Ground 2
97 The ground of appeal asserts that the IAA failed to consider and address a claim "that the psychological harm that may be experienced by the appellant, were he to attempt to live in Kabul, would of itself amount to persecution or significant harm".
98 As was submitted by the appellant, there were two factual premises.
99 The appellant submitted that the articulation by the primary judge at [30] of the first factual premise underlying the ground is incorrect in that it misconstrues the law. The submission continued that the use by the primary judge of the phrase "very likely" at [48], [49] and [52] of the reasons demonstrated that the primary judge misunderstood the statutory test for refugee criteria in s 5J(1)(c) of the Act. The appellant submitted that the test is whether there was a "real chance" of persecution or serious harm.
100 The claim used the words "very likely". It is not clear that the primary judge misunderstood the statutory test. The use of those words by the primary judge was consistent with him taking up the language used in the submission made by the appellant to specifically deal with that submission, rather than the primary judge intending to describe the statutory test. Use of these words does not establish that the primary judge misunderstood the statutory test.
101 The finding made by the IAA, which was that the chance or risk of harm was not a real chance, means that, even based on this test, the relevant threshold was not met.
102 Referring particularly to [118], the appellant also submitted that the IAA did not make a finding about whether the risk or exposure to violence and war-like events directed at his community was likely or very likely to occur or indeed not likely at all.
103 The appellant referred to [118] of the IAA's decision. The IAA reviewed the position against various factors. The paragraph concluded with a finding that "the chance or risk of harm to the appellant … would be credible, but remote and not a real chance".
104 In the context of the submission that there was no finding by the IAA about the likelihood of something happening, the conclusion was that there was "not a real chance". Those words plainly deal with likelihood. They are the words used in the Act. The submission put by the appellant is reading too finely into the IAA's decision in circumstances where the finding was that the chance of harm happening is remote and not a real chance.
105 In the context, particularly of the reasons read as a whole, that reference to risk must include psychological risk of harm and physical risk of harm. There is no confinement of the term risk to one or the other. The discussion is about risk of harm generally.
106 In relation to the first premise, the IAA (at [109]) acknowledged the systematic persecution of Shi'a Hazaras in the recent past (sourced from a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade "Thematic Report - Hazaras in Afghanistan", 8 February 2016), but noted that there had been a marked shift in the security environment within Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The IAA further noted that country advice indicated that the Taliban did not have an ethno-sectarian agenda as it had in the past. On the weight of the country advice, the IAA was not satisfied the Taliban was systematically targeting Shi'as or Hazaras in Afghanistan.
107 In [110] the IAA said: "I am not satisfied that ordinary Shia Hazaras are being targeted on the basis … that they are imputed with a profile that is anti-Taliban or pro-Government". In [111], the IAA found that "there is and would be no real chance of the [appellant] facing harm from the Taliban in Parwan, Kabul or elsewhere in Afghanistan, for reasons of his ethnic and religious profile, or on the basis of any related imputed profile, whether now or in the reasonably foreseeable future".
108 In contrast, at [112], the IAA noted that the ISKP did have a sectarian agenda. Particularly, the IAA noted that, through 2016 and 2018, there were significant risks to the Shi'a Hazara population in some parts of Afghanistan. However, the IAA concluded, based upon country information, that through 2019/2020, ISKP's impact, in terms of attacks against Shi'as and other targets, saw a substantial decrease.
109 Having regard to the most recent data and analysis, the IAA found that ISKP's capabilities had been reduced considerably and that the group was a diminished threat in Afghanistan, which was reflected in a substantial decrease in attacks claimed by the group through 2019 and 2020.
110 At [118], which was referred to by the appellant, the IAA concluded that, looking to the reasonably foreseeable future, the ISKP remained a credible, but diminished, threat to Shi'a Hazaras and that the group's ability to orchestrate attacks against Shi'as and Hazaras and other targeted groups had been substantially reduced through the country, including the capital, and that the Afghan security forces could continue to work to reduce the group's ability to operate in the country. The IAA concluded: "I consider that was the case through 2020, and I am satisfied this will be the case into the reasonably foreseeable future. I consider the chance or risk of harm to the [appellant], as a Shia Hazara, in Kabul would be credible, but remote and not a real chance".
111 At [160], the IAA confirmed its finding that the appellant "would not face a real chance of harm on the basis of his specific profile, his religious and ethnic profile, his mental health, or in terms of any profile related to his time in the west". The IAA concluded that the appellant would have no other risk profile and would not have proximity to other higher profile risks such as government workers. The IAA concluded: "I consider the [appellant] is very unlikely to have any proximity to violence in Kabul". It continued: "I do not consider the country information indicates that generalised violence in Kabul is at such a level where the [appellant] would face anything more than a very remote chance of harm if he were to return to live and work there".
112 Given the earlier reference to mental health in that paragraph and the context in which these comments are made (including the discussion on mental health as a risk profile) in [147]-[156], it seems clear that the reference to harm included psychological as well as physical harm.
113 Based upon the findings outlined above, the IAA also concluded that there was no real chance that the appellant would be exposed to violence and war-related events targeted at Shi'a Hazaras. The first premise was plainly considered by the IAA which, in the context of the submission, concluded it was not the case that, if returned to Kabul, the appellant would be likely to be exposed to violence and war-related events targeted at the Shi'a Hazara community (including himself). It follows that, even based upon the "real chance" test, the finding of the IAA was clearly that this threshold was not met.
114 The IAA also considered the ISKP at [193]. This paragraph has been referred to earlier in these reasons. As to Kabul, the IAA made the finding:
[I]n my assessment it is not a city paralysed by violence, war or the insurgency. As noted above, there are many countermeasures against the threat of violence. EASO notes that while indiscriminate violence is taking place in the city, it is not at a high level. UNAMA also documented a substantial decrease in violence in Kabul through 2020. And, perhaps most significantly, the one group (ISKP) posing a threat to the [appellant's] own profile and community in Kabul has been significantly reduced by Afghan military operations. I again note … that I have found the [appellant] would not face a real chance or risk of harm in terms of generalised violence in Kabul.
115 As mentioned earlier, the paragraphs preceding those observations referred to the consideration of insecurity in Kabul and impact upon the appellant's mental health and its potential to exacerbate his condition. Reference was made specifically to the report by Dr Oertel that, if the appellant were to return to Afghanistan, he would be exposed to further social violence and war-related events which will compound his existing psychological symptoms and thus exacerbate his conditions.
116 The analysis undertaken and the conclusions reached by the IAA were plainly against the background of the report by Dr Oertel and paragraph (2)(c).
117 As mentioned earlier in these reasons, this matter was referred to again in [194] in the context of the IAA balancing the various factors, including Dr Oertel's opinion and the submissions made, and reaching a conclusion.
118 This analysis is indicative of the matters being considered and addressed by the IAA. The conclusion reached by the IAA was open to it.
119 The IAA did not fail to consider the submission at (2)(c). Of course, the IAA did not find that the first premise was made out.
120 The primary judge was correct in the finding made (at [52]). In light of that finding, it was not necessary to consider specifically whether there was a real chance that attacks would cause the appellant psychological harm.
121 The second premise was that there was a real chance that attacks on Shi'a Hazaras in Kabul would, on the expert evidence provided, cause the appellant psychological harm.
122 The appellant asserted that the primary judge implied (in [49]) that attacks on the Shi'a Hazara community "will need to cause psychological harm to all members of the Shia Hazara community in Kabul" and that this is incorrect.
123 The decision of the primary judge focused upon the opinion provided by Dr Oertel's report at [36].
124 The report at [36] referred to the likelihood that, if the appellant were to return to Afghanistan, the appellant "will be exposed to further social violence and war-related events which will compound his existing psychological symptoms and thus exacerbating his features and associated features of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder".
125 This evidence is preceded by Dr Oertel opining that, if the appellant were to return to Afghanistan, "this would provide him constant stimuli or cues that symbolise and resemble his past traumatic experiences and consequently prolong and exacerbate his psychological symptoms".
126 At [54], the primary judge referred to these two aspects, namely:
(a) the constant stimuli; and
(b) exposure to further social violence and war-related events that would compound his psychological symptoms.
127 The second premise is framed as there is "a real chance that attacks on Shia Hazaras in Kabul would on the expert evidence provided, cause the appellant psychological harm".
128 The point being made by the primary judge at [54] was that the evidence from Dr Oertel dealt with (and was limited to) exposure to further social violence and war-related events with no mention as to whether that violence or those events involved attacks on Shi'a Hazaras. Hence, the primary judge saying: "The [appellant] is attempting to then put a third aspect on it: that if the [appellant] were to feel that he was targeted because he was a Shia Hazara at any generalised violence targeting Shia Hazaras, that that too would exacerbate his features and associated features of post-traumatic stress disorder". The primary judge continued (at [55]) that the appellant submitted that "as the IAA did not specifically speak of this particular aspect of persecution, there was a jurisdictional error".
129 The primary judge concluded that such a claim did not arise on the evidence, which was limited to those two aspects of constant stimuli and exposure to social violence and war-related events.
130 The appellant referred to an implication, as the appellant put it, that the primary judge concluded that attacks on the Shi'a Hazara community would need to cause psychological harm to all members of the Shi'a Hazara community in Kabul. This does not seem to be what the primary judge has concluded in the later paragraphs of the reasons. It was not a matter of whether the attacks would need to cause psychological harm to all members of the Shi'a Hazara community. Rather the primary judge's decision seems to have been based upon the fact that the appeal, resting on the reference to attacks on Shi'a Hazaras in Kabul and the possible psychological harm arising from those attacks, was not the subject of expert evidence specifically by Dr Oertel. Although a strict interpretation, the view taken by the primary judge as to the scope of the expert evidence is correct.
131 In any event, as observed earlier, there was no need, based upon the outcome of the consideration in relation to the first premise, to consider the second premise.