"The distinction to be drawn is between proceedings which are necessary for the administration of partnership assets where there is no relevant fault on either side, on the one hand, and proceedings which are rendered necessary by reason of the default of one of the partners, on the other. When the proceedings are caused by such default there is normally good reason not to order payment of costs out of the partnership assets, but rather to order costs against the partner in default, at least up to the conclusion of the hearing, as illustrated by the decision of Jessel, MR in Norton v Russell (1875) 19 Eq 343. I think that the position is accurately summarised in the following passage from Lindley & Banks on Partnership (16 th ed) at para23-para112:
"... it has long been an established rule that all the costs of dissolution proceedings should be paid out of the partnership assets, unless there is a good reason for making some other order. Where, however, such proceedings are, in reality, commenced in order to obtain an adjudication on some disputed claim between the partners, the unsuccessful litigant will normally be ordered to pay the costs up to the date of trial."
20 It is necessary to see whether in the terms of his Honour's distinction and that in Lindley & Banks on Partnership there is good reason to make some other order. In this case the first defendant suggests that the plaintiff's extensive delay in preparing the case coupled with the plaintiff's lack of success on the issues which were last debated before me and the late reference to other matters the day before the last hearing before me commenced, justified some other order.
21 I turn to the question of delay. The history of the proceedings is set out in paragraph 21 to 56 of Mr Kaluski's affidavit of 27 November 2009. The initial orders on 13 June 2008 set a timetable which contemplated completed accounts by 1 August 2008. Due to the failure of the plaintiff to supply information to the accountant that did not happen and fresh orders expected the accounts to be completed by 26 September 2008. Once again this did not happen and there was further investigation needed including orders for filing of accounts for Clemelle Way Pty Limited in October 2008. The matter was supposed to have been ready by 5 February 2009 but this was not achieved. Over the next few months there were orders on three different occasions for the plaintiff to file further information. It was not until 14 May 2009 that that the evidence was complete and the matter set down for hearing.
22 The progress of the accounts indicates that time was taken to check and deal with what was put forward by the plaintiff s and it is also clear that there was a substantial delay on a number of occasions by the plaintiff preparing the initial accounting records.
23 So far as the success on the hearing before me this was summarised in submissions by the defendant in these terms by reference to the issues I have summarised in my judgment of 13 October 2009 at paragraph 14.
"Items 7 & 8 could not be dealt with on the last occasion and item 7 is now conceded by the plaintiffs.