Construction - principles
14 In considering the appropriate approach to the construction of the claim, a useful starting point is the decision of the House of Lords in Catnic Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 (Catnic), where the House of Lords held that the word "vertical", in relation to a lintel of a box girder structure, should be read to cover a situation where the relevant member was 6 to 8 degrees off the vertical. Lord Diplock delivered the decision of the House and made a number of well-known observations. Relevantly, for present purposes, his Lordship said at 242- 243.
"… both parties to this appeal have tended to treat 'textual infringement' and infringement of the 'pith and marrow' of an invention as if they were separate causes of action, the existence of the former to be determined as a matter of construction only and of the latter upon some broader principle of colourable invasion. There is, in my view, no such dichotomy; there is but a single cause of action and to treat it otherwise, particularly in cases like that which is the subject of the instant appeal, is liable to lead to confusion.
The expression 'no textual infringement' has been borrowed from the speeches in this House in the hay-rake case, van der Lely v Bamfords, where it was used by several of their Lordships as a convenient way of saying that the word 'hindmost' as descriptive of rake wheels to be dismounted could not as a matter of linguistics mean 'foremost'; but this did not exhaust the question of construction of the specification that was determinative of whether there had been an infringement of the claim or not. It left open the question whether the patentee had made his reference to the 'hindmost' (rather than any other wheels) as those to be dismounted, an essential feature of the monopoly that he claimed. It was on this question that there was a division of opinion in this House and in the Court of Appeal in the hay-rack case.
My Lords, a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of his own choosing, addressed to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of his invention (ie. 'skilled in the art'), by which he informs them what he claims to be the essential features of the new product or process for which the letters patent grant him a monopoly. It is those novel features only that he claims to be essential that constitute the so-called 'pith and marrow' of the claim. A patent specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge. The question in each case is: whether persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon the way the invention worked.
The question, of course, does not arise where the variant would in fact have a material effect upon the way the invention worked. Nor does it arise unless at the date of publication of the specification it would be obvious to the informed reader that this was so. Where it was not obvious, in the light of then-existing knowledge, the reader is entitled to assume that the patentee thought at the time of the specification that he had good reason for limiting his monopoly so strictly and had intended to do so, even though subsequent work by him or others in the field of the invention might show the limitation to have been unnecessary. It is to be answered in the negative only when it would be apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended by the patentee, who was also skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants which, to the knowledge of both him and the readers to whom the patent was addressed, could have no material effect upon the way in which the invention worked." Emphasis added)
15 Catnic was considered and applied by Hoffman LJ in Improver Corporation v Remington Consumer Products Limited [1990] FSR 181 ("Improver"). His Lordship's approach to the application of the principles in Catnic is set out at 188-189 in the following terms:
"If the issue was whether a feature embodied in an alleged infringement which fell outside the primary, literal or acontextual meaning of a descriptive word or phrase in the claim ('a variant') was nevertheless within its language as properly interpreted, the court should ask itself the following three questions:
(1) Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If yes, the variant is outside the claim. If no -
(2) Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at the date of publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art. If no, the variant is outside the claim. If yes -
(3) Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning was an essential requirement of the invention. If yes, the variant is outside the claim."
16 The three questions posed by his Lordship have subsequently been applied in many cases where they are referred to as "the Improver questions". At 189, his Lordship noted that the question is always whether the alleged infringement is covered by the language of the claim, thereby emphasising the importance of the language as the Court's primary focus. At 190, his Lordship pointed out that the answers to the first two questions do not involve questions of construction. The answers to these questions are used to provide the factual background against which the specification must be construed and it is the third question which raises the question of construction. In his Lordship's view, even a purposive construction of the language may lead to a conclusion that, although the variant made no material difference, it would have been obvious that the patentee was confining the claim to the primary meaning in excluding the variant. Otherwise, there would be no point in asking the third question.
17 The status in Australia of thepurposive approach as formulated in Catnic is not settled.
18 In Populin v HB Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 41 ALR 471 at 475-7, the Full Federal Court affirmed the well-settled "pith and marrow" approach. However, in Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA & Anor v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd & Anor (1986) 12 FCR 477 (Rhone-Poulenc), the Full Federal Court did not draw any distinction between the "pith and marrow" approach and the approach taken in Catnic. Their Honours applied both approaches to reach their conclusion and did not analyse any differential application of the two approaches: see, for example, Lockhart J in Rhone-Poulenc at 498.
19 In Prestige (Australia) Group Pty Ltd v Dart (1990) 26 FCR 197 at 208-9, Gummow J expressed the view that the "purposive approach" had received an uneven reception in the Federal Court: see also Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd v Martin Engineering Co (1990) 91 ALR 513 at 528-9 and Rehm Pty Ltd v Websters Security Systems (International) Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 79 (Rehm). In Rehm, Gummow J stated that Catnic did not propound any novel principle or new category of "non-textual" infringement. At 92, he agreed that what is called for in the construction of claims is a common sense assessment of what the words used convey, in the context of the published knowledge at the priority date. The emphasis is on the language used to express the claim. It is the meaning of this language which must be ascertained.
20 In Olin Corporation Ltd v Super Cartridge Co Pty Ltd (1977) 180 CLR 236 at 246, Gibbs J accepted that the approach described by James LJ in Clark v Adie (1875) 10 Ch App 667 at 675 was good law. The statement of James LJ at that reference is as follows:
"The patent is for the entire combination, but there is, or may be, an essence or substance of the invention underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention, like every other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is a substantially new or different combination." (Emphasis added)
21 Justice Gibbs then went on to say:
" … However, as was pointed out in C Van Der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd [1963] RPC 61 at pp 78, 80, the principle that there may be infringement by taking the 'pith and marrow' or the substance of an invention does not mean that there will be an infringement where the patentee has by the form of his claim left open that which the alleged infringer has done. And it does not affect the fundamental rule that there will be no infringement unless the alleged infringer has taken all of the essential features or integers of the patentee's claim." (Emphasis added)
22 The respondents both rely on the qualification to the "pith and marrow" approach referred to by his Honour to support their submission that, in the present case, the patentee has, by the form of the claim, in selecting the adjective "concrete" as a criterion, left open the use of plastic spacers.
23 An overview of the patent construction principles is set out by Finkelstein J in Root Quality Pty Ltd v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd (2000) 177 ALR 231 at [27] ff (Root Quality). That case was concerned with a patent for a container suitable for growing plants which were later to be transplanted. His Honour considered that the "purposive" approach set out in Catnic had been adopted in Australia but that cases such as Populin implied that the "pith and marrow" approach can still have application. His Honour considered that the "pith and marrow" approach is no longer necessary where the Improver questions are posed and answered and proceeded to analyse the facts on the basis of those questions.
24 In Root Quality, his Honour warned that the Courts should act with care before broadening a claim by applying a purposive construction because elements of the claim which would not appear to be essential for the invention may nevertheless have been regarded by the patentee as essential for some reason that is not evident.
25 At [47], his Honour said:
"If the language of the claim is clear, then the meaning of that language cannot change by reference to what appears in the specification. But the words of the claim must be read in light of the specification as a whole and be given a meaning in that context. Once construed it is not permissible to extend or narrow the ambit of the claim by reference to the specification." (Emphasis added)
26 At [48], in relation to the use the Court may make of amendments to the specification, which is an important matter in this case, his Honour said:
"The approach that I will adopt is to consider the claim in its unamended form to discern what was intended and then to consider whether the meaning has changed following the amendments. Usually, the task of construction is best undertaken by taking the claim as it currently stands and ascertaining its meaning, having regard to the nature of any amendments made. In this case, for reasons which will become apparent, a different approach is called for." ((Emphasis added)
27 At [50], in relation to expert evidence, his Honour said:
"There will be cases, however, where expert evidence is not admissible on the question of construction. Sometimes the text of the specification will be couched in language with which all lawyers are familiar, containing no technical or trade terms calling for explanation. In that event the court of construction can determine for itself, unassisted by experts, the relevant meaning, as it does with any other instrument. In its unamended form the specification of the patent in suit falls into this category at least so far as concerns the issue presently under consideration."
28 In the present case, the respondents correctly submit that the word "concrete" is not a technical term. They submit that the Complete Specification is couched in words with which all lawyers are familiar and that these words should be given their natural meaning in the absence of any ambiguity. It is obvious that "concrete", whether used as an adjective or a noun, is not a word which is capable of including "plastic". The exercise in the present case is quite different from that undertaken in Catnic in relation to the word "vertical", which was clearly capable of being read differently depending on the experience and understanding of the practical reader. In Catnic, the expression was sufficiently ambiguous to include a member that was almost vertical so long as it provided sufficient support and strength to fulfil its purpose. In the present case, there is no such range or spectrum of permissible interpretation which could permit the word "concrete" to mean material other than concrete.
29 In Root Quality, Finkelstein J applied the Improver questions. In relation to the first question, his Honour thought it was evident that the variants would not affect the way in which the invention would facilitate the growth of the root ball in the desired fashion. On the second question, his Honour's conclusion was that it would have been obvious to a person who wanted to use the invention, namely, a horticulturist or nurseryman, that the variants did not have a material effect on the working of the invention. However, on the third question, particularly having regard to the amendments which had been made to the claim, his Honour reached the firm conclusion that the variants were not intended to be excluded from the claim, notwithstanding that they did not affect the working of the invention.
30 In Societe Technique de Pulverisation v Emson Europe Ltd & Ors [1993] RPC 513 at 522, Hoffman LJ, with whom Ralph Gibson and Leggatt LJJ agreed, rejected the evidence of witnesses as to the meaning of the expression "conduit means", saying:
"… one has to construe the language of the claim. The judge allowed counsel to ask the expert witnesses what they understood words like 'conduit means'. These are not technical words having a special trade meaning and in my judgment the opinions of witnesses on their meaning were inadmissible. Construction was a matter for the judge. 'Conduit' is in my view a word which expresses a function. It is not merely something through which liquid flows but of which at least one purpose is to convey liquid from one point to another, however close those points may be." (Emphasis added)
31 In that case, his Lordship applied the clear and unambiguous meaning of the expression "conduit means" and found that there was no infringement because the ring in question was not "conduit means". No such appeal can properly be applied when considering the meaning of "concrete spacer". It is a spacer made of concrete. It is not something which can bear another meaning.
32 In Kirin-Amgen v Hoeschst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46 (21 October 2004) (Kirin Amgen), Hoffman LJ sounded a caution as to the limitations on the use of the Improver questions as a formula for all cases, rather than as guidelines which will, in appropriate cases, help to determine how the skilled man would understand the patentee's intention. The limitations on the utility of the guidelines are most clearly illustrated by the complex pharmaceutical patent under consideration in Kirin-Amgen.
33 Lord Walker, with whom Hope LJ and Rodger LJ agreed, reinforced that qualification in the following terms:
"138 … I particularly welcome Lord Hoffman's detailed explanation of the real significance of the Improver (or protocol) questions … and how they fit in with recent developments in continental patents jurisprudence. There is always a danger that any judicial summary of principle may, precisely because it is concise, practical and repeatedly cited, take on a life of its own, as if it were a statutory text with its own problems of construction to be resolved ('the way the invention works' in the first question is a striking example of this).
139 The fact is that neither Catnic Components Ltd v Hill and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 nor Improver was concerned with anything approaching high-technology science Lord Hoffman has demonstrated that in a rapidly-developing, high-technology field the questions may have no useful function, and may be a distraction from the one compulsory question set by Article 69 and its protocol."
34 I do not consider that the reference to Article 69 in the above remarks diminishes the force of the observations made by their Lordships as to the limitations on the utility of the Improver questions and the making of a decision as to the type of case in which the questions are appropriate.
35 Lord Hoffman in Kirin-Amgen reaffirmed the purposive approach to the construction of patent claims. At [34] his Lordship points out that the reference is not to purpose in a vague generalised sense. Rather, Lord Diplock in Catnic was pointing out that a patentee may be taken to mean something different when he uses words for one purpose from what he would be taken to mean if he was using the words for another purpose. In the Catnic case itself, the question was what was meant by the word "vertical" and the distinction was between the meaning of the term "vertical" in a mathematical theory and the practical functional use of a lintel in the building trade.
36 In the present case, this question does not arise as the words "concrete spacer" are clear and unambiguous and do not admit of any definitional enlargement.
37 The principles relating to the construction of claims were recently considered and applied by Merkel J in PhotoCure ASA v Queen's University at Kingston [2005] FCA 344. At [168]-[175] and [195]-[208], his Honour carried out a comprehensive review of the relevant authorities. At the conclusion of this consideration, his Honour decided to consider the case on the basis of the Improver questions within the framework outlined by Lord Hoffman in Kirin-Amgen. His Honour was of the opinion that the first Improver question should be answered in the negative and accordingly proceeded to consider the second question, namely, the obviousness to a reader skilled in the art of the lack of material effect of the variant at the date of publication. His Honour concluded that the second question should be answered in the negative. In relation to the third Improver question, his Honour expressed the opinion that it may not be strictly necessary to address this question, as the answer to the second question has the consequence that, applying the purposive approach to the construction of the claims, there was no proper basis for concluding that the primary meanings of the phrases under consideration in the claims were not the intended meanings. In any event, his Honour considered that the answer to the third Improver question was that the reader skilled in the art would have understood that compliance with the primary meaning of the phrases was an essential requirement. As a consequence, his Honour dismissed the infringement claim.