Witutams J. A meeting of creditors of the appellant, Benjamin
David Bear, called pursuant to Part XI. of the Bankruptcy Act
1924-1933, was held at Sydney on 24th July 1941, at which an
extraordinary resolution was duly passed that the creditors agree to
accept the sum of £1,000 together with any moneys held by Mr.
©. A. Law as trustee in full satisfaction and discharge of all liabilities
of the appellant as at 24th July 1941, such sum, after payment of
the trustee's proper costs, charges, expenses and commission, to be
divided between the creditors pro rata according to the amount of
their proved debts. A subsequent meeting of the creditors held on
31st July 1941 purported to confirm this extraordinary resolution.
On the last-mentioned date, before the certificates required by sec.
161 (c) had been filed, James Wilson, a creditor of the appellant,
applied to the court by motion pursuant to sec. 161 (d) to appoint
a day to consider the composition accepted at the meeting of creditors
on 24th July and proposed to be confirmed at a further meeting to
be held on 31st July. The application was therefore premature,
but the court fixed 21st August 1941 at 10.30 a.m. to consider the
composition. Notice of the appointment was presumably adver-
tized in the Gazette by the registrar in accordance with sec. 161 (d).
After the applicant's solicitor Mr. Edgley, Law the proposed trustee,
and the appellant had filed affidavits, the motion came on for hearing
before the learned judge in bankruptcy at 10.35 a.m. on 21st August.
The applicant appeared by his solicitor, and Mr. Law by his counsel
Mr. Taylor. Sec. 161 (e) provides that any creditor may, on filing
in court, three days at least before the day appointed, a notice of
his intention to oppose the composition or scheme, be heard against
it; but the debtor and any creditor may, without notice, be heard
in favour of it. The applicant's solicitor at first opposed the com-
position, although there is no evidence that he filed the necessary
notice of opposition. He submitted that the subsequent meeting
had not been held at an interval of "not less than seven days"
after the first meeting, in breach of sec. 161 (6), and that the com-
position did not provide for the priorities directed by sec. 84. He