from the receipt of income to be so regarded. To be deductible an outlay must be part of the cost of trading operations to produce income, ie, it must have the character of a working expense."
It is true that this observation was made in the context of the positive limbs of s 51(1), and I have already referred to the significance of the concession made by the respondent in this respect. Nonetheless, in my view the observations which I have quoted are of assistance in determining whether the payments made pursuant to the guarantee are of a capital nature.
27 The liability was incurred once and for all, for a potentially large amount. The extent of the liability was unrelated to the trading operations between the applicant and BMM. The liability was not one which was incurred to BMM, but to its financiers. These are factors which are relevant to the third of the matters referred to by Dixon J in Sun Newspapers, namely the means adopted to secure the advantage.
28 The liability was not, as a matter of substance, in the nature of a marketing expense. It was incurred because BMM needed, or sought, external assistance in connection with the raising of funds with which to carry on its business. A liability incurred on that account is generally a capital risk: C.I.R. v Huntley & Palmers Ltd (1928) 12 T.C. 1209, 1221. The nature of the benefit or advantage sought was the propping up of BMM so that the applicant could continue to trade with it. That is the type of enduring benefit which will ordinarily result in the cost of acquiring it as being characterised as capital in nature. It does not matter, in my view, that BMM was already a customer of the applicant's, because the issue is not whether the object was to enable the applicant to carry on its business profitably, but whether the means adopted to achieve that end involved the incurring of liabilities which were capital in character.
29 In my opinion, AAT correctly characterised the payments made pursuant to the guarantee as being of a capital nature, and its decision in that respect was not infected by any error of law. In view of that conclusion, and the way in which the matter has been argued (see par 2 above) it has not been necessary to consider whether AAT's decision is more properly regarded as being one of fact, such that the issue for this Court is whether the decision reached is one which was reasonably open to AAT. The competing views on this question are referred to in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v FCT (1946) 72 CLR 634, 645, 646, 652, 656. In Steele (at p 205) the High Court acted on a concession that whether the outgoing was of a capital nature is a question of law.