right or the remedy, whether it deprives the Court of jurisdiction of, I would add, of power to make an order. That s48 applies to a limitation which conditions the existence of jurisdiction on an application made within a time prescribed is made clear by s48(2)(b)."

It seems to me that that case is authority for the proposition to which I have earlier referred, viz. that s48 may operate to extend a time limit even if jurisdiction to grant the extension of time has expired and even if the time limit is a element of the existence of the right. There is further confirmation of that in the following passage of Mason J at page 669: "Section 48(2)(b) confirms the impression that I gather from reading s47(1) and s48(1). They identify statutory provisions by reference to their effect in limiting the time in which proceedings may be brought; the two sub-sections do not otherwise refer to the character of the provisions or to the means by which the limitation operates to defeat the plaintiff's claim. It would be quite wrong to import into the two sub-sections a qualification, based on s48(2)(b), that the two sub-sections have no application to a limitation which operates by prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction except on an application made within the prescribed time, whilst conceding that they may apply to a limitation which conditions the existence of jurisdiction on such an application. Section 48(2)(b) does not extend the language of s.48(1). Section 48(2)(b) is designed to ensure that an extension of time may be granted, notwithstanding that otherwise the court may lack jurisdiction to make the

It follows expressly from General Motors Holdens v Di Fazio that even where a time limit is a condition of the grant of jurisdiction, or where the time limit operates as a condition of the right, s48 can operate to allow a court to extend time within which to bring these proceedings. That is why, in my opinion, it is not necessary to consider whether s54(7)(g)(ii) imposes a time limit which is an element in the right or a condition of the remedy.

44. It would follow that in my opinion a notice can be given pursuant to s54(7)(e) more than three years after the date of the trauma. The notice would need to specify an entitlement to recover compensation under s54(7) and to the extent of that entitlement would operate as a first charge on the damages payable by the wrong-doer to the injured party.

45. As to the extent of the entitlement that will be dependent upon the claimant establishing, as all claimants under this section must, that the injured party is entitled to charges from the wrong-doer. That means that a claimant would need to establish, if the proceedings are brought within time, that the wrong-doer is liable to the injured party at common law. Alsafe Industries v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (supra). If the proceedings are brought outside the three year period, the claimant would have to firstly establish that an order ought to be made extending time within which to bring proceedings, and secondly, the same matters that any claimant within time has to establish.

46. Whilst it would no doubt be said by wrong-doers that the result leaves them exposed to a potential charge upon moneys for an unknown amount, so also would they be so exposed if proceedings were brought within time. The charge at all times only operates to the extent of the wrong-doers obligations to the injured party.

47. The only circumstances contemplated in s54(7)(e) are circumstances where a wrong-doer has not paid to an injured party the damages which the wrong-doer would be obliged to pay to the injured party. It must be remembered that the injured wrong-doer also could obtain an extension of time to bring proceedings. I see nothing unfair in the result arrived at.

48. In those circumstances I would answer 1.1: A notice given by a claimant to a wrong-doer more than three years after the date of the trauma which gave rise to the compensation right, will give that claimant a first charge on damages payable by the wrong-doer to the injured party to the extent of the claimant's entitlement, which entitlement will depend inter alia on the claimant obtaining an order for an extension of time within which to bring the proceedings against the wrong-doer.

49. The answer to 1.2 flows from the answer already given. Each notice creates a first charge to the extent of the claimant's entitlement as already explained. I therefore propose that 1.3 be answered: Each notice of 30 September 1992 and each subsequent notice creates a first charge to the extent of the claimant's entitlement under s54(5) and s54(7).

50. I would thus answer the questions: 1.1 A notice given by a claimant to a wrong-doer more than three years after the date of the trauma which gave rise to the compensation right, will give that claimant a first charge on damages payable by the wrong-doer to the injured party to the extent of the claimant's entitlement, which entitlement will depend inter alia on the claimant obtaining

an order for an extension of time within which to bring the proceedings against the wrong-doer.

1.2 Each notice of 30 September 1992 and each subsequent notice creates a first charge to the extent of the claimant's entitlement under s54(5) and s54(7).