Before proceeding to indicate why we think this is so, it is, however, necessary to advert to the ground upon which the learned trial judge dismissed the appellant's claims, for the line of reasoning which he followed would, if valid, mean not only that the circumstances excluded the implication of a general condition of suitability or fitness but also that no warranty or condition of any kind should be implied and this, of course, would be fatal to each and every one of the counterclaims. The learned trial judge "accepted the view of the nature of the warranty to be implied in cases of bailment enunciated by Jordan C.J. in Gemmell Power Farming Co. Ltd. v. Nies [1] as qualified by Lowe J." in the later case to which we have referred [2] , and then stated that "as a general rule, when one person for value supplies a chattel to another to be used for an agreed purpose or for a purpose indicated by the nature of the chattel, he impliedly promises in the absence of some provision to the contrary (which may be either express or implied from the circumstances surrounding the hiring) that it is reasonably fit for such use". But he refused to imply any such condition in the present case because, in his view, the circumstances of the case were such "that no warranty of fitness should be implied". The consideration which ultimately induced this conclusion was that the original "Offers to Purchase" signed by the appellant contained provisions excluding all warranties or conditions implied by law and he felt "that it would not be right to allow the defendant to obtain the tractor on more favourable terms than had been agreed upon between himself and Moore Road Machinery (Vic.) Pty. Ltd." simply because he had elected to deal with the Acceptance Company and to adopt a hire purchase agreement as the "method of financing his acquisition of the tractor". It was, he thought, "unthinkable that Moore Acceptance Corporation Pty. Ltd. should be regarded as having given by implication any warranty of fitness in relation to this machine". With deference to the learned trial judge this line of reasoning was, in our view, fallacious. No doubt, if the appellant had purchased the tractor from the Machinery Company the existence of such a clause would have operated contractually to exclude conditions or warranties which might otherwise have been implied. But in the events which happened the clause could not have any such operation in relation to the Acceptance Company's obligations. The learned trial judge does not, of course, suggest otherwise; on the contrary, he relies upon the existence of the clause merely as one of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the hire purchase agreement. But even if it may be so regarded what inference, if any, concerning the intentions of the parties to the hire purchase agreement can be drawn from this particular circumstance? Perhaps if one were permitted to guess it could be said that it is probable that the Acceptance Company had no desire to accept any higher responsibility than that which the Machinery Company had purported to accept under the terms of the relevant "Offer to Purchase". But this is far from saying that the existence of the excluding clause in the "Offer to Purchase" negatived the implication in the hire purchase agreement of conditions which might otherwise be implied by law. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that the omission from that agreement of an excluding clause was accidental and the contention may well be open that its omission, in the circumstances, showed that the substance of the clause to be found in the "Offer to Purchase" was not to form part of the appellant's bargain with the Acceptance Company. However this may be the circumstance relied upon does not, in our view, show that the parties intended to exclude conditions or warranties which might otherwise have been implied by law but, since there are difficulties in the way of establishing that the appellant relied upon the skill and judgment of the Acceptance Company, the counterclaims, so far as they are based upon the alleged breach of an implied condition of general fitness or suitability for a known purpose, must fail.