The Central Branch
51 As previously mentioned, in February 1999 National Council made an amendment to the rules in order to create the Central Branch. The new rule was itself amended in October 1999. As so amended, the relevant provision (part of rule 37) reads:
"There shall be a Central Branch of the Union which shall comprise those persons eligible for membership of the Union throughout Australia in accordance with:
(a) Rule 5(E); or
(b) any other Part of Rule 5 and whom with their consent the National Council or National Committee of management notwithstanding any other rule allocates to the Central Branch in order in the circumstances to adequately or more adequately provide for the representation of their industrial and/or other interests as members of the Union, and admitted as members of the Union.
Any person who is allocated to the Central Branch in accordance with paragraph (b) above thereby becomes a member of the Central Branch to the exclusion of any other Branch."
52 Rule 5(E) is a rule providing membership eligibility to people occupying specified categories of supervisory positions. Prior to the establishment of the Central Branch, these members were allocated to a non-geographic Branch of the Organisation known as the "Foremen and Supervisory Branch". When the Central Branch was established, that branch was abolished. The difference between the old Branch and the new, in terms of eligibility, is that the Central Branch may also receive members engaged in non-supervisory work who fall within para (b), set out above.
53 The appellants' attack on the validity of the rule changes relating to the Central Branch is put on two bases. First, counsel say that, if cl 6 of Attachment A to the Memorandum of Agreement is construed in accordance with their submission, the changes infringe the autonomy of the New South Wales Branch of the Organisation. Second, they say the changes have the effect of making the rules of the Organisation oppressive, unreasonable and unjust, in contravention of s 196(c) of the Act; and therefore vulnerable to be declared void by the Court pursuant to s 208(5) of the Act.
54 Having regard to what we have already said about cl 6 of Attachment A, it will be apparent the first argument fails.
55 As to the second argument, there is an immediate question as to the identity of the persons who are said to be oppressed, or unreasonably or unjustly treated, by the rule concerning the Central Branch. Given the fact that members whose eligibility depends on rule 5(E) have always been allocated to a special, non-geographic branch, it can hardly be said such members, who now fall within para (a) of the new rule, are oppressed etc. Nor can it be said members who fall within para (b) are oppressed, or unreasonably or unjustly treated, by the rule; they may be allocated to the Central Branch only with their consent.
56 No doubt in recognition of these considerations, counsel for the appellants did not argue the rule is oppressive etc to members of the Central Branch. The oppression etc, in their contention, is of the remaining members of the Branches from which the allocated members are removed, pursuant to para (b).
57 In considering this aspect of the case, Moore J set out some background material (in paras 96 and 97):
"All branches were created by rule 37 though the manner in which they were to operate was addressed in many of the other rules of the NUW. While the National Council had express power under rule 8(A)(b) to "alter, amend, revise, rescind or add to" the rules, it also had express power to establish branches, arrange for branches to amalgamate, allocate branches the territory within which they could operate, transfer members from branch to branch and close or disband a branch: see rule 8(A)(e). Under the scheme in the rules as it existed at the time in question, the latter power could be exercised (at least as it related to any reallocation of territory or closing or disbanding a branch) only by exercising the former power. However the exercise of these powers to reallocate territory, transfer members or disband a branch was subject to rule 46(D) which required, inter alia, notice being given to the branch affected and, in substance, affording the branch an opportunity to have members of the branch vote on the question. The result of any such vote was binding on the NUW, the National Council, the National Committee of Management and officers and members of the NUW: see rule 46(D)(c). Thus the power of the National Council to reallocate territory between branches, transfer members between branches or disband a branch was subject to what was, effectively, ratification by the members of the affected branches if a plebiscite was requested by the branch committee of management of the branch or branches involved. It has not been part of the applicants' case in these proceedings that the procedures in rule 46(D) were not followed.
There was, immediately before the alterations creating the Central Branch, an anomaly involving the proviso concerning the Foremen and Supervisory Branch (enabling members to transfer from a geographically based branch to that branch) and rule 46(D). The proviso permitted the transfer of a member or members from a geographically based branch with the agreement of the branches involved. This must be viewed, in my opinion, as an exception to the scheme involving the exercise of the power of the National Council to, inter alia, transfer members between branches which might trigger a referendum under rule 46(D). The exception was applicable, at the relevant time, to a limited and specially defined class of member, namely members who were foremen or supervisors."
58 After holding that the rule concerning the Central Branch could not be considered oppressive, unreasonable or unjust from the perspective of the members concerned, Moore J dealt with the effect of the rule on geographically-based branches; and, in particular, with the contention that re-allocations under para (b) would reduce members' contributions to Branch funds and the representation of the New South Wales Branch on National Council. He commented (at para 105):
"However this submission effectively ignores that the member or members in question would have elected to transfer from the NSW Branch to the Central Branch. There can be, in my opinion, no objection in principle to the representation of members of the Central Branch on National Council by delegates drawn from the branch in numbers corresponding to the proportion members of that branch represent to the membership of the NUW as a whole. All the submission demonstrates is a potential anomaly in the process for collecting the contributions of members of the Central Branch who are also members of the NSW Union and some obscurity in the way the contributions would be treated under the rules. It is a potential anomaly and obscurity which desirably should be clarified by further alterations to the rules. It does not, however, reveal an unfairness of the type contemplated by s 196 if, as I understand is the position, the fundamental attack of the applicants is on the rules creating the Central Branch and rule 37 in its amended form in particular. I should add, parenthetically, that the final form of the rule to show cause advanced by the applicants sought orders in relation to 'rule changes' and did not impugn specified rules or parts of rules or the rules generally as contemplated by s 208. However this is ultimately of no consequence given that the applicants have not demonstrated oppression, unreasonableness or injustice in the way they have contended."
59 Moore J also dealt with a submission that the new rule was oppressive etc because it permitted National Council to transfer members out of a Branch without the entire membership of that Branch having the opportunity to vote on the proposed transfer, as it would if there were a transfer to another geographically-based branch. Rule 8(A)(e) permits National Council, amongst other things, "to transfer members from Branch to Branch and to close or disband any Branch or Branches". However, rule 46(D) provides that, where National Council decides to exercise that power, the General Secretary must notify the relevant Branch and the Branch Committee of Management may, within 35 days of notification, request the decision be submitted to a referendum of the financial members of the Branch. The sub-rule does not compel the National Council to agree to the request, but it applies sub-rule (c) of rule 46 to any referendum that may be undertaken.
60 It appears the argument put to Moore J, on behalf of the present appellants, assumed that rule 46(D) would not apply to any decision of National Council to re-allocate members pursuant to para (b) of the rule relating to Central Branch. His Honour thought this would not necessarily make the rule oppressive etc. He said at para 107:
"… there is nothing inherently oppressive, unreasonable or unjust about a rule that may operate in a way that resulted in a group of members securing representation on a governing body of the organisation in a proportion that broadly corresponded with the proportion of their numbers to the membership as a whole. The same can be said of a rule which reduced the representation of a particular group as a result of a reduction in their numbers as a proportion of the membership as a whole. The second observation is that any purported exercise of the power to allocate members (even with their consent) to the Central Branch which was for a purpose for which the power was not conferred (bearing in mind that the allocation must [be] in order to achieve the objective referred to in par (b) of the new Central Branch provision in rule 37) and/or was not a bona fide exercise of the power would expose the members of the body making the allocation to proceedings under s 209 ..."
61 We agree with these comments. They furnish a complete answer to the appellants' second argument concerning the validity of the rule amendments relating to the Central Branch.
62 In the course of argument before us, counsel for the appellants put a contention, about the relationship of rule 46(D) to a transfer decision under rule 8(A)(e), that was directly opposed to that apparently put to Moore J. They contended cl 46(D) would apply to any such transfer and sought a declaration to that effect.
63 Counsel for the respondents argued rule 8(A)(e) had nothing to do with any re-allocation under rule 37; rule 37 was itself the source of the power to re-allocate. He adopted the view of Moore J, expressed in the second paragraph of the extract from his reasons quoted at para 57 above, that the proviso to the old rule concerning the Foremen and Supervisory Branch should be viewed "as an exception to the scheme involving the exercise of the power of the National Council to … transfer members between branches that might trigger a referendum under rule 46(D)."
64 It seems to us that rule 46(D) does not apply to a decision by National Council or National Committee of Management to allocate a member of an existing Branch to the Central Branch. The reason for our view is not that rule 37 uses the word "allocates", whereas rule 8(A)(e) speaks of a power to "transfer members from Branch to Branch"; an allocation of an existing member from a geographically-based Branch to the Central Branch will effect a transfer of that person's membership from the former Branch to the latter. Our reason is that the power of allocation under para (b) of the relevant part of rule 37 applies "notwithstanding any other rule". In other words, even if the allocation effects a transfer from one Branch of the Organisation to another Branch, the allocation may proceed notwithstanding rule 8(A)(e).
65 Further, para (b) permits an allocation only "in order in the circumstances to adequately or more adequately provide for the representation of their industrial and/or other interests as members of the Union". In other words, the power of allocation is one to be exercised to advance the interests of particular members. It would be curious if the ability of the National Council, or National Committee of Management, to provide representation, or better representation, of the interests of individual members was intended to be vulnerable to veto by remaining Branch members concerned to retain their influence in the Organisation.
66 We agree with this aspect of the decision of Moore J. We decline to make the declaration sought by the appellants.